Search Results (7)

A unifying setup for opinion models originating in statistical physics and stochastic opinion dynamics are developed and used to analyze election data. The results are interpreted in the light of political theory. We investigate the connection between Potts (Curie–Weiss) models and stochastic opinion models in the view of the Boltzmann distribution and stochastic Glauber dynamics. We particularly find that the q-voter model can be considered as a natural extension of the Zealot model, which is adapted by Lagrangian parameters. We also discuss weak and strong effects (also called extensive and nonextensive) continuum limits for the models. The results are used to compare the Curie–Weiss model, two q-voter models (weak and strong effects), and a reinforcement model (weak effects) in explaining electoral outcomes in four western democracies (United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany). We find that particularly the weak effects models are able to fit the data (Kolmogorov–Smirnov test) where the weak effects reinforcement model performs best (AIC). Additionally, we show how the institutional structure shapes the process of opinion formation. By focusing on the dynamics of opinion formation preceding the act of voting, the models discussed in this paper give insights both into the empirical explanation of elections as such, as well as important aspects of the theory of democracy. Therefore, this paper shows the usefulness of an interdisciplinary approach in studying real world political outcomes by using mathematical models. Full article

Most sociophysics opinion dynamics simulations assume that contacts between agents lead to greater similarity of opinions, and that there is a tendency for agents having similar opinions to group together. These mechanisms result, in many types of models, in significant polarization, understood as separation between groups of agents having conflicting opinions. The addition of inflexible agents (zealots) or mechanisms, which drive conflicting opinions even further apart, only exacerbates these polarizing processes. Using a universal mathematical framework, formulated in the language of utility functions, we present novel simulation results. They combine polarizing tendencies with mechanisms potentially favoring diverse, non-polarized environments. The simulations are aimed at answering the following question: How can non-polarized systems exist in stable configurations? The framework enables easy introduction, and study, of the effects of external “pro-diversity”, and its contribution to the utility function. Specific examples presented in this paper include an extension of the classic square geometry Ising-like model, in which agents modify their opinions, and a dynamic scale-free network system with two different mechanisms promoting local diversity, where agents modify the structure of the connecting network while keeping their opinions stable. Despite the differences between these models, they show fundamental similarities in results in terms of the existence of low temperature, stable, locally and globally diverse states, i.e., states in which agents with differing opinions remain closely linked. While these results do not answer the socially relevant question of how to combat the growing polarization observed in many modern democratic societies, they open a path towards modeling polarization diminishing activities. These, in turn, could act as guidance for implementing actual depolarization social strategies. Full article

Peter IV king of Aragón (1336–1387). He was the seventh king of the Crown of Aragon, and father of Juan I (1387–1396) and Martín I (1396–1410), the last members of the dynasty to take the throne. When Martín died, the Trastámara branch occupied the throne of the kingdom. Peter IV was dazzling in his ability to use art as a tool of authority and sovereignty. With the aim of exalting the dynasty, he patronised various enterprises, among the most important of which was the abbey of Santa Maria de Poblet, which he intended to be a burial place for himself and his successors, a wish that was fulfilled, without exception, down to Juan II, the predecessor of the Catholic Monarchs. A perfectionist and zealot, he endowed important religious events with profound political significance, and promoted works of great symbolism such as the genealogy of the new saló del tinell, or the ordinacions de la casa i cort, to which he added an appendix establishing how the kings of Aragon were to be crowned. Full article

This paper presents an attempt to systematically describe and interpret the evolution of different religious and political movements in Judaea during the period of the Second Temple using the methods of the theory of social networks. We extensively analyzed the relationship between the main Jewish sects: Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes (Qumranites), and later also Zealots. It is shown that the evolution of the relations between these sects agreed with the theory of social balance and their relations evolved toward more socially balanced structures. Full article

Cooperative vehicular networking has been widely studied in recent years. Existing evolution game theoretic approaches to study cooperative behavior in Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) are mainly based on the assumption that VANET is constructed as a homogeneous network. This modeling method only extracts part attributes of vehicles and does not distinguish the differences between strategy and attribute. In this paper, we focus on the heterogeneous network model based on the public goods game theory for VANET. Then we propose a Dynamic Altruism Public Goods Game (DAPGG) model consisting of rational nodes, altruistic nodes, and zealots to more realistically characterize the real VANET. Rational nodes only care about their own benefits, altruistic nodes comprehensively consider the payoffs in the neighborhood, while zealots insist on behaving cooperatively. Finally, we explore the impacts of these attributes on the evolution of cooperation under different network conditions. The simulation results show that only adding altruistic nodes can effectively improve the proportion of cooperators, but it may cause conflicts between individual benefits and neighborhood benefits. Altruistic nodes together with zealots can better improve the proportion of cooperators, even if the network conditions are not suitable for the spread of cooperative behavior. Full article

We study the q-voter model with flexibility, which allows for describing a broad spectrum of independence from zealots, inflexibility, or stubbornness through noisy voters to self-anticonformity. Analyzing the model within the pair approximation allows us to derive the analytical formula for the critical point, below which an ordered (agreement) phase is stable. We determine the role of flexibility, which can be understood as an amount of variability associated with an independent behavior, as well as the role of the average network degree in shaping the character of the phase transition. We check the existence of the scaling relation, which previously was derived for the Sznajd model. We show that the scaling is universal, in a sense that it does not depend neither on the size of the group of influence nor on the average network degree. Analyzing the model in terms of the rescaled parameter, we determine the critical point, the jump of the order parameter, as well as the width of the hysteresis as a function of the average network degree $⟨k⟩$ and the size of the group of influence q. Full article

In recent European animal welfare statutes, human actions injurious to animals are new “offences” articulated as an injury to societal norms in addition to property damage. A crime is foremost a violation of a community moral standard. Violating a societal norm puts society out of balance and justice is served when that balance is returned. Criminal law normally requires the presence of mens rea, or evil intent, a particular state of mind; however, dereliction of duties towards animals (or children) is usually described as being of varying levels of negligence but, rarely can be so egregious that it constitutes criminal societal injury. In instrumental justice, the “public goods” delivered by criminal law are commonly classified as retribution, incapacitation and general deterrence. Prevention is a small, if present, outcome of criminal justice. Quazi-criminal law intends to establish certain expected (moral) standards of human behavior where by statute, the obligations of one party to another are clearly articulated as strict liability. Although largely moral in nature, this class of laws focuses on achieving compliance, thereby resulting in prevention. For example, protecting the environment from degradation is a benefit to society; punishing non-compliance, as is the application of criminal law, will not prevent the injury. This paper will provide evidence that the integrated meat complex of Canada and the USA is not in a good position to make changes to implement a credible farm animal protection system. Full article