Bridging the Knowledge Void: A Synthetic Near-Empty Review of Intelligent Evolutionary Games’ Employment in Healthcare
Abstract
1. Introduction
- RQ1 (Knowledge Void): What is the nature and extent of the “knowledge void” regarding the operationalization of Intelligent Evolutionary Games (IEGs) in real-world clinical practice?
- RQ2 (Thematic Synthesis): What is the taxonomy of foundational AI algorithms, game strategies, and overarching social themes that can be extracted from the broader literature landscapes of general IEGs (IEG All) and standard Evolutionary Games in health (EG Health)?
- RQ3 (Translation Framework): How can these extracted strategic paradigms be successfully translated into clinical-specific models to address modern healthcare challenges such as AI adoption and algorithm aversion?
- ○
- Identification of a Knowledge Void: We systematically identify the scarcity of frameworks that integrate intelligent strategic modelling into clinical practice, noting that the bottleneck is a lack of peer-reviewed operationalizations [10] rather than clinical data.
- ○
- Methodological Innovation: We apply the Synthetic Near-Empty Review (SNER) framework [9], utilizing bibliometric triangulation to extract structured knowledge from sparse literature landscapes.
- ○
- Translation Framework: We propose a framework that maps broad Intelligent Evolutionary Game (IEG) concepts (like Social Trust) into clinical-specific models (such as Doctor-AI Adoption).
- ○
- Strategic Evolution: We outline the necessary shift from static Replicator Dynamics to Adaptive Learning Strategies to address challenges in healthcare.
2. Methodology
- IEG Health: TITLE-ABS-KEY(“evolutionary game*” and (“intelligen*” OR “machine learning” OR “deep learning” OR “intelligent system” OR “support vector machine” OR (“decision tree” AND (induction OR heuristic)) OR “random forest” OR “Markov decision process” OR “hidden Markov model” OR “fuzzy logic” OR “k-nearest neighbours” OR KNN OR “support vector machine*” or SVM OR “naive Bayes” OR “Bayesian learning” OR “artificial neural network” OR “convolutional neural network” OR “recurrent neural network” OR “generative adversarial network” OR “deep belief network” OR “perceptron” OR {natural language processing} OR {natural language understanding} OR {general language model})) AND (LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA,“MEDI”) OR LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA,“HEAL”)).
- EG Health: TITLE-ABS-KEY(“evolutionary game*”) AND (LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA,“MEDI”) OR LIMIT-TO (SUBJAREA,“HEAL”)).
- IEG All: TITLE-ABS-KEY(“evolutionary game*” and (“intelligen*” OR “machine learning” OR “deep learning” OR “intelligent system” OR “support vector machine” OR (“decision tree” AND (induction OR heuristic)) OR “random forest” OR “Markov decision process” OR “hidden Markov model” OR “fuzzy logic” OR “k-nearest neighbours” OR KNN OR “support vector machine*” or SVM OR “naive Bayes” OR “Bayesian learning” OR “artificial neural network” OR “convolutional neural network” OR “recurrent neural network” OR “generative adversarial network” OR “deep belief network” OR “perceptron” OR {natural language processing} OR {natural language understanding} OR {general language model})).
3. Results
3.1. Knowledge Void
- IEG Health Applications: Focuses on technology-driven healthcare delivery, such as smart homes, cancer treatment, and chronic disease management [28]. An example of real-world IEG use in clinical settings is adaptive oncology. Namely, high-dose chemotherapy frequently fails by eradicating drug-sensitive cells, inadvertently selecting for chemo-resistant phenotypes. IEG models address this by integrating pharmacokinetics to calculate dynamic, adaptive dosages. By maintaining competitive suppression between sensitive and resistant cellular subpopulations, these algorithms mitigate rapid mutation and significantly prolong patient survival [29].
3.2. Thematic Synthesis
3.2.1. The Taxonomy of the Used AI Algorithms
Machine Learning and Deep Learning Models Encompass Algorithms That Teach Data to Make Predictions, Generate Content, or Recognize Patterns
- Neural Networks [43]: The foundational architecture for deep learning, mimicking human brain nodes.
- Deep Learning [44]: Advanced neural networks with multiple layers used for complex pattern recognition.
- Large Language Models (LLMs) [45]: Advanced deep learning models specifically trained on vast amounts of text to understand and generate human language.
Reinforcement Learning
- Q-learning [46]: A foundational, value-based reinforcement learning algorithm used to find the best action to take given a current state.
- Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) [47]: The integration of deep learning neural networks with reinforcement learning principles to solve highly complex, high-dimensional problems.
- Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) [48]: An extension of RL in which multiple AI agents interact, compete, or cooperate within the same environment to achieve their goals.
Distributed and Decentralized AI
- Federated Learning [49]: A privacy-preserving machine learning technique in which a model is trained across multiple decentralized edge devices holding local data samples, without exchanging them.
- Edge Intelligence [50]: The deployment of AI algorithms directly on edge devices (like sensors or smartphones) to process data locally and reduce latency.
Bio-Inspired and Evolutionary Optimization
- Genetic Algorithms [51]: Search heuristics inspired by the theory of natural evolution (mutation, crossover, selection) used to solve optimization problems.
- Swarm Intelligence [51]: Algorithms based on the collective behaviour of decentralized, self-organized systems (e.g., ant colonies or bird flocking).
- Collective Intelligence [51]: A broader concept in which shared or group intelligence emerges from the collaboration and competition of many individuals or agents.
Search and Multi-Agent/Game-Theoretic AI
- Adversarial Search [52]: Algorithms used in competitive multi-agent environments (like board games) to anticipate and counter an opponent’s moves.
- Agent-based Technologies [4]: Computational models for simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous agents to assess their effects on the system as a whole.
- Cellular Automata [53]: Discrete mathematical models consisting of a grid of cells that evolve through discrete time steps according to a set of rules based on the states of neighbouring cells (highly utilized in modelling complex systems and spatial games).
3.2.2. The Taxonomy of the Used Evolutionary Game Strategies
Classic Game Models
- Prisoner’s Dilemma [54]: The foundational game illustrating why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so.
- Snowdrift Game [55]: Also known as the game of “Chicken.” A situation in which both players want the other to yield, but a failure to yield by both results in the worst possible outcome for both. It is often used to model the evolution of cooperation when mutual defection is disastrous.
- Hawk–Dove Game [56]: A model used to analyse the evolution of animal behaviour and conflict over resources, in which “Hawks” are aggressive, and “Doves” are peaceful, yielding to aggression.
Solution Concepts and Strategic Frameworks
- Nash Equilibrium [57]: A state in a game in which no player has an incentive to deviate from their chosen strategy after considering an opponent’s choice. In evolutionary terms, it often relates to an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS).
- Stackelberg Game [36]: A strategic game in economics and game theory in which the leader firm (or agent) moves first, and then the follower firms move sequentially. It models hierarchical decision-making.
Evolutionary Dynamics
- Replicator Dynamics [8]: A fundamental mathematical model in Evolutionary Game Theory that dictates that strategies with a higher payoff than the average population payoff will reproduce and increase in frequency.
- Darwinian Dynamics [58]: A broader term for the mechanisms of natural selection, mutation, and inheritance that drive the evolution of strategies in a population.
- Cooperation Dynamics [59]: The specific study of how cooperative strategies emerge, stabilize, or collapse within a population of self-interested agents over time.
Behavioural Theories and Mechanisms
- Reciprocal Altruism [60]: A behavioural mechanism in which an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism’s fitness, with the expectation that the other organism will act in a similar manner at a later time (often modelled using repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma).
- Cumulative Prospect Theory [61]: A behavioural economic theory describing the way people choose between probabilistic alternatives that involve risk, weighting the probability of extreme events heavily. It modifies traditional game theory by accounting for real-world human psychological biases.
3.3. The Translation from EG Health and IEG All to IEG Health (Translation Framework)
3.3.1. The Translation of Social Governance Themes
3.3.2. The Contextual Shift of Health Domains
- From Drug Resistance to AI-Augmented Chronic Disease Management: Rather than modelling stochastic bacterial evolution, IEG Health models how a patient’s “intelligent” wearable interface adaptively modifies treatment schedules to pre-emptively mitigate resistance.
- From Privacy Protection to Adaptive Security in Smart Environments: This entails a shift from static regulatory compliance to the implementation of self-evolving, AI-driven security protocols designed to safeguard sensitive health telemetry within smart-home ecosystems.
3.3.3. The Logic of Strategic Interaction
3.3.4. Intelligent Computational Engines
- Federated Learning: This facilitates the training of robust diagnostic models across heterogeneous hospital networks while maintaining data siloization, thereby addressing the core theme of privacy.
- Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: This is utilized to model the high-dimensional interactions between diverse stakeholders within chronic disease or smart-home ecosystems.
- Swarm Intelligence: This paradigm is applied to surgical robotics and decentralized diagnostic networks in which coordinated units collaborate heuristically to execute complex medical tasks.
4. Discussion
- IEG All publications deal with high-level systemic issues like public good management, broad social dilemmas, and reputation management.
- EG Health publications transition toward governance, public safety, and passive biological modelling, such as disease transmission and cancer evolution.
- IEG Health publications present the highly specialized convergence of technology and clinical medicine, targeting specific service regulations in elderly care, chronic disease management, and adaptive security in smart homes.
- Handling Complexity: Traditional evolutionary models rely on static differential equations (like Replicator Dynamics) to understand how competition evolves. Deep Learning and LLMs replace these static equations with Adaptive Learning Strategies, allowing systems to process vast, complex data streams for precision diagnosing and real-time medical service regulation.
- Transforming Healthcare Delivery: By acting as the “intelligent” component, these models enable real-time adaptation. For example, concepts like reputation management are translated into algorithm transparency (“Explainable AI”), which is a strict prerequisite for achieving equilibrium in Human–AI games. For a physician to cooperate with an AI agent without succumbing to “algorithm aversion”, they must understand not just the output but the underlying process and data sources. This transparency prevents the “black box” effect, helping doctors assess AI diagnostic accuracy to safely adopt these tools into their workflows.
- Managing High-Dimensional Interactions: MARL is explicitly utilized to model the high-dimensional interactions between diverse stakeholders—such as doctors, patients, diagnostic agents, and smart-home sensors—within chronic disease ecosystems.
- Pre-emptive Healthcare: Rather than passively tracking how a disease evolves, MARL allows for proactive interventions. For instance, in chronic disease management, an “intelligent” wearable interface can adaptively modify treatment schedules to pre-emptively mitigate drug resistance based on real-time feedback.
- Human–AI Synergy: MARL is also used to resolve behavioural challenges in clinical settings, such as algorithm aversion (in which doctors constantly override AI) and clinical deskilling (in which doctors blindly trust AI). By continuously learning a doctor’s risk tolerance alongside the AI’s diagnostic strengths, MARL helps the system reach a dynamic Nash Equilibrium, fundamentally driven by the strategic choice of “Active Human Oversight.” Evolutionary dynamics, such as Replicator Dynamics, can be structured so that the highest fitness and payoff are awarded to a “co-evolving partnership” rather than to physicians who passively delegate tasks to the AI, resulting in a highly cooperative Human–AI healthcare team.
4.1. Conceptual Use Case
- The Players: The Clinical Specialist (Expertise-driven) and the AI Diagnostic Agent (Data-driven).
- The Strategy: * Doctor: Choose to Adopt (Follow AI advice) or Override (Use intuition).
- ○
- AI: Provide High-Confidence or Low-Confidence output.
- The Intelligent Twist: Unlike a static game, this uses MARL. The AI “learns” the doctor’s preferences and risk tolerance, while the doctor “learns” the AI’s strengths.
- Preventing “Deskilling”: If trust is too high (blind adoption), doctors may lose their critical skills.
- Reducing “Algorithm Aversion”: If trust is too low (constant override), the benefits of AI in reducing human error are lost.
- Finding the Nash Equilibrium: The goal is to find the point at which the doctor uses the AI only when the AI’s “Intelligence” truly exceeds human pattern recognition.

4.2. Study Implications
- Methodological Innovation: The research demonstrates the effectiveness of the Synthetic Near-Empty Review (SNER) framework combined with Synthetic Knowledge Synthesis (SKS). This approach allows researchers to extract structured, evidence-based knowledge from “near-empty” or sparse literature landscapes in which traditional systematic reviews would fail.
- A New Translation Framework: The study provides a structured pathway to bridge the “knowledge void” by translating broad social governance themes (e.g., Social Trust, Reputation Management) into specific clinical models (e.g., Doctor-AI Adoption, Adaptive Coordination Games). This shifts the focus from theoretical systems to specialized medical applications.
- Advancement in Strategic Logic: The paper implies a necessary paradigm shift from static evolutionary models (like fixed Replicator Dynamics) to Adaptive Learning Strategies, such as Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and Bayesian updating. This shift is crucial for modelling unpredictable clinical environments and addressing human–AI interaction challenges like “algorithm aversion” and “clinical deskilling”.
- Ethical and Regulatory Governance: The study highlights that translating theoretical AI-EGT models into actual clinical decision-making requires the integration of structured ethical guidelines. It advocates for adopting frameworks like the Assessment List for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (ALTAI) to ensure algorithmic accountability, transparency, and societal well-being.
4.3. Highlighting IEG Health’s Unique Contributions
4.4. Study Limitations
- Sparse Literature Base: The core premise of the study is that the specific field of Intelligent Evolutionary Games in Healthcare (IEG Health) is “near-empty,” with the search yielding only 16 relevant publications. Consequently, the findings heavily rely on translating concepts from broader fields (IEG All) rather than on analysing a robust body of existing clinical evidence.
- Lack of Empirical Clinical Operationalization: The study identifies that the primary bottleneck in the field is a profound scarcity of peer-reviewed publications that successfully operationalize these frameworks in real-world healthcare contexts. The proposed models (such as the adopt/override dynamic for Doctor–AI interaction) remain theoretical or demonstrative and lack empirical validation in actual clinical settings.
- Database and Search Constraints: The meta-data used for the SKS and SNER framework was harvested exclusively from the Scopus bibliographic database. This single-database approach may inadvertently exclude the relevant literature indexed in other major databases (e.g., Web of Science). However, it is worth noting that Scopus includes the PubMed bibliographic database.
- Model Simplification: To demonstrate the translation of concepts like “Social Trust,” the study employs a simplified adopt/override dynamic. While useful for demonstration, this may oversimplify the complex, multifaceted nature of clinical decision-making and legal accountability in reality.
- While MARL and Bayesian updating offer dynamic advantages, they present significant limitations in clinical settings. MARL suffers from the “curse of dimensionality”; as the number of clinical variables increases, the model requires massive amounts of exploratory data to converge, which is unsafe in patient care in which trial and error can be fatal. Additionally, MARL models often function as black boxes, making it difficult for clinicians to interpret the rationale behind a changing strategy. Similarly, Bayesian methods rely heavily on the accuracy of prior distributions; if the initial subjective probabilities are biased or flawed, the updated clinical recommendations will inherently skew, potentially compromising patient outcomes.
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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| IEG All | EG Health | IEG Health | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Overreaching research themes | Reputation management | Public participation in governmental supervision | Service regulation in community elderly care |
| Public good management | Collaborative governance in public health emergencies | Public medical services for chronic disease diagnosing and treatment | |
| Solving social dilemmas | Green technology innovation | Privacy protection | |
| Trust evaluation | Government regulation and privacy protection in health crises | Doctors’ adoption of AI-based medicine | |
| Decision-making | Regulation strategies in elderly care services | Adaptive security of healthcare in smart homes | |
| Task allocation | Carbon emission reduction | ||
| Smart supply chains | Drug resistance and cancer evolution | ||
| Resource allocation | |||
| Multi-objective optimization | |||
| Value co-creation | |||
| Intelligent construction | |||
| Population dynamics | |||
| Auction | |||
| Social networking | |||
| Specific healthcare domains | Privacy protection | Smart home | |
| Green technologies | AI-based medicine | ||
| Cancer evolution | Chronic diseases | ||
| Drug resistance Food and product safety (MAH—Marketing Authorization Holder mechanism) | |||
| Immunotherapy | |||
| Disease transmission | |||
| Angiogenesis | |||
| Evolutionary game strategies | All from EG Health | Cellular automata | |
| Collective intelligence | Prisoners’ dilemma | ||
| Replicator dynamics | Darwinian dynamics | ||
| Nash equilibrium | Cumulative prospect theory | ||
| Stackelberg game | Hawk–dove game | ||
| Cooperation dynamics | Reciprocal altruism | ||
| Snowdrift game | Agent-based technologies | ||
| Integrated AI algorithms and domains | All from IEG Health | Deep learning | |
| Swarm intelligence | Large language models | ||
| Neural network | Genetic algorithms | ||
| Federated learning | Adversarial search | ||
| Edge intelligence | |||
| Deep reinforcement learning | |||
| Multi-agent reinforcement learning | |||
| Q-learning |
| Concept in IEG All (Social Trust) | Translation to IEG Health (Doctor Adoption) | The Intelligent Logic (Mechanism) |
|---|---|---|
| Reputation management | Algorithm transparency | Doctors assess the AI’s “reputation” based on past diagnostic accuracy and explainability (XAI). |
| Cooperation dynamics | Human–AI collaboration | The game moves from “Human vs. AI” to a “Human + AI” team, where the payoff is the patient’s recovery. |
| Trust evaluation | Reliability assessment | Using Bayesian learning, the doctor updates their trust in the AI after every successful or failed intervention. |
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© 2026 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
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Kokol, P.; Blažun Vošner, H.; Završnik, J.; Žlahtič, B. Bridging the Knowledge Void: A Synthetic Near-Empty Review of Intelligent Evolutionary Games’ Employment in Healthcare. Information 2026, 17, 444. https://doi.org/10.3390/info17050444
Kokol P, Blažun Vošner H, Završnik J, Žlahtič B. Bridging the Knowledge Void: A Synthetic Near-Empty Review of Intelligent Evolutionary Games’ Employment in Healthcare. Information. 2026; 17(5):444. https://doi.org/10.3390/info17050444
Chicago/Turabian StyleKokol, Peter, Helena Blažun Vošner, Jernej Završnik, and Bojan Žlahtič. 2026. "Bridging the Knowledge Void: A Synthetic Near-Empty Review of Intelligent Evolutionary Games’ Employment in Healthcare" Information 17, no. 5: 444. https://doi.org/10.3390/info17050444
APA StyleKokol, P., Blažun Vošner, H., Završnik, J., & Žlahtič, B. (2026). Bridging the Knowledge Void: A Synthetic Near-Empty Review of Intelligent Evolutionary Games’ Employment in Healthcare. Information, 17(5), 444. https://doi.org/10.3390/info17050444

