

Article

From Technique to Wisdom: Translation-Induced Polysemy of *Zhiguan* 止觀 Across Chinese Breath-Meditation Texts, the *Chengshi lun*, and the Dunhuang Commentary Haneda 182 (羽182)

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Abstract

The Chinese binome *zhiguan* 止觀 is conventionally associated with *śamatha-vipaśyanā*. In Chinese breath-meditation texts, however, it also refers to fixing the mind and observing the breath. Related Indic materials use *sthāna/sthāpanā* and *upalakṣaṇā* for comparable functions, although precise source terms cannot always be established. Here “translation-induced polysemy” denotes the accumulation of related translation-based associations in one Chinese expression. The native range of *zhi*—“to cease” and “to abide”—facilitated their overlap; the *Chengshi lun*’s equation of *zhiguan* with *dinghui* was a later exegetical reclassification. This article traces these developments through early Chinese meditation texts, the *Chengshi lun*, and the *Chengshi lun yiji* preserved in Haneda 182. Comparison with the Kongō-ji *Anban shouyi jing* and an *Aṅguttara Nikāya* parallel shows how “*zhi* means concentration, *guan* means wisdom” recast a procedural pair as a hierarchy of temporary suppression and definitive eradication. Haneda 182 foregrounds the treatise’s emptiness discourse in practical glosses and correlates *zhiguan* with scholastic path categories. This manuscript-level operation is consistent with, but does not independently establish, broader reconstructions of Mahāyāna reframing. The commentary’s uncertain date precludes a demonstrated genealogy with Zhiyi. Comparison with the *Xiao zhiguan* makes a *Chengshi* precedent plausible but nonexclusive, indicating selective convergence rather than *Chengshi* affiliation or direct transmission. These materials show how translation-induced polysemy supported divergent medieval accounts of meditation and liberation.

Keywords: *zhiguan*; *dinghui*; *Chengshi lun*; *Chengshi lun yiji*; Haneda 182; Dunhuang manuscripts; Buddhist manuscript culture; translation-induced polysemy; Chinese Buddhist exegesis; Tiantai



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1. Introduction: Translation-Induced Polysemy and the Problem of *Zhiguan*

The Chinese binome *zhiguan* 止觀 is conventionally associated with Sanskrit *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, or Pāli *samatha* and *vipassanā*. In several Chinese breath-meditation texts, however, *zhiguan* labels a practical sequence of fixing the mind and subsequently observing the breath within what I call the six stages of breath-mindfulness¹. Related Indic and Sarvāstivāda materials describe comparable functions with terms such as *sthāna/sthāpanā* and *upalakṣaṇā*, but the precise Indic term underlying each Chinese witness cannot be securely recovered. I therefore use these Sanskrit terms as comparative labels for a functional

configuration, not as claims that every occurrence of *zhi* and *guan* directly translates them. The conventional calming-insight dyad and the practical fixing-observing sequence are closely related, but they are not identical (Kusuyama 1975, pp. 181–200).

At a separate level of receptor-language semantics, the coexistence of these associations was facilitated by the native range of *zhi* 止. In classical Chinese, *zhi* could mean cessation, as in the *Tuan* 彖 commentary to hexagram Gen 艮 of the *Yijing* 易經: “When it is time to stop, it stops; when it is time to act, it acts” 「時止則止，時行則行」. It could also mean to stay, abide, or remain in place, as in the *Daxue* 大學 phrase “abiding in the highest good” (*zhi yu zhishan* 止於至善). These senses made the Chinese expression hospitable to both calming and fixing or stationing. They facilitated semantic overlap in Chinese but do not establish the precise Indic source behind any individual occurrence.

Kusuyama’s treatment of *zhiguan* as a Chinese term makes it possible to distinguish the Indic strands that converged in the binome (Kusuyama 1975). The present inquiry begins with the exegetical consequences of that distinction. Reducing the medieval movement from *zhiguan* toward *dinghui* 定慧, concentration and wisdom, to misunderstanding obscures the term’s historical productivity. Research on translation, attribution, meditation literature, and the Kongō-ji discoveries defines the early textual corpus (Boucher 1996; Deleanu 1992, 1997, 2003; Nattier 2008; Zacchetti 2008, 2010; cf. Dhammajoti 2008; Kuan 2008). Greene (2014) cautions against reducing Eastern Han and Three Kingdoms meditation sources either to an intact Indic inheritance or to assimilation into indigenous Chinese breath practice. His account provides the practical-historical setting for the semantic argument developed here: the receptor-language range of *zhi* facilitated the coexistence of calming-insight and fixing-observing associations within one Chinese expression and made their later exegetical interaction possible.

Research on the *Chengshi lun* clarifies the doctrinal operations involved. Priestley (1970) provides the background for its emptiness discourse, while Q. Lin (2015) shows that Harivarman construes liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom as successive stages of temporary suppression and final eradication. The analysis below maps that hierarchy onto the “Zhiguan pin” formula “*zhi* means concentration, *guan* means wisdom.” X. Lin (2025) identifies shared literary sources and argumentative traditions between the treatise and Kumārajīva’s *Madhyamaka* corpus. Her findings establish a broader context of textual and argumentative overlap; they do not establish a line of dependence from the treatise to Tiantai. Zhou (2024) reconstructs more broadly how Chinese *Chengshi* exegetes reread the treatise through Mahāyāna categories. Haneda 182 documents at the manuscript level a related but more limited exegetical operation: in line-by-line glosses on breath meditation and *zhiguan*, it foregrounds emptiness within passages whose immediate wording is practical. This operation is consistent with, but does not independently demonstrate, Zhou’s broader reconstruction. The Tiantai comparison also begins from established findings. Fujii (2003) and Yamaguchi (2020) trace the prehistory of *zhiguan* around Zhiyi, and Yamaguchi (2020, p. 809, n. 13), following Sekiguchi (1969, p. 104), notes the *Xiao zhiguan*’s connection with wording in the *Chengshi lun*’s “Zhiguan pin.” Donner and Stevenson (1993) and Swanson (2017) establish the larger Tiantai frame, while Poceski (2020) follows the later career of calmness and insight. Working in the other chronological direction, this article reconstructs the conjunction of *zhi* with subduing and concentration and *guan* with severing and wisdom. On that basis, a *Chengshi* precedent is plausible but nonexclusive; the relationship is examined as selective convergence rather than as demonstrated appropriation or school affiliation.

Here “translation-induced polysemy” denotes the historically layered capacity of a single Chinese expression to bear more than one related sense because translated and translation-derived texts used it for distinct Indic conceptual configurations. “Translation-

induced” identifies the context in which these senses accumulated; it does not posit a recoverable one-to-one Sanskrit equivalent behind every occurrence. Three analytical levels must therefore be kept separate: the relation of *zhiguan* to different Indic conceptual configurations, the receptor-language semantic range of *zhi* itself, and the later exegetical reclassification of *zhi* and *guan* as *ding* and *hui*. The Chinese semantic range facilitated the overlap of different translation-based associations, whereas the Chengshi formula reorganized their Chinese afterlife; it was not another act of lexical translation. Section 2 examines the early conceptual associations and their overlap in Chinese, Section 3 the Chengshi reclassification, and Section 4 the manuscript and Tiantai elaborations of the resulting classificatory template.

On this basis, the article treats *zhiguan* not only as a lexical problem but as a case of translation-induced polysemy that generated new doctrinal possibilities. It follows this layered history through three textually distinct settings linked by a shared lexical field but not assumed to form a continuous genealogy. The first setting is procedural. It appears in Chinese witnesses associated with Saṅgharakṣa’s **Yogācārabhūmi*—An Shigao’s 安世高 abbreviated *Daodi jing* 道地經 and Dharmarakṣa’s 竺法護 *Xiuxing daodi jing* 修行道地經—and in the Kongō-ji manuscript of the *Anban shouyi jing* 安般守意經. In these materials, *zhi* refers primarily to fixing or abiding: the settled condition in which the mind rests with the breath rather than following it.

The second textual setting is Harivarman’s treatise, translated by Kumārajīva as the *Chengshi lun* 成實論 and conventionally reconstructed here as **Tattvasiddhi*². In its section on the truth of the path, the *Chengshi lun* places a chapter on *zhiguan* between chapters on the in- and out-breaths and on cultivating concentration. The text preserves a sixfold breath-meditation scheme, but it also exegetically reclassifies *zhiguan* through the formula “*zhi* means concentration, *guan* means wisdom” (*zhi ming ding, guan ming hui* 止名定, 觀名慧). This formula reorganizes a procedural pair as a soteriological hierarchy: concentration temporarily suppresses craving, whereas wisdom definitively eradicates ignorance.

The third textual setting is the *Chengshi lun yiji* 誠實論義記 [Commentarial Notes on the *Chengshi lun*], fascicle 4, preserved in the Dunhuang manuscript Haneda 182 (羽182; hereafter *Yiji*) and now held in the Kyōu Shooku 杏雨書屋 collection. The manuscript gives the title as 誠實論 rather than the standard 成實論; I retain this form when referring to the manuscript title. The *Yiji* repeatedly glosses the chapter on the in- and out-breaths through the language of emptiness, distinguishes provisional from real contemplation, and correlates *zhi* and *guan* with scholastic path categories such as *dharma-kṣānti* and *anvaya-kṣānti*. These moves show a manuscript commentator reorganizing inherited meditation vocabulary rather than merely transmitting it.

Haneda 182 is therefore the article’s principal manuscript witness. Galambos’s treatment of Dunhuang manuscripts as material records of textual practice informs the manuscript-historical method used here (Galambos 2020). Ikeda (2014) documented Haneda 182 and tentatively placed its commentary not long after Kumārajīva; Wang (2017) argued for a *terminus post quem* in the latter half of the sixth century from its terminology and parallels with Jingying Huiyuan. Their disagreement leaves the chronology open. What makes the manuscript decisive is that it exposes exegesis at work: a direct Chengshi commentary selects, glosses, and reorganizes inherited meditation vocabulary line by line. The earlier translations and the *Chengshi lun* establish the semantic and doctrinal field against which these operations become legible; the *Xiuxi zhiguan zuochan fayao* 修習止觀坐禪法要 and the *Mohe zhiguan* 摩訶止觀 serve as distinct Tiantai comparators. Haneda 182 can thus be analyzed as a Chengshi exegetical configuration without assigning it a position before, alongside, or after Zhiyi.

Transmitted canonical texts and manuscript witnesses are thus read within a shared but uneven textual history. Lexical or conceptual proximity establishes neither direct influence nor chronological priority; a non-Tiantai configuration, for example, need not predate Tiantai. The question is what each textual form—a translation, a scholastic treatise, or a manuscript commentary—does with an inherited lexical field, and how genre and medium enable different interpretations. This method gives the Kongō-ji and Dunhuang witnesses evidentiary weight as records of textual use.

These comparisons involve several distinct relations. The *Yiji* depends directly on the *Chengshi lun*. The Tiantai materials present a textually suggestive but nonexclusive Chengshi precedent within a broader scholastic vocabulary; their correspondences are treated as evidence of selective convergence rather than of demonstrated direct dependence, deliberate appropriation, or school affiliation. Beyond these cases lies a broader convergence around the problem of relating concrete meditation procedures to *dinghui* and emptiness. Keeping these relations separate prevents lexical proximity from becoming evidence for a single genealogy.

Taken together, the analysis treats translation-induced polysemy as a resource for exegesis rather than a record of imperfect equivalence. It places the *Chengshi lun* at the point where a procedural breath-meditation pair was exegetically reclassified as concentration and wisdom, and it uses Haneda 182 to show how a noncanonical commentary extended that reclassification by foregrounding emptiness and correlating the pair with scholastic path categories. Comparison with Tiantai locates the shared problem while keeping the manuscript and Tiantai in separate and only partially connected lines of development.

2. Zhiguan in Chinese Breath-Meditation Texts

This section compares Chinese witnesses that share a problem of breath-meditation vocabulary rather than assuming that they form a single line of descent. The *Daodi jing* 道地經 and *Xiuxing daodi jing* 修行道地經 preserve Chinese forms of a meditation tradition associated with Saṅgharakṣa's **Yogācārabhūmi* (Deleanu 1992; 1997, pp. 33–52), while the Kongō-ji *Anban shouyi jing* 安般守意經 preserves an An Shigao-associated account of the six practices. Research following the Kongō-ji discovery has substantially revised the relation between this manuscript and the transmitted *Da anban shouyi jing* 大安般守意經 T602 (Ochiai 2002; Deleanu 2003; Guo Huei 2006; Zacchetti 2008).

“Chinese breath-meditation texts” is thus an analytical label, not a claim that these witnesses belong to one date, school, or direct chain of transmission. Boucher (1996) and Nattier (2008) supply the broader translation and attributional context, while Greene (2014) cautions against reducing Eastern Han and Three Kingdoms meditation sources either to a purely Indic inheritance or to simple assimilation with indigenous Chinese breathing practices. Table 1 distinguishes the status, relation, and argumentative function of the sources used below.

The relevance of the first two witnesses to the history of *zhiguan* is not imposed retrospectively. The textual tradition itself marks this vocabulary as central: Dharmarakṣa's version characterizes the teaching as *jiguan* 寂觀 (T606:15.182c20), while An Shigao's abbreviated version explicitly names the *Daodi jing* as a text of *zhiguan* 止觀 (T607:15.231b8).³

The *Za ahan jing* 雜阿含經 is used here as a canonical comparandum for the effects of breath-mindfulness, not as an earlier form of the four- or sixfold practice sequence:

The Blessed One said to the monks: “You should cultivate mindfulness of breathing. If a monk cultivates mindfulness of breathing and cultivates it repeatedly, he obtains the calming of body and mind (*zhixi* 止息). Accompanied by initial and sustained thought (*you jue you guan* 有覺有觀), it is quiescent, unified, and fulfills the cultivation of the perception partaking of knowledge.”⁴

Table 1. Textual witnesses, relations, and functions in the argument.

Source	Textual Status and Relation	Function in This Article
<i>Daodi jing</i> 道地經	An Shigao-attributed abbreviated Chinese witness associated with Saṅgharakṣa's *Yogācārabhūmi.	Shows <i>zhi/guan</i> wording and the grass-cutting simile.
<i>Xiuxing daodi jing</i> 修行道地經	Dharmarakṣa's Chinese version of the same broader meditation tradition; not treated as a simple lineal descendant of the <i>Daodi jing</i> .	Preserves <i>jiguan</i> 寂觀 and a four-practice arrangement.
Kongō-ji <i>Anban shouyi jing</i> 安般守意經	A manuscript witness associated with An Shigao and distinct from the composite transmitted T602.	Provides the six practices and an explicit procedural explanation of <i>zhi</i> .
<i>Za ahan jing</i> 雜阿含經; <i>Apitan piposha lun</i> 阿毘曇毘婆沙論	Canonical and Abhidharma comparanda; neither is asserted to be a direct source for the other witnesses.	Contextualize the effects of breath-mindfulness and a parallel sixfold sequence.
<i>Āṅguttara Nikāya</i>	Indic canonical parallel to the scripture cited in the <i>Chengshi lun</i> .	Clarifies the samatha/vipassanā logic of mind, wisdom, and the two liberations.
<i>Chengshi lun</i> 成實論	A scholastic treatise translated by Kumārajīva.	Recasts <i>zhi/guan</i> as concentration/wisdom and ranks their soteriological efficacy.
Haneda 182, <i>Chengshi lun yiji</i> 誠實論義記	A noncanonical <i>Chengshi</i> commentary preserved in the Dunhuang manuscript Haneda 182 and the principal manuscript witness of this article.	Shows the foregrounding of emptiness, contemplative hierarchy, and correlations with scholastic path categories.
Tiantai comparators: <i>Xiao zhiguan</i> 小止觀 and <i>Mohe zhiguan</i> 摩訶止觀	The <i>Xiao zhiguan</i> is transmitted under Zhiyi's name in multiple recensions; the <i>Mohe zhiguan</i> is used as a separate Tiantai comparator. Neither is placed in a demonstrated chronological sequence with the <i>Yiji</i> , and <i>Chengshi</i> influence is treated as nonexclusive.	Test a possible but nonexclusive <i>Chengshi</i> precedent, selective convergence, and Tiantai's integration of cessation and stationing.

Here *zhixi* 止息 refers to the settling or calming of body and mind, while *you jue you guan* 有覺有觀 is an early translation for what later came to be rendered as “with initial and sustained thought” (*savitarka-savicāra*). The phrase “perception partaking of knowledge” (*mingfen xiang* 明分想) anticipates the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* passage discussed below, where *samatha* and *vipassanā* are called “things partaking of knowledge” (*vijjābhāgiyā*). The passage neither formulates the four- or sixfold sequence nor defines *zhiguan* as a doctrinal pair; it provides a canonical context for vocabulary associated with the effects of breath-mindfulness.

The *Xiuxing daodi jing* raises *zhiguan* to the level of one of the four practices required in the cultivation of breath-mindfulness. Because the wording of the verse itself is evidence for the argument, I cite the Chinese text together with my translation:

數息守意有四事行，無二瑕穢，十六特勝。於是頌曰：
其修行者欲求寂，當知安般出入息，
無有二瑕曉四事，當有奇特十六變。
何謂四事？一謂數息，二謂相隨，三謂止觀，四謂還淨。於是頌曰：
當以數息及相隨，則觀世間諸萬物，
還淨之行制其心，以四事宜而定意。

The practice of counting the breaths and guarding the mind comprises four practices, is free from two faults, and includes the sixteen superior practices. Thus the verse says:

“If practitioners seek quiescence (*ji* 寂), they should know the in- and out-breaths of *anban*.

Free from the two faults, they understand the four practices; they will have the wondrous sixteen transformations.”

What are the four practices? The first is counting the breaths; the second is following; the third is *zhiguan*; the fourth is returning and purification. Thus the verse says:

“With counting the breaths and following, one then observes the myriad things of the world.

Through the practice of returning and purification one controls the mind; by means of the four practices one settles intention in concentration.” (*Xiuxing daodi jing* 修行道地經, T606:15.216a2–10)

Two points require attention. First, the practices that the *Xiuxing daodi jing* groups as “four practices” (*si shi* 四事) are explicitly presented as “six practices” (*liu shi* 六事) in the *Anban shouyi jing*. Second, the second verse moves directly from counting and following to “observing the myriad things of the world” 「則觀世間諸萬物」. Where, then, has *zhi* gone? I first address the relation between the four and the six practices and then return to the apparent omission of *zhi*.

安般守意亦為六事，何等為六？一數、二隨、三止、四觀、五還、六淨。

The *Anban shouyi* also consists of six practices. What are the six? First, counting; second, following; third, *zhi*; fourth, *guan*; fifth, returning; sixth, purification.⁵

Yinshun suggested that the four practices already contain the six practices, and that the later distinction between the four practices and the six wondrous gates developed out of this compact formulation (Yinshun 2009, p. 346). The numerical contrast, however, cannot by itself establish the relative chronology of the **Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Anban shouyi jing*: compression and expansion are both possible in transmission. What matters for the present argument is textual organization. The *Xiuxing daodi jing* groups *zhi* and *guan* as a single item among four practices, whereas the *Anban shouyi jing* separates them as two items within six. The sixfold arrangement also has a close Sarvāstivāda parallel in the *Apitan piposha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論: “Mindfulness of breathing is said to have six practices. What are the six? First, counting; second, following; third, *zhi*; fourth, *guan*; fifth, turning; sixth, purification” (*Apitan piposha lun*, T1546:28.105c6–7).⁶

The explanations that follow in the *Apitan piposha lun* are close enough to the *Anban shouyi jing* to show that the two texts preserve highly similar accounts of breath-meditation practice. Table 2 compares the two accounts.

The second point concerns the meaning of *zhi* 止. In Table 2, the *Anban shouyi jing* glosses *zhi* simply as concentration (*ding* 定). This resembles the later formula in the *Chengshi lun*, but in terms of meditation practice, it leaves the technical process underexplained. The *Anban shouyi jing* therefore gives a more detailed explanation:

止為何等？入息至竟，遍止鼻頭，莫隨。出息至竟，著鼻頭，莫隨。是為止。何用是止？但欲從是止念。

What is *zhi*? When the inhalation has reached its limit, completely fix it at the tip of the nose and do not follow it. When the exhalation has reached its limit, attach it to the tip of the nose and do not follow it. This is *zhi*. What is the use of this *zhi*? Its purpose is simply that, by means of this *zhi*, mindfulness may be fixed.⁷

Table 2. The six stages of breath-mindfulness in the *Anban shouyi jing* and the *Apitan piposha lun*.

Stage	<i>Anban shouyi jing</i> 安般守意經	<i>Apitan piposha lun</i> 阿毘曇毘婆沙論
Counting 數	Counting inhalations and exhalations (計出入息); abandoning thoughts of the household (捨家中念).	Counting inhalations and exhalations (數入出息); abandoning discursive thoughts (捨思覺).
Following 隨	Experiencing inhalation and exhalation (入息出息受想); abandoning thoughts outside the household (捨家外念).	Following inhalation and exhalation (隨入出息); abandoning thoughts of desire (捨離欲覺).
Fixing 止	Concentration (定); cutting off all thoughts (斷一切念).	Fixing the breath at the tip of the nose (住息在鼻端); not abandoning samādhi (不捨三昧).
Observing 觀	Observing only the distinct marks of inhalation and exhalation (入息出息分別但相觀); mental anxiety and ideation (意念所憂想).	Observing the characteristics of abiding and change (<i>zhu</i> 住, <i>yi</i> 異) in the in- and out-breaths (觀入出息住異相); grasping the marks of mind and mental factors (取心心數法相).
Returning/Turning 還 / 轉	Returning to the five aggregates (還五陰); knowing and seeing cessation (知見滅盡).	Knowing the aggregates (知陰); entering the noble path (入聖道).
Purification 淨	Abandoning fetters (捨縛結); seeing purity (見淨).	Cutting off fetters (斷結); purified seeing (淨見).

Here *zhi* means that mindfulness no longer follows the movement of inhalation and exhalation. It indicates that the aim of breath practice—to settle mindfulness in one place—has been attained. This also explains why the first definition of *zhi* in the same text is simply “concentration” (*ding* 定).

The *Xiuxing daodi jing* makes a similar point through the example of the cowherd. After the practitioner has stabilized counting, the text says, he should practice following. This is like a person walking ahead and another following behind like a shadow; the practitioner likewise follows the inhalation and exhalation “without any other thought” (*wu ta zhi nian* 無他之念). When the practitioner has attained following, he should then contemplate. This is like a cowherd standing to one side and watching from afar as the cattle graze; the practitioner similarly observes the process from the initial counting of the breath to its final completion (*Xiuxing daodi jing*, T606:15.216b7–16).

This returns us to the question posed above: why can a practitioner who has attained following apparently pass directly to contemplation without a separately named cultivation of *zhi*? In this passage, *zhi* is best understood as the settled condition reached when the mind follows the breath steadily and is no longer scattered. It is implied in the phrase “following the inhalation and exhalation without any other thought.” The cowherd image makes the same point. Like the practitioner’s mind, the cowherd is no longer dispersed; standing to one side, he can observe and differentiate. The sequence therefore marks a change in cognitive posture—from following to stable observation—whether or not *zhi* is counted as an independent item.

In the passages examined here, then, *zhi* primarily describes fixation, abiding, or the condition in which the mind has ceased to chase its object; active severance is not its primary function. This functional profile is comparable to the semantic field of *sthāna/sthāpanā*: position or remaining, and the act of fixing or stationing. Kusuyama (1975, pp. 182–83) relates this early use of *zhi* and *guan* to a *sthāna-upalakṣaṇā* strand. The comparison identifies a practical configuration of fixing or abiding followed by differentiated observation; it does not establish word-for-word Indic equivalents behind each Chinese witness. The technical sense remains visible in the *Chengshi lun*, which preserves the sixfold scheme but reorganizes *zhiguan* through concentration and wisdom.

3. The *Chengshi lun*: Recasting *Zhiguan* as Concentration and Wisdom

The *Chengshi lun* 成實論 devotes a separate “*Zhiguan pin*” 止觀品 to this issue within the exposition on concentration (*ding lun* 定論) in the section on the truth of the path (*daodi ju* 道諦聚). Read in isolation, this chapter can seem abrupt: the preceding discussion does not explicitly prepare for it, and the following chapters do not develop it at length. Read together with the immediately preceding “*Churuxi pin*” 出入息品 and the following “*Xiuding pin*” 修定品, however, its position becomes clear. The chapter belongs to the same field of problems as the breath-meditation texts discussed above, but it provides a treatise-level recoding of their vocabulary—the recoding on which Haneda 182 later comments.

In the “*Churuxi pin*,” Harivarman gives special weight to the sixteen superior practices (*shiliu tesheng xing* 十六特勝行) within mindfulness of breathing. He even calls them “noble practice” and “heavenly practice,” and argues that they alone are sufficient for the completion of the practice.⁸ This position leads him to reject, or at least relativize, the older explanatory scheme represented by the four or six practices:

行者若得此十六行，爾時名具足。有論師言，以六因緣故名具足，所謂數、隨、止、觀、轉緣、清淨。數名數出入息從一至十，數有三種，若等，若過，若減。等謂十數為十，過謂十一數名為十，減名數九為十。隨名行者心隨息出入。觀名行者見息繫身如珠中縷。止名令心住出入息。轉謂轉身緣心，令受緣心。現前心法亦爾。清淨名行者離一切煩惱諸難，心得清淨。此不必定。所以者何？是諸行中不必要用數隨二法，行者但令心住息中斷諸覺故，若能行十六種名為具足。又此具足相不決定，鈍根所行，於利根者則非具足。

When practitioners obtain these sixteen practices, they are then said to be complete. Some masters say that completion occurs by means of six conditions: counting, following, *zhi*, *guan*, shifting the object, and purification. Counting means counting the in- and out-breaths from one to ten. Counting has three kinds: equal, excessive, and deficient. Equal means counting ten as ten; excessive means counting eleven as ten; deficient means counting nine as ten. Following means that the practitioner’s mind follows the breath as it enters and exits. *Guan* means that the practitioner sees the breath bound to the body like the thread running through beads. *Zhi* means causing the mind to abide in the in- and out-breaths. Turning (*zhuan* 轉; i.e., *zhuanyuan* 轉緣, “shifting the object”) means turning the mind that takes the body as its object into a mind that takes feeling as its object; the same is done in turn for the presently manifest mind and for dharmas. Purification means that the practitioner departs from all defilements and difficulties, and the mind becomes purified. But this is not necessarily fixed. Why? Among these practices, the two methods of counting and following are not necessarily required. The practitioner need only cause the mind to abide in the breath and thereby cut off all initial thoughts. If one can practice the sixteen kinds, they are called complete. Moreover, the mark of completion is not fixed:

what is practiced by those of dull faculties is not complete for those of sharp faculties. (*Chengshi lun* 成實論, T1646:32.356b16–29)

The sixfold scheme is reported as the view of “some masters” and immediately relativized by Harivarman’s “this is not necessarily fixed” (*ci bu bi ding* 此不必定). The *Chengshi lun* clearly knows the scheme, yet it makes counting and following dispensable for a practitioner able to make the mind abide in the breath from the beginning. Harivarman explains this through the contrast between dull and sharp faculties (*dungen* 鈍根 and *ligen* 利根): the former may proceed step by step, whereas the latter can begin directly with the sixteen superior practices. The contrast explains why the sequence need not be universal.

The stronger doctrinal claim appears in the following “Zhiguan pin,” where Harivarman redefines the pair. At the opening of the chapter, an interlocutor asks why, among the many forms of meditation and concentration that should be cultivated, only *zhi* and *guan* are singled out. Harivarman answers:

問曰：佛處處經中告諸比丘，若在阿練若處，若在樹下、若在空舍，應念二法，所謂止觀。若一切禪定等法皆悉應念，何故但說止觀？答曰：止名定，觀名慧。一切善法從修生者，此二皆攝。及在散心聞思等慧亦此中攝。以此二事能辦道法。所以者何？止能遮結，觀能斷滅。……又止能斷貪，觀除無明，如經中說：修止則修心，修心則貪受斷；修觀則修慧，修慧則無明斷。又離貪故，心得解脫；離無明故，慧得解脫。得二解脫，更無餘事，故但說二。

Question: In many scriptures the Buddha tells the monks that, whether they are in a wilderness retreat, under a tree, or in an empty dwelling, they should keep in mind two dharmas, namely *zhiguan*. If all dharmas such as meditation and concentration should be kept in mind, why are only *zhi* and *guan* spoken of?

Answer: *Zhi* means concentration, and *guan* means wisdom. All good dharmas that arise from cultivation are included in these two. Forms of wisdom, such as those arising from hearing and thinking, even when one is in a scattered mind, are also included here. These two things can accomplish the path. Why? *Zhi* can suppress the fetters; *guan* can cut them off and extinguish them. ... Moreover, *zhi* can cut off craving, while *guan* removes ignorance. As a scripture says: cultivating *zhi* cultivates the mind; when the mind is cultivated, craving and feeling are cut off.⁹ Cultivating *guan* cultivates wisdom; when wisdom is cultivated, ignorance is cut off. Furthermore, through separation from craving, the mind is liberated; through separation from ignorance, wisdom is liberated. Once the two liberations have been obtained, nothing further remains to be done. Therefore only these two are spoken of. (*Chengshi lun* 成實論, T1646:32.358b2–11)

The phrase “*zhi* means concentration, *guan* means wisdom” is the pivot of the chapter. It shifts *zhiguan* from the narrower sequence of breath practice into a soteriological register. *Zhi* remains linked with concentration and the suppression of distraction, but its function is now framed in terms of cutting off craving. *Guan*, previously the observation of the breath or analysis of its marks after fixation, becomes the cultivation of wisdom and the removal of ignorance.

The scripture cited here corresponds closely to a passage in the *Anguttara Nikāya*. I cite the Pāli by PTS volume and page because modern numbering systems differ:

“Monks, these two things partake of knowledge. Which two? *Samatha* and *vipassanā*. When *samatha* is developed, what benefit does it bring? The mind is developed. When the mind is developed, what benefit does it bring? Craving is abandoned. When *vipassanā* is developed, what benefit does it bring? Wisdom is developed. When wisdom is developed, what benefit does it bring? Ignorance is abandoned. ... Through the fading away of craving there is liberation of mind;

through the fading away of ignorance there is liberation by wisdom.” (*Āṅguttara Nikāya*, PTS A I 61; my translation from the Pāli; cf. Bodhi 2012, pp. 152–53; Hirakawa 1975, p. 39)

The *Āṅguttara Nikāya* passage treats *śamatha* and *vipassanā* as practices that develop mind and wisdom respectively. The *Chengshi lun* folds this logic into the Chinese term *zhiguan* and uses it to answer a problem inherited from meditation manuals: if counting and following are dispensable, what justifies the centrality of *zhi* and *guan*? For Harivarman, they summarize the two powers necessary for the path: concentration and wisdom.

The chapter then sharpens the distinction between the two by contrasting suppressive severance (*zheduan* 遮斷) with definitive severance (*bijing duan* 畢竟斷):

If the scripture says that cultivating *zhi* cuts off craving, this refers to suppressive severance. ... If it says that ignorance is cut off, this is definitive severance. How do we know this? Because when ignorance is cut off, craving and the other defilements are also extinguished without remainder. The scripture also says: through separation from craving, the mind attains liberation; this is called suppressive severance. Through separation from ignorance, wisdom attains liberation; this is definitive severance. There are two kinds of liberation: temporary liberation and unshakable liberation. Temporary liberation is suppressive severance; unshakable liberation is definitive severance. ... Temporary liberation is so called because, by means of a superior power, it suppresses the fetters for a short time, but cannot cut them off forever; later they arise again. Therefore it is not uncontaminated. This liberation is also called “liberation cherished only for a time” (*shi'ai jietuo* 時愛解脫), for an arhat who has exhausted the contaminants has nothing to desire.¹⁰

The *Chengshi lun* therefore ranks *guan* above *zhi* in soteriological efficacy. *Zhi*, associated with concentration, can temporarily suppress craving, while *guan*, associated with wisdom, definitively removes ignorance and thereby eradicates the defilements without remainder. This gives *guan* a higher doctrinal status than the observing stage in early breath-meditation manuals could have carried on its own, and it opens an interpretive space around *zhiguan* that had not previously existed.

Q. Lin (2015, pp. 89–93) has shown that Harivarman interprets liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom as two stages on the path: the former temporarily suppresses defilements through meditation, whereas the latter ultimately eliminates all defilements, including ignorance. The “*Zhiguan pin*” maps the same hierarchy onto *zhi* and *guan*. This places the chapter’s lexical contrast within Harivarman’s broader exegetical strategy for ranking temporary and definitive liberation.

The *Chengshi lun* retains the technical configuration. In the “*Churuxi pin*,” even after counting and following are treated as dispensable for some practitioners, mindfulness of breathing is praised by contrast with contemplation of impurity. In the “*Zhiguan pin*,” the simile “*zhi* is like grasping grass, *guan* is like cutting with a sickle” has a close parallel in Saṅgharakṣa’s **Yogācārabhūmi*. An Shigao and Dharmarakṣa differ precisely in their translation of the first member, as Table 3 shows:

Table 3. The grass-cutting simile in An Shigao and Dharmarakṣa. Translator’s note: An Shigao’s phrasing is archaic, and the punctuation of several clauses is uncertain. The translation below is therefore provisional and is intended primarily to preserve the contrast between *zhi* 止 and Dharmarakṣa’s *ji* 寂. **Boldface identifies the contrasting Chinese terms and their corresponding English renderings.**

Text	Chinese	Translation
An Shigao, <i>Daodi jing</i> 道地經	止觀相云何？若意在使一因緣止止不動，不或念餘，是應止相；若在止處，偏分別偏去，如相觀思惟，如有受，是應觀相。……譬如人刈芻，左手把芻，右手持鎌便斷芻。彼譬如把芻是應止，如斷芻是應觀。	What are the marks of <i>zhi</i> and <i>guan</i> ? If the mind is made to remain on a single condition, stopping without movement and not thinking of anything else, this is the mark of <i>zhi</i> . If, while in the place of <i>zhi</i> , it differentiates and proceeds in analysis, contemplating and thinking according to marks and according to what is experienced, this is the mark of <i>guan</i> It is like a person cutting fodder: with the left hand he grasps the fodder, and with the right hand he holds a sickle and cuts it. Grasping the fodder corresponds to <i>zhi</i> ; cutting it corresponds to <i>guan</i> . (<i>Daodi jing</i> , T607:15.235b27–c8)
Dharmarakṣa, <i>Xiuxing daodi jing</i> 修行道地經	何謂為寂？其心正住，不動不亂而不放逸，是為寂相；尋因其行心觀正法，省察所作而見本無，因其形相是謂為觀。……如人刈草，左手獲草，右手鎌刈，其寂然者如手捉草，其法觀者如鎌截之。	What is <i>ji</i> 寂? The mind rightly abides, unmoving, undisturbed, and not negligent; this is the mark of <i>ji</i> . Then, based on that practice, the mind contemplates the true Dharma, examines what is done, and sees original non-being (<i>benwu</i> 本無); according to these forms, this is called <i>guan</i> It is like a person cutting grass: with the left hand he grasps the grass, and with the right hand he cuts with a sickle. What is quiescent is like the hand grasping grass; Dharma-contemplation is like the sickle cutting it. (<i>Xiuxing daodi jing</i> , T606:15.211c20–26)

Dharmarakṣa uses *ji* 寂 rather than *zhi* 止, but the underlying understanding is close to An Shigao’s. In both passages the first member of the pair describes a mind fixed in one place, unmoving and undistracted. It is not primarily an active operation of cutting off; the cutting function belongs more clearly to *guan*. The grass-cutting simile makes this vivid: the left hand first gathers and holds the grass so that it is no longer scattered, and only then can the right hand cut it with the sickle. The same divergence appears even in the treatises’ programmatic self-description, as noted above: Dharmarakṣa’s version speaks of *jiguan* 寂觀, while An Shigao’s version speaks of *zhiguan* 止觀.

The *Chengshi lun* thus brings two inherited associations of *zhiguan* into the same textual field. The first is procedural: a Chinese sequence of fixing or abiding and subsequent observation, functionally comparable to stages termed *sthāna/ssthāpanā* and *upalakṣaṇā* in related Indic materials. It remains visible in the sixfold explanation and the grass-cutting simile. The second is soteriological: the familiar association of *zhiguan* with calming and insight. The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* parallel provides a useful doctrinal comparandum for this latter association. The treatise’s distinctive contribution is the concise formula *zhi ming ding, guan ming hui* 止名定，觀名慧, which exegetically reclassifies the Chinese pair as concentration and wisdom and ranks the two terms by their capacity for temporary suppression and definitive eradication.

The treatise gives priority to the second configuration while preserving the first. Counting and following remain optional devices for practitioners capable of beginning with the sixteen superior practices, while the “*Zhiguan pin*” assigns definitive efficacy to wisdom. Superimposition produces a hierarchy: procedural vocabulary now links meditative technique to the wisdom required for liberation. The *Yiji* begins its exegetical work from this unresolved semantic and doctrinal layering.

The historical importance of the Chengshi formula lies as much in the question it answers as in the equivalences it proposes. Asked why numerous practices can be reduced to *zhi* and *guan*, the treatise turns a procedural pair into a classificatory grammar capable

of subsuming the path under *ding* and *hui*. It thereby supplies later readers with a compact template for connecting heterogeneous techniques to suppression, eradication, and liberation. A source, however, only makes such a template available; it does not determine which of its possibilities later exegetes will select and amplify. The comparison with Haneda 182 and Tiantai therefore asks how the formula was reused in distinct settings and why it proved repeatedly useful.

4. Haneda 182 and the Doctrinal Reorganization of Zhiguan

The surviving fascicle bears the title *Chengshi lun yiji* 誠實論義記, fascicle 4, and is preserved in the Kyōu Shooku 杏雨書屋 collection; it is reproduced in *Tonkō hikyū* 敦煌秘笈, film volume 3, pp. 152–71 (Kyōu Shooku 2010, pp. 152–71). The designation “Dunhuang manuscript” refers to the provenance and preservation context of the surviving witness. Preservation at Dunhuang does not by itself indicate local composition or use; the commentary’s place of origin remains undetermined. Alongside other fragmentary *Chengshi lun* commentaries, such as Tsugei 津藝 024, it offers rare access to a commentarial world largely absent from transmitted editions. The discussion below concentrates on its comments on the “Churuxi pin” and “Zhiguan pin.”

The composition date of the commentary preserved in Haneda 182 remains contested. Ikeda (2014, p. 321) tentatively placed the commentary only somewhat after the period of Kumārajīva’s activity. Taking the commentary’s date as his central problem, Wang (2017) argued instead for a *terminus post quem* in the latter half of the sixth century. The argument rested on two clusters of evidence. The expression *chan ti* 禪體 occurs only once in the *Chengshi lun* but seven times in Haneda 182, all in glosses on the chapters on the third and fourth *dhyānas*, where its scope is noticeably broadened. More decisively, the gloss “dhyāna engages its object, and in this respect is called activity” (*chan neng she jing, yi zhi wei xing* 禪能涉境，以之為行) closely parallels Jingying Huiyuan’s explanation in the *Dasheng yizhang* 大乘義章: “the inner mind engages its object; this is called activity” (*nei xin she jing, shuo ming wei xing* 內心涉境，說名為行). On this basis, Wang proposed that the commentator had drawn on Huiyuan’s writings, which would place the commentary no earlier than the latter half of the sixth century.

If that dependence is accepted, Haneda 182 cannot be assumed to predate Zhiyi or the *Mohe zhiguan*. The present article does not reopen the full dating problem, but it treats the later dating as a live possibility. The absence of Zhiyi’s threefold definitions and the mature Tiantai architecture of contemplation therefore cannot serve as a *terminus ante quem*, especially because only fascicle 4 survives; that absence may reflect exegetical affiliation rather than chronology. Accordingly, Haneda 182 is used here as evidence for a *Chengshi lun* exegetical configuration not articulated in Tiantai terms, while its chronological relation to Zhiyi is left open.

Viewed as a manuscript witness, Haneda 182 records an act of textual use—selection, glossing, and doctrinal reorganization—within a commentarial tradition no longer available in transmitted editions. This approach accords with work on Dunhuang manuscript culture that treats manuscripts as evidence for textual practices not preserved in transmitted editions (Galambos 2020). Wang’s 2017 study also examined the manuscript’s commentarial form, especially the place of *yiji* 義記 between *zhu* 注 and *yishu* 義疏. Here the dating argument is cited to delimit the chronological claims of the present study; the analysis that follows addresses a different question: how the commentary preserved in Haneda 182 reinterprets *zhiguan* vocabulary in the chapters on breath meditation and calmness and insight. It does not attempt to identify the anonymous commentator, locate the commentary’s composition or use at Dunhuang, or reconstruct a specific monastic community.

In quotations from the *Yiji*, □ marks an illegible or uncertain character in the manuscript transcription, and ellipses indicate omitted manuscript text where the argument does not depend on the omitted wording.¹¹

The following sections examine three places where Haneda 182 foregrounds or deploys categories not explicit in the immediately glossed passages of the base text: emptiness, provisional and real contemplation, and the path of seeing.

I call this pattern “exegetical reorganization”: the commentary uses these categories to change what inherited meditation vocabulary can explain.

4.1. Foregrounding Emptiness in the Exegesis of Breath Practice

When explaining the sixteen practices of mindfulness of breathing in the “Churuxi pin,” the *Yiji* repeatedly brings the language of emptiness to the foreground in its individual glosses, shifting the immediate practical wording of the *Chengshi lun* toward explicit doctrinal interpretation. One example concerns the question of long and short breaths:

第二問答釋十六行，從「云何」以下是。從……念四行。言出入之氣，謂以為息，息體形礙，猶色陰也。而出息之短，起於麤心，入氣□□，生□細識。從緣無性，故色空也。

The second question-and-answer explains the sixteen practices; it begins from “How ...?” From ... the four practices of mindfulness. The expression “the air that goes out and comes in” refers to breath. The body of breath has form and obstruction, and is thus like the form aggregate. The shortness of exhalation arises from a coarse mind; the inhaled air □□ gives rise to □ subtle consciousness. Because it lacks self-nature through conditions, form is empty. (Kyōu Shooku 2010, p. 156, Haneda 羽182, image 7, ll. 19–21).

The corresponding passage in the *Chengshi lun* explains the length and shortness of breath through the coarseness or subtlety of the mind:

Question: What is meant by long and short breaths?

Answer: It is like a person climbing a mountain: when carrying a heavy load and becoming exhausted, one’s breath is short. The practitioner is the same. When in a coarse mind, the breath is short. A coarse mind means an agitated, quick, and scattered mind. Long breath means that when the practitioner is in a subtle mind, the breath is long. Why? Because as the mind becomes subtle, the breath also becomes subtle. It is like the same person who, once exhausted and then resting, has a breath that becomes subtle; at that time it is a long breath.¹²

The commentator summarizes the relation between short breath and coarse mind, and between long breath and subtle mind, but then adds: “Because it lacks self-nature through conditions, form is empty.” The statement can be connected to the preceding observation that “the body of breath has form and obstruction, and is thus like the form aggregate,” yet neither the surrounding practical discussion nor the immediately glossed base passage makes emptiness explicit. It is therefore better understood as an interpretive extension that brings a doctrinal category to the foreground of the practical explanation.

Other examples show the same tendency:

「覺喜」、「覺樂」者，……從由無性，故受空也。

As for “aware of joy” and “aware of bliss,” ... because [feeling] lacks self-nature through conditions, feeling is empty. (Kyōu Shooku 2010, p. 156, Haneda 羽182, image 7, ll. 24–25).¹³

「覺心行」、「除心行」者，……終靡定，畢竟空也。

As for “aware of mental formations” and “calming mental formations,” ... ultimately there is no fixity; it is ultimately empty. (Kyōu Shooku 2010, p. 156, Haneda 羽182, image 7, ll. 25–27).¹⁴

從「行者」以下，.....四皆無性，法盡空也。

From “the practitioner” onward, ... all four lack self-nature; dharmas are entirely empty. (Kyōu Shooku 2010, p. 157, Haneda 羽182, image 8, ll. 2–4).¹⁵

Priestley’s analysis of Harivarman’s threefold scheme of awareness—of concepts, phenomena, and emptiness—shows that emptiness already has a systematic place in the *Chengshi lun* (Priestley 1970, p. 31). In the two chapters most directly concerned with meditation, the “Churuxi pin” and the “Zhiguan pin,” however, the treatise largely remains within a framework of practical sequence and explains meditation step by step, in a more operational idiom. Thus, the “Churuxi pin” concludes:

Because liberation is attained in this sequence, it is called the sixteen practices of mindfulness of the in- and out-breaths.¹⁶

By contrast, *Yiji* does not further elaborate the technique of meditation. While summarizing the base text, it repeatedly redirects attention from the phenomena described to their conditioned lack of self-nature and ultimate emptiness. The shift is consistent across form, feeling, mental formations, and dharmas. What the manuscript supplies is therefore not an additional step in breath practice but a doctrinal key through which the practical sequence can be reread.

Zhou (2024) reconstructs, primarily from school history and transmitted sources, a broader process in which Chengshi exegetes affirmed the treatise as Mahāyāna and supplemented what they regarded as its insufficient treatment of emptiness with Mahāyāna doctrinal resources. Haneda 182 documents at the manuscript level a related but more limited exegetical operation. It does not introduce emptiness into a treatise that otherwise lacked it. Rather, as the commentator moves line by line through the meditation chapter, he makes the *Chengshi lun*’s own discourse of emptiness an explicit interpretive key to passages whose immediate wording is practical. This passage-level foregrounding is consistent with Zhou’s broader reconstruction, but it does not by itself identify a specifically Mahāyāna source or demonstrate that Mahāyāna reclassification was the commentator’s primary aim.

4.2. Hierarchizing Contemplative Methods as Provisional and Real

When discussing contemplation of impurity and the sixteen superior practices, *Yiji* calls contemplation of impurity a “provisional contemplation” (*jiaguan* 假觀) and the sixteen superior practices a “real contemplation” (*shiguan* 實觀):

初明假觀生累，實觀滅惑，從「不淨」以下是。第二明實則易興，假則難成，從「又此」以下是。

First, it explains that provisional contemplation gives rise to entanglement, while real contemplation extinguishes delusion; this begins from “impurity” onward. Second, it explains that the real is easy to arouse, while the provisional is difficult to complete; this begins from “moreover, this” onward. (Kyōu Shooku 2010, p. 157, Haneda 羽182, image 8, ll. 5–6).

The corresponding passage in the *Chengshi lun* says:

When those who have not yet attained freedom from desire practice contemplation of impurity, they become disgusted with their own bodies and the mind becomes confused and oppressed. This is like taking too much medicine, so that the medicine itself causes illness. In this way, contemplation of impurity easily

gives rise to disgust. For example, by the river Vaggumudā, monks who practiced contemplation of impurity developed deep disgust and killed themselves in various ways, by drinking poison, jumping from heights, and so forth. This practice is not like that. It can attain freedom from desire without giving rise to disgust; therefore it is called superior. Moreover, this practice is easy to obtain because it has one's own body as its object; contemplation of impurity is easily lost.¹⁷

Here, *Yiji*'s provisional/real framework reorganizes a passage whose emphasis in the *Chengshi lun* lies elsewhere. For the *Chengshi lun*, contemplation of impurity is effective, at least in severing sexual desire. This accords with the early meditation manuals represented by the *Xiuxing daodi jing*:

At once he becomes joyful, able to delight in sweetness and reach what is extraordinary; he establishes and holds firm his resolve and no longer follows desire. If he sees a woman, he regards her as a chain of bones and not as a beautiful face. He examines and knows this truly: the desire he formerly practiced is a flaw and impurity. He separates from erotic feeling and does not commit evil. This is the first *dhyāna*. Having abandoned the five hindrances and fulfilled the five virtues (i.e., the five factors of the first *dhyāna*), separated from thoughts and far removed from desires and unwholesome dharmas, his mind focuses in quiet unity, and he joyfully practices the first *dhyāna*. This is called the quiescent and tranquil dharma. Seeking in this way is based on contemplation of the foul.¹⁸

The *Xiuxing daodi jing* then explains that the first *dhyāna* is still contaminated and that breath-mindfulness must be cultivated to reach the fourth *dhyāna*. The *Chengshi lun*, correspondingly, is concerned above all with the practical danger that contemplation of impurity may produce excessive disgust and self-harm. Neither text organizes its assessment through the provisional/real hierarchy used by *Yiji*. The commentary therefore shifts the axis: a practical assessment of efficacy and danger becomes a doctrinal account in which "provisional contemplation" produces entanglement and "real contemplation" extinguishes delusion.

4.3. Correlating Zhiguan with Scholastic Path Categories

In the first half of the "Zhiguan pin," the *Chengshi lun* uses numerous similes to explain the methods and effects of cultivating *zhi* and *guan*, and it emphasizes that *guan* removes ignorance while *zhi* only suppresses craving. Near the end of the chapter, however, an interlocutor raises a scriptural question:

Question: A scripture says: by means of *zhi*, one cultivates the mind and attains liberation based on *guan*; by means of *guan*, one cultivates the mind and attains liberation based on *zhi*. How should this be understood?

Answer: If the practitioner, because of meditative concentration, gives rise to knowledge that takes cessation as its object (*yuanmie zhi* 緣滅智), this is called cultivating the mind by means of *zhi* and attaining liberation based on *guan*. If, with a mind not yet collected in meditative concentration (lit. "a scattered mind," *sanxin* 散心), one analyzes the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields and thereby obtains calm that takes cessation as its object (*yuanmie zhi* 緣滅止), this is called cultivating the mind by means of *guan* and attaining liberation based on *zhi*. If one reaches the penetration-oriented stage represented by the establishments of mindfulness and related factors and brings the mind into collectedness, then one cultivates *zhi* and *guan* together. Moreover, all practitioners attain liberation through the extinction of mind by relying on these two dharmas.¹⁹

The expressions *yuanmie zhi* 緣滅智 and *yuanmie zhi* 緣滅止 are not self-explanatory. I take *yuan* 緣 verbally, “to take as an object,” and *mie* 滅 as cessation, yielding “knowledge that takes cessation as its object” and “calm that takes cessation as its object.” Wen (2004, pp. 399–401) adopts this grammatical reading and reconstructs concentration-first and contemplation-first routes. I follow his parsing of the phrases without assuming that the *Chengshi lun* thereby reproduces the later Theravāda distinction between practitioners who take calm or insight as their vehicle. This parsing is also consistent with the internal *Chengshi lun* parallels collected in note 19, in which *yuan* functions verbally to introduce the object of a mind or concentration. An alternative causative construal takes *yuan* as the noun “conditions” and understands the phrases as knowledge and calm through which conditions cease. The two readings thus differ grammatically—cessation is the object in the first and the result in the second—even though they point to a similar soteriological horizon. I adopt the object-oriented translations as the more economical grammatical rendering. The *Yiji*’s later gloss of both phrases as “entering the seeing of the truths” is compatible with this reading but does not decide it: the gloss assigns a path stage, and seeing the truths encompasses all four truths rather than cessation alone. The translations adopted here are therefore provisional rather than claiming to recover an Indic expression behind the Chinese.

On this reading, the answer explicitly distinguishes two initial orientations rather than mutually exclusive results. In the first, meditative concentration gives rise to knowledge directed toward cessation. In the second, analysis of the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields begins before the mind has been collected in meditative concentration and leads to calm directed toward cessation. The following sentence marks their convergence: once the practitioner reaches the penetration-oriented stage represented by the establishments of mindfulness and related factors and collects the mind, *zhi* and *guan* are cultivated together. The contrast concerns the direction from which practice begins, while the passage closes by making both indispensable to liberation.

The following comparison is illustrative and contextual rather than genealogical. I adduce the *Xiuxing daodi jing* as a practical comparandum, not as evidence of textual dependence. It presents a comparable reciprocity:

A practitioner may first obtain *ji* 寂 and then enter *guan*, or may first obtain *guan* and then enter *ji*. If one practices quiescence and upon reaching *guan* obtains liberation, or if one first enters *guan* and then reaches quiescence, one also obtains liberation.²⁰

As argued above, *ji* here corresponds functionally to *zhi*. This parallel helps clarify how two initial orientations could converge in liberation, but no direct textual relationship can presently be established. It neither identifies the source of the *Chengshi lun* question nor determines the grammar of the two unusual *yuanmie* compounds. The *Xiuxing daodi jing* next explains the difference between *ji* and *guan* by taking contemplation of the body as an example:

When a practitioner observes the skeleton of a human body before him and behind him, equally and without difference, whether the eyes are open or closed, observing it as the same, this is called *ji*. He then thinks: the head and neck are in different places; the hands and feet are each distinct; the joints and limbs are disassembled and scattered in different places. This is called *guan*. This skeleton-body grows because of four things: food and drink, desire, sleep, and karmic merit and demerit. All return to impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self (*feishen* 非身), impurity, decay, and accumulation; all are without anything at all. This is called *guan*. To state it briefly: seeing without examining is called *ji*; discriminating its nonexistence is called *guan*.²¹

At the level of practical structure, the distinction turns on whether the object is merely held in view or analytically differentiated. Harivarman's account of analyzing the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields can therefore be compared with the *Xiuxing daodi jing's* statement that "discriminating its nonexistence is called *guan*." In the *Chengshi lun* passage, *sanxin* identifies the initial absence of prior meditative collection; the text does not say that analysis performed in a distracted state is itself liberating. Analysis leads toward calm, and at the penetration-oriented, collected stage *zhi* and *guan* are cultivated together. This reading does not erase the term's usual negative force, as the *Chengshi lun's* warning elsewhere about scattered mind shows:

Therefore, those who wish to obtain knowledge as it really is should exert themselves diligently in cultivating samādhi. Those with scattered minds cannot even obtain the benefits of worldly scriptures, crafts, and arts, much less can they obtain supramundane benefits. Therefore one should know that all worldly and supramundane benefits are obtained through a concentrated mind.²²

The commentary interprets these two orientations by correlating meditative concentration and scattered analysis with the paired categories *dharma-kṣānti* and *anvaya-kṣānti*:

初明依止解脫，從始以下是。「因禪定」者，四法忍也。「緣滅智」者，入見諦也。「得解脫」者，出思惟也。

First, [the passage] explains liberation based on *zhi*, beginning with the opening of the answer. "Because of meditative concentration" means the four receptivities to dharma-knowledge (*si fa ren* 四法忍). "Knowledge that takes cessation as its object" means entering the seeing of the truths (*ru jiandi* 入見諦). "Attaining liberation" means *chu siwei* 出思惟²³. (Kyōu Shooku 2010, p. 158, Haneda 羽182, image 10, ll. 11–12).

第二明依觀解脫，從「若以」下是。「散心」者，四比忍也。「緣滅止」者，入見諦也。「得解脫」者，出思惟也。

Second, [the passage] explains liberation based on *guan*, beginning with "if by means of." "Scattered mind" means the four receptivities to subsequent knowledge (*si bi ren* 四比忍). "Calm that takes cessation as its object" means entering the seeing of the truths. "Attaining liberation" means *chu siwei*. (Kyōu Shooku 2010, p. 158, Haneda 羽182, image 10, ll. 12–13).

The referent of *chu siwei* 出思惟 remains uncertain. If *siwei* abbreviates a rubric associated with the path of cultivation, *chu* may indicate passing out of, and hence completing, that stage rather than entering it. A more literal reading would be "going beyond reflection or deliberation." The surviving fascicle provides no parallel sufficient to decide between these possibilities. I therefore leave the expression untranslated and do not use it to establish an exact transition between the paths of seeing and cultivation.

These paired receptivities belong to a wider Sarvāstivāda path schema. The manuscript's "four *dharma-kṣāntis*" and "four *anvaya-kṣāntis*" are abbreviated designations for the four receptivities to dharma-knowledge (*dharma-jñāna-kṣānti*) and four receptivities to subsequent knowledge (*anvaya-jñāna-kṣānti*). In the standard sequence, each of the Four Truths is realized in four moments: receptivity and knowledge concerning the desire realm, followed by receptivity and knowledge concerning the two upper realms. This yields eight receptivities and eight knowledges. Within each pair, receptivity abandons the relevant defilements and knowledge confirms their cessation. The first fifteen moments constitute the path of seeing; the sixteenth begins the path of cultivation and marks stream-entry (Dhammajoti 2015, pp. 511–13). The same arrangement is attested in the Kumārajīva-associated

Zuochan sanmei jing 坐禪三昧經²⁴. This standard account supplies doctrinal context for the *Yiji*'s terminology, but it is not a complete sequence explicitly set out by the commentary.

The commentary explicitly makes four equations: "because of meditative concentration" with the four *dharma-kṣāntis*; "scattered mind" with the four *anvaya-kṣāntis*; and both *yuanmie* compounds with "entering the seeing of the truths." It does not explain the otherwise surprising equation of *sanxin* with *anvaya-kṣānti*, nor does it present the complete sequence of eight receptivities and eight knowledges. In the standard sixteen-moment schema, the *dharma*- and *anvaya*-receptivities are interleaved with their corresponding knowledges for each truth; they do not constitute two separately ordered routes. The commentary's equation should therefore not be treated as a lexical identification of "scattered mind" with *anvaya-kṣānti*. On the basis of its paired assignments and its identical gloss of both *yuanmie* expressions, I suggest that the *Yiji* schematically coordinates two differently oriented approaches within a single path framework. This is a possible reconstruction of the commentary's equations, not a sequence explicitly stated by the manuscript.

The surviving fascicle thus preserves a distinctive *Chengshi lun* exegetical strategy. The terminology at issue situates the glosses within a repertoire prominently attested in Kumārajīva-period translations. This identifies one textual field activated by the commentary, not the limits of the commentator's knowledge. X. Lin (2025) identifies shared literary sources and argumentative traditions across the *Chengshi lun* and Kumārajīva's *Madhyama* corpus, providing a broader context for this repertoire without identifying any single text as the *Yiji*'s source. By correlating concentration and analysis undertaken before meditative collection with the four receptivities to *dharma*-knowledge and the four receptivities to subsequent knowledge, the commentary places the reciprocal relation of *zhi* and *guan* within categories drawn from a scholastic path schema. Because it does not spell out the sequence, and because *chu siwei* remains uncertain, the evidence supports a schematic classification extending from entry into seeing to an uncertain relation with cultivation, rather than an exact internal articulation of the path of seeing. This configuration can therefore be examined on its own terms. The evidence does not establish whether it precedes, overlaps with, or follows the Tiantai synthesis.

4.4. A Possible Chengshi Precedent and Selective Convergence: The Tiantai Comparison

The comparison with Tiantai involves three evidentiary levels: a specific but nonexclusive *Chengshi* precedent, individual correlations that belonged to a broader scholastic vocabulary, and selective convergence around a shared classificatory template. Haneda 182's relation to the *Chengshi lun* is direct, since the manuscript comments on the treatise. Tiantai's relation is less direct and cannot be reduced to a single source.

The text commonly known as the *Xiao zhiguan* 小止觀, transmitted under Zhiyi's name in several recensions, opens with a strikingly close set of correlations.²⁵

Because Haneda 182 may belong to the latter half of the sixth century or later, the comparison assumes neither that the manuscript predates Zhiyi nor that either witness depends on the other.

若夫泥洹之法，入乃多途，論其急要，不出止觀二法。所以然者，止乃伏結之初門，觀是斷惑之正要；止則愛養心識之善資，觀則策發神解之妙術；止是禪定之勝因，觀是智慧之由藉。若人成就定慧二法，斯乃自利利人法皆具足。

Although the ways of entering the true Dharma of *nirvāṇa* are many, in their essentials they do not go beyond *zhi* and *guan*. Why? *Zhi* is the initial gate for subduing the fetters, whereas *guan* is the essential means for severing delusion. *Zhi* is the beneficial support that nurtures mind-consciousness, whereas *guan* is the subtle art that stimulates spiritual understanding. *Zhi* is the superior cause of meditative concentration, whereas *guan* is the basis through which wisdom is

developed. When one accomplishes these two dharmas, concentration and wisdom, the dharmas of benefiting oneself and others are complete. (*Xiuxi zhiguan zuochan fayao* 修習止觀坐禪法要, T1915:46.462b7–12)

Yamaguchi (2020, p. 809, n. 13), following Sekiguchi (1969, p. 104), notes the *Xiao zhiguan*'s connection with wording in the *Chengshi lun*'s "Zhiguan pin." Building on that observation, Table 4 compares the shared rhetorical frame, the concentration-wisdom and suppression-severance correlations, and the formulations that lack a precise counterpart in the other passage.

Table 4. Wording in the *Chengshi lun* and the *Xiao zhiguan*. The Chinese is retained to display the exact verbal correspondences; complete English translations appear in the preceding discussion.

Chengshi lun	Xiao zhiguan	Comparative Significance
若一切禪定等法皆悉應念，何故但說止觀？……一切善法從修生者，此二皆攝。	入乃多途，論其急要，不出止觀二法。	A shared inclusivist frame reduces a plurality of practices or approaches to <i>zhi</i> and <i>guan</i> .
止名定，觀名慧。	止是禪定之勝因，觀是智慧之由藉。	Naming or classification is recast as a causal or enabling relation.
止能遮結，觀能斷滅。	止乃伏結之初門，觀是斷惑之正要。	The pairs 遮/伏 and 斷滅/斷惑 are semantically close, but the wording is reformulated.
止能斷貪，觀除無明。	—	A further <i>Chengshi</i> specification has no precise counterpart in the <i>Xiao zhiguan</i> passage.
—	止則愛養心識之善資，觀則策發神解之妙術。	The <i>Xiao zhiguan</i> adds a functional contrast without a precise counterpart in the cited <i>Chengshi</i> passage.

The verbal and rhetorical correspondence is both closer and more limited than a list of isolated pairings suggests. Both passages begin by reducing a plurality of practices or approaches to *zhi* and *guan*. Within this shared frame, the *Chengshi lun* has 止名定，觀名慧 and 止能遮結，觀能斷滅, while the *Xiao zhiguan* presents 止乃伏結之初門，觀是斷惑之正要 and 止是禪定之勝因，觀是智慧之由藉. The pairs 遮/伏 and 斷滅/斷惑 are semantically close, whereas *ming* 名 becomes 勝因/由藉: naming or classification is recast as a causal or enabling relation. The *Xiao zhiguan*'s correlation of 愛養心識 with 策發神解 has no precise counterpart in the cited *Chengshi lun* passage, while the latter's pairing of craving and ignorance has no precise counterpart in the *Xiao zhiguan*. The conjunction of the shared rhetorical frame and several close correlations makes a *Chengshi* precedent textually plausible without establishing quotation, exclusive dependence, or wholesale doctrinal agreement.

This possible precedent should not be mistaken for *Chengshi* affiliation. Tiantai developed partly through critical engagement with positions associated with *Chengshi* exegetes, especially in debates over the two truths (Swanson 1989, pp. 82–156). That broader polemical relationship does not establish deliberate appropriation in the present passage; it only cautions against treating the verbal convergence as evidence of school affiliation or wholesale agreement. Compared with the *Chengshi* formulation, the *Xiao zhiguan* reconfigures this classificatory template. It presents *zhi* as a cause of *ding* and *guan* as a basis of *hui*, and it immediately insists that the two must be cultivated in balance, like two wheels or two wings (T1915:46.462b7–15). The *Mohe zhiguan* then integrates cessation and stationing within a more reciprocal architecture:

止觀各三義：息義、停義、對不止止義。息義者，諸惡覺觀、妄念、思想寂然休息。淨名曰：何謂攀緣，謂緣三界，何謂息攀緣，謂心無所得。此就所破得名，是止息義。停義者，緣心諦理，繫念現前，停住不動。仁王云：入理般若名為住。大品云：以不住法住般若波羅蜜中。此就能止得名，即是停止義。

Zhi and *guan* each have three meanings. [For *zhi* these are] the sense of stilling (*xi* 息), the sense of stationing (*ting* 停), and *zhi* as the counterpart of non-*zhi*. The sense of stilling means that negative notions and perceptions, deluded thoughts, and conceptualizations become quiescent and cease. The *Vimalakīrti* [nirdeśa] says: “What is clinging to conditions? It means taking the three realms as objects. What is the cessation of clinging to conditions? It means that the mind obtains nothing.” Here the name is derived from what is overcome; this is the sense of stilling. The sense of stationing means that the mind takes the true principle as its object, mindfulness is fixed before one, and it stays and abides without movement. The *Renwang jing* says: “Entering the prajñā of principle is called abiding.” The *Dapin* says: “By means of non-abiding dharmas, one abides in prajñāpāramitā.” Here the name is derived from what is able to stop; this is the sense of stopping and stationing. (*Mohe zhiguan* 摩訶止觀, T1911:46.21b18–25; cf. Swanson 2017, vol. 1, pp. 425–27)²⁶

Although Zhiyi grounds this account in Mahāyāna scriptures, its conceptual structure can accommodate the two functional associations traced above: cessation associated with *samatha-vipaśyanā* and stationing functionally comparable to *sthāna/sthāpanā* within a fixing-observing sequence. Zhiyi’s system nevertheless differs from Haneda 182. The commentary correlates the Chengshi hierarchy with emptiness and scholastic path categories, while Tiantai coordinates the same lexical and soteriological resources within a balanced and ultimately integrative architecture. They are best described as divergent receptions of a possible shared Chengshi precedent, not as successive stages in a single line.

At the level of shared scholastic vocabulary, Jingying Huiyuan provides a third point of comparison. In the *Dasheng yizhang* 大乘義章, he writes: “Guarding the mind so that it abides on its object and departs from distraction and movement is called *zhi*. Because *zhi* keeps the mind from disorder, it is also called concentration. ... Examining and discriminating dharmas is called *guan*; because *guan* penetrates, it is called wisdom” (守心住緣，離於散動，故為止。止心不亂，故復名定。.....於法推求簡擇名觀，觀達稱慧; T1851:44.665c3–6). Huiyuan shares the *zhi-ding* and *guan-hui* classification, but not the full conjunction of inclusivist rhetoric and suppression-severance correlations found in the *Chengshi lun* and the *Xiao zhiguan*. Since Huiyuan’s writings may also have informed the *Yiji*, this evidence points to partially overlapping scholastic networks rather than an independent invention or a single demonstrable line of transmission.

The recurrence of the formula also reflects its explanatory usefulness. It allowed exegetes to relate particular meditation exercises to the path-wide categories of concentration and wisdom and, in some settings, to liberation and emptiness. Because these milieus were only partly connected, the parallel need indicate neither exclusive dependence nor wholly separate invention. “Selective convergence” describes the observable result: a possible shared textual resource, a broader scholastic vocabulary, and distinct exegetical elaborations. The wording alone cannot determine whether the *Xiao zhiguan* directly consulted the *Chengshi lun* or received a composite formulation circulating through partially connected networks.

5. Conclusions: Polysemy, Selective Convergence, and Manuscript Transmission

Three analytical levels must be distinguished in the history of *zhiguan*. At the level of translated conceptual configurations, the expression could evoke the conventional calming-insight dyad and, in Chinese breath-meditation texts, a practical sequence of fixing or abiding followed by observation, functionally comparable to stages termed *sthāna/sthāpanā* and *upalakṣaṇā* in related Indic materials. The precise Indic term behind

each Chinese witness, however, cannot always be recovered. At a separate level of receptor-language semantics, the native range of *zhi* 止—both cessation and abiding—facilitated the overlap of these associations in Chinese. At the exegetical level, the *Chengshi lun* formula “*zhi* means concentration, *guan* means wisdom” reclassified the inherited Chinese pair as *dinghui*. This was not another translation equivalence: it reorganized the pair’s Chinese afterlife and ranked its liberative functions.

The *Chengshi lun* preserves and reworks a sixfold breath-meditation scheme also attested in the Chinese meditation materials associated with Saṅgharakṣa and An Shigao. In the “Churuxi pin,” counting and following become dispensable preliminaries for practitioners able to make the mind abide directly in the breath. In the “Zhiguan pin,” the formula “*zhi* means concentration, *guan* means wisdom” recodes the pair as concentration and wisdom and ranks them through suppressive and definitive severance. As Q. Lin (2015) helps clarify, this hierarchy belongs to Harivarman’s broader interpretation of liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom as successive stages of temporary suppression and ultimate eradication. Equally important, the chapter asks why the path can be summarized by only two terms. By answering with *dinghui*, suppression, and definitive eradication, the treatise turns a meditation pair into a compact classificatory grammar available for later reuse.

Haneda 182 gives direct evidence of how this formula was read in a manuscript commentary. Its glosses foreground the *Chengshi lun*’s discourse of emptiness within the sixteen practices, rank contemplation of impurity as provisional and the sixteen superior practices as “real”, and correlate the two orientations of *zhiguan* practice with *dharma-kṣānti* and *anvaya-kṣānti*. By making emptiness an explicit and recurrent key in line-by-line glosses, the commentary documents a manuscript-level exegetical operation consistent with Zhou’s broader reconstruction, without independently establishing a specifically Mahāyāna source or program. These moves form a coherent Chengshi exegesis of meditation and the path.

Haneda 182 therefore documents a distinct Chengshi exegetical configuration; its uncertain date prevents treating it as a bridge to Zhiyi. The *Yiji* depends directly on the *Chengshi lun*. The Tiantai parallel is less determinate: the *Xiao zhiguan* shares an inclusivist rhetorical frame and several correlations, supporting a nonexclusive Chengshi precedent and selective convergence rather than Chengshi affiliation, direct dependence, or a demonstrated line of transmission. The two settings develop the pair differently. The *Yiji* joins the pair to emptiness and scholastic path categories, whereas Tiantai makes *zhi* and *guan* mutually necessary and integrates cessation with stationing.

The formula’s recurrence across only partly connected exegetical settings reflects its explanatory usefulness: it linked inherited techniques to a path-wide account of concentration and wisdom.

Read together, the Kongō-ji *Anban shouyi jing* and Haneda 182 show why manuscript witnesses are indispensable to the history of Chinese Buddhist concepts. They preserve not merely variant readings but distinct instances of practical and exegetical use that the transmitted canon alone does not reveal. The history of *zhiguan* is thus also a history of textual media: a layered expression in Chinese breath-meditation texts, a soteriological category and reusable problem structure in a scholastic treatise, and an object of doctrinal reorganization in a noncanonical commentary preserved in a Dunhuang manuscript. Manuscript evidence makes it possible to observe convergence without collapsing distinct exegetical elaborations into a single genealogy.

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Notes

- ¹ By “the six stages of breath-mindfulness” I refer to counting, following, fixing, observing, turning, and purification (shu 數, sui 隨, zhi 止, guan 觀, zhuan 轉, jing 淨), corresponding to the six practices discussed in early Chinese breath-meditation literature. Related Sarvāstivāda materials and modern discussions use sthāpanā for the fixing stage and upalakṣaṇā for the observing stage (Kusuyama 1975; Dhammajoti 2008). Because the precise Indic terminology underlying each Chinese witness cannot be fixed, I use sthāna/sthāpanā and upalakṣaṇā as comparative labels for these functions, not as reconstructed source terms for every occurrence of zhi and guan.
- ² The Sanskrit title of Harivarman’s treatise has been reconstructed both as **Tattvasiddhi* (Katsura 1974) and as *Satyasiddhiśāstra* (Sastri 1978). I use **Tattvasiddhi* for consistency, while treating the Chinese *Chengshi lun* 成實論 as the primary textual reference.
- ³ For the An Shigao passage, see Deleanu (1997, p. 37). Deleanu explains **Yogācārabhūmi* in terms of “tranquillity and insight” on the basis of T607:15.231b8. He also cites the Dharmarakṣa passage at T606:15.182c20 in another context, but the present article treats the two passages together in order to foreground the lexical contrast between *zhi* 止 and *ji* 寂.
- ⁴ Chinese text: 「爾時，世尊告諸比丘：『當修安那般那念。若比丘修習安那般那念，多修習者得身止息及心止息，有覺有觀，寂滅、純一，明分想修習滿足。』」 *Za ahan jing* 雜阿含經, fasc. 29, T99:2.206a9–12.
- ⁵ Guo Huei’s transcription gives this passage in the newly discovered *Anban shouyi jing*, lines 62–65 (Guo Huei 2008, p. 21).
- ⁶ Chinese text: 「阿那般那念，說有六事。云何為六？一數、二隨、三止、四觀、五轉、六淨。」 *Apitan piposha lun* 阿毘曇毘婆沙論, vol. 14, T1546:28.105c6–7.
- ⁷ Guo Huei’s transcription gives this passage in the newly discovered *Anban shouyi jing*, lines 79–81 (Guo Huei 2008, p. 40).
- ⁸ The *Chengshi lun* describes the sixteen superior practices as “noble practice” (*shengxing* 聖行) and “heavenly practice” (*tianxing* 天行) in the “Churuxi pin” 出入息品 (T1646:32.356a14–19). These practices are often discussed as the “sixteen modes” (*ṣoḍaśākāra*) of mindfulness of breathing (Dhammajoti 2008); I render *tesheng* 特勝 as “superior practices” to preserve the *Chengshi lun*’s own justification, “therefore it is called superior” (故名為勝).
- ⁹ The Chinese reads *tan shou* 貪受. Since the Pāli parallel has only *rāga*, I preserve the extra Chinese term in the quotation rather than silently assimilating it to the Pāli.
- ¹⁰ Chinese text: 「若經中說修止斷貪，是說遮斷。……若說無明斷是究竟斷。何以知之？無明斷故貪等煩惱斷滅無餘，經中亦說：離貪故心得解脫是名遮斷，離無明故慧得解脫是畢竟斷。有二種解脫，時解脫、不壞解脫。時解脫是遮斷，不壞解脫是畢竟斷。……時解脫名但以上力少時遮結，而未能永斷、後則還發，故非無漏。又此解脫名時愛解脫，漏盡阿羅漢無所可愛。」 *Chengshi lun*, T1646:32.358b17–c2.
- ¹¹ Unless otherwise noted, transcriptions of Yiji are mine from the facsimile in Tonkō hikyū (Kyōu Shooku 2010, pp. 152–71). Square boxes □ indicate illegible or missing characters; punctuation is mine. Plate line numbers count each facsimile image separately. Catalogue description: beginning-defective, end-complete, 905 lines on thirty-six sheets, approx. 27.0 × 1290.2 cm (Kyōu Shooku 2010, pp. 152–53; Ikeda 2014, pp. 326–27). The manuscript title gives 誠實論 rather than 成實論. Ikeda treats Haneda 182 and Tsugei 024 as closely related (2014, pp. 359–60); that proposed relationship is not adopted here. I cite him for codicological description, transcriptional information, and his tentative dating of the commentary to a period somewhat after Kumārajīva (2014, p. 321). The competing later dating is discussed in the text above (Wang 2017).
- ¹² Chinese text: 「問曰：云何名息長短？答曰：如人上山，若擔重疲乏故息短。行者亦爾，在羸心中爾時則短。羸心者，所謂躁疾散亂心也。息長者，行者在細心中則息長。所以者何？隨心細故息亦隨細，如即此人疲極止故息則隨細，爾時則長息。」 *Chengshi lun*, T1646:32.355c20–25.
- ¹³ The *Chengshi lun* base text reads: 「覺喜者，是人從此定法心生大喜，本雖有喜不能如是，爾時名為覺喜。覺樂者，從喜生樂。所以者何？若心得喜身則調適，身調適則得猗樂，如經中說：心喜故身猗，身猗則受樂。」 “Aware of joy” means that from this concentration the practitioner’s mind gives rise to great joy. Although there was joy before, it was not like this; at this time it is called being aware of joy. “Aware of bliss” means that bliss arises from joy. Why? If the mind obtains joy, the body becomes pliant and well adjusted; when the body is pliant and well adjusted, it obtains the bliss of ease. As a scripture says: because the mind is joyful, the body is pliant; when the body is pliant, one experiences bliss. *Chengshi lun*, T1646:32.355c28–356a3.
- ¹⁴ The *Chengshi lun* base text reads: 「覺心行者，見喜過患，以能生貪故。貪是心行，從心起故。以受中生貪故，見受是心行。除心行者，行者見從受生貪，過除滅故心則安隱。亦滅除羸受，故說除心行。」 “Aware of mental formations” means seeing the

- faults of joy, because it can give rise to craving. Craving is a mental formation because it arises from the mind. Because craving arises within feeling, one sees feeling as a mental formation. “Calming mental formations” means that the practitioner sees that craving arises from feeling; when that fault is removed and extinguished, the mind becomes peaceful and secure. Coarse feeling is also removed, and so this is called calming mental formations. *Chengshi lun*, T1646:32.356a3–7.
- 15 The *Chengshi lun* base text reads: 「行者如是心寂定故生無常行，以無常行斷諸煩惱，是名斷行。煩惱斷故心則厭離，是名離行。以心離故得一切滅，是名滅行。」 Because the practitioner’s mind is thus quiescent and concentrated, the practice of impermanence arises. By means of the practice of impermanence, one cuts off the defilements; this is called the practice of cutting off. Because the defilements are cut off, the mind becomes disgusted and detached; this is called the practice of detachment. Because the mind is detached, one obtains the cessation of all; this is called the practice of cessation. *Chengshi lun*, T1646:32.356a10–13.
- 16 Chinese text: 「如是次第得解脫，故名十六行念出入息。」 *Chengshi lun*, T1646:32.356a13–14.
- 17 Chinese text: 「不淨觀，未得離欲自惡厭身，心則迷悶，如服藥過則還為病。如是不淨喜生惡厭，如跋求沫河邊，諸比丘不淨觀故深生惡厭，飲毒墜高等種種自殺。此行不爾，能得離欲而不生惡厭，故名為勝。又此行易得，自緣身故；不淨易失。」 *Chengshi lun*, T1646:32.356a21–26.
- 18 Chinese text: 「即時歡喜，以能甘樂致於奇特，豎立秉志不復隨欲。若見女人，謂是骨鎖非為好顏，察知審諦，本所習欲以為瑕穢，離於情色不造眾惡，是第一禪。棄捐五蓋具足五德，離諸思想，遠眾欲惡、不善之法，其心專念靜然一定，而歡喜安行第一禪，是謂為寂淡然之法。求之若此因惡露觀。」 *Xiuxing daodi jing*, T606:15.212b12–18.
- 19 Chinese text: 「問曰：經中說，以止修心、依觀得解脫，以觀修心、依止得解脫。是事云何？答曰：行者若因禪定生緣滅智，是名以止修心、依觀得解脫。若以散心分別陰界入等，因此得緣滅止，是名以觀修心、依止得解脫。若得念處等達分攝心，則俱修止觀。又一切行者皆依此二法得滅心解脫。」 *Chengshi lun*, T1646:32.358c20–27. For internal parallels in which yuan 緣 introduces the object of a mind or concentration, see 緣泥洹 (T1646:32.333c19–21), 緣泥洹定 (T1646:32.369a1–3), and 緣色心 (T1646:32.370a2–5).
- 20 Chinese text: 「其修行者，或先得寂而後入觀，或先得觀然後入寂；習行寂寞適至於觀便得解脫，設先入觀若至寂寞亦得解脫。」 *Xiuxing daodi jing*, T606:15.211c17–19.
- 21 Chinese text: 「其修行者，觀人身骸在前在後，等而無異，開目閉目，觀之同等，是謂為寂；尋便思惟，頭頸異處，手足各別，骨節支解，各散一處，是謂為觀。此骨鎖身因四事長，飲食、愛欲、睡眠、罪福之所緣生，皆歸無常、苦、空、非身，不淨朽積悉無所有，是謂為觀。取要言之，見而不察是謂為寂，分別其無是謂為觀。」 *Xiuxing daodi jing*, T606:15.212a2–10. The verse that follows is omitted here because it repeats the prose explanation.
- 22 Chinese text: 「是故欲得如實智者，當勤精進修習三昧。散心者尚不能得世間經書工巧等利，何況能得出世間利？故知一切世間出世間利，皆以定心故得。」 *Chengshi lun*, T1646:32.334b19–22.
- 23 The uncertainty of chu siwei 出思惟 is discussed in the main text. I leave the expression untranslated because the surviving fascicle supplies no parallel sufficient to establish its precise referent.
- 24 *Zuochan sanmei jing* 坐禪三昧經, T614:15.280a19–b5. Comparable terminology also appears in other Kumārajīva-period translations, including the *Da zhidu lun* 大智度論; the link proposed here should therefore be understood as a textual resemblance rather than an exclusive source identification.
- 25 The work commonly known as the *Xiao zhiguan* is transmitted under several titles and in multiple recensions. T1915 bears the title *Xiuxi zhiguan zuochan fayao* 修習止觀坐禪法要, while Sekiguchi’s textual work centers on the *Lüeming kaimeng chuxue zuochan zhiguan yaomen* 略明開矐初學坐禪止觀要門 (Sekiguchi 1954; Ōno et al. 2004). T1915 is cited here for accessibility. The four correlations used below are preserved in the latter recension; its minor reading 觀亦斷惑之正要, against T1915’s 觀是斷惑之正要, does not affect the cumulative comparison.
- 26 Translation is mine; cf. (Swanson 2017, vol. 1, pp. 425–27). Swanson renders 停 as “stopping”; I use “stationing” to preserve the connection with *sthāna*.

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