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PQ-WB-KEM: White-Box ML-KEM-768 1.0
PQ-WB-KEM: Toward a White-Box Construction of ML-KEM-768 with Arithmetic Masking for M2M Communications - Mathematics (MDPI)
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Entry-determinacy witness: recover the whole Construction-B baked table set from its minimum determining entries, and measure Construction A's zero-read secret exposure, using this repository's own table builder. More...
Go to the source code of this file.
Classes | |
| class | table_extraction_witness._CountingArray |
| Array proxy that charges every indexed entry to a read budget. More... | |
| class | table_extraction_witness.ReadCountingTables |
| Baked-table view that counts every entry fetched by the extractor. More... | |
Namespaces | |
| namespace | table_extraction_witness |
Functions | |
| table_extraction_witness._bit_exact (a, b) | |
| Bit-exact comparison of two baked table sets. | |
| table_extraction_witness._build_encoding_sublayer (seed) | |
| Output-encoding sublayer: per factor two random Z_q bijections plus their two derived inverses. | |
| table_extraction_witness._invertibility_sweep (tabs, sh) | |
| Check that every nonzero index recovers the baked scalar: s0 = h0[x]*x^-1. | |
| table_extraction_witness._measure_determinacy_degree_baked (seed_a, seed_b) | |
| Measure Construction B's entry-determinacy degree d instead of asserting it. | |
| table_extraction_witness._secret_polys (seed) | |
| ML-KEM-768 secret: K polys, coefficients uniform over {-2..2} (the CBD support; the extraction budget is distribution-independent), in the NTT domain. | |
| table_extraction_witness._stored_bytes (tabs) | |
| Serialized footprint of one polynomial's baked table set. | |
| table_extraction_witness.extract_and_regenerate (view, gammas) | |
| Read the determining entries of each baked table and rebuild the full set. | |
| table_extraction_witness.main () | |
| Run the entry-determinacy witness on both constructions and write JSON. | |
Variables | |
| int | table_extraction_witness.ENC_INDEPENDENT_PER_FACTOR = 2 |
| int | table_extraction_witness.ENC_TABLES_PER_FACTOR = 4 |
| table_extraction_witness.m | |
| table_extraction_witness.reads | |
| int | table_extraction_witness.SEED = 42 |
| tuple | table_extraction_witness.SEEDS = (42, 1337, 20250714, 7, 99) |
| int | table_extraction_witness.Z_TRIALS = 1000 |
Entry-determinacy witness: recover the whole Construction-B baked table set from its minimum determining entries, and measure Construction A's zero-read secret exposure, using this repository's own table builder.
The entry-determinacy degree d of a table family is the minimum number of entries that determine the whole table. Construction B bakes h(x) = shat*x mod q, which is Z_q-linear, so d = 1: the entry at the unit index is the scalar itself and every other entry is a public multiple of it. The budget at which a table-access- bounded adversary attains advantage 1 is therefore M* = (independent secret scalars) x (bytes per entry), independent of the stored size S_tbl. This script witnesses that claim end to end: it reads the determining entries out of tables built by build_baked_tables(), regenerates the full set, checks bit-exactness over all 384 (component, polynomial) pairs and several seeds, and measures the success rate Z of the regenerated tables against base_mul_direct on fresh ciphertexts. Construction A is measured on the other side of the dichotomy: build_shared_table() takes no secret argument (d = 0, a public function), so the secret is never in the table and the extractor needs zero table reads – it is the plain sh argument of base_mul_shared.
expected_targets, never as emitted quantities.results/table_extraction_witness.json - Entry-determinacy witness, regeneration and ZDefinition in file table_extraction_witness.py.