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Energies 2015, 8(12), 14197-14218; doi:10.3390/en81212419

Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market

1
School of Mechatronics Engineering and Automation, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200072, China
2
Ingram School of Engineering, Texas State University, San Marcos, TX 78666, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Ying-Yi Hong
Received: 14 October 2015 / Revised: 4 December 2015 / Accepted: 7 December 2015 / Published: 16 December 2015
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Electric Power Systems Research)
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [2231 KB, uploaded 16 December 2015]   |  

Abstract

This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism using an independent system operator (ISO) and multiple power generating companies (GenCos). Further, a Q-learning approach was implemented to analyze and assess the response of GenCos to the incentive menu. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract. View Full-Text
Keywords: stackelberg game; Q-learning; multi-agent simulation; electricity market; incentive mechanism stackelberg game; Q-learning; multi-agent simulation; electricity market; incentive mechanism
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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Yu, Y.; Jin, T.; Zhong, C. Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market. Energies 2015, 8, 14197-14218.

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