PQ-WB-KEM: White-Box ML-KEM-768 1.0
PQ-WB-KEM: Toward a White-Box Construction of ML-KEM-768 with Arithmetic Masking for M2M Communications - Mathematics (MDPI)
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Security Analysis

Security verification and attack analysis modules. More...

+ Collaboration diagram for Security Analysis:

Modules

 Algebraic Attack Analysis
 BGE-style attack analysis for lattice cryptography.
 
 Concrete Security Bounds
 Bit-security and concrete security calculations.
 
 DCA Simulation
 Differential Computation Analysis simulation.
 

Files

file  algebraic_attack_analysis.py
 Algebraic attack resistance analysis for white-box ML-KEM.
 
file  concrete_security_bounds.py
 Engineering security-estimate calculator for white-box ML-KEM-768.
 
file  dca_simulation.py
 DCA attack simulation against unmasked and n-share masked ML-KEM.
 
file  entry_determinacy.py
 Entry-determinacy dichotomy for the white-box ML-KEM-768 table families: measures the entry-determinacy degree d and the minimal table-access budget M* at which an access-pattern-oblivious, table-access-bounded adversary attains Z=1.
 

Detailed Description

Security verification and attack analysis modules.

This group contains scripts for analyzing the security properties of the white-box implementation, including DCA simulation, algebraic attack analysis, and concrete security bound calculations.

Security Framework

Against the full white-box adversary the construction provides no key confidentiality: the base multiply forms the clear product coordinates before masking, and these yield linear equations for the secret. Two properties are delivered, each scoped to a strictly weaker adversary:

Placed against the DLPR hierarchy, neither incompressibility notion is attained. Strong incompressibility is proven impossible for key-fixing encryption; the weak notion (space-hardness) fails by measurement, since 1,536 bytes of table reads regenerate the Construction-B baked set bit-exactly and Construction A needs no table read at all (entry_determinacy.json, table_extraction_witness.json). One-wayness of the underlying KEM is inherited from ML-KEM-768 IND-CCA2 and is a black-box property, not a white-box guarantee.

Attack Analysis Types

Attack Type Module Resistance
DCA (1st order) dca_simulation Resistant
DCA (2nd order) dca_simulation Resistant
DCA (3rd order) dca_simulation Vulnerable
BGE algebraic algebraic_attack_analysis Mitigated
Division timing overhead_calculation No leak in the protected base multiply
Table extraction table_extraction_witness Vulnerable (1,536 B for B, 0 B for A)