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PQ-WB-KEM: White-Box ML-KEM-768 1.0
PQ-WB-KEM: Toward a White-Box Construction of ML-KEM-768 with Arithmetic Masking for M2M Communications - Mathematics (MDPI)
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Security verification and attack analysis modules. More...
Collaboration diagram for Security Analysis:Modules | |
| Algebraic Attack Analysis | |
| BGE-style attack analysis for lattice cryptography. | |
| Concrete Security Bounds | |
| Bit-security and concrete security calculations. | |
| DCA Simulation | |
| Differential Computation Analysis simulation. | |
Files | |
| file | algebraic_attack_analysis.py |
| Algebraic attack resistance analysis for white-box ML-KEM. | |
| file | concrete_security_bounds.py |
| Engineering security-estimate calculator for white-box ML-KEM-768. | |
| file | dca_simulation.py |
| DCA attack simulation against unmasked and n-share masked ML-KEM. | |
| file | entry_determinacy.py |
| Entry-determinacy dichotomy for the white-box ML-KEM-768 table families: measures the entry-determinacy degree d and the minimal table-access budget M* at which an access-pattern-oblivious, table-access-bounded adversary attains Z=1. | |
Security verification and attack analysis modules.
This group contains scripts for analyzing the security properties of the white-box implementation, including DCA simulation, algebraic attack analysis, and concrete security bound calculations.
Against the full white-box adversary the construction provides no key confidentiality: the base multiply forms the clear product coordinates before masking, and these yield linear equations for the secret. Two properties are delivered, each scoped to a strictly weaker adversary:
Placed against the DLPR hierarchy, neither incompressibility notion is attained. Strong incompressibility is proven impossible for key-fixing encryption; the weak notion (space-hardness) fails by measurement, since 1,536 bytes of table reads regenerate the Construction-B baked set bit-exactly and Construction A needs no table read at all (entry_determinacy.json, table_extraction_witness.json). One-wayness of the underlying KEM is inherited from ML-KEM-768 IND-CCA2 and is a black-box property, not a white-box guarantee.
| Attack Type | Module | Resistance |
|---|---|---|
| DCA (1st order) | dca_simulation | Resistant |
| DCA (2nd order) | dca_simulation | Resistant |
| DCA (3rd order) | dca_simulation | Vulnerable |
| BGE algebraic | algebraic_attack_analysis | Mitigated |
| Division timing | overhead_calculation | No leak in the protected base multiply |
| Table extraction | table_extraction_witness | Vulnerable (1,536 B for B, 0 B for A) |