



games



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Dynamics and Consistency of Individual Preferences in Strategic and Non-Strategic Decisions

Guest Editor:

Prof. Dr. Joachim Weimann

Otto-von-Guericke-University
Magdeburg, Universitätsplatz 2,
39106 Magdeburg, Germany

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Message from the Guest Editor

Both rational choice theory and many behavioral approaches implicitly assume that preferences are stable over time. This is an important assumption, in view of the fact that very few decisions are made only once. It is also important because, in experimental studies, decisions are usually made only at one point in time. Even if identical decisions are made several times in an experimental session, this is something different than if there is a longer time span between identical decision situations. Whether the assumption of stable preferences is justified is largely open, as there are very few experimental studies on this question to date. Equally open is the question of whether people behave consistently with regard to their preferences. If someone reveals in a gift-exchange game that he behaves reciprocally, can this behavior be expected in other games as well? Or are preferences situation-dependent? These and related questions will be covered in the present Special Issue.



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Special Issue