Search Results (6)

In the current context of severe environmental challenges and climate change, the low-carbon green development model has become an international consensus. This study establishes a green supply chain duopoly competition model, considering two types of government subsidies and data-driven marketing (DDM) to help achieve supply chain development. The aim of the research is to explore how to provide green subsidies, enhance green levels, maintain competitive advantage, and improve profits in supply chain enterprises with inconsistent green levels. The study discusses the impact of green consumer preferences, market competition, and DDM quality on the profits of supply chain enterprises. It also analyzes how to use supply chain contracts to achieve coordination and optimization within the supply chain. The findings are summarized as follows. (1) As consumer preferences for green products increase, the unit subsidy model continues to enhance performance and market share more effectively than the total subsidy model. (2) The unit subsidy model requires a more relaxed subsidy coefficient, making it easier for enterprises to develop without needing high subsidies. It consistently achieves better total performance, particularly with improved DDM quality. (3) Manufacturers and retailers can achieve a win–win situation through internal coordination of the supply chain via wholesale price contracts. (4) Under certain conditions, consumers more sensitive to green products will increase the product pricing of both M1 and M2. The level of greenness of M2 will also increase. But also, the wholesale and retail prices of M1 will decrease because of the effect of DDM. (5) The effect of the intensity of market competition on pricing decisions is more complex. Under certain conditions, the market competition coefficient has a positive impact on the pricing of M1 and a negative impact on the pricing and green level of M2. This can be changed due to an increase in the level of DDM quality, where an increase in the market competition coefficient results in lower pricing for M1 and higher pricing for M2. The green level for M2 is also improved. In addition, the improvement in DDM quality consistently has a positive impact on pricing decisions and green levels for M2. Pricing decisions for M1 are affected differently, depending on the customer’s sensitivity to DDM. Full article

The development of international land–sea transport corridors has provided more convenient access to the sea for inland areas and promoted the improvement of transportation efficiency, environmental improvement, and the strengthening of international cooperation. However, the construction of international land–sea transport corridors has also intensified competition among the ports, which has extended from the local and regional to the national and even international levels. This paper explores the impact of international land–sea transport corridors on oligopolistic port competition between neighboring countries using the Hotelling model. By setting up the utility of the shipper’s port selection, the equilibrium price, market share, and profit of duopoly ports in neighboring countries are analyzed under different conditions of cross-border land transportation and maritime transportation. It is found that the high cross-border transportation cost of the international land–sea transport corridor is not conducive to increasing the market share of the overseas oligopolistic ports in the region. If the maritime transportation cost of overseas oligopoly ports is too high compared with domestic oligopoly ports, it will offset the land transport advantages brought by international land–sea transport corridors. The findings in this paper could provide support for strategic decision making in port markets and cross-border transport corridor development. Full article

This study seeks to address the question of whether China’s Western Development Strategy (WDS) has affected the carbon emission intensity of the regions it covers. There remains a distinct lack of analysis based on the normative causal inference method regarding the impact of this economic development policy on carbon emissions. Our research contributes to the large body of international literature studying the effects of place-based policy and has implications for place-based policies regarding the impact of carbon emissions. It constructs a duopoly model to illustrate the relationship between lower prices of capital (caused by policies such as tax reduction) and carbon emissions. Using county-level data on both sides of the provincial boundary of the WDS from 1998 to 2007, and applying the difference-in-differences method, our results indicate that the WDS has significantly increased carbon emission intensity of the western counties. Our findings also indicate that while the WDS has had no significant positive effect on counties’ economic growth, no policy trap effect was found. There is also no evidence suggesting that the economic activities attributable to the WDS have brought any negative externalities of carbon emissions to the counties east of the western provincial border. Full article

In this work, we consider a classic international trade model with two countries and one firm in each country. The game has two stages: in the first stage, the governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either: (a) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (b) cooperatively (social optimum); in the second stage, firms competitively choose (Nash) their home and export quantities under Cournot-type competition conditions. In a previous publication we compared the competitive tariffs with the cooperative tariffs and we showed that the game is one of the two following types: (i) prisoner’s dilemma (when the competitive welfare outcome is dominated by the cooperative welfare outcome); or (ii) a lose–win dilemma (an asymmetric situation where only one of the countries is damaged in the cooperative welfare outcome, whereas the other is benefited). In both scenarios, their aggregate cooperative welfare is larger than the aggregate competitive welfare. The lack of coincidence of competitive and cooperative tariffs is one of the main difficulties in international trade calling for the establishment of trade agreements. In this work, we propose a welfare-balanced trade agreement where: (i) the countries implement their cooperative tariffs and so increase their aggregate welfare from the competitive to the cooperative outcome; (ii) they redistribute the aggregate cooperative welfare according to their relative competitive welfare shares. We analyse the impact of such trade agreement in the relative shares of relevant economic quantities such as the firm’s profits, consumer surplus, and custom revenue. This analysis allows the countries to add other conditions to the agreement to mitigate the effects of high changes in these relative shares. Finally, we introduce the trade agreement index measuring the gains in the aggregate welfare of the two countries. In general, we observe that when the gains are higher, the relative shares also exhibit higher changes. Hence, higher gains demand additional caution in the construction of the trade agreement to safeguard the interests of the countries. Full article

Recently, the insurance industry in China has been greatly developed. The number of domestic insurance companies and foreign investment insurance companies has greatly increased. Competition between different insurance companies is becoming increasingly fierce. Grasping the internal competition law of different insurance companies is a very meaningful work. In this present work, we set up a novel fractional-order delayed duopoly game model in insurance market and discuss the dynamics including existence and uniqueness, non-negativeness, and boundedness of solution for the established fractional-order delayed duopoly game model in insurance market. By selecting the delay as a bifurcation parameter, we build a new delay-independent condition ensuring the stability and creation of Hopf bifurcation of the built fractional-order delayed duopoly game model. Making use of a suitable definite function, we explore the globally asymptotic stability of the involved fractional-order delayed duopoly game model. By virtue of hybrid controller which includes state feedback and parameter perturbation, we can effectively control the stability and the time of creation of Hopf bifurcation for the involved fractional-order delayed duopoly game model. The research indicates that time delay plays an all-important role in stabilizing the system and controlling the time of onset of Hopf bifurcation of the involved fractional-order delayed duopoly game model. To check the rationality of derived primary conclusions, Matlab simulation plots are explicitly presented. The established results in this manuscript are wholly novel and own immense theoretical guiding significance in managing and operating insurance companies. Full article

In a domestic market, a duopoly produces a homogeneous final good, pollution, pollution abatement, and R&D, which reduces abatement cost. One of the firms (foreign) has superior technology. The government regulates the duopoly by levying a pollution tax to maximize domestic welfare. We consider the potential implementation of three innovation agreements: cooperative research joint venture (RJV), non-cooperative RJV, and licensing. In the cooperative (non-cooperative) RJV, the firms (do not) internalize R&D spillovers. We show that, for the domestic firm, the cooperative RJV dominates, and licensing is the least desirable alternative. Although licensing is dominant for the foreign firm, it is not implementable. Both RJVs are implementable. Implementation of both types of RJVs improves the competitiveness of the domestic firm and welfare. This study yields an important policy prescription: a subsidy policy that induces the foreign firm to accept a feasible cooperative RJV when it strictly prefers a feasible non-cooperative RJV is always welfare improving. Full article