



Mechanism Design

Guest Editor:

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Deadline for manuscript
submissions:

closed (1 March 2013)

Message from the Guest Editor

Dear Colleagues,

In theory, mechanism design is an incredibly promising methodology within economics and game theory. In practice, however, its applicability is limited by our limited understanding of human behavior. Derived solutions to a given mechanism design problem depend crucially on the behavior rule or equilibrium concept assumed by the designer. To move this field toward real-world application, more focus must be placed on this assumption. With this special issue I am seeking papers that improve our understanding of how to design mechanisms for real-world use. This may include experiments on behavior, examples of mechanisms being implemented or tested in the field, novel theoretical work using "non-standard" behavior rules (Level-K, QRE, etc.), or any other papers that push mechanism design theory closer to field applications.

Dr. Paul J. Healy
Guest Editor

