Equal Opportunity Beliefs beyond Black and White American Christianity

: Scholars in critical race and the sociology of religion have independently drawn attention to the ways in which cultural ideologies drive beliefs about inequalities between groups. Critical race work on “abstract liberalism” highlights non-racially inﬂected language that tacitly reinforces White socioeconomic outcomes resulting from an allegedly fair social system. Sociologists of religion have noted that White Evangelical Christian theology promotes an individualist mindset that places blame for racial inequalities on the perceived failings of Blacks. Using data from the National Asian American Survey 2016, we return to this question and ask whether beliefs about the importance of equal opportunity reveal similarities or di ﬀ erences between religious Asian American and Latino Christians and Black and White Christians. The results conﬁrm that White Christians are generally the least supportive of American society providing equal opportunity for all. At the other end, Black Christians were the most supportive. However, with the inclusion of Asian American Christian groups, we note that second generation Asian American and Latino Evangelicals hew closer to the White Christian mean, while most other Asian and Latino Christian groups adhere more closely to the Black Christian mean. This study provides further support for the recent claims of religion’s complex relationship with other stratifying identities. It suggests that cultural assimilation among second generation non-Black Evangelical Christians heads more toward the colorblind racist attitudes of many White Christians, whereas potential for new coalitions of Latino and Black Christians could emerge, given their shared perceptions of the persistent inequality in their communities.


Introduction
Inasmuch as the racial disparities in employment, wealth and housing continue and are worsened by some measures, attitudes about equal opportunity undergird much of the resistance toward policies aimed at ameliorating these inequalities. Pertinent to the collection of studies in this volume is the evident role that cultural scripts play through religious affiliations, as they relate to racial disparities and the very ideals intended to project an exceptionalist or colorblind view of American society. As Wilde and her colleagues have shown and argued, research findings on religious differences always intersect with social characteristics in which our society is typically stratified, namely race, class, and gender (Wilde 2018;Wilde and Glassman 2016). In many cases, it is the responses of White Americans that drive the narratives of "religious effects". Wilde termed this intersectional framing of religion "complex religion", and our study provides another example of how our current understanding of religious cultural scripts renders the views of non-White religious individuals and groups inconsequential or invisible. In the following, we consider the associations of religious affiliations and racial identities with attitudes about equal opportunity. We apply the racial hierarchy framework to the research on religious affiliation's relationship to inequality attitudes using a unique sample of Americans that allow US. Among the newcomers, some are almost immediately cast into the middle class and its attendant upward mobility opportunities, while others arrive in the working class with limited opportunities for mobility (Zhou 1997). This aligns with the collective Black and honorary White categories in Bonilla-Silva's framing. Evidently, Latino and Asian Americans navigate a unique racialized reality as racial groups who experience both privileges (relative to Blacks) and discrimination (Kim 1999;Lee and Tran 2019;Lee and Bean 2012). More pointedly, as different Asian and Latino groups assimilate structurally into different sectors of the American economy, the cultural component of assimilation also takes root (Gordon 1964). This can and often does include assimilation into the dominant racial ideology, colorblind racism.

Colorblind Racism and the Narrative of Equal Opportunity
Ideology is an important factor within the revised racial order. Sociologists contend that cultural ideologies play an important role in the allocation of resources (Sewell 1992). In the post-Civil Rights Era, direct racial prejudice has largely (although not entirely) fallen by the wayside in favor of what many scholars, such as sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, are calling colorblind racism, which he defined as a new racial ideology which "explains contemporary racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial dynamics" (Bonilla-Silva 2010, p. 2). The main framework for colorblind racism is abstract liberalism, which employs laissez faire views towards racial issues, while also describing them in an abstract manner (Bonilla-Silva 2015). In other words, while many White Americans avoid overt racist language, they defend their racism by appealing to abstract ideals such as individualism that tacitly asserts that racial differences in social and economic outcomes are a result of personal abilities or failings rather than systemic efforts to disenfranchise entire groups of individuals. This frame of colorblind racism is so embedded in racial ideologies and current structures that minorities also fail to recognize its hidden power (Hunt 1996;Manning et al. 2015;Bobo 2011).
One particular principle within abstract liberalism is the belief in equal opportunity. The narrative of equal opportunity is familiar to most Americans; it imagines an ideal society in which its members are given opportunities for upward mobility, regardless of group affiliations or characteristics (e.g., gender, race, religion etc.). These opportunities therefore are equally available to all individuals without discriminating against class, gender, race and religion. When opportunities are equally available, outcomes can be unequal, since every individual applies her effort in unequal ways. The impact of ethnic, racial or religious systemic bias is minimal based on this view of equal opportunity. As long as society makes opportunity available equitably, alleged "structural differences" must be the result of some other factor in the personal life and decisions of the individual.
Because White Americans believe in abstract liberalism, they project the same expectations on racial minorities. Consequently, many White Americans oppose programs implemented to help racial minorities because they fundamentally believe that equal opportunity is available for all Americans. They further maintain that they have no hidden advantages and that current policies in fact penalize them, as seen in the accusations of 'reverse discrimination' (Bonilla-Silva 2015; Delgado and Stefancic 2012). This belief does not account for structural inequities "baked in" which may result in significant inequalities in the labor market, wealth accrual, and educational attainment. White Americans adhere to this belief that equal opportunity is a reality far more than non-Whites, and their conviction exemplifies their privileged status.
Black Americans, by contrast, are strong advocates for structural change intended to rectify current and past inequities by improving opportunities for all African Americans (Bobo and Kluegel 1993;Hunt 1996;Hunt 2007). The visible disparities in equal opportunity between Whites and Blacks leads to greater health inequalities for African Americans (Noonan et al. 2016), large wage gaps and high unemployment rates among Blacks relative to Whites, even when accounting for mass incarceration rates (Western and Pettit 2005). Thus, supporting structural remodeling is inherently necessary for the welfare of the Black community (Delgado and Stefancic 2012;Western and Pettit 2005;Golland 2011;Hunt 2007).
Latino and Asian Americans have a unique position in the racial hierarchy, significantly distinguishable from both Black and White Americans (Yancey 2004;Hunt 1996;Hunt 2007). They support both abstract liberalism's individualism as well as sociologically informed structural explanations for racial inequality (Yancey 2004;Hunt 2007). In these studies, scholars did not differentiate skin tone for Latinos and ethnicity for Asian Americans, as Bonilla-Silva has explicated. However, what this research suggests is that without disaggregation of these racial categories, it appears that, over time, Asian and Latino Americans' attitudes hew closer to White Americans' preference for individualist explanations of racial inequality (Yancey 2004;Hunt 2007). With regard to Asians Americans, such ideological adherence to abstract liberalism coincides with their pre-migration educational advantages, socioeconomic mobility, residential integration and racial intermarriage (largely with Whites) (Yancey 2004;Lee and Bean 2012).
From this review, we posit that an examination of abstract liberalist ideology, particularly equal opportunity attitudes, will mirror racial inequality attitude patterns. Namely, we expect that White Americans would be least supportive of the need for greater equal opportunity for all, while Black Americans will be most supportive, and Asian and Latino Americans falling in between.

Colorblind Racism and American Evangelical Cultural Scripts
Commitment to the abstract liberal ideal of equal opportunity is strongly endorsed by most White Americans, but White Evangelical Christians have received special attention because of their overtly stated convictions. For White Christians, particularly evangelicals, religion, and specifically the cultural tools (Swidler 1986) derived from their combined religious beliefs and social position, plays a significant role in shaping their racial attitudes (Emerson et al. 1999;Edgell and Tranby 2007). As framed by the theory of colorblind racism, White evangelicals also employ abstract liberalism by blaming the problems of racial inequality on African Americans both as individuals and their culture. Emerson and Smith (2000) argued that White evangelicals see the root of the inequality not as structural failure to enforce equal opportunity but as individual inability to maximize one's efforts when opportunities present themselves. Because the problem is not located in society's structures, the solutions must also be individual and non-structural. This focus on non-structural solutions such as cross-racial friendship building, sometimes dubbed "racial reconciliation", helps us understand how White evangelicals can decry racial inequality while also proffering a solution that does nothing to change the root problem. Subsequent research has extended this argument to include all White Christians, regardless of Christian tradition (Taylor and Merino 2011;Hinojosa and Park 2004).
Less well considered are the views of African American Christians, who constitute the majority of African Americans today. How do they understand these inequities and to what extent does religion affect their views? Studies reveal that Black Christians are influenced by their religion and exhibit different perspectives on some social issues from Black non-Christians (Shelton and Emerson 2012;Taylor and Merino 2011). However, unlike their White counterparts who display some variation in perspectives toward racial inequality, Black Christians remain consistent across all denominations (Hinojosa and Park 2004). African American Christians, particularly those from historically Black churches and denominations, show that the script of individualism and the ideology of abstract liberalism do not necessarily emerge from all Christian theology and practice. In African American Christian theology, cultural scripts emphasize liberation and equality (Taylor and Merino 2011;Paris 1985). The Black Church has often been at the forefront of calls for institutional change to further guarantee equal opportunity for all (Pattillo-McCoy 1998;Edgell and Tranby 2007). While Black Christians may accede that racial inequalities may be due in part to differences in individual effort, they emphasize that the primary driver of racial inequalities is structural in nature. Thus, equal opportunity in American society must be pursued and protected.
While scholars of religion have studied extensively the racial attitudes of White and Black Christians, there is sparse literature on the views of Latino Christians, despite the fact that 83 percent of the group claim this religious affiliation, with a majority (62 percent) identifying as Catholic (Taylor et al. 2012). Studies have suggested a possible Catholic-Protestant divide among Latino Christians; Brown (2009) found that Latino American Christians, regardless of tradition, share similar views toward racial inequality, indicating a regnant racial schema. Edgell and Tranby (2007), however, found that Latino Catholicism provides a distinct set of cultural tools favoring structural explanations and advocacy for institutional resolutions. Asian American Christians, to date, have not been considered on these matters (with the exception of Brown 2009). However, similar to other studies about general racial patterns on racial ideology, Asian American Christians also show a more middling position on racial inequality attitudes, similar to that of Latino Christians. In sum, the current research would lead us to hypothesize the following: Hypothesize 1a (H1a). White Christians will express the lowest support for equal opportunity for all.
Hypothesize 1b (H1b). Black Christians will express the highest support for equal opportunity for all.
Hypothesize 2 (H2). Asian American Christians will express lower support for equal opportunity for all compared to Black Christians.
Hypothesize 3 (H3). Latino Christians will express lower support for equal opportunity for all compared to Black Christians.

Religio-Racial Consolidation or Generational Cleavage?
According to the racial trichotomy framework, we would expect that the ideological views of American Christians would follow the same hierarchy as the structural position of all Americans in general. However, we have reason to believe that nativity or generational status differences may play an important and complicating role in the ways that religious affiliation can affect commitment to abstract liberalism. For immigrants, much of their understanding of the racial structure in American society is filtered through their exposure to that ideology prior to arrival in the US (Kim 2008;Rodríguez 2018). However, for their children, the second-generation, whether born or raised in the US, their view is informed through a combination of factors while undergoing their primary socialization in the US. Asian and Latino immigrants may not be as attuned to their position as racial minorities compared to the second generation. For these immigrants, including Christian immigrants, we might expect a certain level of optimism and adherence to abstract liberalism. For the second generation, we might expect some conflict in their ideological formation. They may observe their immigrant forebears and peers' belief in abstract liberalism as something they too should embrace or internalize, but they may also interpret such adherence as cultural naiveté, one that does not comport with their daily observations of their social surroundings. Thus, we provisionally suggest that Asian and Latino Christians will diverge in their views about equal opportunity; immigrant Asian and Latino Christians will be nearer to the attitudes of White Christians, while second generation Christians will be nearer to the attitudes of Black Christians.

Data and Methods
The data used for our analysis were drawn from the 2016 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) Ramakrishnan et al. (2018). NAAS is a telephone survey (landline and cellphone combined) conducted over the course of four months after the 2016 national elections. About two thirds of the respondents were surveyed over landlines, while the remaining respondents were contacted via cell phone. The survey was also available in ten different Asian languages, in addition to English and Spanish. This was crucial for this survey because 74 percent of Asian adults speak another language at home. Thus, having translation into their native tongue as an option creates a better sample of Asian Americans and removes past biases towards English speaking, higher educated, and younger Asian American adults (Lee and Pérez 2014). Moreover, unlike past surveys, NAAS purposefully targeted previously under-sampled Asian ethnic groups by oversampling ten Asian groups. This includes about 500 Chinese, Asian Indian, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese Americans, and between approximately 320 and 400 Bangladeshi, Cambodian, Hmong, Lao, and Pakistani Americans. The survey had a response rate of 28%. The NAAS included over 6400 respondents from all different racial and religious backgrounds. About 4400 of all respondents were Asian, reporting Asian ancestry or at least one Asian parent. In addition, around 400 non-Latino Whites, 400 non-Latino African Americans and 1125 Latinos (whether White, Black or other) were also included in this survey to allow for interracial comparisons. We limited our analyses only to those 2969 respondents who identified as Christian broadly construed. While the United States remains largely Christian, Asian Americans are the least Christian of all racialized groups. As such, a survey with large oversamples of Asian Americans will produce a sample that is much less Christian than US surveys that sample using conventional sampling techniques and strategies (Funk et al. 2012;Smith et al. 2015).

Dependent Variable: Need for Equal Opportunity
The main dependent variable is a summed scale derived from three questions out of six regarding perceptions of equal opportunity. These read: "Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed." "If people were treated more fairly in this country, we would have fewer problems." "One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance." All items included 5-point Likert scale responses where 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree. These items were reverse-coded such that the summed scale highest value reflects the highest agreement on a need for greater equal opportunity. Table 1 shows that the mean for this summed scale is 11.9, with a range of 3 to 15. Factor analysis with varimax rotation using the original 6 equal opportunity questions identified two significant groupings. The variables that were identified and used in our summed dependent variable for analysis had an average communality of 0.724 and an eigenvalue above 1, thus satisfying Kaiser's criterion and justifying their grouping.

Primary Independent Variable: Racial/Ethnic, Generational, Religious Identities
Our primary independent variable measure disaggregated racial and generational groupings within religious affiliations by integrating all three characteristics. Race was measured as self-identity with a variety of ethnic and racial labels from which one could identify as many labels as one prefers. The NAAS oversample of Asian Americans introduced a large number of Asian ethnic groups, few of whom selected more than one label. Since the US racial order joins together Asian ethnic groups into the racial category "Asian", we employed this designation to simplify our analyses. However, we created a generation variable where we differentiated those Asian and Latino respondents who had immigrated after age 12 (immigrant generation or first generation) and those who were born in the US or arrived in the US prior to age 13 (the second generation). Inclusion of certain immigrants based on age of arrival signals that primary socialization of the respondent occurred in the US. As such, these immigrants, sometimes called the "1.5 generation", understand American social realities as a lived experience as a racial minority. Other immigrants socialized elsewhere in their formative early years likely experienced society as a member of the majority (Portes and Zhou 1993). In the following analyses, we include the following racialized groups: White, Black, Asian American 1st generation, Asian American 2nd generation, Latino 1st generation, and Latino 2nd generation.
Religious groupings were based on the "RelTrad" classification scheme that combines Protestant Christian religious groups into larger categories that retain cultural and historical significance (Steensland et al. 2000). Utilizing the limited denominational categories, we subdivided these into Evangelical, Mainline, Historic Black Protestant, Other Christian, and Catholic. Where denominations were ambiguous, we utilized the "born-again or Evangelical Christian" to divide these respondents.

Controls
We accounted for other possible explanatory factors that may contribute to explaining the responses to our dependent variable in our analyses. Age was a dichotomous measure distinguishing those 35 and older (1) from those younger than 35 (0). Gender was coded dichotomously, where women = 1 and men = 0. Employment status was also coded dichotomously to reflect current employment status (1) from not currently employed (0). Educational attainment was measured along 6 categories reflecting no educational completion (1), no high school completion (2), high school completion or GED equivalent (3), some college course attainment (4), B.A. degree attainment (5), and post-B.A. advanced degree attainment (6). Political affiliation was coded into three dummy variables reflecting Republican, Independent, and Democratic party identities. Region was coded into a system of dummy variables indicating four conventional Census regions, and an indicator for California, which was oversampled. The variable for the western state region excludes this state. Given the oversampling, we felt this was a more rigorous accounting for possible regional effects on the dependent variable. Table 1 presents an overview of the NAAS variables we used. We examined the dependent variable means across all of our major religio-racial groupings and these are illustrated in Figure 1. Table 2 includes the multivariate coefficients from OLS regressions of the main independent variable and the controls. In Model 1, we included only control measures, and Model 2 includes religio-racial identities, with White Evangelical Protestants as the comparison group. Model 3 re-introduces this group but excludes Black Church Protestants. Models 2 and 3 help to illustrate the primary finding of the relationship between non-Black minority Christians and White as well as Black Christians. The observations in Figure 1 were then placed into OLS regression where we controlled for other possible explanatory factors, including age, gender, educational attainment, employment status, region and political affiliation as shown in Table 2.   Table 1 presents the frequencies, means and ranges for our primary variables. Survey respondents expressed the highest levels of agreement with the statement about ensuring equal opportunity. The lowest level of agreement was with the statement "One of the big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance". With regard to the primary independent variable, we note that not one of the religio-racial groupings constitutes more than 13 percent of the entire sample (1st generation Asian American Catholics), and no grouping has an N less than 43 (Black Christians who are not in historically Black Protestant denominations). More than 80 percent of the sample is over the age of 34; women constitute a majority (about 56 percent), as does non-employment status (about 52 percent), and Democrat affiliation (about 57 percent). In terms of educational attainment, the largest category, BA degree attainment, garnered almost one-third (32 percent) of all respondents, followed by about 21 percent with a high school degree or GED equivalent. In terms of region, excluding California, which included 38 percent of the sample, the largest fraction of respondents were from Southern states (about 22 percent). Another 19 percent were from the non-California west and the remaining 21 percent were about evenly divided between Northeast and Midwestern states. Figure 1 shows us the general pattern of responses to the equal opportunity scale by religio-racial groupings. We grouped findings based on Christian religious traditions with racial disaggregations per religious grouping (with the exception of Native Hawaiian Christians which had no other comparison group within it). Mentioned earlier, Christian responses had an overall mean of 11.9, with a range of 3 to 15. Among Evangelical Whites, Asians, and Latinos, only first generation Latinos had a higher rating than the average (12.5). White Evangelicals showed the lowest support for equal opportunity (10.0). Mainline Protestants show the same pattern: White Mainline respondents showed the lowest support for equal opportunity (10.7), and every other group was nearer to the sample mean (11.3-11.9). Protestants in historically Black denominations were the most supportive of equal opportunity (13.7), followed closely behind by other Black Christians not in this tradition (13.3). No other religio-racial grouping approaches this level of support. Among Catholics, again White Catholics showed the lowest support for equal opportunity (11.1), and they are joined with first generation Asian Americans, who were similarly below the sample mean. The second generation Catholic Asian Americans and Latinos, as well as Latino first generation, had a high level of support compared to the sample mean. This suggests a pattern seen in previous research: White Christian support, regardless of tradition, was lowest for equal opportunity, while Black Christian support was highest. Most every other racial minority Christian group fit somewhere between these two mean positions. Asian American Christian groups, with the exception of second generation Catholics, were between White Christians and the sample mean. Second-generation Asian American evangelicals joined White Christians in expressing some of the lowest support for equal opportunity. Latino Christians, with the exception of second generation Evangelicals were at or above the sample mean. This suggests that opinions about equal opportunity among religio-racial groupings largely fall into a racial hierarchy where White Christians are least supportive, followed by second generation Asian and Latino Protestants. African American Christians were the most supportive and are joined by Latino Christians and second generation Asian American Catholics. All other groups fall somewhere between these two clusters. Notably, our hypothesis regarding generational shifts toward White Christian attitudes applies to second generation Protestants; second generation Catholics, both Asian and Latino, are closer to Black Christian views on average.

Results
The observations in Figure 1 were then placed into OLS regression where we controlled for other possible explanatory factors, including age, gender, educational attainment, employment status, region and political affiliation as shown in Table 2.
Model 1 accounts for these alternative factors and accounts for about 8 percent of the variance in predicting equal opportunity beliefs. In this all-Christian study, women (compared to men), along with Democrats and Independents (compared to Republicans), were more supportive of equal opportunity. Those over 34 years of age and those with greater educational attainment were less favorable. These effects were consistent across all models. The exception to this pattern was regional effects. Even when accounting for the California oversample as a distinct possible outlier, respondents in the western region were not significantly different from those in southern states. In Model 1, none of the regions were significantly different from the South. In the subsequent models, however, respondents in the Northeast and Midwestern states were more supportive of equal opportunity compared to those in the South. The primary measure of religio-racial affiliations was significant, even with the aforementioned controls included. In Model 2, White Evangelical Christians were the comparison group and every other religio-racial group, except for White Mainline/Other Christians, were statistically significantly more in favor of equal opportunity. While statistically significant, we note also that the smallest coefficients were for White Catholics and second generation Evangelical Asian Americans and Latinos. Standardized Betas (not shown) suggest that, although these groups are different from White evangelicals by a statistically significant margin, they have the smallest effect in comparison to all other groups. In Model 3, we changed the comparison group to affiliates in historically Black Protestant denominations and found that all other religio-racial groupings among Christians, save for Black Christians of other traditions, were significantly less supportive of equal opportunity. Suggestive of Figure 1, second generation Evangelical Latinos stand apart from other Latino Christians in having the largest negative coefficient (−2.371) by one full point in comparison to all other Latino Christian groups in Model 3. Overall, we find that Black Christians are the most supportive of equal opportunity, White Christians tend to be the least, and Asian and Latino Christians tend to fall somewhere in the middle. These results generally suggest a racialized hierarchy within American Christianity with regard to attitudes toward equal opportunity, and some religio-racial generational distinctiveness that has not been shown before.

New Religio-Racial Solidarities and Cleavages
Our study suggests that the general racial hierarchy or revised racial order applies to attitudes toward equal opportunity among American Christians. This suggests that structural racial domination has counterparts within cultural ideologies; White supremacy generally goes unquestioned through the internalization of abstract liberalism, particularly for White Christians, regardless of specific tradition. Resistance to this ideology is evident among some Christians, particularly those informed by the liberation theologies in the historic Black Church tradition. At the extreme ends of support for abstract liberalism, we find confirmatory evidence of a racial hierarchy among Black and White Christians.
However, Latino and Asian American Christians show some important complications to this current understanding of abstract liberalist ideological adherence. We conjectured that immigrants, including immigrant Christians, from Asia and Latin America would show adherence to abstract liberalism roughly approximating that of White Christians. We further conjectured that the second generation would align more closely with Black Christians. On both points, evidence did not readily support these claims. The general alignment of Latino Christians, with the important exception of second generation Latino evangelicals, comports with Brown's earlier finding that Latino Christians were largely similar on inequality attitudes. The clustering of Latino Catholics in both generations also supports Edgell and Tranby's argument that Catholicism offers a unique cultural toolkit that challenges racial inequality attitudes for these professing Latinos. Our disaggregation of Latino Christians by religious tradition and generation revealed that cultural assimilation to White evangelical ideology may be at work primarily for second generation Latino evangelicals. The same could be said for second generation Asian American evangelicals. Unlike Latino Christians, other Asian American Christians are more dispersed in their views about equal opportunity. Here, we may have evidence of an "honorary White Christian" attitudinal position that mirrors the structural one identified by Bonilla-Silva. In sum, religious affiliative effects on abstract liberalist attitudes such as equal opportunity are complicated by a combination of generational status and racial designation; our findings support the complex religion argument that religion intersects with race and nativity. Larger oversamples may better clarify how distinctive these religious traditions are within different generations of Asian and Latino Christians. New oversamples of immigrant and second generation African and Caribbean Christians, most of whom identify as Black, will also add important clarification on how racial positioning may work in the ideological commitments of recently arrived Black Christians. Other explanatory factors we could not account for due to data limitations include racial and socioeconomic compositions of the respondent's neighborhood, stronger individual-level socioeconomic indicators, and perceptions of having faced discrimination. As one reviewer noted, each of these can help explain respondent attitudinal disposition regarding equal opportunity.

Future Directions
Complex religion invites scholars to move beyond current framings, especially those involving racial difference. The Black-White framing in racial inequality attitudes research and in race-related sociology research more generally remains robust insofar as understanding racial broad dynamics are concerned. What we show here is that non-Black minority Christians, particularly Asian and Latino American Christians, constitute potential new allies that may complicate the terminology for the framings we currently use.
We need more qualitative inquiry into the sources at work that help explain why these new potential cleavages are occurring as they are among American Christians. What cultural resources and scripts inform how immigrant and second generation Asian American and Latino Christians think about equal opportunity and inequality for that matter? While this question is often directed at further academic inquiry, we feel this has import for social justice efforts. This introductory study raises questions about how colorblind ideology is transmitted more so among some non-White Christians than other non-White Christians. Conversely, how are anti-racist ideologies embraced by some non-Black Christians more so than others? Christian communities of color could begin conversations that invite immigrant and second-generation members to discuss the sources of their ideological commitments and excavate the roots from which those commitments first appeared. To the extent that racial equity is important to the mission of a given Christian community of color, such intra-and intergenerational communal introspection could transform the ways and means of addressing racialized injustice in their local community perhaps through a combination of ethnic-specific collective effort and partnerships with like-minded Black Christians. At present, much of our scholarship on these subpopulations has not taken this next step given our reliance on assimilation theory. Our findings suggest that there is more to the cultural assimilation framework than generational identity boundary work. What informs the boundary work apart from rejection of practices and beliefs surrounding internalized ethnic cultural beliefs? How is identity linked to perceptions of the inequalities occurring around these immigrant and second generation individuals and communities? How do the cultural scripts from Christian communities inform and socialize non-Black minority Christians in view of these social inequalities?
Apart from these investigations, we recommend revisiting these analyses in two other ways. First, we recommend consideration of non-Christians. To what extent are the cultural scripts among American Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists similar to or different from American Christians, particularly Black and White Christians? Further how might the views or scripts of atheist, agnostic, and otherwise non-religious Americans resemble or differ from those of different racialized Christian groups? Studies of the so-called "Protestant work ethic" proposed by Weber suggest that this concept is not exclusively Protestant (Park et al. 2016). If similar ethe exist, future research should examine how those too could alter the effect of religious affiliation on equal opportunity beliefs. Second, we recommend ethnic-specific interactions with Christianity. Asian Americans are the least Christian of all major racialized groups in the US. However, among Asian American Christians, different ethnic groups dominate these subpopulations. The largest fraction of Asian American evangelicals is Korean (about 43 percent of NAAS), and another 53 percent of Asian American Catholics are Filipino in NAAS. Similarly, Mexican Americans dominate the Latino category and we should expect that this is true among Catholic and Protestant Latinos. How might ethnic group dominance within these racialized categories alter our understanding of the alleged "racial differences" found in religion research? These are a few avenues for future directions that complex religion helps to illuminate.