Modeling Foreign Influence with Game Theory

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Message from the Guest Editors

Dear Colleagues,

In our interconnected world, economic and political interests inevitably reach beyond national borders. Foreign influence activities are widespread and an integral part of international political economy, as well as a potentially important determinant of public policy choices and institutional developments in other sovereign countries.

This Special Issue of *Games* is devoted to studying foreign influence as a strategic choice, using game theory to model different foreign influence strategies and the choices among them. Some of the topics of interest include, but are not limited to, policy for aid deals, sanctions, regime interventions, interventions in foreign elections, interventions in civil war, peace-keeping operations, foreign lobbying and bribery, soft power interventions, foreign influence as a network phenomenon, and foreign intervention in cyberspace. We are interested in both game-theoretical as well as game-theoretically motivated empirical papers relating to the economics of foreign influence. We welcome authors with research on these topics to submit their contributions to this Special Issue of *Games*.

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