PQ-WB-KEM: White-Box ML-KEM-768 1.0
PQ-WB-KEM: Toward a White-Box Construction of ML-KEM-768 with Arithmetic Masking for M2M Communications - Mathematics (MDPI)
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DCA Simulation

Differential Computation Analysis simulation.

+ Collaboration diagram for DCA Simulation:

Differential Computation Analysis simulation.

Simulates DCA attacks to verify the effectiveness of arithmetic masking. Measures correlation coefficients between intermediate values and key hypotheses.

Leakage Model

The Hamming weight leakage model is used:

\[ L(x) = HW(x) + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2) \]

where HW(x) counts the number of 1-bits in the 12-bit representation of x mod q.

Simulation Results

rho_max is the correct-key correlation; the maximum over the wrong-key hypotheses is 0.031, itself within the null noise band.

Implementation Traces rho_max Attack
Unmasked 1,000 0.866 Success
Unmasked 10,000 0.853 Success
3-Share Masked 1,000 0.031 Fail
3-Share Masked 5,000 0.005 Fail
3-Share Masked 10,000 0.011 Fail

The masked correct-key correlations are non-monotone because all three are sampling-noise-floor values (~1/sqrt(N)) rather than a decaying signal.

Security Threshold

The operative criterion is that the correct-key correlation rise above the wrong-key spread. At 10,000 traces it does not: the correct-key rho_max = 0.011 sits below the 0.031 wrong-key maximum, about 1.1x the 1/sqrt(N) = 0.01 sampling-noise floor, so no first-order leakage is detectable and the attack fails. The boolean resistant field of dca_simulation.json applies the stricter naive rho_max < 0.01 floor test, which 0.011 marginally exceeds; the wrong-key comparison is what determines the outcome. These figures characterize the masked share intermediates under a gray-box Hamming-weight model, not the whole program: the clear product coordinate formed before masking still leaks at the unmasked ~0.85 level.