Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information
AbstractWe consider indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information. A game is offered between two players and accepted unless it is known that the other person is a defector. Whenever a defector manages to exploit a cooperator, his or her reputation is revealed to others in the population with some probability. Therefore, people have different private information about the reputation of others, which is a setting that is difficult to analyze in the theory of indirect reciprocity. Since a defector loses a fraction of his social ties each time he exploits a cooperator, he is less efficient at exploiting cooperators in subsequent rounds. We analytically calculate the critical benefit-to-cost ratio above which cooperation is successful in various settings. We demonstrate quantitative agreement with simulation results of a corresponding Wright–Fisher process with optional interactions and private information. We also deduce a simple necessary condition for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio. View Full-Text
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Olejarz, J.; Ghang, W.; Nowak, M.A. Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information. Games 2015, 6, 438-457.
Olejarz J, Ghang W, Nowak MA. Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information. Games. 2015; 6(4):438-457.Chicago/Turabian Style
Olejarz, Jason; Ghang, Whan; Nowak, Martin A. 2015. "Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information." Games 6, no. 4: 438-457.