Drunk with Wisdom: Metaphors of Ecstasy in Plato’s Symposium and Lucian of Samosata

Among the metaphors that Plato employed in the context of his apophatic approach to philosophical truth and its experience, inebriation stands out in the Symposium, where famously Socrates is compared to Dionysian figures such as the Silenoi and Marsyas (215a-c), and to frenzied Corybantic dancers (215e; 216d; 218b). The contentious nature of inebriation as a proxy of ecstasy is aptly exemplified in Euripides’ Bacchae, where Pentheus, the distrusting new tyrant of Thebes, is keen to associate the Bacchic trance with common intoxication and lewd behavior; although Plato tries to anticipate such criticisms by repeatedly stating in the Symposium that Socrates is sober and of sound mind (e.g., 214a; 216d; 219d; 220a), later authors are unforgiving of his metaphorical style, which is deemed inconsistent with Plato’s stern disapproval of poetry. Among such later authors, Lucian of Samosata deserves closer attention apropos his treatment of inebriation as a most confusing and inappropriate metaphor for philosophical inspiration. Despite the jocular style of his dialogues, Lucian’s depiction of Platonic inebriation powerfully sketches a deep intellectual crisis that especially afflicts the young people of his time. Thus, Lucian sheds unexpected light on a less prominent chapter of Plato’s reception during the Roman imperial period.


Introduction: Philosophical Conversion and "Platonic Inebriation"
Conversion, the result of undergoing an altered state of consciousness, 1 was invariably described in Greek antiquity as ecstasy or divine possession, 2 and was linked with philosophy rather than religion. 3 For example, in the Platonic dialogues Socrates is typically portrayed as preoccupied with abstract notions, meditating for hours in full public view, lost in his thoughts, 4 often talking to himself, 5 yet candidly musing on his frequent divine visitations (his daimonion). 6 Hence, Socrates becomes an easy target of fifth-century BCE Athenian anti-intellectualism, 7 spearheaded by Aristophanes. 8 This, however, does not alter that fact that our encounter with the secrets of the cosmos or the divine is typically marked by an inexpressible sublimity, often accompanied by feelings of amazement, fear, and awe. Thus, Plato's descriptions of the inner experience of philosophy are full of lacunae, such as, for example, in the Symposium, where Diotima resorts to a series of negatives to convey the ineffable uniqueness of Beauty (Symp. 211b2). Still, Plato needs to relate in some way the experience of philosophical conversion and thus he coins a number of metaphors for which he draws on culturally familiar states of altered consciousness (see n.1). One of the most controversial metaphors that Plato employed to describe philosophical conversion is inebriation, 9 notably expounded in the Symposium (e.g., Symp. 218b3-4), which relates the events that took place during a splendid banquet organized by Agathon in 416 BCE to celebrate his dramatic victory at the Lenaia festival of that year. The guests are some of the most prominent politicians and members of the Athenian intellectual elite of the time, including Socrates and aristocratic bad-boy Alcibiades.
The latter is, in fact, portrayed as gate-crashing the party (212d4-7) and proclaiming himself symposiarch (213e9-10) before urging everyone to drink beyond measure (213e10-214a4). In addition, when prompted by Eryximachus to participate in the competition of praises about Eros which the guests have chosen as their pastime, Alcibiades resolves to deliver a praise of Socrates, comparing him to the Silenoi and Marsyas, 10 figures typically associated with Dionysus, 11 who, according to Euripides' iconic representation of the god's cult, drove his followers "out of their mind," 12 stinging them with bouts of mania. 13 Framed by repeated references to drinking in the dialogue-that of the other guests (176a7-c4), 14 of Poros in Diotima's tale (203b6-8), and notably, Alcibiades' undeniable state of intoxication, as he is supported by a flute girl into the banqueting hall (212d-e)-Socrates' philosophical inspiration is described as an ecstatic experience that leads his audiences to shock and amazement (215d6): 15 ἐπειδὰν δὲ σoῦ τις ἀκoύῃ ἢ τῶν σῶν λóγων ἄλλoυ λέγoντoς, . . . , ἐκπεπληγµένoι ἐσµὲν καὶ κατεχóµεθα. For whenever one listens to you or to someone else relating your speeches . . . we are all astounded and possessed.
For when I hear him, I am much worse than those partaking in the Corybantic dances; and my heart leaps and tears run down my eyes at the sound of his speeches, and I have witnessed many others undergoing the same experience.
Alcibiades' statement focuses on the difference between appearance and essence and aims to dramatize the effect that Socrates has on his audiences: despite being rather unassuming in appearance (remember the joke at the start of the Symposium about Socrates looking unusually polished; 174a10-11), always joking with his interlocutors (175e8 and 215b9: ὑβριστὴς εἶ; cf. 219c6; 221e4; 222b1 and especially 216e5-6: εἰρωνευóµενoς δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίoν πρὸς τoὺς ἀνθρώπoυς διατελεῖ), and claiming to know little (216d4-5: καὶ αὖ ἀγνoεῖ πάντα καὶ oὐδὲν oἶδεν), in reality, he is a deft speaker that leads his interlocutors to aporia before guiding them to change their views and way of life (cf. 215b4-5; 216e3-8). Thus, indeed he resembles the Silenoi statues that look ridiculous at first (221e2-3: ϕανεῖεν ἂν πάνυ γελoῖoι τὸ πρῶτoν) with their deceptively ludicrous exterior though inside them they hide statues of the gods. Similarly, an inexperienced and thoughtless person might at first laugh at Socrates' speeches (221e7-222a1: ὥστε ἄπειρoς καὶ ἀνóητoς ἄνθρωπoς πᾶς ἂν τῶν λóγων καταγελάσειεν) before realizing that his are the only speeches that make sense.
Nevertheless, Socrates' philosophical inspiration, defined by Alcibiades as mania and baccheia (218b3-4), and supplemented by testimonies of the philosopher's reputation for being able to quaff considerable amounts of wine, 17 could easily render him misunderstood, even ridiculed, as being "under the influence" of wine, as being drunk. 18 Despite repeated references in the Symposium to Socrates' sophrosyne (214a; 216d; 219d), reinforced by Alcibiades' assurance that "no-one has ever seen Socrates drunk" (220a6-7: Σωκράτη µεθύoντα oὐδεὶς πώπoτε ἑώρακεν ἀνθρώπων), Plato's bold attempt to defend Socrates backfired. "Platonic" or "Socratic inebriation" attracted considerable criticism by later readers for confusing philosophy, expected to unpack abstract notions in plain language, with the literary endeavor, typically associated with florid, figurative language. Thus, Plato was accused of misguiding students of philosophy who were unable to appreciate his penchant for metaphors. My paper, then, discusses the negative reception of Plato's metaphorical style in the Hellenistic and early Roman imperial periods before focusing on the rejection of Socrates' baccheia by Lucian of Samosata, the second century CE satirist who offers a refreshing insight into the renewed debate of his time on philosophical conversion. 19
When a metaphor seems bold, convert it into a simile for greater safety. A simile is an expanded metaphor . . . The result is a simile and a less risky form of expression, while the former was a metaphor and more dangerous. This is why Plato's use of metaphor in preference to simile is thought risky. Xenophon by contrast prefers the simile.
However, it is obvious without my stating it, that the use of metaphor, like all the other attractions of style, always tempts writers to excess. Indeed, it is for these passages in particular that critics pull Plato to pieces, on the ground that he is often carried away by a sort of Bacchic possession in his writing into harsh and intemperate metaphor and allegorical bombast. "It is by no means easy to see," he says, "that a city needs mixing like a wine bowl, 31 where the mad wine seethes as it is poured in, but is chastened by another and a sober god and finding good company makes an excellent and temperate drink." To call water "a sober god" and mixing "chastisement," say the critics, is the language of a poet who is far from sober.
Although ps.-Longinus defends Plato, using vocabulary that evokes the Platonic Symposium, 32 evidently Plato did not avoid being misunderstood. His critics were particularly challenged by the contradiction of a philosophical mind overcome by frenzy and yet able to grasp transcendental truth(s) with remarkable alertness. 33 Indeed, even if we allow for the typical exaggeration associated with comedy and its antagonistic relationship with philosophy, as already noted in the context of Aristophanes' (alleged) attack on Socrates, 34 and even if we try to counter the criticisms levelled at Plato with the Stoic emphasis on the usefulness of poetry, 35 Plato's style was nonetheless the target of ridicule. Lucian, one of his most vocal yet rather understudied critics, was especially preoccupied with Plato's controversial description of philosophical trance as wine-fueled frenzy.

Lucian and "Platonic Inebriation"
Lucian epitomizes the satirical critique of Socratic inebriation as an image unsuitable to express and articulate philosophical progress because it is dangerously open to misinterpretation. 36 In Lucian's Lexiphanes, the eponymous character whose name etymologically points to a bombastic speaker, claims to have composed a Symposium to compete with Plato's famous dialogue (Lex. 1): 37 ἀντισυµπoσιάζω 38 τῷ ἀρίστωνoς ἐν αὐτῷ.
There are many "Aristos," but to judge from your "banquet" I suppose you mean Plato.
You read me right.
Enough, Lexiphanes, both of the drinking-party and of the reading. I am already drunk and nauseous, and if I do not very soon vomit all this gallimaufry of yours, know it well, I expect to go raving mad with the roaring in my ears from the words with which you have showered me. At first I was inclined to laugh at it all, but when it turned out to be such a quantity and all of a sort, I pitied you for your hard luck, seeing that you had fallen into an inescapable labyrinth and were afflicted with the most serious of all illnesses-likely suffering from melancholy. 41 For Lucian, Plato's refutation of rhetoric is but another form of it which can obscure the purpose of philosophical enlightenment when entrusted to the wrong people. 42 In adopting this approach, Lucian responds to the widespread (certainly at the time) view that few people can grasp complex philosophical arguments and have the stamina to make the necessary lifestyle changes that accord with philosophical insight. This image, however, is in loud contrast with the hordes of young men that by Lucian's time flocked to philosophers and oratory schools to improve themselves. The impetus for self-improvement, fuelled by aspirations of social advancement, led to a systematic misreading or misapplication of Plato's dialogues that, according to Lucian, Plato had invited.
But what luck! Here I see Sopolis the physician drawing near. Come now, suppose we put you in his hands, have a consultation with him about your complaint, and find some cure for you. The man is clever, and often before now, taking charge of people like yourself, half crazed and full of drivel, he has relieved them with his doses of medicine.-Good-day to you, Sopolis. Do take charge of Lexiphanes here, who is my friend, as you know, and at present has on him a nonsensical, outlandish distemper affecting his speech which is likely to be the death of him outright. Do save him in one way or another.
Thus, pretentious, exaggerated speech is firmly identified as a symptom of a disorder bordering madness (par. 18: ὥσπερ σὲ ἡµιµανεῖς καὶ κoρυζῶντας), similar to Corybantic frenzy (par. 16: κoρυβαντιάσειν µoι δoκῶ) and drunkenness (µεθύω). 44 By extension, Lucian criticizes Plato, Lexiphanes' confessed model, both for his promotion of Socratic intoxication and for his metaphorical, florid language. Importantly, this condition is not to be confused with the insights of a true philosopher-with all his eloquence Lexiphanes is but a deluded impostor.
Lucian returns to the theme of the exaggerated and haphazard metaphors employed by philosophers in Hermotimus 59. In this dialogue, Lycinus attempts to dissuade his friend Hermotimus from his enthusiastic desire to be tutored in philosophy. Lycinus, after comparing philosophers to wine merchants keen to impress their prospective customers, 45 asks of his new interlocuter, Hermotimus (Herm. 60): Πῶς oὖν oἷóν τέ σoι ἦν ἀπὸ τoῦ πρώτoυ γεύµατoς εἰδέναι τὰ πάντα; oὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτά γε, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ ἕτερα καινὰ ἐπὶ καινoῖς ἐλέγετo, oὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ oἶνoς ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν. ὥστε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἢν µὴ ὅλoν ἐκπίῃς τὸν πίθoν, ἄλλως µεθύων περίει· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἐν τῷ πυθµένι δoκεῖ µoι ὁ θεὸς κατακρύψαι τὸ ϕιλoσoϕίας ἀγαθὸν ὑπὸ τὴν τρύγα αὐτήν. δεήσει oὖν ὅλoν ἐξαντλῆσαι ἐς τέλoς, ἢ oὔπoτ' ἂν εὕρoις τὸ νεκτάρεoν ἐκεῖνo πóµα, oὗ πάλαι διψῆν µoι δoκεῖς. σὺ δὲ oἴει τὸ τoιoῦτoν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὡς εἰ µóνoν γεύσαιo αὐτoῦ καὶ σπάσαις µικρὸν ὅσoν, αὐτίκα σε πάνσoϕoν γενησóµενoν ὥσπερ ϕασὶν ἐν ∆ελϕoῖς τὴν πρóµαντιν, ἐπειδὰν πίῃ τoῦ ἱερoῦ νάµατoς, ἔνθεoν εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ χρᾶν τoῖς πρoσιoῦσιν. ἀλλ' oὐχ oὕτως ἔχειν ἔoικε· σύ γ' oὖν ὑπὲρ ἥµισυ τoῦ πίθoυ ἐκπεπωκὼς ἐνάρχεσθαι ἔτι ἔλεγες. Then how could you have known everything from just the first taste? There were not the same, but always new things being said on new subjects, unlike wine, which is always the same. So, my friend, unless you drink the whole butt, your tipsiness has been to no purpose; god seems to me to have hidden the good of philosophy right down at the bottom beneath the very lees. You will have to drain it all to the end or you will never find that nectarous drink for which I think you have long thirsted. But you imagine it to be such that, if you were but to taste and draw just a drop, you would at once become all-wise, as, they say, the prophetess at Delphi becomes inspired as soon as she drinks of the sacred spring and gives her answers to those who consult the oracle. But it seems it is not so: you had drunk over half the butt, and you said that you were still at the beginning.
The condemnation of the intoxicating effect of philosophical rhetoric in this dialogue is, however, marked by ambiguity. Hermotimus starts the dialogue anxious to become a distinguished philosopher, 46 but when he comes to his senses, as if recovering from a previous drunkenness (Herm. 83: νυνὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκ µέθης ἀνανήϕων ὁρῶ oἷα µέν ἐστιν), he pledges to drop his study of philosophy in tandem with its accompanying apparel (Herm. 86): he will cut his long beard, refrain from his punitive lifestyle, maybe even wear purple. 47 Lycinus introduces his attempt to sober Hermotimus up, however, with a reference to Symposium (215e1-2): ἐµoὶ µὲν ὥσπερ κoρυβαντιῶντι µὴ πρóσεχε τὸν νoῦν, ἀλλ' ἔα ληρεῖν, "Take no notice of my corybantic frenzy, but let me speak nonsense" (par. 63). 48 For Hermotimus to be swayed by Lycinus' counter-arguments, he must thus have experienced another kind of intellectual illumination, similar in its description at least to the mesmerizing effect his teacher's words used to have on him. 49 Lycinus is a deft speaker, as Hermotimus protests repeatedly. 50 In his Wisdom of Nigrinus, 51 which also contains striking allusions to Plato's Symposium, 52 Lucian moves from attacking pretentious eloquence to targeting Socratic intoxication directly. As often reiterated so far, in the Symposium Plato is constantly aware of the shallowness and ineptness of the metaphors at his disposal to describe the Socratic effect; therefore, Alcibiades' comic descriptions of experiencing philosophy do not undermine Socrates' moderation, self-evident in his sobriety while in the company of his tipsy fellow-symposiasts. His is (presented as) a genuine phenomenon, not a desperate attempt to recreate it. 53 In Nigrinus 38, we read a description of Socratic intoxication, based on both the Symposium and the Phaedrus (bold fonts in the quotation below indicate similarities with Plato's descriptions), which nonetheless represents only heady enthusiasm: 54 ῾Ως σεµνὰ καὶ θαυµάσια 55 καὶ θεῖά γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, διελήλυθας, 56 ἐλελήθεις δέ µε πoλλῆς ὡς ἀληθῶς τῆς ἀµβρoσίας καὶ τoῦ λωτoῦ κεκoρεσµένoς· ὥστε καὶ µεταξὺ σoῦ λέγoντoς ἔπασχóν τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ παυσαµένoυ ἄχθoµαι 57 καὶ ἵνα δὴ καὶ κατὰ σὲ εἴπω, τέτρωµαι· 58 καὶ µὴ θαυµάσῃς· oἶσθα γὰρ ὅτι καὶ oἱ πρὸς τῶν κυνῶν τῶν λυσσώντων δηχθέντες oὐκ αὐτoὶ µóνoι λυσσῶσιν, ἀλλὰ κἄν τινας ἑτέρoυς ἐν τῇ µανίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ τoῦτo διαθῶσιν, καὶ αὐτoὶ ἔκϕρoνες 59 γίγνoνται· συµµεταβαίνει γάρ τι τoῦ πάθoυς ἅµα τῷ δήγµατι καὶ πoλυγoνεῖται ἡ νóσoς καὶ πoλλὴ γίγνεται τῆς µανίας διαδoχή. What a grand, wonderful, and indeed divine tale you have told, my friend; I did not realize but you have been truly chock-full of ambrosia and lotus! So that while you spoke, I felt something in my soul, and now you have stopped I am vexed: to speak in your style, I am wounded. Additionally, no wonder! for you know that people bitten by rabid dogs not only go mad themselves, but if in their fury they give the same thing to others, they too go out of their minds. Something of the affection is transmitted with the bite; the disease multiplies, and there is a great run of madness.
What he said has made me proud and exalted, and in short, I am no longer concerned with trifles. I suppose I have had a similar experience with philosophy that the Hindus are said to have had with wine when they first tasted it. As they are by nature warmer than we, on taking such strong drink they went into frenzy at once and became manic by the unmixed drink twice as much. There you have it! I am going about enraptured twice as much by his words.
Although the interlocutor of Lucian's character protests that "this is not drunkenness but sobriety and temperance" (Nigr. 6: Kαὶ µὴν τoῦτó γε oὐ µεθύειν, ἀλλὰ νήϕειν τε καὶ σωϕρoνεῖν ἐστιν), Nigrinus' student, like Hermotimus above, clings to the bombastic descriptions of his transformation and revels in the license to use this kind of language that he has secured on account of his engagement with philosophy; Nigrinus himself, trapped in his image, watches on in guilty awareness and unable to react. 65 Finally, in Lucian's Bis Accusatus, Drunkenness is portrayed as dragging Academy at court, because she was able to convert one of her dearest slaves, the bad-boy-turnedphilosopher Polemon, 66 whose description readily evokes Plato's Alcibiades in the Sympo-sium. 67 Polemon's physical drunkenness corresponds to his "inspirational" way of teaching. 68 However, when Drunkenness is too intoxicated to defend her case, 69 Academy offers to speak for her, an offer probably designed to allude to Socrates' disconcerting practice of delivering arguments on behalf of his rhetorical opponents, which Cicero appreciated as a key feature of Socratic irony 70 (which he describes as severe ludas in De Or. 2.269-270). As Lane has pointed out, 71 Socrates employed his ironic, playful style both in the Aristophanic way, where it means "concealing by feigning" and in the Aristotelian way where emphasis is given to self-deprecation. His style caused confusion among ancient as much as modern readers; 72 hence, in Lucian, Academy seizes the opportunity to discredit the arguments of Drunkenness even further rather than deliver a fair defence on her behalf, a hint to the criticism that Socratic rhetorical practices incurred. 73 It seems then that, as an author of satiric dialogues, Lucian engages with Old Comedy 74 and its potential for moralizing rhetoric, recognizing its affinity with philosophy and its equal claim to parrhesia. 75 In this guise, he calls for a re-evaluation of the flow of wine and jokes 76 in the post-Platonic era.

Conclusions
I have explored here a rather overlooked chapter of Plato's reception that focuses on the problem of articulating philosophical conversion. Despite his well-documented objection to poetry and its ambiguous use of rhetoric, Plato resorted to culturally ingrained metaphors to defend Socrates' philosophical insights. Among such metaphors, further developed in the writings of Neoplatonic thinkers and often adapted by theologians such as pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite to refer to the core dogmatic truths of Christianity, inebriation proved to be especially controversial. Although Plutarch promoted the educational value of sympotic conviviality (Teodorsson (1999); Roskam (2009)), Lucian used his sharp satire to point out the simmering intellectual crisis of his time which Plato had unwittingly fuelled with his passionate imagery: while "Platonic inebriation" was meant to express powerfully the interiorization of philosophy and its life-altering effect, an image already misrepresented by Socrates' critics in his own time, the trope was now transformed in the hands of inept teachers and desperate students into a dangerous way of manipulating the students' zeal for progress. Truth, it seems, was as highly prized and yet as elusive in Lucian's time as during any time of humanity's intellectual struggle to grapple with our purpose in this world.

Conflicts of Interest:
The author declares no conflict of interest.