Special Issue

Strategy-Proof Mechanism Design

Message from the Guest Editors

Collective decision problems where agents hold private information are ubiquitous in economic environments. Mechanism design uses game theoretic tools to address such problems and strategy-proofness has emerged as a prominent one, since it embodies a robustness property wherein agents report their private information truthfully as a weakly dominant strategy. The study of strategy-proof social choice functions (deterministic and random) under restricted domains of preferences has proven to be instructive for a variety of collective decision problems such as public good provision, locating facilities on networks, division of nondisposable commodities, and the allocation of indivisible goods with or without monetary transfers, among others. This Special Issue of *Games* is devoted to research that enhances the theoretical underpinnings of this topic and expands its applicability.

Guest Editors

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