Search Results (3)

The promotion of energy conservation and emission reduction involves a multi-party game among governments, enterprises, and other stakeholders. To explore the game relationships among governments, the public, and coal-fired power enterprises under the “dual carbon targets”, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model for energy conservation and emission reduction involving three parties: the government, coal-fired power enterprises, and the public. Through a theoretical analysis and simulation analysis of the case study involving a central Hebei energy enterprise in China, the impact of parameter variations on the strategic choices of all parties and the evolutionarily stable strategies of the system is thoroughly discussed. The research findings indicate that reducing public supervision costs, increasing government rewards, subsidies, and penalties, and enhancing government regulatory capabilities are crucial factors in promoting energy-saving and emission-reduction efforts by coal-fired power enterprises. After multiple evolutionary iterations, the tripartite evolutionary game system ultimately reaches an evolutionarily stable state of government regulation, public supervision, and energy-saving and emission-reduction by coal-fired power enterprises at the point $E_8(\mathrm{1,1},1)$. Based on these findings, we propose a series of policy recommendations aimed at providing theoretical support for the Chinese government to achieve its energy-saving and emission-reduction strategies under the dual-carbon targets. These recommendations also offer practical guidance for the government in formulating emission reduction policies, for enterprises in optimizing their operational strategies, and for the public in participating in emission reduction efforts. Full article

In 2011, the Grassland Ecological Conservation Subsidy and Reward Policy (GECSRP) was implemented in China. The purpose of implementing the policy was to protect grassland ecosystems, secure the supply of livestock products, and increase the income of herders. Through quantitative research data collection methods, based on analysis and comparison of the effects of the GECSRP before and after its implementation in 2011 on grassland ecology, livestock production, and herder incomes on a national scale, this study summarized the effectiveness of the policy and main problems encountered during the policy implementation period and offered suggestions for optimizing the GECSRP. The results show that the GECSRP has been significantly effective in protecting grassland ecology, regulating livestock production, and safeguarding the livelihoods of pastoralists. Under the existing policies, low subsidy and reward standards caused an increase in the overgrazing rate, livestock production remained the main income source for herders, and a lack of technical support reduced forage and livestock quality, which subsequently reduced the income of herders. In conclusion, the existing policies can be improved by gradually enhancing evaluation standards, considering the balance between livestock grazing and grassland ecology, promoting industrialization of livestock products, and valuing the production skills of herders. Full article

Sustainable utilization of grassland resources was an important topic concerned by worldwide countries and regions, and ecological compensation had gradually become the main policy tool for grassland environmental management and ecological protection. This study adopted face-to-face interviews and questionnaires, and multiordered Logit model was then used to explore herdsmen’s satisfaction with Grassland Ecological Conservation Subsidy and Reward Policy (GECSRP) focusing on identifying the key factors behind it. Results showed that herdsmen were not satisfied with GECSRP on the whole, while value perception, environmental regulation and their interaction played a positive role on improving the satisfaction. Specifically, economic benefits had the strongest promotion impacts, followed by social identity in the two-dimensional variables of value perception. The guiding regulation had stronger promoting impacts, followed by the incentive regulation in the two-dimensional variables of environmental regulation. Interestingly, incentive regulation played an enhanced interaction on the influence of economic benefits and environmental value on herdsmen’s satisfaction, yet the interaction between guiding regulation and environmental value was not significant. These indicated that herdsmen paid more attention to substantial subsidies and rewards in the process of ecological livestock husbandry, and environmental regulation formulated by government had a phenomenon of “relative system failure”. Thus, the grassland ecological environment policy should be further adjusted and improved to promote the economic development of pastoral areas. Full article