

## Article

# Assembling the Crisis of COVID-19 in Australia: A Foucauldian Analysis of Prime Ministerial Press Conferences in March 2020

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**Abstract:** In this article, I present a Foucauldian analysis of the speeches made by the then Prime Minister of Australia (Mr. Scott Morrison) in March 2020. This analysis sets out to explore the political rationalities that assembled COVID-19 as a particular type of ‘problem’ that warranted unprecedented governmental intervention into the everyday lives of citizens. I believe that the insights provided by such an analysis are relevant to ongoing examination of governing in liberal democracies both during a crisis and afterwards.

**Keywords:** press conferences; COVID-19; Australia; Foucault

## 1. Introduction

The emergence and global spread of the novel coronavirus (hereafter referred to as COVID-19) widely reported from January 2020, presented a unique challenge to the ways in which governments sought to manage the health of citizens. Advanced liberal economies in Western democracies such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States have been dominated for decades by neoliberal and advanced liberal approaches to governing that position responsibility (and consequences) for many decisions at the level of the individual (Reich and Turnbull 2018). In these countries, health has been commodified and the active, responsible citizen is expected to take a personal role in the avoidance (or minimisation) of illness and disease (Larsen 2012; Popay et al. 2008). These approaches to the management of populations and their health draw heavily on discourses of *risk* (Lupton 1995, 2015) and *individual responsibility* (Leggett 2014; Haas and Cunningham 2014). The multidimensional crisis presented by COVID-19, however, altered the fundamental nature of the interaction between governments and the health of citizens. Rather than seeking to direct the behaviour of responsible citizens by drawing on rationalities grounded in scientific risk, governments and experts were suddenly confronted with a context defined by *uncertainty*. Risk-based decisions draw on known probable outcomes—this can be illustrated through the analogy of “betting on a roulette wheel” (Williams and Baláz 2012, p. 168). Uncertainty, in contrast, is linked with “imperfect knowledge about current conditions (. . .) [and] unpredictability of the future” (p. 168). Attempting to govern through uncertainty thus requires the mobilisation of different types of discourses and strategies.

In this article, I explore how uncertainty was reflected in one stream of government discourse by analysing a corpus of speeches made by the then Australian Prime Minister<sup>1</sup>, Mr. Scott Morrison, in press conferences in March 2020. This period was selected as it was the month in which the global spread of the virus accelerated and included the World Health Organization’s (WHO) declaration of a pandemic on 11th of March (Singh et al. 2021). During this time of intensified crisis, global leaders increasingly made use of the forum of press conferences to engage with their citizens, share information about COVID-19 and give updates on response strategies. The transcripts of these press conferences thus provide a useful source of empirical data on how the unfolding crisis was assembled and the



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rationales governments gave for their associated actions. The corpus of speeches analysed represents only one of the numerous ways through which the Australian government sought to communicate with and shape the behaviour of citizens during this crisis period. These press conferences, however, marked the point at which new information and plans were presented to the general public and thus represent a key point of translation (Li 2007) of government discourse.

The analysis presented in this article is informed by Michel Foucault's perspective of governmentality (Foucault 2007). Governmentality provides a nuanced way of exploring the complexity of governing and the interconnections of the discourses, strategies and techniques through which it unfolds. This is particularly useful in considering how the uncertainty associated with COVID-19 was reflected in the discourses of political leaders, which, in turn, were used to mobilise strategies and ways of governing that were unprecedented outside of wartime in most Western liberal democracies (Vasilopoulos et al. 2023). The following sections of this article briefly introduce the elements of Foucault's work that guide the analysis before turning to the context of the press conferences and then empirical data and the parameters of the analysis. The article concludes by identifying the contributions made by this type of analysis and areas for future research.

### 1.1. Foucault's Analytical Toolbox: Governmentality

Foucault's (2007) work on governmentality and its development by subsequent writers (including Dean 2006, 2007, 2010; Li 2007; Miller and Rose 2008), offers a useful way of looking at how contemporary modes of governing unfold through discourses, strategies and techniques that assemble particular types of problems and justify certain policy responses. Dean (2010) observed that taking up this perspective "provides a language and framework for thinking about the linkages between questions of government, authority and politics, and questions of identity, self and person" (p. 20). The analysis presented in this article is informed by Foucault's work and seeks to explore one specific forum in which representatives of the Australian government worked with uncertainty to discursively assemble COVID-19 as a particular type of crisis. This is significant as the discourses represented created certain conditions and rationales that facilitated the introduction of unprecedented and restrictive government policies that affected all domains of citizens' lives. Such an analysis draws attention to how strategies or techniques of governing were reshaped and mobilised in the context of the first global health crisis in a generation. Taking this perspective does not offer judgement or evaluation of the measures taken but rather considers questions of how the words spoken in the press conferences contributed to conditions in which certain changes unfolded. This analysis thus adds more broadly to an important and critical engagement with contemporary "arts of governing"—that is, a consideration of the ways in which governing unfolds "so that this or that end may be achieved through a certain number of means" (Foucault 2007, p. 99). Foucault (1994) argued that taking this approach acknowledges the complexity of governing:

*governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified ...*  
(p. 204)

Such an analysis involves considering "how problems come to be defined as problems in relation to particular schemes of thought, diagnoses of deficiency and promises of improvement" (Li 2007, p. 264). Foucault referred to the "effects in the real" that flow from such programs or policies: "they crystallize into institutions, they information individual behavior, they act as grids for the perception and evaluation of things" (Foucault 1991, p. 81). In the context of COVID-19, Foucault's work suggests ways of examining how the novel coronavirus was assembled as a particular type of problem that warranted the introduction of certain ways and means of governing. Governing, from this perspective, unfolds through the translation (Rose 1999) of statements, directives and policies issued by authorities that have the effect of authorising experts, interventions and programs of

work. [Rose and Miller \(1992\)](#) referred to such complex arrangements as “technologies of government . . . through which authorities seek to employ and give effect to governmental ambitions” (p. 175). Governing and these processes of translation and assemblage do not unfold in a linear way but are messy and contested ([Rose 1999](#)). It is for that reason that one examination of the crisis of COVID-19 in Australia can usefully begin with the analysis of the texts generated from the Prime Ministers’ press conferences. These press conferences marked a critical point of translation as information, policies and interventions were announced to the public.

### 1.2. Press Conferences

Press conferences are a standard component of government and institutional communication strategies ([Tay 2022](#)). Unlike ceremonial speeches given at formal events, such as inaugurations, press conferences tend to be shorter in duration and often serve the specific purpose of engaging the public through the media in the announcement of political policies and ideas ([Moberg and Eriksson 2013](#)). The scheduling of press conferences thus often signifies the intention of a government to make significant announcements ([Eshbaugh-Soha 2013](#)). Press conferences usually begin with a prepared speech given by the key speaker that is followed by contributions from other relevant experts and then questions from assembled media representatives ([Moberg and Eriksson 2013](#)). The announcement fulfils information-sharing intentions whilst the forum of the press conference presents details in relatively small chunks that can be easily shared in sound-bites via social media across the 24-hour news cycle ([Dau and Ellis 2022](#); [Rinke 2016](#)).

Political press conferences are considered a particular genre of political communication. Press conferences are often a forum in which key information is announced but they also represent a public performance of politics. Leaders and experts use carefully chosen words, which work to mobilise discourses through a public performance that takes policies out of government offices and recontextualises them in a public space ([Ekstrom and Eriksson 2017](#)). The speeches given in the context of a press conference can therefore be considered political texts that represent not only the thoughts, opinions and personality of the speaker, but also various experts or stakeholders who may have contributed to the detail of what was said. Importantly, these texts and the associated performance go on to the shape the broader social and political context in which the problem (or crisis) is situated. Foucault emphasised that discourses are only one component of the many “diverse elements” that make up governmental interventions. Discourses can be seen to come together and cohere in various forms, including “institutions, forms of expertise and social groups whose deficiencies need to be corrected” ([Li 2007](#), p. 263). In the context of this article, the texts of press conferences are examined as one component of attempts to govern through the uncertainty of the COVID-19 crisis. The press conference has particular significance as it was a forum that was frequently used by international leaders.

The frequency of press conferences given political leaders increased significantly during the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis; in some nations, leaders appeared daily for periods of time ([Allen et al. 2023](#)). These events usually followed a particular choreography with leaders and experts arriving together, standing at strategically positioned and socially-distanced podiums in front of national flags. The press conferences often included the presentation of visual information tracking the spread of the virus and gave details about various actions that governments had taken or planned to implement ([Allen et al. 2023](#)). The use of press conferences during the health crisis has been explored from a variety of perspectives, including crisis communication ([He et al. 2023](#)), genre analysis ([Wang and Ge 2022](#)), collective intentionality ([Kirgil and Voyer 2022](#)) and speech acts ([Schueler and Marx 2023](#)). This research provides important insights into the role of press conferences. Limited research, however, has considered the how press conferences functioned to create and problematise COVID-19 in a context of great uncertainty. In this article, the analysis focuses on how the discourses presented in the press conferences worked to reposition

the role of the government and its relationship with citizens. Connections between these discourses and emotions, such as fear, are also discussed.

## 2. Materials and Methods of Analysis

### 2.1. Materials

Between 3rd and 30th March 2020 (inclusive), Morrison gave 19 public, televised press conferences (one of which was referred to as an ‘address to the nation’). These press conferences followed the same format; Morrison began with a pre-prepared statement providing an update of relevant facts and associated actions or policies proposed and taken by the government. At the end of this stage, Morrison then introduced various health, security and scientific ‘experts’ who raised relevant discussion points and answered questions from the assembled media audience. Ekstrom and Eriksson (2017) argued that the first phase of the press conference works as a political speech as it usually features the introduction of policies and justification of actions. Importantly, the politician can speak without interruption and thus make use of various pre-planned rhetorical strategies and “set the agenda for the entire event” (Ekstrom and Eriksson 2017). In this article, I focused on the analysis of the pre-prepared statements presented by Morrison. To facilitate analysis of the discourses that shaped these press conferences, transcripts were downloaded free of charge from the publicly accessible government repository (<https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au>, accessed on 4 January 2021). Morrison’s addresses lasted between 10 and 20 min, and the transcripts were combined to form a corpus that was 38,516 words in length.

### 2.2. Methods of Analysis

Analysis of this corpus of press conferences was undertaken in two complementary stages. Stage one involved careful and repeated line-by-line reading and annotation of relevant words, phrases and passages. To facilitate analysis across the corpus, transcripts were uploaded to the freely available WordSmith 8.0 software ([www.lexically.net](http://www.lexically.net), accessed on 4 January 2021) in stage two. Word frequency lists were generated and used to check the collocation of relevant key words and phrases. Tracking the collocation of frequently occurring words and phrases facilitated the mapping of discourses across the corpus.

## 3. Results

In early March 2020, COVID-19 cases in Australia were growing but still lagged significantly behind European countries, such as Italy. There was, however, concern that Australia was on a similar trajectory that would see a rapid increase in cases (Hughes 2020). Morrison began his press conference speech on 3 March 2020 with a clear declaration in relation to the intention of his government to communicate transparently<sup>2</sup>:

*Key in the government’s response to the coronavirus is being upfront with the Australian people. (3rd March)*

Across the speeches that followed in the month of March, Morrison deployed a range of linguistic and discursive devices, including metaphors and links with national identity to problematise COVID-19 and to justify the introduction of various government policies and programs. By the end of March 2020, Australia’s international borders were closed to all non-essential travellers, and a raft of social distancing measures had been introduced that curbed both social and economic activity (Churchill 2021; Stobart and Duckett 2022). In the following sections, I explore how discourses of crisis, unity and hope for a return to ‘normal’ after the crisis established ways of thinking about talking about these governmental interventions that positioned them out as necessary and logical. I also examine the extensive and deliberate use of the ‘bridge’ metaphor by Morrison.

### 3.1. COVID-19 as a Temporary Crisis That Requires Unity and Sacrifice from All Australians

Throughout the press conferences in March, Morrison emphasised that the COVID-19 crisis was temporary, originated from outside Australia and thus presented an external

threat to a usually safe country. Morrison drew on discourses of national unity throughout the month of March—beginning on 3rd March with the statement that Australians would “get through this together as a country” (3rd March). In contrast to discourses of individual choice, Morrison repeatedly called for Australians to come together and demonstrate what were implied to be features of a national identity—solidarity, calmness and common sense:

*So to all Australians, let's get through this together. Let's help each other. Let's stay calm. Let's go about our business. Let's continue to enjoy the most wonderful country in the world in which to live, and that doesn't change under these circumstances. And we've always worked well together. We've always understood what our responsibilities are. And we've always gone about our business with common sense. And that's what we're known for. So let's do that, and I'm sure, I have no doubt, Australians will get through this like we get through everything else. (5th March)*

*Every Australian has a role to play, whether you're in a government, federal, state, local, whether you're an employer, whether you're an employee, wherever you happen to be. We all have a role to play. To stay together, work together, to work through this very challenging time. And importantly, on the other side, because there is another side, that we bounce back stronger than ever. (11th March)*

*We cannot prevent all the many hardships, all the many sacrifices. That we will face in the months ahead. And while these hardships and these sacrifices may break our hearts on occasion, we must not let them break our spirit. And we must not let them break our resolve as Australians. (22nd March)*

Morrison referred to Australians as “common sense people” and matched this with the nature of the government that would introduce “sensible” measures around quarantine and the self-isolation of returned travellers (3rd March). Morrison also emphasised the preparedness of the Australian government and emphasised the ‘joined up nature’ of the work being done by the various experts involved in decision-making (the National Security Committee, Ministers for Health and Education, scientific and medical experts). Morrison named expert panels and plans to illustrate that the government was actively involved and preparing for the approaching crisis:

*The emergency response plan was activated, as we said last week, and that was in anticipation of where we understood the broader global Coronavirus was heading. We're now in some 75 countries, I'm advised, around the world where this is impacting. And that is what we anticipated this spread would be. And that's why we took that early action well in advance of most other countries. (3rd March)*

The emphasis on preparedness continued throughout March:

*I said yesterday, in 2020 is one focus: the health and wellbeing of Australians, their livelihoods, their jobs and ensuring that Australia bounces back better on the other side. That's our focus. That's what the Government is intently been working on. From the outset, back in January we moved to get ahead. We've been working hard to stay ahead, and it's important that we keep our heads as well when it comes to how we're addressing these issues. (11th March)*

As the potential scale of the global crisis became more evident, Morrison continued to offer reassurance that the government had plans in place whilst also alluding to the uncertainty inherent within the broader situation. In March 2020, very little was known about the virus, and no vaccines or treatments were yet widely available. Morrison, like all leaders at the time, was presented with a situation in which uncertainty had to not only be acknowledged, but also managed. Emphasising preparedness and a plan became strategies for managing uncertainty:

*I want to assure you and your family tonight that while Australia, cannot and is not immune from this virus, we are well prepared and are well equipped to deal with it, and we do have a clear plan to see Australia through. Our plan has three goals:*

- *Protect Australians' health*

- Secure Australians' jobs and livelihoods, and
- Set Australia up to bounce back stronger when the crisis is over. (12th March)

Morrison continued to assemble COVID-19 as both a health and economic crisis. On the 11th March, Morrison made clear the connection between the health and economic aspects:

*I said yesterday, in 2020 is one focus: the health and wellbeing of Australians, their livelihoods, their jobs and ensuring that Australia bounces back better on the other side. That's our focus. (11th March)*

The term livelihoods was repeated 20 more times in the speeches, and in almost all of these cases, it was closely linked with lives. For example, on the 22nd March, Morrison made the following statement:

*The more Australians themselves assist us in this fight against the virus to protect lives and to protect livelihoods, the more and the better able we are to ensure that Australia comes out stronger on the other side. (22nd March)*

He repeatedly emphasised the dual elements of the crisis throughout the month:

*As I described it last night, a twin crisis, a crisis on a health front, which is also causing a crisis in the economy as well. And both of them can be equally as deadly, both in terms of the lives of Australians and their livelihoods. (25th March)*

Morrison continued to emphasise the uncertainty of the overall situation and warned late in March that Australians should be prepared for an increase in the number of COVID-19 cases; again, he seemed to offer reassurance in terms of the government being prepared for this eventuality:

*Life is continuing to change. And together we're going to have to continue to adapt to those changes to keep Australia running. Australians, we will all continue to see more information. There will be additional cases. This is something we should be continuing to expect. This is anticipated. The presence of additional cases is not something of itself that should cause alarm, because at the end of the day, you don't stop this virus, but you can defeat it by slowing it down. And that is how we save lives. (20th March)*

The speeches given at the press conferences in March assembled the problem of COVID-19 in terms of health, economics and uncertainty. Across the speeches, the focus on the urgency of the health and economic crisis grows and lays out the rationalities and ways of thinking that are shaping government policies. Due to the paucity of information about the virus, the government cannot present scientific or risk-based information for individuals to use in decision-making. Instead, citizens are being asked to trust the government, and the experts who seek to guide them through this uncertainty. Importantly, within the speeches, Morrison frames this uncertainty and the necessary intervention as temporary and essential to getting through the crisis.

### 3.2. Unprecedented Restrictions Are a 'Bridge' to the Other Side of the Crisis

Within the speeches, Morrison used a range of metaphors to refer to the temporary nature of the crisis and establish hope for the future and a return to normal. The dominant metaphor used for this purpose was that of a 'bridge'. This metaphor was introduced in the speech given on 19th March and was then used repeatedly in subsequent speeches. The way in which this metaphor was used provided a powerful illustration and rationalisation for the governmental interventions and the compromises citizens were being asked to make. The use of the 'bridge' metaphor also reinforced the temporary nature of the crisis (even though the potential duration was unknown) and also positioned the government as a key support that could help citizens get to the other side of the crisis. This is evident in the first instance in which the metaphor is used:

*Our plan is to ensure that over the next six months, or as long as it then takes, that we can effectively build a bridge to ensure that Australians, Australian businesses, those that are impacted, we can bring them across that bridge and get them to the other side. Which*



*is where on that side the economy is rebounding, Australians health has been rebounding and Australian life can go back to what it was. (19th March)*

The bridge metaphor is used again in the speech, and Morrison provides insight into why it is being used with specific reference to the economic measures the government planned to introduce:

*And this notion of the bridge is what we discussed. It was described in these ways by the Reserve Bank Governor, and he's absolutely right. Because there is a period through which we will have to move. That will be difficult. And the best way to get there is the measures that we're putting in place on a sustainable and staged basis. (19th March)*

In relation to the introduction of temporary financial measures, Morrison said:

*... this is a very significant injection to support Australians, to support our economy, to support business, to support jobs, as we all go across on this bridge together to the other side, where on the other side we know that the Australian economy will be stronger, Australians will be healthier, and Australian life can return to what we knew it to be. (19th March)*

Morrison continued to use this metaphor in his press conference the next day. Again, it was used in a way that reinforced that the restrictions were temporary and an essential means of getting through the crisis:

*There is a way through this. We all need to keep going. I need all of you to keep going. And we're going to keep going to keep Australia running. All Australians have a role to play as we make our way through. And there is a way through. There is a bridge over this. And if we continue to work together in the way we are, all around the country, then Australia will bounce back strongly, you will bounce back strongly, your family, your business, your community. There is a way through. (20th March)*

The repeated encouragement to cross the bridge to the future attempts to allay the potential fears driven by uncertainty. There is no way of predicting if, how or when the immediate crisis will end. Morrison, however, seeks to reassure Australians that there will be a return to normality—crossing the bridge together is key to that. The interventions of the government are also framed within this context of uncertainty.

Morrison's final press conference on 30th March repeated many of these appeals to unity and belief in the temporary nature of the crisis. By the end of March, Australia was essentially closed off from the world, the crisis in aged care was escalating and citizens were subject to a range of social distancing measures. Morrison's closing statement summarised effectively the intention of the government and the justification for the actions they had taken:

*It is never the time for rash and ill-conceived decisions. That is why we have applied ourselves to delivering this plan that will provide Australians with the economic lifeline that they will need in the many months ahead to make it through and to get on this bridge we're building together to the other side. Some will say it's too little. Others will say that it's too much. (30th March)*

#### 4. Discussion and Conclusions

In early 2020, as the COVID-19 crisis intensified, global leaders were faced with significant challenges in terms of how to communicate effectively with citizens in a context imbued with uncertainty. The nature of the virus in terms of its infectivity seemed to necessitate the imposition of unprecedented restrictions on people's daily lives. Western liberal democracies, such as Australia, have in recent decades been characterised by approaches to governing that seek to maximise individual decision-making. Thus, the sudden need to intervene directly into people's lives and to draw on a sense of collective responsibility presented new challenges to those in government as well as to citizens who were being asked to engage with very different approaches to governance. Governing through discourses of responsibility draws on notions of risk. In contrast, the COVID-19

presented extreme uncertainty. In contrast, in the first months of 2020, little was known in terms of the severity of the virus or likely duration or potential end of the crisis itself. Thus, governments had to manage the communication of this uncertainty whilst also maintaining a sense of authority and engendering trust in the citizens.

This negotiation can be seen in the analysis of the press conference speeches given by the then Prime Minister of Australia. In his speeches in March 2023, Morrison drew heavily on discourses of national unity and framed the crisis as temporary but of unknown duration. A key strategy used in the speeches related to the development of the metaphor of a bridge; Morrison deployed this metaphor repeatedly as a means of reinforcing the need for collective action to cross the bridge as well as to position the government as the foundation and support of the structure. The interventions proposed by the government to address the immediate crisis were also framed in these terms—temporary, affecting all Australians and key to be able to cross the bridge to the future on the other side. These emotional appeals represented a call for greater trust in the government itself and marked a significant shift from the discourses of risk and responsibility that characterised the usual low-interventionist approaches taken in Western liberal democracies (Liu et al. 2022). It is also of note that this problematisation of the crisis and the ‘need’ for the proposed solutions narrowed the scope or potential for disagreement. By emphasising the need for all Australians to work together, dissent or disagreement was actively discouraged. The lack of knowledge made it difficult to weigh up options and to make decisions about what degree of restrictions were proportionate. Decision-making thus became less rationale and more influenced by a desire to reduce uncertainty. Vasilopoulos et al. (2023) noted that increasingly restrictive approaches to governing emerge in contexts of fear. The associated uncertainty may facilitate similar changes and acceptance of restrictions.

The consideration of the use of metaphors in government press conferences highlights a marked change in the relationship between the Australian government, its agencies, citizens and the idea of health. In contrast to the familiar discourses of risk and responsibility, COVID-19 was problematised in a way that opened up the ‘need’ for governments to take a direct and interventionist approach to the management of health and disease. The Prime Minister positioned such actions as building a bridge that would help Australians get to the ‘other side’ of the crisis. The policies associated with this were positioned as temporary and essential. In the Australian context, these policies led to actions, such as the closure of international and domestic state borders, which severely restricted travel and movement in and around the country. The closure of internal state borders is particularly significant when considering Australia’s geography and the impact this had on the flow of goods and access to medical and educational services for local residents. The closure of Australia’s international borders included limits on citizens returning and was one of the strictest approaches taken internationally (Larson 2022). Connections were made between the urgent need for these temporary actions and fears of the unknown consequences of inaction. It is of note that fear appeals are often used in public health communication (Stolow et al. 2020) to motivate certain health-related behaviour choices at the level of the individual. However, in the press conferences, Morrison used language and discourse to achieve different and collective ‘effects’. Morrison used heavily emotional terms, such as ‘sacrifice’ to acknowledge the gravity of the actions citizens were being asked to take. This connects with appeals for national unity and reflect a shift away from individualist discourses of risk and responsibility. The inherent uncertainty of the situation is evident in the final statement given on 30th March: *Some will say it’s too little. Others will say that it’s too much.*

In this article, I have taken up elements of Foucault’s work on governmentality (Foucault 2007) to explore how COVID-19 was assembled as a particular type of crisis that warranted extensive and unprecedented interventions into the lives of citizens. By drawing on the speeches given in the forum of press conferences by the Australian Prime Minister in March 2020, the analysis has highlighted that COVID-19 was assembled as a temporary crisis that required national unity and sacrifice. COVID-19 presented a multidimensional



crisis in terms of the impact it had upon health, global economics and the ways in which citizens were governed. Future research could usefully aim to understanding more about how discourses of uncertainty are deployed during a crisis and used to renegotiate ways and means of governing. Additionally, mapping the retraction or ‘rolling back’ of crisis interventions will also provide valuable insights into some the lasting effects and legacies of crisis-based governing.

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## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Australia is governed as a Commonwealth, or federation, of six states and two territories. The Prime Minister is the leader of the government of the Commonwealth of Australia. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/corporate/protocol-guidelines/1-introduction-to-australia-and-its-system-of-government>, accessed on 1 September 2023.
- <sup>2</sup> The following extracts from the speeches are taken directly and unedited from the transcripts. Key words and phrases have been underlined.

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