Special Issue

Advances in Contest Theory: Strategic Foundations and Mechanism Design

Message from the Guest Editor

This Special Issue aims to highlight state-of-the-art theoretical research in contest theory and mechanism design. We welcome papers that develop new models, extend existing frameworks, or explore novel applications within the theoretical domain. The scope of this Special Issue includes, but is not limited to, optimal prize allocation, endogenous entry, asymmetric ability or cost structures, multi-stage contests, contests with incomplete or asymmetric information, stochastic or dynamic environments, and contest design under budget or policy constraints. We also welcome theoretical studies that explore the connections between contests and broader areas in mechanism design, auction theory, or industrial organization. While this Special Issue focuses on theoretical contributions, we particularly encourage submissions that offer conceptual clarity, tractable modelling approaches, and potential relevance for applied researchers and policymakers. Our aim is to consolidate and showcase recent advances in contest theory, stimulate new lines of inquiry, and support the development of more robust and versatile contest-based mechanisms for both academic and practical purposes.

Guest Editor

Dr. Jun Zhang

Economics Discipline Group, School of Business, University of Technology Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2007, Australia

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Games
Editorial Office
MDPI, Grosspeteranlage 5
4052 Basel, Switzerland
Tel: +41 61 683 77 34
games@mdpi.com

mdpi.com/journal/ games





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Prof. Dr. Ulrich Berger

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