Is Ethics Without God Possible? An Answer, Plus Some Thoughts, About the Question

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The MS has some obvious strengths and weaknesses.

 

In terms of strengths, the MS shows a high level of familiarity with the field and with relevant metaethical issues. The author is also aware of the relevance of the paper to metaphilosophical questions that are sometimes raised about philosophy of religion. The critique both of Plantinga’s ontological argument as well as of his overarching approach to philosophy of religion is valuable. Indeed, I found myself on reflection wishing that some of this information (or related claims about bias in philosophy of religion) made its way into the introduction, to help anchor the greater significance of the argument offered in the paper.

 

In terms of weaknesses, the MS could be organized in a more straightforward way. Having 13 points (there are two “12s”) in a 17 page paper seems to leave a lot to the reader to keep organized. As it stands, the paper seems a bit over-numbered and under-organized. The good news is that this is easily rectified (see below). Also, the author refers to a Wikipedia reference for information on the history of legal arguments concerning enslavement within European countries and empires. I would strongly advise against using a Wikipedia article as a source in an academic article. Fortunately, there are many good resources (possibly even some mentioned in that article) on the history of ideas about ethics and enslavement. Fixing this with strengthen the ethos of the paper.

 

As for constructive remarks, I have two points to make:

 

First, I would recommend a new introduction that gives the reader a clear overview of what is to come and why this particular topic matters. While some readers will already be “on board” with the agenda of the paper, a more welcoming introduction would invite more readers. Similarly, the abstract should be re-written to exclude references to what they author is not going to do; there is plenty to cover when it comes to briefly describing the point of the paper and a precis of the argument.

 

Second, I would recommend considering the higher order structure of the outline. If points 3-6 belong under the parent category “2. Metaethics: A Brief Overview”—as I suspect they do—then perhaps they can be rendered as 2.1, 2.2, etc. Likewise, if point 7 initiates the core argument of the paper, then perhaps subsequent points within the argument could be placed under it (now labeled “3”) as “3.1, 3.2, and so on”. Lastly, this would better highlight the metaphilosophical remarks in section 13 (perhaps now rendered as “4”). Where possible, I would recommend removing unnecessary subheadings.

 

One metaphilosophical question: How does the author think about the relationship of atheism and naturalism to philosophy of religion? Arguably, naturalism and atheism (as theism’s others) belong within the purview of philosophy of religion, broadly construed. Perhaps the author disagrees, but to this reviewer, theistic, nontheistic, and atheistic points of view (among others) all belong under the banner of philosophy of religion.

Author Response

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Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Please find attached a copy of my report. 

Kind regards

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Author Response

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Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The paper has some interesting parts, especially concerning Plantinga's argument and its possible refutation, but it has many unnecessary parts and the 'really' interesting section is too short and cursory. The paper should begin at Section 7, the previous parts are unnecessary and underdeveloped (an example: Section 3 discusses what the author calls the non-propositional view of ethical statements, and offers only a rhetorical refutation of them, see lines 90-97). The rest of this first larger part of the paper is similar: superficial references to huge issues, Stanford Encyc. cited without any engagement with the article, etc.). The inverted Plantinga argument for the necessary existence of the greatest evil possible, from which the author deduces the possibility of ethics without God, is certainly the most valuable part of the discussion. However, it also suffers from problems, such as the way the author simply announces that s/he is uninterested in the defense of the Anselmian argument, although this would be absolutely central to her/his argument. Further, I would have been interested in his/her anticipated responses to objections such as (1) perhaps the greatest evil does exist in the form of rejecting the greatest good, that is, God, but this merely shows that God permits evil to exist, perhaps out of love (toleration, freedom or free will) (2) perhaps free will is central to moral goodness, which just entails that 'a' God capable of 'suffering' being rejected is just the necessary proof for His existence as a moral being. Other arguments would also be worth considering, W. L. Craig would certainly deserve more than a single quotation, or Richard Swinburne - all in all, while the paper has some interesting insights, and while the author is knowledgable, I do not think that the paper this paper is publishable in this present form. I would suggest a very major revision, maybe using the Plantinga argument as a core. I found the author's habit of dismissing heavyweight issues, such as proofs of God's existence (lines 540-550) summarily, rather odd. Finally, the author often omits quot. marks, which I found confusing and inappropriate (Plantinga, Schellenberg, etc.).

Author Response

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Round 2

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I still consider the paper uneven, the central argument being, in my view, loosely connected to the first part of the discussion. The question on what the argument hinges is whether God's existence is a prerequisite to ethics. In one sense, the answer is obviously yes: since many people do not believe in God's existence, hence subjectively God does not exist (for them), but they are moral persons (thinking about themselves as such), the answer is trivial. In another sense, the answer is not that obviously affirmative. Is ethics conceivable without God? I understand that, for instance, naturalism is a philosophical position that denies God's existence, but wishes to maintain that ethics is possible, hence it deserves discussion, but if the author rejects it (as well as intuitionism), then one wonders how s/he would construct an alternative theory of (meta)ethics. Finally, concerning Anselm's and Gaunilo's controversy: I still think that a more thorough engagement with the pro-Anselmian camp would be necessary. And in particular, contrary to the author, I think that 'moral goodness' and 'moral evil' are not just two properties of the same kind. If they are, then the argument becomes very sterile, nominalist, and trivial. It has been a perennial problem of philosophy how to distinguish between good and evil and their nature. If the author wishes to take the Biblical account of the problem seriously, an idea to be discussed could be the relation of goodness to life and evil to death (and destruction). Very tersely: a morally evil God would be self-destructive and hence impossible to conceive. 

Author Response

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Round 3

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Since I am hard-pressed to give positive feedback, let it be done. But I want to stress that the paper addresses too many difficult questions, hence it is apt to cause misunderstandings, due to its brevity. The author's final response is typical: s/he thinks since I argued that good and evil may not be of the same kind (of property), I must subscribe to the privatio boni argument. This is too simple. S/he cites physical pain as intrinsic evil (though a synthetic apriori judgment), which it is obviously not. Many kinds of physical pain are either instrumental (extrinsic) to some good or positively 'enjoyable' (e.g. sometimes muscle soreness is such). And there are all kinds of pain, apart from physical one. I am inclined to think, for instance, that having free will is an intrinsic good, and indeed, the lack of it is intrinsically bad, but I also think that having free will somehow irreversibly corrupted (oriented to evil) is indeed an intrinsically evil property. So matters are more complicated. Generally, the problem of free will and its relation to God and God's goodness is not addressed in the paper at all, although I suspect that some crucially important insights could be retrieved from considering this.