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## Biometric Presentation Attack Detection in Mobile Devices

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### Message from the Guest Editors

Dear Colleague,

Biometric authentication mechanisms in mobile phone applications come with vulnerabilities to presentation attacks (PAs), challenging the effectiveness of this technology. PAs refer to techniques that inhibit the intended operation of a biometric capture system, interfering with the acquisition of the true identity. An impersonation attack can occur when a malicious individual tries to unlock the phone of someone else. Biometric spoofs can be detected through accurate and robust presentation attack detection (PAD) algorithms. PAD modules classify biometric samples as either live (non-spoof) or fake (spoof). The specificity of the sensor in determining a live biometric—as opposed to a recording, picture, or another non-living spoof—is commonly known as liveness detection. The latest development is therefore a subset of the potential attacks that might be detected through PAD. Despite the significant attention given to the problem of face spoofing and fingerprint recognition, PAD systems still produce poor results, through either false alarms or poor usability, lacking generalized PAD methods performing robustly in a practical environment.



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**Special Issue**