

Quantum-Resistant Encryption for IoT Communication in Critical Engineering Infrastructure [†]

Wai Yie Leong 

Faculty of Engineering and Quantity Surveying, INTI International University, Nilai 71800, Malaysia;
waiyie.leong@newinti.edu.my

[†] Presented at the 7th Eurasia Conference on IoT, Communication and Engineering 2025 (ECICE 2025),
Yunlin, Taiwan, 14–16 November 2025.

Abstract

The growing interconnection of critical engineering infrastructure through IoT introduces unprecedented exposure to cyber threats. Emerging quantum computing capabilities pose a transformative risk to classical cryptographic primitives such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography, which underpin secure communication and device authentication in industrial control systems, power grids, transportation networks, and healthcare infrastructure. This paper investigates quantum-resistant encryption, often termed post-quantum cryptography (PQC), as a sustainable security paradigm for IoT communication within critical systems. By analyzing lattice-based, code-based, multivariate, and hash-based schemes, the study evaluates trade-offs between computational cost, memory footprint, and latency constraints intrinsic to resource-limited IoT nodes. A hybrid architectural framework integrating the National Institute of Standards and Technology-standardized algorithms (e.g., Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices—Kyber, Dilithium) with lightweight symmetric primitives (e.g., Ascon, GIFT block cipher in Combined Feedback mode) is proposed for secure data transmission across heterogeneous IoT layers. Experimental simulations benchmark key-exchange throughput, ciphertext expansion, and resilience against quantum-adversarial models, demonstrating up to 65% reduction in handshake latency compared to baseline lattice implementations under constrained conditions. The paper concludes with policy and engineering recommendations for the adoption of quantum-resistant IoT protocols in energy, transportation, and industrial automation sectors, highlighting alignment with global PQC migration roadmaps and IEC 62443 cybersecurity standards.

Keywords: IoT; cybersecurity; infrastructure; AI



Academic Editors: Teen-Hang Meen,
Chi-Ting Ho and Cheng-Fu Yang

Published: 22 April 2026

Copyright: © 2026 by the author.

Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the [Creative Commons Attribution \(CC BY\)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) license.

1. Introduction

Critical engineering infrastructures—such as power transmission grids, smart transportation systems, and oil and gas monitoring networks—rely increasingly on IoT devices for real-time telemetry, condition monitoring, and control [1,2]. These embedded devices, often connected via heterogeneous networks, employ public-key cryptography protocols such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA)-2048 or Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC)-256 for secure communication. However, with the rapid progression of quantum computing, these traditional cryptosystems are projected to be vulnerable to polynomial-time attacks using algorithms like Shor’s and Grover’s, which can efficiently factor large integers and compute discrete logarithms [3].

The quantum threat horizon, estimated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to emerge within the next 10–15 years, necessitates proactive migration toward quantum-resistant encryption algorithms [4]. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) research aims to design schemes resilient against both classical and quantum adversaries, without reliance on quantum hardware. In the IoT context, this challenge is magnified by constrained CPU, memory, and power budgets that complicate direct deployment of computationally intensive post-quantum schemes [5].

In industrial IoT (IIoT) and cyber-physical systems, security protocols such as Transport Layer Security version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) or Datagram Transport Layer Security depend on elliptic-curve key exchange and digital signatures [6]. Once large-scale quantum computers become operational, Shor's algorithm could break ECC within seconds, exposing critical infrastructures to eavesdropping, spoofing, and manipulation [7]. Attackers could exploit "harvest-now, decrypt-later" strategies—capturing encrypted traffic today to decrypt retrospectively once quantum capabilities mature [8].

Hence, IoT systems used in energy grids, water treatment facilities, and transportation networks must transition toward encryption algorithms offering quantum-computational hardness. Candidate families under NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project include lattice-based (Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices—Kyber, SABER), code-based (Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation (BIKE), Classic McEliece), multi-variate quadratic (Rainbow), and hash-based (SPHINCS+) approaches [9]. Among these, lattice-based approaches show favorable performance on embedded microcontrollers due to moderate key sizes and efficient polynomial arithmetic [10].

The integration of PQC in IoT ecosystems is non-trivial. Critical infrastructures often deploy legacy control units, wireless sensor networks, and edge gateways that operate with firmware designed around classical cryptographic libraries [11]. Migrating to PQC must therefore preserve backward compatibility, scalability, and minimal overhead. Recent studies propose hybrid cryptographic frameworks combining PQC key exchange with classical symmetric ciphers such as Advanced Encryption Standard–Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) or lightweight alternatives like Ascon, recently standardized by NIST for constrained environments [12]. Moreover, to achieve resilience and compliance with industrial cybersecurity standards (e.g., International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 62443-4-2 and International Organization for Standardization (ISO)/IEC 30141 [13]), IoT systems must integrate quantum-resistant encryption into their secure-by-design architecture. This includes secure boot, firmware signing, key management, and remote attestation [14]. The convergence of PQC with hardware-based trust anchors (e.g., Trusted Platform Module version 2.0, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), or secure elements) offers a promising path for end-to-end protection [15].

This study aims to investigate the design, implementation, and evaluation of quantum-resistant encryption mechanisms tailored for IoT communication in critical engineering infrastructures. Its main contributions are the evaluation of PQC algorithms (lattice-, code-, and hash-based) for constrained IoT devices under latency, energy, and throughput metrics. Development of a hybrid PQC framework integrating CRYSTALS-Kyber with Ascon authenticated encryption for low-power embedded systems. Simulation and experimental validation use microcontroller benchmarks (Advanced RISC Machine Cortex-M4 (ARM Cortex-M4), Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC)-V) to quantify communication overheads and quantum-attack resilience. Through this research, we aim to bridge the existing gap between academic post-quantum cryptography and practical industrial IoT security deployments, contributing toward the global transition to quantum-resilient critical systems.

2. Literature Review

Predictive maintenance represents an evolution from the reactive and preventive strategies traditionally employed in infrastructure management. The dependence of modern secure communications on public-key cryptography—particularly RSA and ECC—forms the cornerstone of authentication and confidentiality across all IIoT infrastructures. These asymmetric primitives rely on mathematical problems such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms, which are computationally infeasible for classical computers to solve within practical timeframes. However, the advent of quantum computing radically changes this paradigm. Shor’s algorithm, proven to factor large integers in polynomial time, directly undermines the security foundations of both RSA and ECC [1].

In a large-scale quantum environment, the effective bit security of RSA-2048 and ECC-256 collapses to fewer than 30 bits, rendering them breakable within seconds once a universal quantum computer with thousands of logical qubits is realized. This threat has motivated the global PQC standardization initiative led by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [3–5]. NIST’s PQC project formalizes evaluation criteria, including mathematical soundness, implementation efficiency, and resistance to both classical and quantum attacks. The third-round finalists—Kyber, SABER, BIKE, Classic McEliece, SPHINCS+, and Dilithium—represent distinct hardness assumptions and provide potential replacements for RSA and ECC in public-key infrastructures.

Importantly, this quantum threat intersects critically with cyber-physical infrastructure, where IoT gateways, field sensors, and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) still employ legacy TLS 1.2 or 1.3 handshakes using ECC-based key exchange [2]. A “harvest-now, decrypt-later” adversary can record encrypted traffic and later decrypt it once quantum resources mature [6]. Consequently, the entire communication chain of energy, transport, and manufacturing systems must migrate to quantum-resistant cryptography well before large-scale quantum hardware becomes commercially viable.

PQC proposals are categorized by their mathematical underpinnings: lattice-based, code-based, multivariate, and hash-based cryptography. Each class exhibits unique security assumptions, key-size characteristics, and performance implications for IoT devices with constrained resources [4,5]. Lattice-based cryptography leverages the hardness of problems such as the learning with errors (LWE) or Module-LWE, believed to resist both classical and quantum attacks. The CRYSTALS-Kyber key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and CRYSTALS-Dilithium digital-signature scheme—both selected by NIST for standardization in 2024—offer polynomial-time algorithms suitable for constrained environments [7]. Kyber provides compact public keys (up to 800 bytes) and efficient polynomial-ring arithmetic, enabling implementation on 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 devices. Empirical studies demonstrate energy consumption per key exchange under 5 mJ on embedded microcontrollers, making it a leading candidate for IIoT deployment. While lattice-based primitives impose greater computational overhead than ECC, they are comparatively less memory-intensive than code-based alternatives. Hardware co-processing and vectorized polynomial multiplication have further reduced latency by up to 40% in recent embedded implementations [7].

Code-based systems—such as Classic McEliece and BIKE—derive security from the intractability of decoding random linear codes [4,5]. They exhibit decades of cryptanalytic stability but require megabyte-scale public keys, which exceed the flash storage capacity of most IoT devices. Although suitable for high-end gateways, code-based PQC remains impractical for deeply embedded nodes in critical infrastructure monitoring (e.g., transformer sensors, smart meters). Researchers therefore advocate a hybrid adoption: lattice-based algorithms for constrained endpoints and code-based variants for backbone gateways [10,11].

Hash-based digital-signature schemes such as SPHINCS+ ensure quantum-resilient authentication using only collision-resistant hash functions [5]. Their stateless design and simplicity align well with firmware-signing applications in critical infrastructure, where signature generation occurs infrequently. Multivariate-quadratic systems (e.g., Rainbow) once offered competitive performance but suffered key-recovery vulnerabilities discovered during NIST's second-round analysis [4]. Consequently, current industrial migration efforts focus primarily on lattice- and hash-based primitives.

IoT networks in industrial control systems demand ultra-low-power encryption. While PQC provides quantum resilience, its computational intensity must be mitigated through lightweight symmetric encryption. The Ascon algorithm family, standardized by NIST in 2023 [8,9,14], offers authenticated encryption and hashing with a minimal hardware footprint (≈ 2.6 k gate equivalents). Integrating Ascon with Kyber in hybrid protocols enables secure and energy-efficient end-to-end communication. A representative hybrid handshake operates as follows: the device performs a Kyber-based key exchange to derive a session key and subsequently uses Ascon-128a for symmetric encryption. Such a configuration balances quantum resistance, speed, and energy efficiency—achieving message authentication and confidentiality under IoT timing constraints. Benchmarking on ARM Cortex-M33 microcontrollers indicates Ascon's encryption throughput of 24 Mbps with only 3 μ J/byte energy use [8,9]. Lightweight cryptography (LWC) complements PQC by securing data streams between IoT nodes once quantum-resilient session keys are established. Research continues to explore combined architectures where PQC + LWC form a dual-layer security model—one handling key establishment (quantum-resistant) and the other providing fast authenticated encryption (resource-efficient).

Critical infrastructure IoT deployments exhibit distinctive security challenges that complicate PQC integration [10–12]. Considering legacy devices and firmware lock-in, many industrial controllers operate for 15–25 years without firmware updates. Resource constraints, limited flash (<512 kB), and random access memory (RAM) (<64 kB) hinder the implementation of large key or signature structures. Real-time performance requirements, sub-millisecond deterministic response times are mandatory for process control loops. Interoperability with standards and migration must remain compatible with IEC 62443-4-2 security requirements [15] and industrial protocols such as Modbus/Transmission Control Protocol and Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture. Regulatory compliance and certification, safety-critical sectors, must satisfy cybersecurity certifications, requiring formal assurance of PQC implementations. These limitations necessitate architectural innovation beyond simple algorithm replacement. Studies propose tiered PQC integration, where constrained devices rely on lightweight hybrid schemes, while more capable edge gateways perform cryptographic translation and certification [10,12].

Table 1 summarizes comparative parameters for the most promising PQC algorithms in constrained-device contexts, while Figure 1 illustrates the layered Quantum-Resistant IoT Encryption Stack integrating PQC, lightweight symmetric encryption, and hardware trust anchors.

Table 1. Comparison of major post-quantum algorithms for IoT applications.

Algorithm	Type	Public Key Size (Bytes)	Ciphertext/Signature (Bytes)	Security Level (bits)	Typical Handshake Latency (ms, ARM M4)	Suitability for IoT
Kyber-512	Lattice (KEM)	800	768	128	3.5	High
SABER	Lattice (KEM)	992	1088	128	4.0	High
Dilithium-II	Lattice (Signature)	1312	2420	128	6.2	Medium
Classic McEliece	Code (KEM)	261,120	128	256	>200	Low

Table 1. Cont.

Algorithm	Type	Public Key Size (Bytes)	Ciphertext/Signature (Bytes)	Security Level (bits)	Typical Handshake Latency (ms, ARM M4)	Suitability for IoT
BIKE-1 Level 1	Code (KEM)	12,803	1578	128	9.3	Medium
SPHINCS+-SHA2-128s	Hash (Signature)	32	7856	128	5.8	High
Rainbow Ia	Multivariate (Signature)	66 k	66 k	128	— (vulnerable)	Discarded




Figure 1. Quantum-resistant IoT encryption stack.

In Figure 1, a five-layer schematic architecture comprises the following.

- Device and sensing layer: Embedded controllers with PUF-based identity seeds [16];
- Edge security layer: PQC key exchange (Kyber/SABER) + Ascon authenticated encryption [7–9];
- Network and transport layer: Hybrid TLS 1.3 handshake supporting PQC + Elliptic-Curve Diffie–Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) [2];
- Application layer: PQC-aware Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT)/Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) communication with crypto-agile libraries [10–12];
- Governance layer: IEC 62443/ISO 30141 compliance and key-management policies [15].

This layered approach ensures that even if a classical algorithm is compromised, session-key and identity protection persist through the quantum-resistant layer.

The reviewed literature confirms that quantum-resistant encryption represents the next critical evolution in industrial IoT security. While NIST’s standardization of Kyber, Dilithium, and Ascon provides mature algorithmic foundations [5–9], translating these into

real-time, resource-constrained environments demands further multidisciplinary effort. Integrating PQC with lightweight cryptography and hardware trust anchors offers a viable pathway for secure communication within power, transport, and manufacturing systems. However, achieving scalability, interoperability, and compliance across heterogeneous legacy infrastructures remains an open challenge that the subsequent methodology section will address.

3. Methodology

In this study, a design-science research approach is applied to engineer, evaluate, and optimize a hybrid quantum-resistant encryption architecture tailored for resource-constrained IoT environments deployed in critical engineering infrastructures. The framework integrates PQC algorithms for key establishment with LWC for data confidentiality, anchored by hardware-rooted trust primitives such as PUFs [7–9,16]. The research design consists of five sequential stages.

- Requirements: Security, performance, and compliance criteria were extracted from the IEC 62443-4-2 and ISO/IEC 30141 standards [15];
- Algorithm selection: Candidate PQC and LWC schemes were shortlisted based on NIST PQC reports [4–6];
- Hybrid protocol architecture: Integration of PQC + LWC + PUF layers into an IoT communication stack (Figure 1);
- Prototype implementation: Embedded firmware development using ARM Cortex-M33 and RISC-V microcontrollers;
- Evaluation and validation: Benchmarking under latency, power, and throughput metrics; security analysis via simulated quantum adversary models.

The specifications in Table 2 informed the architectural modeling and evaluation thresholds discussed below. Algorithms were evaluated on the basis of security level: $\geq$ NIST Level 1 (128-bit classical/quantum). Key and ciphertext size impact on the IoT memory footprint. Computation latency and energy were measured in cycles/byte and mJ/handshake. Implementation maturity shows the availability of open-source C implementations. The standardization status was aligned with NIST's finalized standards (Module Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM), Module Lattice-based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA), and Stateless Hash-based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA) [6]).

Table 2. Requirement definition for quantum-resistant IoT systems.

Constraint Category	Representative Requirement	Source
Real-time operation	≤ 5 ms encryption latency per message; deterministic response	IEC 62443-4-2
Memory footprint	< 256 kB Flash/ 64 kB RAM	Field controller specs
Power consumption	< 10 mJ per handshake; battery operation > 1 year	IIoT node profiles
Quantum resilience	Security $\geq$ 128-bit against LWE/Grover attacks	NIST IR 8413 [5]
Interoperability	Backward-compatible with TLS 1.3, MQTT, CoAP	IETF RFC 8446 [2]
Governance compliance	IEC 62443 and ISO 30141 policies enforced	[15]

The chosen primitives include the following.

- PQC layer: CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM-768) for key encapsulation [7];
- Signature layer: Dilithium (ML-DSA-768) for device authentication [7];
- Symmetric layer: Ascon-128a authenticated encryption [8,9];
- Hardware trust: Arbiter PUF (64-bit Challenge–Response Pair (CRP)) for unique key derivation [16,17].

This combination ensures quantum resistance, authenticated key exchange, and low computational overhead suitable for embedded devices. The architecture (Figure 2) expands upon Figure 1 and comprises five integrated layers with defined cryptographic and operational functions.




Figure 2. Hybrid PQC–LWC–PUF architecture for IoT systems.

- Device and sensing layer: Embedded MCUs generate PUF-derived entropy to seed Kyber keypairs. Local Ascon-protected data buffers collect telemetry (sensor status, voltage, temperature);
 - Edge security layer: Edge gateways aggregate data and perform Kyber KEM handshakes with central servers. Session keys rotate every 100 transactions to minimize harvest-now/decrypt-later risk [6];
 - Network and transport layer: Implements Hybrid TLS 1.3 (PQC + ECDHE) with server certificate signed using Dilithium [2]. Session key negotiation uses Kyber for KEM and AES-GCM fallback for legacy devices;
 - Application layer: PQC-aware MQTT/CoAP protocols with crypto-agile libraries [10–12]. APIs for secure remote firmware updates signed via Dilithium signature verification;
 - Governance layer: Security monitoring dashboard enforcing IEC 62443/ISO 30141 compliance [15]. Policy engine logs key rotation, firmware signing, and audit events.
- The hybrid PQC-TLS protocol integrates Kyber-768 into TLS 1.3 key-exchange routines [2,7].
- Client Hello: Client announces PQC support (kyber768+ecdhe_secp256r1);
 - Server Hello: Server responds with Kyber public key and ECDHE parameters;
 - Client Key Exchange: Client encapsulates shared secret via Kyber ciphertext;

- Server Decrypt: Server decapsulates to recover shared secret;
- Symmetric Phase: Both sides derive Ascon-128a session key = HKDF(Shared Secret).

This hybrid model provides backward compatibility for devices that only support ECDHE while introducing forward-secure quantum resilience.

Equation (1) formalizes the shared-key derivation.

$$K_{\text{session}} = \text{HKDF}(\text{SHA3-256}, K_{\text{Kyber}} \parallel K_{\text{ECDHE}}, \text{nonce}) \quad (1)$$

Each IoT node incorporates a 64-stage Arbiter PUF generating 128-bit responses. During enrollment, 10,000 challenge-response pairs (CRPs) are sampled and digitally signed by the manufacturer [16,17]. A fuzzy extractor reconstructs stable keys from noisy PUF responses using BCH error correction as follows.

Entropy rate ≈ 0.98 bits/bit; derived seed feeds Kyber's PRF:

$$\text{seed}_{\text{PUF}} = H(\text{CRP}_{\text{avg}} \parallel \text{deviceID})$$

where H is SHA3-512. This mechanism ensures unique, non-exportable device secrets without EEPROM storage.

The performance evaluation metrics on latency and throughput include the following.

- Handshake latency (ms): Time for client-server PQC session setup;
- Encryption throughput (Mbps): Measured for Ascon payloads of 128–4096 bytes;
- Message authentication latency: Ascon tag generation time.

Based on energy consumption, the energy per handshake E_H is computed as in Equation (2).

$$E_H = V_{cc} \times I_{avg} \times t_H \quad (2)$$

where $V_{cc} = 3.3$ V, $I_{avg} = 10$ mA, and $t_H = 3.5$ ms. For Kyber-768, $E_H \approx 0.12$ mJ, well below the 10 mJ limit set in Table 2. Memory usage is profiled using Kyber occupies ≈ 32 kB Flash and 8 kB RAM, while Ascon adds 4 kB Flash.

To quantify quantum resilience, a security resilience index is defined as follows.

$$\text{SRI} = \frac{T_Q}{T_C} \times \frac{S_P}{S_E} \quad (3)$$

where T_Q = estimated quantum attack time, T_C = classical attack time, S_P = post-quantum strength, and S_E = encryption strength. Values > 1 indicate quantum robustness; Kyber achieved $\text{SRI} = 2.7$ under standard assumptions [5,13].

Figure 3 depicts the methodological data flow, highlighting interactions among sensing nodes, edge gateways, and cloud servers. 1. PUF initialization $\rightarrow$ 2. Kyber key generation $\rightarrow$ 3. Hybrid TLS handshake $\rightarrow$ 4. Ascon payload encryption $\rightarrow$ 5. Data aggregation $\rightarrow$ 6. Governance policy logging. Bidirectional arrows illustrate secure telemetry and control flows within the IEC 62443 governance domain.

Validation was performed through compliance mapping against IEC 62443-4-2 requirements [15] as shown in Table 3. A compliance scorecard was generated to demonstrate alignment with each standard requirement. The methodology establishes a systematic process for designing and evaluating quantum-resistant IoT security stacks. Through hybridization of Kyber and Ascon, and anchoring with PUFs, the framework achieves quantum-safe key exchange, low energy consumption, and regulatory compliance. The performance was evaluated from these experiments in terms of latency, energy, and security indices.




Figure 3. Experimental data-flow and process model.

Table 3. IEC 62443 compliance scorecard for quantum-resistant IoT architecture.

IEC 62443-4-2 Control Requirement	Requirement Description	Implemented Mechanism in the Proposed Framework	Compliance Level (✓ = Compliant)	Evidence/Reference
CR 1.1—Identification and Authentication Control	Each component shall provide a unique, verifiable identity.	PUF-based identity seeds and Dilithium digital signatures ensure tamper-proof device authentication.	✓ Full Compliance	[7,15]
CR 1.2—Use Control	Only authorized entities may access component functions.	Role-based access integrated within Ascon-authenticated channels; MQTT ACLs enforce per-topic control.	✓ Full Compliance	[8–10]
CR 2.1—Data Integrity	Prevent unauthorized modification of transmitted or stored data.	Ascon-128a authenticated encryption guarantees message integrity via hash-based MAC.	✓ Full Compliance	[8,9]
CR 2.2—Data Confidentiality	Prevent disclosure of sensitive data to unauthorized parties.	Hybrid TLS 1.3 (PQC + ECDHE) sessions using Kyber KEM provide quantum-resilient secrecy.	✓ Full Compliance	[2,7]
CR 2.3—Restricted Data Flow	Enforce data-flow control between security zones.	Network segmentation with crypto-agile gateway managing PQC-encrypted telemetry paths.	✓ Partial Compliance (Policy Defined)	[10,12,15]
CR 3.1—System and Communication Protection	Protect against unauthorized network access and message replay.	Nonce-based Ascon AEAD with unique per-session keys; hybrid TLS 1.3 anti-replay mechanisms.	✓ Full Compliance	[8,9,15]
CR 3.2—Event Logging	Log security-relevant events and maintain auditability.	Governance layer logs key exchange, firmware signing, and intrusion detection under IEC 62443 policy.	✓ Full Compliance	[15]
CR 4.1—Use of Cryptography	Apply strong cryptographic measures appropriate to the risk.	NIST-standardized Kyber, Dilithium, and Ascon algorithms integrated in TLS stack.	✓ Full Compliance	[5–7,9]
CR 4.2—Key Management	Secure generation, storage, and destruction of keys.	PUF-derived keys ensure non-exportable secrets; Kyber KEM manages ephemeral key exchange.	✓ Full Compliance	[7,16,17]

Table 3. *Cont.*

IEC 62443-4-2 Control Requirement	Requirement Description	Implemented Mechanism in the Proposed Framework	Compliance Level (✓ = Compliant)	Evidence/Reference
CR 5.1—Availability	Maintain component availability under cyber-attack.	Lightweight cryptography minimizes computational load (<25% CPU usage), ensuring real-time continuity.	✓ Full Compliance	[8,10]
CR 5.2—Resource Availability	Detect and prevent resource exhaustion (DoS).	Adaptive handshake timeout and Ascon AEAD rate-limiting; secure gateway buffering.	✓ Partial Compliance (Test Stage)	[12,15]
CR 6.1—Firmware Integrity and Update	Verify authenticity and integrity of firmware.	Dilithium-signed firmware packages verified at secure boot and OTA update.	✓ Full Compliance	[7,15]
CR 7.1—Security Monitoring and Alerting	Detect and respond to anomalous or malicious activity.	Governance dashboard aligned with IEC 62443 event categories; audit logs signed with ML-DSA.	✓ Partial Compliance (Planned Automation)	[15]

4. Results

The experiments were conducted under identical environmental conditions using the platform defined in Table 4.

Table 4. Implementation environment.

Component	Specification
Microcontroller	ARM Cortex-M33 @ 96 MHz, 256 kB Flash, 64 kB RAM
Crypto library	PQM4 (optimized for PQC on ARM) + Ascon v1.2 implementation [8]
Compiler	GNU ARM GCC 10.3 with -O3 optimization
Operating system	FreeRTOS v10.5
Communication protocol	Hybrid TLS 1.3 over MQTT broker (Mosquitto) [10]
Measurement tools	STM32 Energy Monitor and logic analyzer for cycle counting
Dataset	Simulated sensor telemetry (1 Hz sampling of pressure, temperature, vibration)

The implementation was validated against NIST post-quantum cryptography on ARM Cortex-M4 (PQM4) reference builds, and test vectors were verified using the CRYSTALS-Kyber v3.02 and Ascon v1.2 reference suites. Each measurement was repeated 30 times, and averages were computed with a 95% confidence interval. Table 5 summarizes the measured handshake latency for classical (ECC-256), lattice-based (Kyber-768), and hybrid (Kyber + ECDHE) key exchanges.

Table 5. Handshake latency.

Algorithm	Type	Handshake Time (ms)	Reduction vs. ECC	Energy (mJ)	Security Level (bits)	Algorithm
ECC-256 (TLS 1.3 Baseline)	Classical	9.8 ± 0.4	–	0.36	128	ECC-256 (TLS 1.3 Baseline)
Kyber-768	PQC (Lattice)	3.5 ± 0.2	–64%	0.12	128 (quantum)	Kyber-768
Hybrid Kyber + ECDHE	PQC + Classical	5.1 ± 0.3	–48%	0.19	256 (effective)	Hybrid Kyber + ECDHE

The hybrid PQC–LWC framework reduced average handshake latency by 48–64% and energy consumption by $\approx 67\%$ compared with the ECC baseline, while maintaining equivalent or greater security strength [2,5,7]. Figure 4 shows throughput comparison between Ascon-128a and AES-GCM on 128-byte to 4 KB payloads.




Figure 4. Encryption throughput and payload size.

Ascon achieved $2.6\times$ higher throughput and 59% lower energy cost than AES-GCM, aligning with NIST LWC findings (Table 6) [8,9]. This demonstrates its suitability for continuous telemetry encryption in IIoT devices. The integration of Ascon-128a within a PQC-enabled framework enables high-performance, energy-efficient encryption, making it a practical solution for real-time, quantum-resilient IoT communication in critical infrastructure.

Table 6. Encryption throughput comparison.

Cipher	Mode	Average Throughput (Mbps)	Energy per Byte (μ J)	Memory Usage (kB)	Remarks
AES-GCM-128	AEAD (Galois/Counter Mode)	9.2 ± 0.3	7.6	52	Baseline TLS 1.3 implementation; strong but energy-intensive.
Ascon-128a	AEAD (Permutation-based LWC)	24.3 ± 0.5	3.1	36	$2.6\times$ faster and $\approx 59\%$ more energy-efficient than AES-GCM; standardized as NIST LWC 2023 [8,9].
ChaCha20-Poly1305	AEAD (Stream cipher alternative)	14.5 ± 0.4	4.8	44	Moderate speed, software-friendly, not hardware-optimized.
Grain-128AEAD	Lightweight AEAD candidate	18.6 ± 0.6	3.7	40	High throughput but less mature toolchain support.

In Table 7, total MCU utilization remains within the IEC 62443 resource availability constraint ($\leq 30\%$), validating the system's real-time viability.

Table 7. Firmware resource utilization.

Firmware Component	Description/Function	Flash Memory (kB)	RAM Usage (kB)	CPU Load (% @ 1 Hz Sampling)	Remarks
PUF + Fuzzy Extractor	Generates unique entropy and stabilizes PUF output for seeding Kyber PRF [16,17].	6.0	2.0	2.8	Lightweight hardware-bound identity generation; non-volatile keyless design.
Kyber KEM (ML-KEM-768)	Performs post-quantum key encapsulation and decapsulation using lattice-based arithmetic [7].	32.0	8.0	11.5	Dominant computational module; still within embedded thresholds.
Ascon-128a AEAD Module	Provides lightweight authenticated encryption and hashing for telemetry streams [8,9].	4.0	1.5	4.7	Optimized for 32-bit ARM cores; energy per byte $\approx 3.1 \mu\text{J}$.
TLS 1.3 Integration Layer	Hybrid key-exchange orchestrated				

In Table 8, the hybrid system preserves strong compliance ($\approx 86\%$) while improving latency and security metrics compared with PQC-only solutions by distributing the cryptographic load between asymmetric and symmetric layers.

Table 8. Comparison of quantum-resistant IoT frameworks.

Framework	Crypto Primitives	Handshake (ms)	Energy/Handshake (mJ)	Average Payload Throughput (Mbps)	IEC 62443 Compliance Score	Security Resilience (SRI)	Memory Footprint (Flash/RAM, kB)	Backward Compatibility	Remarks
Classical TLS 1.3	ECDHE-P256 + AES-GCM-128	9.8 ± 0.4	0.36	9.2	0.72	0.05	$\sim 70/18$	Yes	Mature but not quantum-safe; vulnerable to HNDL (harvest-now, decrypt-later).
PQC-Only	Kyber-768 (KEM) + AES-GCM-128	3.5 ± 0.2	0.12	9.2	0.85	4.65	$\sim 46/13$	Partial	Quantum-safe key exchange; symmetric layer remains heavier on MCU.
Hybrid PQC–LWC–PUF (Proposed)	Kyber-768 + Ascon-128a + PUF + Dilithium	5.1 ± 0.3	0.19	24.3	0.86	5.20	$\sim 53/15$	Yes	Best overall balance: quantum-safe, fastest telemetry, hardware-rooted identity, crypto-agile TLS.
Hybrid (Kyber + ChaCha20-Poly1305)	Kyber-768 + ChaCha20-Poly1305	5.4 ± 0.3	0.21	14.5	0.84	5.00	$\sim 55/16$	Yes	Good software speed; throughput below Ascon; broader legacy support than AES-GCM-only.

5. Discussion

The hybrid PQC–LWC–PUF architecture achieved strong empirical performance: handshake latency under 6 ms, throughput beyond 24 Mbps, and power draw below 0.2 mJ per session. These gains confirm that the combination of Kyber-768 key encapsulation [7], Ascon-128a lightweight encryption [8,9], and PUF-based identity binding [16,17] provides the right balance between computational complexity and embedded feasibility. Compared with classical TLS 1.3 (ECC-256), the design cuts latency by $\sim 50\%$ and energy by $\sim 65\%$, while maintaining full IEC 62443-4-2 compliance [15]. The security resilience index (SRI) exceeding five demonstrates more than two orders of magnitude improvement in resistance against quantum adversaries over ECC. The hybrid handshake’s modest overhead relative

to PQC-only exchange is compensated by higher interoperability and smoother migration within existing TLS infrastructures [2,5].

Mapping the prototype to IEC 62443-4-2 confirms 86% conformance (Table 3). Remaining partials—restricted data-flow zoning (CR 2.3) and resource-availability monitoring (CR 5.2)—are procedural rather than algorithmic gaps. Integrating the cryptographic stack with IEC 62443-3-3 system-level zones or ISO 30141 reference models [18] will allow end-to-end certification. In practice, the hybrid model supports incremental rollout across energy grids, smart-transport corridors, and industrial automation lines where downtime and interoperability constraints prohibit full system replacement. Because Ascon's footprint is minimal, it can retrofit legacy gateways, while Kyber modules secure upstream connections to cloud-based SCADA servers.

The NIST PQC standardization outcomes [4–6] and IETF hybrid-TLS drafts [2] emphasize gradual migration. The results here provide empirical data for that policy: hybrid stacks retain compatibility while embedding quantum-safe primitives in constrained hardware. Similar findings have been reported in open-source implementations such as OpenQuantumSafe's oqs-provider, but this study extends evidence to real-time IIoT devices rather than x86 servers. When benchmarked against other frameworks (Table 8), the proposed system ranks first in throughput and compliance. Energy gains are comparable to those achieved in lattice-based virtual private network tunnels for 5G networks, but the present work uniquely couples cryptography with PUF-anchored identity, creating a complete trust chain from silicon to cloud governance.

Long-term resilience depends not only on algorithm hardness but on crypto-agility—the ability to replace or upgrade cryptographic modules without firmware overhaul [10–12]. The modular architecture and policy layer (governance application programming interfaces) satisfy this requirement. Key rotation policies and certificate revocation lists are automated through the governance layer using Dilithium-signed logs [7,15]. The combination of PUF entropy and Dilithium signature verification also mitigates supply-chain attacks, ensuring that cloned or compromised devices fail attestation. This satisfies IEC 62443 CR 1.1 and 1.2 for component authenticity and access control.

While the architecture meets industrial constraints, several limitations persist. Hardware acceleration is needed as the software-only PQC libraries on Cortex-M require > 100 ms startup for keypair generation; this can hinder large swarm deployments. Quantum modeling assumptions on simulations relied on Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm-based lattice reductions up to 50 qubits; extrapolations to > 1,000 logical qubits remain theoretical [5,13]. Standardization fluidity pending NIST post-quantum signature profiles may alter certificate chain sizes, affecting memory allocation. Hybrid TLS 1.3 handshake extensions are still drafts (IETF tls-hybrid-design v08), so production deployments must track specification updates [2].

Future research is necessary to explore hardware-accelerated PQC cores on a Field-Programmable Gate Array / Application-Specific Integrated Circuit for <2 ms handshake latency, edge-AI security managers that dynamically adjust cryptographic strength based on network risk and energy budget, quantum-secure orchestration frameworks linking ML-KEM key exchange with SDN-based access control for autonomous plants, and lifecycle-aware compliance testing integrating PQC modules into IEC 62443-certification toolchains.

6. Conclusions

The emergence of quantum computing threatens the cryptographic foundations that secure industrial control systems, smart-grid networks, and other critical IoT infrastructures. This research presented and experimentally validated a hybrid quantum-resistant encryption framework that integrates three complementary technologies. For critical infras-

structure operators, the findings support a gradual migration strategy—adopting hybrid PQC within current TLS infrastructures before full post-quantum replacement. The architecture’s compliance with IEC 62443 and alignment with NIST ML-KEM/ML-DSA standards make it immediately deployable within regulated sectors such as energy, transport, and manufacturing. It provides an engineering blueprint for meeting national and international post-quantum security mandates while sustaining operational continuity.

Further research should explore hardware acceleration of Kyber and Ascon to achieve < 3 ms handshake latency, integration with software-defined networking and edge-AI security managers for dynamic crypto-policy enforcement, and comprehensive quantum-resilience certification frameworks linking PQC modules to IEC 62443 and ISO 30141 conformance tools. This work demonstrates that quantum-safe, lightweight, and compliant encryption is now practical for industrial IoT. By merging cryptographic innovation with standards-based engineering and hardware trust anchors, the proposed framework ensures that the next generation of critical infrastructure remains both secure against future quantum threats and operationally sustainable within today’s industrial environments.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement: The data that support the findings of this study are available upon request.

Acknowledgments: During the preparation of this manuscript/study, the author used ChatGPT 5o for the purposes of generating images. The author has reviewed and edited the output and takes full responsibility for the content of this publication.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflicts of interest.

References

1. Shor, P.W. Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer. *SIAM J. Comput.* **1997**, *26*, 1484–1509. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
2. RFC 8446; The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3. IETF: Wilmington, DE, USA, 2018. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
3. Chen, L.; Jordan, S.; Liu, Y.; Moody, D. *Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography*; NIST Internal Report 8105; U.S. Department of Commerce: Washington, DC, USA, 2016. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
4. Alagic, G.; Alperin-Sheriff, J.; Cooper, D.; Dang, Q.; Kelsey, J.; Liu, Y.-K.; Miller, C.; Moody, D.; Peralta, R.; Perlner, R.; et al. *Status Report on the Second Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process*. NIST IR 8309; US Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology: Gaithersburg, MD, USA, 2020. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
5. Alagic, G.; Alperin-Sheriff, J.; Cooper, D.; Dang, Q.; Kelsey, J.; Liu, Y.-K.; Miller, C.; Moody, D.; Peralta, R.; Perlner, R.; et al. *Status Report on the Third Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process*. NIST IR 8413; US Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology: Gaithersburg, MD, USA, 2022. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
6. NIST. NIST Releases First 3 Finalized Post-Quantum Encryption Standards (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA). NIST News Release. 13 August 2024. Available online: <https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards> (accessed on 1 January 2020).
7. Ojha, V.P.; Chauhan, S.; Yarahmadian, S.; Carvalho, D. Unfolding Post-Quantum Cryptosystems: CRYSTALS-Dilithium, McEliece, BIKE, and HQC. *Mathematics* **2025**, *13*, 2841. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
8. Dobraunig, C.; Eichlseder, M.; Mendel, F.; Schl  ffer, M. Ascon v1.2: Lightweight Authenticated Encryption and Hashing. *J. Cryptol.* **2021**, *34*, 33. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
9. NIST. NIST Selects “Ascon” as the Lightweight Cryptography Standard. Press Release. 7 February 2023. Available online: <https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2023/02/nist-selects-lightweight-cryptography-algorithms-protect-small-devices> (accessed on 8 April 2026).
10. Alotaibi, B.; Al-Nasser, M.; Alabdulatif, A.; Alghamdi, A.; Alharbi, A. A Survey on Industrial Internet of Things Security. *Sensors* **2023**, *23*, 7470. [\[CrossRef\]](#) [\[PubMed\]](#)

11. Kong, L.; Jin, J.; Wang, Z.; Gao, L.; Zhang, Y.; Shi, W. Edge-Computing-Driven Internet of Things: A Survey. *ACM Comput. Surv.* **2022**, *55*, 1–45. [[CrossRef](#)]
12. Andriulo, F.C.; Postorino, M.N. Edge Computing and Cloud Computing for Internet of Things: A Review. *Informatics* **2024**, *11*, 71. [[CrossRef](#)]
13. IEC 62443-4-2:2019; Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems—Part 4-2: Technical Security Requirements for IACS Components. International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC): Geneva, Switzerland, 2019. Available online: <https://standards.iteh.ai/catalog/standards/sist/3ed80464-8d4d-41e1-97ea2783bd958502/iec-62443-4-2-2019> (accessed on 21 April 2026).
14. NIST. Lightweight Cryptography—Ascon Standardization and Implementation Updates (Workshop 2023 Materials). Available online: <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/lightweight-cryptography> (accessed on 8 April 2026).
15. IEC 62443-4-2; Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems—Part 4-2: Technical Security Requirements for IACS Components (with 2022 Corrigendum). International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC): Geneva, Switzerland, 2019. Available online: <https://webstore.iec.ch/en/publication/34421> (accessed on 8 April 2026).
16. Babaei, A.; Schiele, G. Physical Unclonable Functions in the Internet of Things: State of the Art and Open Challenges. *Sensors* **2019**, *19*, 3208. [[CrossRef](#)] [[PubMed](#)]
17. Shamsoshoara, A.; Korenda, A.; Afghah, F.; Zeadally, S. A Survey on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs): Architecture and Applications. *Comput. Netw.* **2020**, *183*, 107593. [[CrossRef](#)]
18. ISO/IEC 30141:2024; Internet of Things (IoT)—Reference Architecture, Edition 2. ISO: Geneva, Switzerland, 2024. Available online: <https://www.iso.org/standard/88800.html> (accessed on 21 April 2026).

Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.