Special Issue

Applications of Game Theory to Industrial Organization

Message from the Guest Editors

This Special Issue aims to collect original, high-quality applications of game-theoretic methods to the broad field of industrial organization. A non-exhaustive list of these methods includes: dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, models with myopic, adaptive and farsighted players, behavioral games, cooperative and coalition formation games and network and information sharing games. Applications include, but are not limited to, collusion, horizontal and vertical differentiation, innovation, two-sided markets, markets with asymmetric information, vertical industries and monopolistic competition.

Keywords non-cooperative games

cooperative games imperfect competition asymmetric information vertical markets collusion differentiation innovation

two-sided markets

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Deadline for manuscript submissions

30 September 2025



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mdpi.com/si/135327

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