Article

Change: Thinking through Sāṅkhya

Sthaneshwar Timalsina

Department for the Study of Religion, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA 92182, USA; timalsin@sdsu.edu

Abstract: This paper explores the ways change is addressed in Sāṅkhya, one of the major Hindu schools of philosophy, specifically in light of the classical debate between Hindu and the Buddhist philosophers regarding intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) and the concept of transformation (*pariṇāma*). When we closely analyze Sāṅkhya categories, the issue of temporality stands out, because for Sāṅkhya philosophers time is not a distinct category and is infrequently addressed in classical Sāṅkhya. Nonetheless, we can still extract two different notions related to time, dynamism intrinsic to *rajas,* and temporality that is enclosed within the notion of space and spatial objects. What this implies is that the temporality implicit within the concept of change is only applicable to the last of the evolutes, according to Sāṅkhya cosmology. However, the Sāṅkhyan idea of 16 transformations (*pariṇāma*) applies to all categories, except *puruṣa*. By exploiting the parameters of these arguments, this paper makes the case for a closer analysis of the category of transformation in classical Sāṅkhya. Reading about change in the light of *svabhāva*, the intrinsic nature of an entity, versus the idea of its termination, allows us to have a wider conversation on what it means for something to change from within the Sāṅkhya paradigm.

Keywords: transformation (*pariṇāma*); change; Sāṅkhya philosophy; time; *prakṛti; guṇa*

1. Introduction

Historically, change as a relational category has been analyzed in the light of something constant. Buddhism developed change itself as an absolute category. The classical debate on two issues, whether change implies something permanent or if change is self-determining, reflects one of the key categories for philosophical dialogue between Buddhist and Hindu thinkers. Whether in physics or philosophy, grounding change in the absence of something constant invites multiple challenges. Setting aside these metaphysical issues, an epistemic issue arises: how to establish the concept of change independent of something permanent. Even the Buddhist arguments concerning change presuppose the *prima facie* position of permanence. That is, even while Buddhists denied the existence of anything permanent, their understanding of change relies upon permanence. In this frame, change becomes an absolute, lacking varying degrees of intensity, requiring different temporal durations that are antithetical, while adopting an absolutism of temporality. Noteworthy for our current conversation is the juxtaposition of the Sāṅkhya notion of *pariṇāma* with the Buddhist theory of non-origination, or the origination of the non-existent (*asatkāryavāda*). The central argument is that the Sāṅkhya concept of *pariṇāma* makes a distinction between *dharma* and *dharmin* and, while *dharmas* change when an old *dharma* ceases to exist and new *dharma* comes into being, the *dharmin* remains constant. Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti object to this model of causality, first pointing to the inseparability of *dharma* and *dharmin*, wherein there is no *dharmin* in isolation from *dharmas,* and therefore *dharmin* cannot continue to exist in the cessation of *dharmas*. If the Sāṅkhyan notion of change is rooted in continuity, the Buddhist notion is grounded on cessation. The core issue in this conversation is whether something continues to exist when change happens or whether the emergence of B requires the destruction of A. We can glean further information from the position of a philosopher, Vārṣagaṇya, whose literature is available only in citation. When engaging with the concept of *pariṇāma* in Sāṅkhya, Watanabe (2011, p. 558) attributes to Vārṣagaṇya the view that

vināśa only means disappearance and not the cessation of the existence of the entity. This position, while credited to Vārṣagaṇya, should be acknowledged as being much more widely prevalent, as Pāṇini interprets in *dhātupāṭha*, √*ṇas adarśane*, as in the meaning of being invisible; accordingly, the words derived from this root, such as *nāśa*, do not refer to cessation of an entity but simply its disappearance. Speaking from the Sāṅkhya perspective, the entity as such does not ever cease to exist, closely aligning with the Sanskrit term for an entity, "something that continues to exist" (*vastu*, from the root √*vas*). In this paper, I will explore the ways change is defined in Sāṅkhya.[1]

Evidently, the very concept of change and causation implies that there is a new entity that did not exist before in either structure or name, but change also implies that something endures. This ambivalence has prompted many schools of classical Hindu philosophy to argue for a position of homogeneity that accommodates heterogeneity, or the idea of identity while having difference (*bhedābheda*). Evidently the *prima facie* material and its effect cannot be identical, because otherwise the very concept of causality would be a moot point. However, given that cause and effect are different, the Sāṅkhya concept of *pariṇāma* stresses continuity, where the cause is consistent in its effect and what constitutes an effect is the appearance of new *guṇas* and the disappearance of old ones, for example, how the color red is latent in the spring whereas green leaves later turn into brilliantly colored autumn leaves. The same concept of *pariṇāma* is modified in Siddhānta Śaiva or some Vaiṣṇava schools as proposed in the concept of *bhedābheda*, where different *guṇas* manifest in the effect and are therefore effects that are different but, at the same time, manifest the essential entity that continues to exist and is therefore identical to its cause (Acri 2021, pp. 535–69). As we can see in the *bhedābheda* concept as detailed above, this tendency of shifting the core categories on causality to make an ontological statement is also explicit in the Jain understanding of *sad-asat-kārya-vāda*, the thesis that the effect is both existent and non-existent in its cause (Bajželj 2020).

Broadly, change and permanence in Sāṅkhya underscore two central categories: *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Etymologically, the word *prakṛti* denotes the primacy of action, as the word is derived from *i* + √*kṛ* + *ktin*.[2] The other category, *puruṣa*, is derived in multiple different ways,[3] and in the Sāṅkhya context, where *puruṣa* lacks inherent dynamism, it can be derived as *puri śete*, or the one that sleeps in the body or in the enclosure. Accordingly, *puruṣa* would then refer to the stable entity that is not subject to change. This metaphysical bifurcation–something that establishes a permanent basis versus something that revolves around it–has nothing to do with the world of our commonsense experience. Just like the Buddhist philosophers, Sāṅkhyans also adhere to the idea that the world of commonsense experience is in flux. However, change, as Sāṅkhya philosophers explain, does not imply substitution, and therefore what changes into new modalities has always been present, always changing. As for the world of commonsense experience, both terms that determine it, *saṃsāra*, derived from *am* + √*sṛ* + *ghañ*, and *jagat*, derived from √*gam*, to go or to move, inherently refer to dynamism.

The central topic of this investigation is change, as espoused by Sāṅkhya philosophers. But the concept of change is universal, and it is relevant that we contextualize the Sāṅkhyan notion of change within the broader context of change as a universal category. Before engaging the definitions and metaphysics of change, it is necessary to address the parameters. For some who reject or defend change, what they mean is for Q[X] (the entity X having a defining quality Q) to change into Q1[X] or to have a slight variation in the same quality, or alternatively, for Q[X] to change into R[X], meaning that the entity X would have an entirely new defining quality. In both accounts, the entity X remains unchanged. Others, whether rejecting or defending change, understand the category X to change into Y. This position is particularly relevant in contextualizing Buddhist nominalism, which rejects the existence of universals or entities extending over space and time, considering such entities as merely conventional. For those who reject an entity having a homologous and generic character, the category change can only mean substitution, and therefore there could be no continuity of the same entity when it changes. In contrast to the Sautrāntika

reading of change, Sāṅkhya philosophy underscores the consistency of an entity over time, although the world (*jagat* or *saṃsāra*) itself is defined by its capacity to change. This somewhat echoes the dialogue on change and permanence between the followers of Heraclitus and Parmenides. However, the Sāṅkhyan notion of permanence rests on two types of permanence: the foundational motionless consistency (*kūṭastha-nityatā*), and the permanency of dynamism (*pravāha-nityatā*), where the first type of permanence corresponds to the conscious subject (*puruṣa*), the second relates to *prakṛti* and its evolutes.[4] We can find a similar conversation in Kant: in terms of variation by appearance or the concept of appearance as temporal (*Critique of Pure Reason,* A 182 B 225), Kant conceives of the object itself as permanent, whereas its determination (the ways in which the object exists) is mutable. For Kant, though, "all appearance(s)are in time". The variations of an object are determined either through simultaneity or succession, both temporal concepts. In contrast to the Kantian understanding of change, temporality, and objectivity in general, this paper argues that the change in terms of *pariṇāma* in Sāṅkhya is not necessarily temporal. Time as a category is not applicable to the Sāṅkhyan concept of change.[5] This position requires that we address what it means for something to change, where change is not temporally determined.

　　Next, change is a relative concept: it is only in relation to something changeless that we can contextualize change. But so also is temporality only in relation to something having a non-relative presence in order that entities can be addressed in temporal categories. This issue is worth exploring through the Sāṅkhya notion of change, as for Sāṅkhya time is not a real category. This makes it necessary that we separately view the inherent dynamism of *prakṛti* with the change in succession that is temporal. This means that the category change both as addressed in the Sāṅkhya of three *guṇas* and what we generally understand by change in a temporal sense needs to be reexamined.[6] Rather than interpreting change as antithetical to permanence, we need to understand *pariṇāma* or transformation of *prakṛti* as constant and contrast this type of consistency with the permanence of *puruṣa.* What we can extract by contrasting temporally determined change with the consistency of the flow of *prakṛti* in giving rise to its evolutes is that the *pariṇāma* intrinsic to *prakṛti* is not the cessation of a temporal entity giving rise to a heterogenous entity diachronically. It is not necessary that the consistency that is maintained through the modes of transformation, as categorized as *pariṇāma-nityatā*, addresses all the transformed entities. By borrowing the concept from Vyāsa-bhāṣya, we can argue that there are two types of transformation: the one whose finality has been actualized (*labdhaparyavasāna*), and the one whose finality cannot be actualized (*alabdhaparyavasāna*). It is not necessary for the evolutes, for instance 'intellect' (*buddhi*), to continue in their form or to have their originality preserved in the course of mutation. However, the change intrinsic to *prakṛti*, or the change within the three *guṇas*, from the Sāṅkhyan paradigm, does not come to any fruition. And this therefore makes the case that even if the manifest modes of *prakṛti* cease to exist for those who have actualized the foundational difference between *puruṣa* and *prakrti*, the process continues to unfold with regard to those who have not actualized their true nature.[7] It is not the case that *prakṛti* ceases to function upon the liberation of one subject. For, if *prakṛti* were to return to its primordial state upon a subject's liberation, meaning involution with regard to all the manifest categories, there will be several consequences:

I.　The consistency in the form of the flow (*pravāha-nityatā*) has a determinate course, meaning, the consistency of the flow is not an actual consistency, a consequence.

II.　*Prakrti* as such is defined as the category that does not actualize its finality in terms of transformation (*alabdhaparyavasānā*), and, if *prakṛti* were to return to the primordial state and merely reside in the form of *guṇas*, it would contradict what has been the defining mark of *prakṛti*, i.e., to not actualize its terminal point.

III.　The dynamism attributed to *prakṛti* would be an imposed trope and not its intrinsic nature. For example, consider whether a heated iron rod can burn, in spite of burning not being an inherent nature of the iron. However, since burning is the inherent nature of fire, we cannot conceive of fire that is bereft of its burning capacity.

2. Change and *Pariṇāma*

The concept of change is always bound together with notions of causation, time, and motion. While the issues related to time and causality are broadly intertwined, the Sāṅkhya paradigm separates the issue of causality from that of temporality. For time is not a distinctive category in Sāṅkhya and temporality is addressed only in relation to space and entities in space. As it turns out, space is one of the last evolutes in Sāṅkhya metaphysics. Therefore, the concept of *pariṇāma* as change underscores causality where causality is not necessarily intertwined with temporality. In essence, change that is conditioned by spatial or temporal markers is distinct from change designated as such by *pariṇāma* which is applicable to the transformation of *prakṛti* into the manifold. Furthermore, when it comes to causation, we therefore need to make a distinction between the general causation that we exemplify in the material world and causation as far as the evolutes of *prakṛti* are concerned. For the internal change of evolutes, all the way to their expression in the form of five *mahābhūtas,* is categorically different from alteration in their elemental configuration, and this can be seen in all the examples of transformation, be that of threads and cloth, clay and clay-pot, or gold and golden ornaments. Roma Ray (1982) has argued that, for the doctrine of *pariṇāma* to be complete or for the Sāṅkhya model of causality to be taken seriously, it needs to incorporate a category of an instrumental cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*) within its system, relying on the argument that a pot is not latent in the potter, nor does a pot manifest by mere emanation without some external cause. What is missing in this argument are all the examples of causality that Sāṅkhya provides, which are mere illustrations to demonstrate the internal alteration of *prakṛti* into its evolutes, without the instrumentality of time or space in the process of manifestation of all the evolutes. The argument is that, in all entities that are mediated by an instrumental cause, the instrumentality of time is inseparable. While reconfiguration of the five elements into varied structures does require instrumentality, and since we do have time in its expressed sense as well as space with the manifestation of five elements, this does not apply to any of the evolutes that precede the *mahābhūtas,* nor does this apply to *mahābhūtas* either, for space cannot be instrumental in giving rise to space, nor can time give rise to temporality.

The Sāṅkhya understanding of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* can be compared to the 'permanent object' in Kantian terms. However, change in Sāṅkhya, as discussed above, is completely decoupled from temporality. The time that makes relationality possible, from the Sāṅkhyan perspective, is contingent upon five elements from sky to earth, but these are the last of the evolutes, and if *pariṇāma* is change, most of what change means in Sāṅkhya is preconceived within the axis of spatio-temporality. But there is more to it. If change is intrinsic to *prakṛti*, that essentially means that dynamism, thanks to *rajas*, is one of its inherent qualities. It the case that there is *prakṛti* separate from these *guṇas* such as *rajas* which are there to qualify it, like someone wearing a white shirt. *Prakṛti* is not something to which *guṇas* are added, and so, while dynamism intrinsically constitutes *prakṛti*, and even though inertia is integral to *prakṛti*, *rajas* alone does not determine what constitutes *prakṛti*. Nevertheless, there is nothing that gives *rajas* its dynamism, as it is what it is. If time is to be intrinsic to *rajas* for its dynamism, this is the very dynamism that is to be equated with absolute temporality and not the dynamism that emerges from temporality. While this conversation identifies the Sāṅkhyan notion of *pariṇāma* with unique properties that cannot be reduced to the category change, it also makes it necessary to ground change in the absence of notions of space and time. From the Sāṅkhya perspective, the transformation of *prakṛti* into intellect (*buddhi*) can mean different things:

I.   Creature consciousness that makes egoity possible,
II.   Judgmental consciousness that makes ascertainment or determination possible, or
III. The ground for the emergence of the phenomenal ego and of other evolutes that follow the phenomenal ego.

None of these manifestations are to be considered as temporal events from the Sāṅkhya perspective, and accordingly, there is no change in space in these transformative modes. The entire conversation on *pariṇāma* is silent about spatio-temporal change; there is no

conversation about extrinsic change (for example, a dog coming to sit next to a cat), but it does address intrinsic change (in this example, changes in the mental state of the cat). The Sāṅkhyan notion of change, therefore, is about the evolution of categories led entirely through the intrinsic thrust of *rajas*. While external factors can be instrumental in causing change, what causes an entity to change is fundamentally about inherent factors of the entity in flux. This leads to the conclusion that any causality attributed to external factors is merely an imposition of the properties from one entity to the next.

Even though *prakṛti* embodies dynamism, we cannot equate dynamism with *prakṛti*. Although the constituent *rajas* reflects dynamism, the other two constituents of *sattva* and *tamas* lack it, and therefore *prakṛti* as the totality cannot be identified with any one of these qualifiers as such. Even then, the other *guṇas* are also equally acting. In the act of illumination (*sattva*) or in the act of inertia (*tamas*), they are actively revealing or concealing, and so they are not in opposition to dynamism. But these acts of *prakṛti* are not 'acts' in the everyday sense, as they do not entail temporality. If we understand temporality as distinct from this inherent dynamism, then relative temporality underscores spatialization, the manifestation of *ākāśa*, and this time already implies change, as the sky is one qualifier within the last set of evolutes. Causation in this light is not intrinsically linked with temporality, for manifestation of evolutes is a constant process that defines *prakṛti*; there is no instant where *prakṛti* is not unfolding, for that would contradict its inherent nature (*svabhāva*). We therefore need to distinguish the everyday use of the term change from the inherent dynamism of *prakṛti*, for our use of the term underscores spatio-temporality. Yet again, time is not the cause in propelling an evolution of *prakṛti*, as there is neither temporality above the category *prakṛti*, nor does *prakṛti* depend on external factors to express its inherent nature. There is nothing to cause *guṇas* to change; it is what they do. It is change then that makes space and time possible, and changes that we observe in space and time are relational and do not reflect the absolute dynamism of *prakṛti*. In essence, the Sāṅkhyan understanding is that the world is an organismic process lacking an actual beginning or end. This is a closed system in the sense that there is no outside agency, and the dynamism of *prakṛti* does not have a predetermined teleology or a teleology imposed by some external factor. If *puruṣa* were to be expunged from the matrix of Sāṅkhya metaphysics, then change in itself would be blind. Even the arrow of evolution from *prakṛti* to the five elements (*mahābhūtas*) does not imply a real change in what is changing, i.e., *prakṛti*, as what change implies here is merely modifications and not an elimination of the triadic structure of *prakṛti*. When one *guṇa* comes to fully display its potencies, other *guṇas* are dormant and are not eliminated, only resting till they get their turn to come to prominence. According to the Sāṅkhya paradigm, what is created never exceeds its triadic structure of being composed of *guṇas* that maintain its dynamism. In the Sāṅkhya world, everything except for *puruṣa* is subject to change, whereas *puruṣa* is the witnessing self that observes the dynamism that envelops the rest.

3. Change: Rethinking *Prakṛti* and Its Evolutes

I begin this conversation with three propositions:

I.　　Action entails change. But change does not entail temporality.
II.　　Change is spontaneous: it does not require any agent.
III.　　Change is not antithetical to permanence. It only identifies two types of constants, the constant that does not change and the one that constantly changes.

Following the first proposition (action entails change but change does not entail temporality), action is a temporal event that entails change. But not all changes are temporal and not all change qualifies as action. To begin with, there is nothing to cause *prakṛti* to change, and there is no temporality above and beyond *prakṛti* to cause change; *prakṛti* changes by itself in the form of evolutes such as *mahat*. If temporality is a condition for conceiving of change, temporality needs to be conceived of within the belly of *prakṛti*. This, however, is not the mainstream Sāṅkhya argument. When Vijñānabhikṣu says, "time and space are the sky itself",[8] he is resting his argument on *Sāṅkhyasūtra*, "time and space

are not separate from the sky etc".[9] While commenting upon this Sūtra, Vijñānabhikṣu makes an observation that "the constant space and time are the primal nature of the sky and are the *guṇas* of the very *prakṛti* and this is what makes it possible for space and time to be all-encompassing".[10] Accordingly, the determined space and time are products of the five elements that confine the predetermined all-encompassing space and time, and these in turn, are the inherent *guṇas* of *prakṛti*. This leads to the conclusion that space and time are intrinsic to *prakṛti*, and change in space and time is change in the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*. But since *prakṛti* does not change into something else, as all the evolutes retain their primordial characteristic to return to their original nature, time and change cannot be separated from *prakṛti*. But this also leads to the consequence that any change in *prakṛti* does not lead to irreversible change, as that would amount to substitution. If *prakṛti* were to change into something else, that would amount to *prakṛti* self-annihilating in the mode of its transformation, and change and annihilation would be identical. Since time does not exceed *prakṛti*, *Yuktidīpika* [YD] explicitly rejects it as a category:

"For us, there is no entity called time."[11]

Time, according to YD, is merely:

"An instrument in giving rise to the consciousness of the duration of the actions that are being performed, such as the revolving of the sun, milking a cow, or (hearing) thunder".[12]

Following the second proposition, change is spontaneous and does not require any external agency. Dynamism is not action, because there exists an inherent dynamism that is non-temporal, and this non-temporal dynamism is intrinsic to the entities that are constant, or that are not temporally determined. The dynamism of *prakṛti* is what makes change possible, and this is not an 'intelligent design',[13] as there is no agency over the mutation of *prakṛti* and its tendencies. This is explicit in the following *Yuktidīpikā* (YD) statement:

"*Sattva* etc., which are being mutually supported by their inherent properties such as illumination etc., do not depend upon the facilitation of a conscious agent".[14]

To bolster his position, the author of YD cites the statement of Vārṣagaṇya:

"The motivation of *prakṛti* is spontaneous and is not facilitated by a conscious agent".[15]

The fundamental Sāṅkhya position that is later confronted in the Trika system, is the concept that consciousness is fundamentally passive, actionless. YD argues:

"Motion is affirmed only of insentient entities such as milk and not of any sentient entity, and therefore the conscious agent is motionless".[16]

When this actionless consciousness is inverted in the paradigm of no transformation, and if the plurality of *puruṣa* is reduced to the plurality of the inner cognitive complex (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) or that of the phenomenal ego (*ahaṃkāra*), this position leads to the Advaita of Śaṅkara, for the self in both accounts is not agentive in any actions, and is of the character of consciousness that lacks any directionality. For both philosophies, change is within the domain of *prakṛti*. The only difference is that the Advaita of Śaṅkara considers *prakṛti* and its modifications to be a projection of *mayā*. Nevertheless, as far as the nature of consciousness and the self is concerned, Sāṅkhya and Advaita merge ever closer. And if we were to read *prakṛti* as being not diametrically opposite but intrinsic to the absolute all-embracing category, and further read dynamism as inherently woven in the fabric of the absolute, this leads to the Trika paradigm. If Advaita rejects change in any absolute sense, the Trika system rejects the thesis that change is blind. We need to address Sāṅkhyan notion of change within these parameters.

Finally, following the third proposition that change is not antithetical to permanence, both what does not change and what changes are permanently existing. While this is simply reframing the concept of *prakṛti* as one that is intrinsically dynamic and *puruṣa* as

that which never changes, the explicit reference for this third proposition can be found in *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* upon the *Yogasūtra*:

> "Permanence is twofold–the changeless (*kūṭastha*) permanence and changing permanence. The changeless permanence corresponds to *puruṣa* whereas the *guṇas* are endowed with transforming permanence. If the essential nature is not destroyed upon it being changed, [the result is] permanence. Both are permanent for they both lack the destruction of their essential nature".[17]

The soteriological implications in how the category of transformation is recognized can be observe if we analyze it how the category of *nirodha* is examined in both the Buddhist Yogācāra school and the Yoga system of Patañjali.[18] Following the Buddhist perspective, the 'repression' (*nirodha*) of the mind is not a change in mental state, either from having one specific property to lacking that property. From the Patañjalian perspective, at least following the way the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* glosses the text, repression and emergence are two modes of mind, and these two tendencies merely illustrate the states in which the mind is, and not that the mind ceases to exist upon the state of 'repression' (*nirodha*). *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* expands upon this, that

> "The property (*dharma*) is nothing above and beyond the essential nature of the entity having that property (*dharmin*), and it is by means of (change in) the property that transformation in the property-bearer is explained".[19]

The property-bearer (*dharmin*) in this context is the mind (*citta*), and the property being addressed here is 'repression' (*nirodha*) which in itself constitutes a specific mental modification, a *saṃskāra*, which indeed is a property of the mind. The property does not exist in the absence of a property-bearer, and if there is no mind to endure through *nirodha*, then no modification of mind is possible due to the fact of undergoing *nirodha*. Along the same lines, the emergence of new properties, of course in relation to the mind, is compared in this light to change in appearance, like gold fashioned into a golden bracelet. The temporal shift, or alteration in temporal markers, is determined, accordingly, as change in character (*lakṣaṇa*), and aging, for instance is given as an example of change in condition (*avasthā*).[20] The entity as such, therefore, does not follow the course of time. On the contrary, properties keep evolving, and as new properties emerge, old ones cease to exist, and therefore are temporal.[21]

4. Defining Change

The above conversation demonstrates an unbridgeable gap between the ways change is understood. This classical debate has its parallel in classical Greek thinking as stated above, between the positions of Heraclitus and Parmenides, with the first maintaining that everything changes and the latter that nothing changes in reality. For us to contextualize the concept of change in Sāṅkhya, we can closely analyze some statements in YD, a commentary on SK. But before we engage these passages, we need to recognize the triadic structure of change in Sāṅkhya, wherein

I.　The basic entity that changes into manifold forms, *prakṛti*;
II.　The manifest manifoldness, *vikṛti*; and
III.　The constant that neither is the basic entity in change nor the changed manifold, the *puruṣa* (SK, verse 3).

From within this triad, the changing *guṇas* that give rise to categories such as *mahat* underscore their fundamental character that is neither to be reduced to its ground nor to be radically differentiated from it. Making evolutes as absolutely identical would reject the notion of causality, but at the same time, something being diametrically opposite would also reject the causal relation. On these grounds, SK stresses that evolutes are neither homogenous nor heterogenous to their cause.

What then does the category change (*pariṇāma*) mean in the Sāṅkhya context?

What is *pariṇāma*? First, let us read two outside sources and then we shall directly engage Sāṅkhya texts for further consideration:

I.	Transformation refers to the activation of a new property upon the disappearance of the earlier property corresponding to an enduring substance.[22]

II.	The term *pariṇāma* refers to the manifestation of the new property upon disappearance of the earlier property corresponding to an enduring substance.[23]

We can initiate our reflection on the basis of the following statements from the *Yuktidīpikā*:

I.	When the property-possessor, after its previous property has disappeared (*tirobhāvya*) due to its receiving (*anugraha*) another power without abandoning its nature (*svarūpa*), appears with another property, we then call such a situation transformation. (YD on SK, verse 16. Translation, (Watanabe 2011, p. 557)).[24]

II.	(The category) change of an entity refers to inactivation of one *dharma* and activation another *dharma.* Here, the suppression of an existing *dharma* and manifestation of a non-existing *dharma* is proposed, and so this does not confirm the emergence of a new entity.[25]

On the one hand, identity is maintained between *dhrmas* and the entity is endowed with those *dharmas*, while on the other hand, *dharmas* are constantly changing whereas the entity endowed with them is not. This is reconciled by following the above argument, on the basis of the YS-*Yuktidīpikā* statement, that *dharmas* are nothing more than the base entity to which they inhere. To confirm this position of change, YD cites a verse:

"While resigning the earlier *dharma* and the new ones, when an entity (endowed with those *dharmas*) does not cease from among the existents, it is called change".[26]

To further extend the concept of change as the alteration of an entity, *Yuktidīpikā* gives further explanation:

When a particular structure of the threads that is called cloth is brought to manifestation by means of the act-participants by means of their corresponding operations while (the entity) as such is an assemblage, there is a convention of the common people that (an entity) is made, or emerges, or is born, etc. And when the act-participants retrieve the previous state before the manifestation of new structure, the structure that was encountered before becomes the reference of the word 'cessation.' In reality, neither is there manifestation of an entity nor its cessation.[27]

The category change (*pariṇāma*) here captures the sense of all three following cases:

I.	The change of structure, as in making cloth or pot, where threads or clay change their original structure.

II.	The change of water into ice where a new crystalline structure emerges that did not exist in the fluid form.

III.	The case of birth, as in birth of a kitten.

The third case is categorically different from the earlier ones, as a new kitten is not an alteration of the same old cat. However, this is where the difference lies between nominalists and those accepting the consistency of a generic cat. For those who accept the universals, there is no emergence of a generic entity cat in the birth of a new kitten.

In other words, change is not the emergence of a previously non-existent entity. But this does not imply rejection of novelty, for novelty is not a substitution of what existed before but is the manifestation of a new structure where some of the tendencies that were prominent before are now subsumed as new ones manifest. However, this is not to say that those *guṇas* that manifest in a new structure did not exist prior to their manifestation. For these *guṇas* are dormant in their intrinsic form of potency only, and they manifest when they find their appropriate moment. There is no limit to the extent to which *prakṛti* can give

rise to new structures. Speaking in biological terms, the substitution of base chemicals is not necessary for manifestation of a new species.

It is change as such that is identified with terms such as emergence or creation, etc. Change implies continuity of the base entity at the same time as an alteration of the manifest *guṇas*. Therefore, a dog does not change into a plant, nor does a plant mutate into an elephant. An entity that is credited to change, in this light, is a generic entity that undergoes structural change. YD defines structure as assuming the particularity of what is generic, and this is called (having) a structure.[28] Basically, when we confront an entity and identify change, we are referring to the structure and not what lies beneath that structure. What is assumed in all causal relations is that, while an effect is not different from its cause in essence, it is nevertheless different in structure. So if an entity is different from its cause, it is with regard to the manifest structure, and if it is identified as the same, it is with regard to its essence. This is what is underscored in the statement, "the effect is different in structure with its cause while also similar in form".[29] In essence, when it comes to determining homogeneity and heterogeneity, it depends on subject's intention: in relation to something different, that something is determined to be similar and in relation to something similar, it is yet somewhat different.

The above understanding of change cannot be reduced to change that is determined within the limitations of change in space and time. In this regard, we need to closely analyze the categorization of change as emphasized in YD. For instance, YD categorizes two types of motion (*kriyā*), one in the form of change and the other in the form of pulsation.[30] Accordingly, motion in the form of change is restricted to an entity undergoing alteration in its structure, and that is caused due to cessation of earlier tendencies and emergence of a new one. On the other hand, pulsation relates to the function of breath, sensory faculty, or movement of external objects. Now, going back to the interdependence of change and time/space, Sāṅkhya philosophy in this light is very clear that only motion in the form of pulsation is spatio-temporal, and change in the sense of transformation that relates to the alteration of *guṇas* is not conceived of as determined in terms of space and time. This transformation then is the intrinsic nature of what exists as an entity, and on this ground, we can make a claim that when it comes to addressing entities in the world, Sāṅkhya is inherently dynamic. From the Sāṅkhya perspective, both these motions are possible due to *rajas*, the inherent *guṇa* of *prakṛti* that makes dynamism possible. So *rajas* is then not just dynamism, but also the potency that makes dynamism possible. In that sense, temporality and change both are woven into the very fabric of *rajas*.

This all leads to the conclusion that everything of the manifest world changes, or everything is in flux, in dynamism, whether potentially or in expressed forms. But there are limits to what change means here: change implies continuity of the base entity while at the same time being an alteration of the manifest *guṇas*. As a consequence, an entity cannot emerge into its own opposition, for example, light changing into darkness. There is also a categorical difference between the primal cause, *prakṛti,* and its evolutes: The categories with manifest signs (*liṅga*) have a cause, are transitory, are not all-permeating, are dynamic, and are dependent on multiple entities. In contrast, the unmanifest or *prakṛti* has no cause, is not transitory, is all-permeating, and is not dependent upon other entities for its being (SK 10). Accordingly, all entities that manifest have change as their inherent nature. This inherently changing character also incorporates *prakṛti*. That *puruṣa* does not undergo change makes it possible to determine change, as from the Sāṅkhyan perspective this change is contrasted against the backdrop of the changeless *puruṣa* (SK 11).

Just like other philosophers, Sāṅkhya philosophers ground change on the basis of causal relation. However, their causal relation is not grounded in temporality. The dynamism of *prakṛti* to express itself in the form of *mahat,* etc., is not a genesis story, nor is it an event that occurred in the past: it is a dynamic constant process by means of which *prakṛti* keeps unfolding into new forms. What underlies this premise is that there is no generic difference, albeit having difference in particulars, in each mode of manifestation. This is

what makes the relation of cause and effect possible, or there would be no homogeneity between cause and effect that are temporally diachronic.

5. The Teleology of Change

While the interaction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is explained in terms of liberation, Sāṅkhya philosophy rests on the assumption that *puruṣa* as such is never bound and what is bound and what liberates is *prakṛti* alone (SK 69). Since *prakṛti* is not conscious, it lacks intentionality to effect change. If a teleology of *prakṛti* is to be justified, it is 'self-less' and blind, and if this is sought in *puruṣa*, it is only due to misconception. As a consequence, when engaging the Sāṅkhya paradigm, change happens and is not made. We come to this conclusion by synthesizing the discussion above, and reach the following conclusions:

I.   Composites are made of three *guṇas*,
II.   Composites change,
III.   Composites lack their own teleology.

While the earlier points are evident, the last point is derived on the basis of the statement that

'Composites are for the sake of the others'. (*saṅghātaparārthatvāt* . . . SK 17)

Because sensory faculties lack consciousness,[31] their functioning cannot be considered to have their own teleology, whether in grasping their corresponding objects; in the functioning of the mind or the *antaḥ-karaṇa* to have various desires, to have the ego-sense, or to make judgment; or for three *guṇas* to mutually support with their inherent tendencies of illumination, activation, and delimitation (*prakāśa-pravṛtti-niyama*). This means that the entities that lack consciousness cannot determine their function as 'theirs' and 'for themselves,' and so, even though there are functions in categories that are not intrinsically conscious, their functioning cannot be 'for themselves,' for the same reason that they lack the sense of 'self.'

If change is inherent to *prakṛti*, this is confirmed only by the conscious self, *puruṣa*. Basically, while change is spontaneous, it is not for the benefit of what is changing. The argument from the perspective of evolution is that complexity that evolves in matter does not adhere to what is changing, but there is an underlying principle, consciousness, as the basis, that is not changing through these modes. SK gives two analogies to illustrate this:

I.   Just as there is spontaneous motivation of milk which in itself is insentient for the sake of nourishing a calf, so also is the motivation of *prakṛti* for the sake of liberation of *puruṣa* (SK 57).
II.   Just as people engage in various acts to satisfy their desires, *prakṛti* engages itself in action for the sake of the liberation of *puruṣa* (SK 58).

The difference between these two analogies is that, whereas the first underscores blind and spontaneous motivation of inert matter that serves the purpose of the sentient being, the second exemplifies an intentional act where the accomplishment of the act is the very teleology of an act. We eat for nourishment, we walk to reach to a destination, but when we act out of our eagerness to attain something or to avoid the undesirable, the very satisfaction that ensues is its purpose. These two illustrations also reflect an inherent conflict in interpreting *prakṛti* in classical Sāṅkhya.

This raises a question regarding teleology: is this an emergence of a non-existent entity, where meaning is not intrinsic to being and is an emergent property? For, in that case, it would contradict the Sāṅkhya notion of an effect existing in its material cause (*satkārya*). YD therefore explains this absence of teleology in terms of not having any manifest purpose, with the example that when people say there is no water in this well, what they mean is, water is not visible (YD in SK 57). The argument is, in absence of a sentient subject, that no determination of teleology is possible in *prakṛti* and its transformation. But from the Sāṅkhya perspective, even the sentient subject (*puruṣa*) lacks its own agency, as it is indifferent to action and its results. As a consequence, the issue of teleology becomes challenging to resolve from within the Sāṅkhya paradigm: *prakṛti* lacks any inherent

purpose for the acts it carries out, and *puruṣa* lacks any motivation, and likewise, any action. Sāṅkhya provides an instinct-based argument for explaining teleology, that the insentient *prakṛti* acts for the sake of sentient *puruṣa*, similar to the way the breast milk flows for the nourishment of the calf. Apparently, it is not the actions or desire of the calf that causes milk to flow, but when and if there is a calf, the spontaneous flow of milk occurs (YD in SK 57).

There is an alternative to characterizing the motivation of *prakṛti* as blind: it is *dharma* and *adharma*, or a subject's vice and virtue that cause *prakṛti* to transform and act accordingly. For milk that spontaneously flows for a calf, it would be the virtue of the calf to receive milk. Even though one can rely on unforeseeable factors such as virtue to explain the causal relation in these instances, this does not address the fundamental question as to whether blind *prakṛti* can act on its own without having its own sentience. Replacing *prakṛti* with new categories such as vice and virtue does not address the question, for vice and virtue on their own are not sentient entities that can have their own teleology. So the argument that *dharma* and *adharma* are self-motivated does not respond to the underlying objection; it only replaces *prakṛti* with something different.

There are deeper problems in accepting that *dharma* and *adharma* act on their own, motivating *prakṛti* to transform and give rise to the manifold. The issue is that *dharma* and *adharma* are qualities inherent to intellect (*buddhi*). The subject that undergoes transformation due to *dharma* and *adharma*, or vice and virtue, is not the foundational subject or *puruṣa* but the phenomenal ego (*ahaṅkāra*), and the ego, from the Sāṅkhya perspective, is itself a product of intellect. So the primal motivation could have been caused neither by ego nor by *dharma* and *adharma*, as they would not have been manifest prior to *prakṛti* transforming into *buddhi*. As far as *dharma* and *adharma* are concerned, when *buddhi* is overpowered or propelled by the illuminating factor of *sattva*, it manifests *dharma*, and when the very *buddhi* is overpowered by the delimiting factor of *tamas*, it manifests *adharma* (SK 23). For a classical understanding of the scope of *dharma*, this is a key point, since the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas consider *dharma*, *adharma*, as well as *saṃskāra* to be qualities inherent in the self (both the individual subject or *jīvātman* as well as *paramātman* or God).[32]

Yuktidīpikā confirms this concept further:

> Virtue and vice do not exist prior to activation of *prakṛti*, since (they are) *dharmas* inherent to the intellect and intellect itself is an effect of *prakṛti*.[33]

It is only upon *puruṣa* actualizing the essential self-nature or attaining isolation from *prakṛti*, that its potencies of *prakṛti* are actualized.[34] Or, if we were to find teleology in *prakṛti*, it would be determined only after *puruṣa* actualizes itself, or recognizes itself as distinct from *prakṛti*. YD illustrates that potencies are confirmed only upon their expression, arguing that "the burning of fire or the cutting of an axe cannot be confirmed in the absence of something to be burnt or something to be cut".[35] From the Sāṅkhya perspective, what *prakṛti* embodies within itself is not already manifest prior to the manifestation of *prakṛti*, whether this is manifestation of *buddhi* and qualities that *buddhi* possesses. The causal relation in the model of *satkārya* (where the cause is endowed with properties that are manifest in the effect), makes sense only when we accept that, prior to expression of properties in the effect, those properties remain in the field of indeterminacy, or that their presence or absence can only be confirmed upon their expression.

But what is it that is recognized or removed? From the Sāṅkhya perspective, there never was any mutation on the part of *puruṣa*, nor is there ever any increase or decrease in *puruṣa*, since consciousness is its very essence. From the part of *prakṛti*, even after liberation of one *puruṣa*, it does not cease to function, as *prakṛti* keeps functioning, allowing other *puruṣas* to recognize their true nature. Then, what is achieved is merely a realization, and this realization is possible only on the part of *puruṣa*, for only the conscious subject is capable of having realization. There is a consequence in the concept of *puruṣa's* self-realization, that *puruṣa* achieves its distinctiveness from *prakṛti* and isolates itself from the triadic structure of *guṇas*, also making the case for an actual change in the state of *puruṣa*.

Īśvara-Kṛṣṇa rejects this objection by saying that "this *puruṣa*, therefore, is never bound. No one is bound, neither is anyone liberated. The *prakṛti* that rests on many (*puruṣas*) is what changes, what is bound and what liberates" (SK 62). What this implies is that this entire misconception occurs within *prakṛti* and is merely superimposed on *puruṣa*. Otherwise, *puruṣa* would actually be bound, could be liberated, and therefore subject to change.

Now, returning to change with regard to *prakṛti*, the concept of *abhivyakti* can help us explain it further, in that the manifest *guṇas* are already intrinsically given to *prakṛti* in seminal form, and they only subsequently become manifest, similar to the blossoming of some plants. This is to say that the concept of change defended here is not that of the category A changing into B, but of A enduring into new forms without being completely altered. The difference between these two notions of change is what underscores the categorical difference between Hindu and Buddhist philosophies. This, however, is not to say that there has never been an overlap between these two systems. If we overlook the marginal difference in reading the same philosophical categories when doing intertextual criticism, we will make the blunder of reading *pariṇāma* from Sāṅkhya according to Sarvāstivada Abhidharma, or even worse, the Sautrāntika-Yogacara model, and the same error can occur when reading *pariṇāma* in Buddhist texts along the lines of Sāṅkhya Yoga. As a consequence, we would be reading *nirodha* in terms of the cessation of mind found in Sāṅkhya-Yoga or impose the idea of the involution of the mind returned to its primal cause as found in Buddhist texts. This would identify a fundamental shift in the ways these schools think of change. This difference is closely addressed in Whicher's argument of the cessation or transformation of the mind (Whicher 1997). While Patañjali, particularly in the Vyāsa-commentary on the *Yogasūtra*, does substantially borrow ideas from Ghoṣaka, Vasumitra or Buddhadeva (Maas 2020), we need to keep in mind that the core principle of what it means for something to change is not conflated by the philosophers, whether they are using this category from the Buddhist or the Sāṅkhya-Yoga standpoint.

6. Conclusions

If we equate the dynamism of *rajas* with change, it would be intrinsic to *prakṛti*. However, *prakṛti* is more than change, as it also delimits, suspends, and illuminates change. When we read transformation as inherent dynamism, we are distinguishing it from spatio-temporal change. Even if genetic mutation is read along temporal lines as a gradual progression, the manifestation of *prakṛti* into its evolutes is not the same, as there never is a time when *prakṛti* is not expressing itself. We cannot engage the dynamism of *prakṛti* by interpreting change within spatio-temporal parameters, for space itself is one of the last evolutes and time is determined on the basis of space and spatial entities. What we also glean from the above conversation is that while change lacks its own inherent teleology but facilitates the foundational entity, the changeless base for it is to recognize itself and to liberate itself from having the tendencies of blind mutation upon oneself and impose change within it. If change, inherent to *prakṛti*, is compared with the motivation of a subject to satisfy her curiosity, the purpose of change is actualized in recognizing change itself, for it is in this recognition that the self actualizes its distinctness from the qualities that are intrinsic to *prakṛti* but not the self. Along these readings, our zeal or our drive towards something (*autsukya*), unlike other acts, is not guided by the urge to achieve some results, as the goal of acting due to curiosity is fulfilled merely by realizing something that requires no further action. This also explains the nature of liberation in Sāṅkhya, that no external means other than realization is necessary for liberation. *Puruṣa* in this sense is not even actually bound, as bondage is also superimposed.

Upon reflection, the Sāṅkhya discourse on *pariṇāma* addresses consistency as much as it does change. The classical texts repeatedly cite two different examples to describe change: gold and its ornaments, and milk and yoghurt. The change that we see in melting one gold ornament and making a new one describes change in appearance while emphasizing its changeless basis. The second example of milk and yoghurt highlights change in its chemical structure, with some *guṇas* being subordinate and others coming to primacy. Even

then, the triadic structure remains intact and in that sense, *pradhāna* as such has not altered but is only reconfigured. In essence, no matter the extension of transformation, nothing that exists can ever exceed the primordial triadic structure of *guṇas*.

Abbreviations

NS　　*Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama
SK　　*Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa
YD　　*Yuktidīpikā* (Kumar and Bhargav 1992)
YS　　*Yogasūtra* of Patañjali

Notes

1　There is not one Sāṅkhya philosophy. If we compare *Sāṅkhyakārikā* (SK) with the *Mahābhārata*, we will encounter different strands of Sāṅkhya philosophies, some accepting additional categories and others defining the same categories differently. In particular, a closer analysis of *Yuktidīpikā* [YD] reveals some scholastic developments in this front, raising key disagreements among the classical Sāṅkhya philosophers. In this paper, I am broadly reading *SK* and mostly relying on *YD*, and in many instances, this simplified reading can be confronted on the basis of internal categorical differences. This paper is not the place to discuss those internal minor differences, and those interested in these discussions can consult (Larson 2011; Larson and Bhattacharya 2016; Chakravarti 1975).

2　This type of suffix is called *bhāva* suffix in the Pāṇinian grammar. These suffixes do not add new meaning but refer to what the very verbal root stands for. In this case, the base stands for action or dynamism.

3　For some key ways to derive the term *puruṣa*, see the *Nirukta* of Yāska I.13; II.3.

4　The earliest I am able trace the concept of two types of permanency is to Patañjali (2nd C. BCE), the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* upon Pāṇini's grammar. In the *Mahābhāṣya* (I.1.1), Patañjali introduces the concept that one type of permanency is the eternal, something that does not change (*dhruva, kūṭastha*, etc.), and the other type is the form (*ākṛti*) or the generic character, as it does not perish even when the particulars perish. The *Vyāsa-Bhāṣya* (YS IV.33) introduces the same concept in modified terms of *kūṭastha nityatā and pariṇāmi-nityatā*, the eternal-changeless-type constant versus the constant that changes. What we understand here by 'consistency in terms of the flow' (*pravāha-nityatā*) is the same as *pariṇāmi-nityatā*, albeit, as we can see, the concept of dynamic consistency as understood in Sāṅkhya is not the same as what the grammarian Patañjali understood in terms of the consistency of generic forms.

5　For the scope of Kantian analysis in understanding Sāṅkhya, read (Burley 2007, pp. 57–71).

6　I have refrained from addressing *bhāvas* as that would require a much larger space. Also, I have refrained from translating the term *guṇa*. For discussion on *guṇa*, read (Rao 1963, pp. 61–71).

7　Read (Shevchenko 2017) for the concept of liberation in Sāṅkhya. To explore this concept further in the Patañjalian system, one can consult YS II.22: *kṛtārthaṃ prati naṣṭam apy anaṣṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt* |.

8　*dikkālau cākāśam eva . . .* | *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya* of Vijñānabhikṣu I.61. See also Prasad (1984).

9　*dikkālāv ākāśādibhyaḥ* | *Sāṅkhyasūtra* II.12.

10　*nityau yau dikkālau tāvākāśaprakṛtibhūtau prakṛter guṇaviśāv eva* | *ato dikkālayor vibhutvopapattiḥ* | *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya* II.12.

11　*na hi naḥ kālo nāma kaścid asti* | *Yuktidīpikā* on SK, verse 15.

12　*kriyamāṇakriyāṇām evādityagatigodohaghaṭāstanitādīnām viśiṣṭāvadhisarūpapratyayanimittatvam* | *Yuktidīpikā* on SK, verse 15.

13　While some scholars have argued in favor of the concept of God within the Sāṅkhya paradigm, (Bronkhorst 1983), there is no argument in saying that there is no 'creator' outside of the self-governing system of *prakṛti* and its evolutes.

14　*na hi sattvādayaḥ prakāśādibhir dharmair itaretaropakāreṇa vartamānāḥ puruṣakṛtam upakāram apekṣante* | *prakāśādidharmasannidhānamātrād eva tu pravartante* | *Yuktidīpikā* on SK, verse 19.

15　*pradhānapravṛttir apratyayā puruṣeṇāparigṛhyamāṇā ādisarge vartante* | Cited in *Yuktidīpikā* on SK, verse 19.

16　*acetanānāṃ hi kṣīrādīnāṃ kriyāvattvam upalabdhaṃ cetanasya na kasyacid ity ato niṣkriyaḥ puruṣaḥ* | *Yuktidīpikā* on SK, verse 19.

17   *dvayī ceyaṃ nityatā–kūṭasthanityatā pariṇāminityatā ca | tatra kūṭasthanityatā puruṣasya | pariṇāminityatā guṇānām | yasminpariṇamyamāne tattvaṃ na vihanyate tannityam | ubhayasya ca tattvānabhighātān nityatvam | Vyāsa-bhāṣya* upon *Yogasūtra* IV.33.

18   The influence of the Buddhist schools upon the Yoga system of Patañjali is too broad a topic to discuss here. Besides the observations of Philip Maas (2020) on some critical terms, Pradip Gokhale (2020) has made similar observations regarding the entire text.

19   *dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmo dharmivikriyaivaiṣā dharmadvārā prapañcyata iti | Vyāsa-bhāṣya* upon YS III.13.

20   For a detailed analysis of this threefold transformation of the mind, see the *Vyāsa-bhāṣya* and *Tattvavaiśāradī* commentaries upon YS III.13.

21   *na dharmī tryadhvā | dharmās tu tryadhvānaḥ | Vyāsa-bhāṣya* upon YS III.13.

22   *pariṇāmaśācāvasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivṛttau dharmāntarapravṛttir iti /* (Bhāṣya on NS 3.2.15).

23   *avasthitasya dravyasya pūrvadharmanivṛttau dharmāntarotpattiḥ pariṇāma iti /* (Vyāsa-Bhāṣya on YS 3.1.13).

24   *yadā śaktyantarānugrahāt pūrvadharmaṃ tirobhāvya svarūpād apracyuto dharmī dharmāntareṇāvirbhavati tad avasthānam asmākaṃ pariṇāma ity ucyate /* Yuktidīpikā on SK, verse 16.

25   *pariṇāmo hi nāmāvasthitasya dravyasya dharmāntaranivṛttiḥ dharmāntarapravṛttiś ca | tatra sato dharmāntarasya nirodhābhyupagamād asataś cotpattipratijñānān nedam arthāntaram ārabhate | Yuktidīpikā* on SK, verse 9.

26   *jahad dharmāntaraṃ pūrvam upādatte yadāparam | Tattvād apracyuto dharmī pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate | |* Cited in *Yuktidīpikā* on SK, verse 9.

27   *ātmabhūtaṃ hi tantūnāṃ paṭākhyaṃ vyūhasthānīyam sanniveśaviśeṣaṃ yadā kārakāṇi svena svena vyāpāreṇāviṣkurvanti tadā kriyata utpadyate jāyata ity evamādir lokasya vyavahāraḥ pravartate | yadā tu kārakāṇi śaktyantarāvirbhāvāt saṃsthānāntareṇautsukyavartitām avasthām upasaṃharanti tadā prāgupalabdhaṃ saṃsthānaṃ vināśaśabdavācyatāṃ pratipadyate | paramārthatas tu na kasyacid utpādo'sti na vināśaḥ | Yuktidīpikā* on SK, verse 9.

28   *sāmānyasya hi viśeṣaparigrahaḥ saṃsthānam | Yuktidīpikā*, on SK, verse 9.

29   *mahadādi tac ca kāryaṃ prakṛtisarūpaṃ virūpaṃ ca | SK*, verse 9cd.

30   *calattā kriya | sā ca dvividhā, pariṇāmalakṣaṇā praspandalakṣaṇā ca | YD* on SK, verse 13.

31   … *svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ | | SK* 56.*na caiṣa svārthaḥ sarvasyāsyācetanatvāt, kin tarhi? Parārtha evāyam ārambhaḥ saṅghātatvād ityāha | YD* on SK 56.

32   For qualities of the mind and the self, see (Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti 1991).

33   *prākpradhānapravṛtter dharmādharmayor asaṃbhavaḥ, buddhidharmatvāt tasyāś ca pradhāna-vikāratvāt | YD* in SK, verse 52.

34   I have broadly used the terminology of liberation for *kaivalya* for the sake of communication and occasionally rely on translating the term as 'isolation from *prakṛti*,' a transcendence of consciousness from the matrix of *prakṛti*. This is not a place for me to address the scope and nature of this experience, and for that, one can consult (Whicher 2005, 2007; Burley 2007, pp. 133–55).

35   *agner dahanaṃ paraśoś chedanam asati dāhye chedye ca na vyajyate | YD* in SK, verse 20.

References

Acri, Andrea. 2021. Vedāntic Analogies Expressing Oneness and Multiplicity and their Bearing on the History of the Śaiva Corpus. Part I: Parin. Āmavāda. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 49: 535–69. [CrossRef]

Bajželj, Ana. 2020. Clay Pots, Golden Rings, and Clean Upper Garments: Causality in Jaina Philosophy. In *Framing Intellectual and Lived Spaces in Early South Asia: Sources and Boundaries*. Edited by Lucas den Boer and Elizabeth A. Cecil. Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 197–224. [CrossRef]

Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1983. God in Sāṃkhya. *Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 27: 149–64.

Burley, Mikel. 2007. *Classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga: An Indian Metaphysics of Experience*. New York: Routledge.

Chakrabarti, Kishor Kumar, and Chandana Chakrabarti. 1991. Toward Dualism: Nyāya-Vaiseṣika Way. *Philosophy East and West* 41: 477–91. [CrossRef]

Chakravarti, Pulinbihari. 1975. *Origin and Development of the Sāmkhya System of Thought*. Reprint. New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation.

Gokhale, Pradip. 2020. *The Yogasūtra of Patañjali: A New Introduction to the Buddhist Roots of the Yoga System*. Delhi: Routledge India.

Kumar, Shiv, and D. N. Bhargav, eds. 1992. *Yuktidīpikā*. 2 vols, Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers.

Larson, Gerald J. 2011. *Classial Sāṃkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning*. Delhi: Motilal Banersidass.

Larson, Gerald J., and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya. 2016. *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume IV: Sāṃkhya, A Dualistic Tradition in Indian Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Maas, Philipp A. 2020. Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Theories of Temporality and the Pātañjala Yoga Theory of Transformation (*pariṇāma*). *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 48: 963–1003. [CrossRef]

Prasad, Hari Shamkar. 1984. Time and Change in SAMKHYA YOGA. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12: 35–49. [CrossRef]

Rao, K. B. Ramakrishna. 1963. The Guṇas of Prakṛti According to Sāṃkhya Philosophy. *Philosophy East and West* 13: 61–71. [CrossRef]

Ray, Roma. 1982. Is Parinamavada a Doctrine of Causality? *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 10: 377–96. [CrossRef]

Shevchenko, Dimitry. 2017. Natural Liberation in the Sāṃkhyakārikā and Its Commentaries. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 45: 863–92. [CrossRef]

Watanabe, Toshikazu. 2011. Dharmakirti's Criticism of Anityatva in the Samkhya Theory. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 39: 553–69. [CrossRef]

Whicher, Ian. 1997. Nirodha, Yoga Praxis and the Transformation of the Mind. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 25: 1–67. [CrossRef]

Whicher, Ian. 2005. The Liberating Role of "Saṃskāra" in Classical Yoga. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 33: 601–30. [CrossRef]

Whicher, Ian. 2007. Ethics of Liberation in Patañjali's Yoga. In *Indian Ethics: Classical Traditions and Contemporary Challenges*. Edited by Purushottama Bilimoria, Renuka Sharma and Joseph Prabhu. New York: Routledge, pp. 161–70.