On the Ālayavijñāna in the Awakening of Faith: Comparing and Contrasting Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s Views on Tathāgatagarbha and Ālayavijñāna

The Awakening of Faith, one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna. Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the Yogācārabhūmi, in which ālayavijñāna is described as a defiled consciousness, the Awakening of Faith explains it as a “synthetic” consciousness, in which tathāgatagarbha and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes noted the innovative explanation of the Awakening of Faith and compiled the commentaries, among which Huayan master Fazang’s (643–712) commentary had a profound effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative tathāgatagarbha texts in East Asia. However, as scholarly perceptions that the commentators’ interpretations do not always represent the Awakening of Faith’s tenets themselves have grown, the propriety of relying on Fazang’s commentary for understanding the treatise has also been questioned. What attracts our attention in this regard is that the Silla scholar-monk Wŏnhyo’s (617–686) commentaries, which are known to have significantly influenced Fazang’s, present very different views. This article demonstrates that two distinct interpretations existed in Wŏnhyo’s days for tathāgatagarbha and ālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith, by comparing Wŏnhyo and Fazang’s commentaries, and further considers the possibility that the Awakening of Faith’s doctrine of ālayavijñāna is not doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra on the basis of Wŏnhyo’s view on ālayavijñāna.


Introduction
The Treatise on the Awakening of Faith According to the Mahāyāna (C. Dasheng qixin lun 大乘起 信論, hereafter, the Awakening of Faith), one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of tathāgatagarbha ("womb of Tathāgatas", viz., the potential to achieve buddhahood) andālayavijñāna ("storehouse consciousness", viz., the fundamental mind of a sentient being). Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the Yogācārabhūmi, in whichālayavijñāna is described as a defiled consciousness, the Awakening of Faith explains it as a "synthetic" consciousness, in which tathāgatagarbha and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes, who noted the innovative way of explanation of the Awakening of Faith, compiled commentaries, and among them, Huayan 華嚴 master Fazang's 法藏 (643-712) Dasheng qixinlun yiji 大乘起信論義記 (hereafter, Yiji), had a profound 1 The predominant recognition of the Awakening of Faith as a so-called "tathāgatagarbha text" owes evident debts to Fazang's identification of the treatise as "the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha" (C. Rulaizang yuanqi zong 如來 藏緣起宗) in his fourfold doctrinal taxonomy (C. jiaopan 敎判) of Buddhist teachings. Based on Fazang's interpretation, the thought of tathāgatagarbha has been regarded as a separate doctrinal system from the two major Mahāyāna traditions, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, especially by Japanese scholars. For instance, Katsumata Shunkyō argues that Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism cannot be explained merely in terms of the antagonistic evolution of the two doctrinal systems of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, by saying that Fazang's recognition of the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. Rulaizang yuanqi zong 如來藏緣起宗) separately from Madhyamaka and Yogācāra shows his impartial perspective on Indian Buddhism (Katsumata 1961, pp. 593-94). Takasaki Jikido also admits that the present distinction of the tathāgatagarbha thought as a separate doctrinal system from Yogācāra is based on the traditional way of thinking that has been formed through Huayan doctrines (Takasaki 1960, p. 280). 2 Kashiwagi also goes on to indicate that in the history of the development of "the ideas of the Awakening of Faith" in China and Japan, Huayan's, especially Fazang's, understanding of the Awakening of Faith, offered a decisive direction (Kashiwagi 1981, pp. 4-5). Thereafter, Yoshizu Yoshihide also addresses this issue of "the ideas of the Awakening of Faith" in his article on Jingying Huiyuan's 淨影慧遠 (523-592) deviating interpretation of the Awakening of Faith. Although Kashiwagi emphasized the need to distinguish the original tenets of the Awakening of Faith from the later commentators' interpretations of the Awakening of Faith, in this article, Yoshizu carefully suggests the possibility that the late commentators' interpretations may also discuss some of the original teachings of the Awakening of Faith (Yoshizu 2005, p. 1). 3 In the Dasheng qixinlun yiji (Hereafter, Yiji), Fazang seeks to resolve the contemporary doctrinal tension revolving around the distinct doctrinal positions of Madhyamaka master Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500-570; C. Qingbian 淸辯/清辨) and Yogācāra master Dharmapāla (ca. 6th century CE; C. Hufa 護法), by using the teaching of the Awakening of Faith. At the beginning of the Yiji, Fazang introduces the contrasting positions of Madhyamaka exegete Jñānaprabha (d.u.; C. Zhiguang 智光) and Yogācāra exegeteŚīlabhadra (529-645; C. Jiexian 戒賢), Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla's successors, respectively, regarding the Buddha's three-period teachings (C. sanshi jiao 三時教). In his four-level taxonomy of Buddhist teachings, Fazang locates their teachings on the second and third level, designating them as the teaching of true emptiness and no-characteristics (C. Zhenkong wuxiang zong 眞空無相宗) and the teaching of consciousness-only and dharma characteristics (C. Weishi faxiang zong 唯識法相宗), respectively. The Awakening of Faith is located in the fourth and highest teaching, with the name of the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. Rulaizang yuanqi zong 如來藏緣起宗). In this highest teaching of the Awakening of Faith, the principle (C. li 理) and phenomena (C. shi 事), which are valued in the second and third teachings, respectively, are unimpededly interpenetrated. See the Yiji, Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新修大藏經 (Hereafter, T)1846:44.242a29-242c05; 243b22-c01. 4 As is well-known, Dharmapāla's Yogācāra teaching spread to China when the famous pilgrim and translator Xuanzang 玄 奘 (602-664) brought a new corpus of canonical texts from India in 645, after he had studied underŚīlabhadra, the teacher of Dharmapāla. Beside this, the fact that early commentaries, such as Tanyan's 曇延 (516-588) Qixinlun yishu 起信論義疏 and the Dunhuang manuscript of the Dasheng qixinlun shu 大乘起信論疏 (tentative title; 羽333V) recently discovered in the archives of the Kyou Shōoku 杏雨書屋, are written from significantly different perspectives than Wȏnhyo or Fazang's, also suggests that the Awakening of Faith was interpreted in different ways, according to the commentators' positions. For instance, while Wȏnhyo and Fazang explain the Awakening of Faith by drawing on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Tanyan's commentary and the anonymous Dunhuang text are written with considerable reference to the She dashenglun shi 攝大乘論釋, Paramārtha's (499-569; C. Zhendi 眞諦) translation of Mahāyānasam . graha, never mentioning the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. For more information on the Dunhuang manuscript of the Dasheng qixinlun shu, see Ikeda (2012). way than what has broadly been accepted so far by relying on Fazang's commentary. I shall discuss that while Fazang takes the position that despite its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, tathāgatagarbha interacts directly with the arising-and-ceasing mind, Wȏnhyo considers that tathāgatagarbha, which has a twofold nature, interacts with the arising-and-ceasing mind on the one hand, but on the other, preserves the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature. Based on Wȏnhyo's understanding, I shall also suggest a possible doctrinal compatibility between the Awakening of Faith and the early Yogācāra, which has been dismissed among scholars.

Tathāgatagarbha
In the Awakening of Faith,ālayavijñāna is defined as a unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing (mind of suchness) (viz. tathāgatagarbha) and the arising-and-ceasing (mind) in a neither-identical-nordifferent condition. 5 Such exegetes as Wȏnhyo and Fazang both find the doctrinal origin of this unique nature ofālayavijñāna in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. 6 In the same manner as the Awakening of Faith, the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra explains the consciousness of a sentient being as having not only a phenomenal (or defiled), but also a 'true' or 'real', nature. In Gun . abhadra's four-fascicle recension of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the consciousness is described as consisting of three kinds of mental attributes; that is, [self] true character (C. [zi]zhenxiang [自]眞相), karmic character (C. yexiang 業相), and evolving character (C. zhuanxiang 轉相). 7 Likewise, Bodhiruci's ten-fascicle version presents these three characters of the consciousness with slightly different names: the consciousness of wisdom character (C. zhixiangshi 智 相識), the consciousness of karmic character (C. yexiangshi 業相識), and the consciousness of evolving character (C. zhuanxiangshi 轉相識). 8 While the first character of the three, the (self) true character (or self-character) or the consciousness of wisdom character, corresponds to the true nature of the consciousness, the other two correspond to the phenomenal nature. Wȏnhyo also indicates that the (self) true character among the three characters of the four-fascicle recension is also referred to as the self-character (C. zixiang 自相) in the 10-fascicle edition. 9 Consulting the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra in commentingālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith, Wȏnhyo and Fazang both explain the first character of the three kinds of mental attributes described in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra as the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind, viz., tathāgatagarbha, ofālayavijñāna. 10 Although Wȏnhyo and Fazang both consider the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature ofālayavijñāna as tathāgatagarbha by relying on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the next passage of Wȏnhyo's Kisillon so suggests 5 See the Awakening of Faith T1666:32.576b07-09: 心生滅者，依如來藏故有生滅心，所謂不生不滅與生滅和合， 非一非異，名 為阿梨耶識.

6
Four recensions of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra are known: Bodhiruci's (fl. 508-35) Ru lengqie jing 入楞伽經 in 10 fascicles (513) According to the first view, the mind-essence of theālayavijñāna is described as what is subject to arising-and-ceasing in accordance with karmic afflictions. It is regarded as being produced by karmic afflictions and disappears when they are exhausted. By contrast, in the second view, the mind-essence is neither-arising-nor-ceasing. The mind-essence, or self-character, should originally exist (viz., does not arise from nowhere), and moves its essence when being prompted by nescience; however, with nescience exhausted, the mind returns to the original basis (viz., does not cease).
In the third view, the first and second views are both accepted in that they have a reasonable basis, which relies on the sacred scriptures. This position might seem idiosyncratic at first, since the two former views take contrasting positions. In fact, the first and second views are respectively attributed to the Yogācārabhūmi and the Awakening of Faith, which are generally considered to take distinct or even incompatible doctrinal positions on a concept such asālayavijñāna. According to this third view, however, the real messages of the two teachings should not be assumed merely by their literal expressions. In other words, if properly understood beyond their literal meanings, the first and second views may both be accepted without any doctrinal conflict. It may then be said that in this view, the mind-essence-i.e., tathāgatagarbha-has a twofold nature, though in a somewhat paradoxical way; that is, the nature of arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing.
Wȏnhyo advocates the third view that the mind-essence-i.e., tathāgatagarbha-ofālayavijñāna, has a twofold nature. 13 When taken in their literal senses, the nature of arising-and-ceasing of the first view and the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing of the second should be seen as two distinct natures, which are incompatible for one single mind ofālayavijñāna. In the same vein, the teachings of the Yogācārabhūmi and the Awakening of Faith would be two incompatible doctrinal positions, because their explanations of a concept such asālayavijñāna, as mentioned above, conflict with each other. However, when considered beyond the literal meanings, these two seemingly opposite natures may be taken as compatible as a twofold nature of one single mind ofālayavijñāna. The teachings may have literal meanings, and may also mean what is beyond the literal meanings. In this regard, the Yogācārabhūmi and the Awakening of Faith's positions onālayavijñāna need not be seen as doctrinally conflicting with each other. It is a well-known fact that Wȏnhyo seeks to reconcile the early Yogācāra texts with the Awakening of Faith in the Kisillon so and the Pyȏlgi. 14 What should be noted, particularly in terms of our current issue, is that this passage reveals that there were two different views, that is, the second and the third, on the mind-essence (i.e., tathāgatagarbha). According to the typical understanding, based on Fazang's interpretation of the Awakening of Faith, tathāgatagarbha is considered neither-arising-nor-ceasing. This way of understanding seems 12  It has also been known that although Fazang substantially relies on Wȏnhyo's commentaries, he never cites or quotes the passages from Wȏnhyo's commentaries, in which the early Yogācāra doctrine or text is introduced to be reconciled with the teaching of the Awakening of Faith. Besides, in the Ijangȗi 二障義 [System of the Two Hindrances], Wȏnhyo comprehensively deals with this matter of reconciliation between the early Yogācāra and the teaching of the Awakening of Faith by focusing on the concept of the two hindrances (K. ijang 二障). Detailed discussions may be found in Muller (2004Muller ( , 2006. very similar to the second view. However, there was another view on tathāgatagarbha, the third view that tathāgatagarbha has the twofold nature of not only neither-arising-nor-ceasing but also arising-and-ceasing, and this view was advocated by Wȏnhyo. Wȏnhyo's twofold view on tathāgatagarbha is also evident in his interpretation of the concept of [original] enlightenment (C.
[pon]gak [本]覺), one of the two aspects ofālayavijñāna presented in the Awakening of Faith, along with non-enlightenment (C. bujue, K. pulgak 不覺). 15 It is stated in the Awakening of Faith that (original) enlightenment indicates the mind-essence that is freed from deluded thoughts, implying that original enlightenment has the same connotation as tathāgatagarbha. 16 Wȏnhyo also says that it has a twofold meaning, just in a way that recalls the aforementioned twofold nature of the mind-essence; in his answer to the question of whether the reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is because it lacks non-enlightenment or because it has the function of illumination of awakening, Wȏnhyo answers by saying that original enlightenment has a twofold meaning, original enlightenment and initial enlightenment (C. shijue, K. sigak 始覺), as follows: Question: Is the reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is because it lacks non-enlightenment or because it has the function of illumination of enlightening (K. Answer: [The reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is] not only because it lacks non-enlightenment, but also because it has the function of illumination. Because it has the [function of] illumination, defilements can be also eradicated. What does this mean? When enlightenment that comes after delusions is considered to be called enlightenment, initial enlightenment has [the meaning of] enlightenment, while original enlightenment does not. When the original lack of delusion is said to be called enlightenment, original enlightenment is enlightenment, but initial enlightenment is not. The [matter of] eradicating defilements [may be discussed] likewise. When eradication of previously exiting defilements is called eradication, initial enlightenment has the [function of] eradication, but original enlightenment does not. When the original lack of defilements is called eradication, original enlightenment refers to eradication, but initial enlightenment does not. Viewed from this [latter] way, [defilements] are originally eradicated, and thus originally there is no ordinary being, just as stated in the passage below, "all sentient beings are originally 15 See the Awakening of Faith T1666:32.576b10-14: 此識有二種義，能攝一切法、生一切法。云何為二？ 一者、覺義， 二 者、不覺義。所言覺義者，謂心體離念。離念相者，等虛空界無所不遍，法界一相即是如來平等法身，依此 法身說名本 覺。Here, the "enlightenment" (C. jie 覺), which is contrasted with non-enlightenment (C. bujue 不覺), is also expressed as "original enlightenment" (C. benjue 本覺).Strictly speaking, it may be said that there are two levels of meaning of original enlightenment: one that is contrasted with non-enlightenment and the other that is contrasted with initial enlightenment (C. shijue 始覺). The former may be seen as original enlightenment in a broad sense, in contrast to non-enlightenment, and the latter as in a narrow sense, in contrast to initial enlightenment within the category of the enlightenment. Yet, the Awakening of Faith states that initial enlightenment is ultimately not different from original enlightenment, and thus the broad and narrow senses of original enlightenment may be accordingly said to be not-different from each other in an ultimate sense. Wȏnhyo argues that the mind-essence is called original enlightenment because it has the meaning of not only original enlightenment, as represented in the literal expression of original enlightenment, but also initial enlightenment. On the one hand, original enlightenment has the meaning of the original lack of non-enlightenment and, in this sense, all sentient beings are considered as constantly abiding. On the other hand, original enlightenment is called as such because it has the function of illumination of enlightening, explaining the presence of ordinary beings. Two seemingly contrasting characters are both accepted as the twofold aspect of original enlightenment, i.e., tathāgatagarbha. Here again, Wȏnhyo takes original enlightenment not just in the literal sense, but in the sense beyond literal expression.
One might indicate that the division of (original) enlightenment into original and initial enlightenment is already stated in the Awakening of Faith and Fazang also provides a proper explanation of them in his commentary. However, a comparison of Wȏnhyo and Fazang's explanation on the two types of original enlightenment, original enlightenment that is pure in nature (C. xingjing benjue, K. sȏngjȏng pon'gak 性淨本覺) and original enlightenment that conforms to impurity (C. suiran benjue, K. suyȏm pon'gak 隨染本覺), discloses that their views on original enlightenment are not identical, but rather implies a significant difference. In the Kisillon so, Wȏnhyo addresses these two types of original enlightenment as the basis of the twofold aspect of (original) enlightenment, which have just been discussed above, original enlightenment and initial enlightenment, respectively. 18 In other words, Wȏnhyo explains each side of the twofold aspect of original enlightenment in a separate way, by relating them to each type of original enlightenment among the two; that is, the original enlightenment that is pure in nature and the original enlightenment that conforms to impurity. This respective interpretation of the twofold meaning of original enlightenment may also be applied back to the twofold nature of the mind-essence, the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing and arising-and-ceasing. Then, it seems that in Wȏnhyo's interpretation of the Awakening of Faith, the terms that have the connotation of tathāgatagarbha, such as the mind-essence or original enlightenment, have a twofold nature/meaning, each side of which has a distinct meaning/nature. In Wȏnhyo's commentary on the Nirvana Sutra, the Yȏlban chongyo 涅槃宗要, original enlightenment that conforms to impurity appears with a slightly modified name, as the nature of realization that conforms to impurity (K. suyȏm haesȏng 隨染解性). 19 Given this, we may presume that in Wȏnhyo's works, the two terms-nature of realization (K. haesȏng 解性) and original enlightenment-are distinguished from each other, with different implications.  Although Fazang likewise mentions the two types of original enlightenment in the Yiji, it does not seem that he recognizes any distinction between them, because he often interchangeably uses the terms "original enlightenment" and "nature of realization", which are distinguished by Wȏnhyo as the two types of original enlightenment: the original enlightenment that is pure in nature and the nature of realization that conforms to impurity. 20 For instance, in explaining original enlightenment as the cause of uncontaminated (C. wulou 無漏, anāsrava) dharmas along with the conditions of permeation from learning (C. wen xunxi 聞熏習,śruta-vāsanā), Fazang draws on a passage from Paramārtha's commentary on the Mahāyānasam . graha, in which the nature of realization, not original enlightenment, is presented as the cause of sainthood, together with the permeation from learning. 21 This shows that Fazang identifies original enlightenment with the nature of realization. Faznag also uses these two terms side by side in a compound word, as if the words have the same meaning. 22 Most of all, he clearly identifies these two concepts in the Huayan wujiao zhang 華嚴五敎章 by saying that the nature of realization mentioned in Paramārtha's commentary on the Mahāyānasam . graha refers to the original enlightenment of the Awakening of Faith. 23 Given all of this, it does not seem that Fazang distinguishes the two types of original enlightenment in the same way as Wȏnhyo does. Although Fazang addresses the two types of original enlightenment, it is apparent that he does not see any valid distinction between them. Rather, it seems that these two terms just refer to two names given to tathāgatagarbha, which has only one (not a twofold) nature, merely by depending on whether or not it is combined with the arising-and-ceasing mind.
In fact, just as Fazang identifies the two types of original enlightenment, Fazang describes tathāgatagarbha as having one, not a twofold, nature. Unlike Wȏnhyo, as discussed above, who considers the mind-essence, i.e., tathāgatagarbha, to have a twofold nature of arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing, Fazang says that the tathāgatagarbha has only the one nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing. 24 This implies, along with his identification of the two types of original enlightenment, that, for Fazang, tathāgatagarbha and other concepts that have an equivalent connotation, such as original enlightenment, do not have a twofold meaning/nature, but only one. I have mentioned that among the three views introduced by Wȏnhyo on the mind-essence, the second view is very similar to Fazang's interpretation of tathāgatagarbha as neither-arising-nor-ceasing. It seems very likely then that Wȏnhyo introduced the second view by keeping in his mind an exegete such as Fazang. 20 In Wȏnhyo's works, such as the Yȏlban chongyo, the nature of realization that conforms to impurity refers to the original enlightenment that conforms to impurity.  24 By comparison, Fazang describes tathāgatagarbha as neither-arising-nor-ceasing, the seven consciousnesses as arising-and-ceasing, andālayavijñāna as arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing. See the Yiji T1846:44.255a29-b03: 一以如來藏唯不生滅。如水濕性。二七識唯生滅。如水波浪。三梨耶識亦生滅亦不生滅 。如海含動靜。四無明倒執非生 滅非不生滅。如起浪猛風非水非浪. "First, tathāgatagarbha neither-arises-nor-ceases, just like the nature of the wetness of water; second, the seven consciousnesses only arise-and-cease, just like waves [of water]; third,ālayavijñāna not only arises-and-ceases but also neither-arises-nor-ceases, just like the ocean that contains [the natures of] moving and stillness; the fourth, nescience and deluded attachments neither arise-and-cease nor neither-arise-nor-cease, just like arising waves and strong wind are neither water nor waves." Fazang also states that tathāgatagarbha maintains the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing even when it is involved in the abode of arising-and-ceasing (C. shengmie men 生滅門). See the Yiji T1846:44.255b13-15: 非直梨耶具動靜在此生滅中。亦乃如來藏 唯不動亦在此門中. "It is not just thatālayavijñāna, which has [both natures of] moving and stillness, belongs to [the abode of] arising-and-ceasing; rather tathāgatagarbha, which never move, also belongs to this abode."

3.Ālayavijñāna
Wȏnhyo and Fazang's distinct views on tathāgatagarbha are also reflected in their understanding ofālayavijñāna. As mentioned above,ālayavijñāna is defined in the Awakening of Faith as a unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing (mind of suchness, viz. tathāgatagarbha) and the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. Wȏnhyo accounts for the unification of these two minds inālayavijñāna as twofold, namely, in a non-identical (K. piil 非一) condition on the one hand, and in a non-different (K. pii 非異) condition on the other hand, in a similar way to how he considers tathāgatagarbha to have a twofold nature. 25 It may be said that there are two (viz., non-identical) minds inālayavijñāna, that is, the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind; however, the mind-essence of these two minds are not separated (viz., non-different) and thus constitute one single mind. This mind, which has the two minds and yet is not separated, is calledālayavijñāna. 26 The twofold condition ofālayavijñāna is explained by Wȏnhyo as a logical consequence that follows when two mistaken views are removed; the view that the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind (viz., tathāgatagarbha) is either identical with or different from the arising-and-ceasing mind (viz., phenomenal mind). Wȏnhyo also gives a warning, in this regard, of nihilism and eternalism in a similar way to how he does in discussing the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha, mentioned above. The view that they are identical would end up with nihilism because the mind-essence, or tathāgatagarbha, should also disappear when the arising-and-ceasing mind is eradicated; the view that they are different would amount to eternalism because the mind-essence, which would be regarded as just neither-arising-nor-ceasing, could not move along in accordance with various conditions. 27 The logical basis of this twofold condition ofālayavijñāna, in this sense, may be traced back to the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha. Viewed from the perspective of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, tathāgatagarbha is distinct from the arising-and-ceasing mind and thus their unification inālayavijñāna will also be in a non-identical condition. In this case,ālayavijñāna may not be seen as identical to (or not-different from) tathāgatagarbha. By contrast, from the perspective of the arising-and-ceasing nature of tathāgatagarbha, it may be said to accord with the arising-and-ceasing mind and accordingly, their unification will be in a non-different condition. In this case,ālayavijñāna is viewed as identical to (or not-different from) tathāgatagarbha.
On the basis of this twofold unification inālayavijñāna, Wȏnhyo also explains the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra's inconsistent statements on the relationship betweenālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra is well-known for taking an ambiguous position on the relationship betweenālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha.Ālayavijñāna is sometimes equated with tathāgatagarbha, thereby implying that it 25 Wȏnhyo explains the neither-identical-nor-different [condition], in which the two types of mind are unified, as twofold, by saying, "As for 'the neither-identical-nor-different [condition],' [on the one hand,] the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind moves its essence, and thus this mind is not different from the arising-and-ceasing [mind]. Yet, [on the other hand, the mind] does not lose the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature and thus the arising-and-ceasing [mind] is not identical to the [neither-arising-nor-ceasing] mind." See the Kisillon so T1844:44.208b20-22: 非一非異者。不生滅心舉體而動。故心 與生滅非異。而恒不失不生滅性。故生滅與心非一。In other words, the two types of minds are said to be unified in a not-different or in a not-identical condition, depending on whether tathāgatagarbha (or, the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind) moves its essence in accordance with the arising-and-ceasing mind or keeps its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature. In this passage, the implication is that the nature of tathāgatagarbha consists of two distinct aspects, and the twofold condition of the unification inālayavijñāna is explained based on these aspects. In fact, Fazang cites this same passage by Wȏnhyo in the equivalent place of the Yiji. However, the implication is different: The nature of tathāgatagarbha has only the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, and thus, for Fazang, the twofold unification inālayavijñāna is determined depending on whether this neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha is non-identical to or non-different from the arising-and-ceasing mind. A more detailed discussion shall follow below in the main text. 26  . However, as discussed above, Fazang's understanding of tathāgatagarbha is different from Wȏnhyo's, and his interpretation of the unification inālayavijñāna, which is based on his understanding of tathāgatagarbha, also has a different implication than Wȏnhyo's. More discussion will follow soon.
is pure; at other times, it is regarded as separate from it, with the connotation that it is impure. 28 Wȏnhyo seeks to resolve this problem by drawing upon the twofold condition of theālayavijñāna. When the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind (viz., tathāgatagarbha) and the arising-and-ceasing mind are unified in a non-identical condition, theālayavijñāna is described as separated from the tathāgatagarbha.
On the contrary, when they are unified in a non-different condition,ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha are identified with each other. 29 In Wȏnhyo's view, if the tathāgatagarbha did not have a twofold nature, but had only one nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing, the unification, if ever, between tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind would only occur in a non-identical condition, and tathāgatagarbha could not move along in accordance with the arising-and-ceasing mind. Fazang's view onālayavijñāna is quite different from Wȏnhyo's. I have mentioned that Fazang only accepts the unitary nature of tathāgatagarbha: the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing. Then, the twofold unification inālayavijñāna should occur between the neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind; Fazang does not need the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha to explain the twofold unification inālayavijñāna. When considered from Wȏnhyo's perspective, the unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind constitutes only one side of the twofold unification, that is, the unification in a non-identical condition. In Fazang's view, however, the tathāgatagarbha, which only has the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing, still moves itself and produces the arising-and-ceasing [phenomena], 30 and is unified with the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. The former activity of the tathāgatagarbha, the activity of moving itself and producing the arising-and-ceasing, is well-known as the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. rulaizang yuanqi 如來藏緣起) or the dependent origination of Thusness (C. zhenru yuanqi 眞如緣起); the latter activity of its unification with the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition as the unification of truth and delusion (C. zhenwang hehe 眞妄和合). 31 The doctrine of dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (or Thusness) means that all of the phenomenal world is evolved from tathāgatagarbha (or Thusness). This doctrine is often regarded as deviating from, or even contradictory to, the position of the early Yogācāra tradition, 28 The seemingly inconsistent statements of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra on the relationship betweenālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha appear only in the Ru lengqie jing, Bodhiruci's 10-fascicle recension. The passage, in whichālayavijñāna is identified as tathāgatagarbha, reads, "Mahāmati!Ālayavijñāna is named tathāgatagarbha and coexists with the seven consciousnesses in delusion." See the Ru lengqie jing T671:16.556b29-c01: 大慧！ 阿梨 耶識者，名如來藏，而與無明七識共俱. Soon after this passage, it states, "Mahāmati! Tathāgatagarbha consciousness does not reside inālayavijñāna; therefore, the seven kinds of consciousness arise and cease and tathāgatagarbha neither arise nor cease." See the Ru lengqie jing T671:16.556c11-13: 大 慧！ 如來藏識 不在阿梨 耶識中，是故七種識有生有滅，如來藏識不生不滅. In Gun . abhadra's translation in the four-fascicle, the Lengqie abatuoluo baojing,ālayavijñāna is consistently identified with tathāgatagarbha. See the Lengqie abatuoluo baojing T670:16.511b07-19; 512b06-08. For a detailed explanation of the difference in the two recensions, see Fuji (1964, pp. 154-55). 29 In commenting on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra's passage in which tathāgatagarbha consciousness does not reside inālayavijñāna (the Ru lengqie jing T671:16.556b29-c01; see footnote 28 above), Wȏnhyo makes a distinction between the seven consciousnesses and tathāgatagarbha by describing them as arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing, respectively (See the Pyȏlgi T1845:44.229c28-230a04: 十卷意者。欲明七識。 是浪不非海相。在梨耶識海中故有生滅。如來藏者。是海非浪。不在阿梨 耶識海中故無生滅。故言如來藏不在阿梨耶識中。是故七識。有生有滅等。以如來藏即是阿梨耶識故。言不在). On the contrary, regarding the passage in whichālayavijñāna is named tathāgatagarbha (the Ru lengqie jing T671:16.556b29-c01; see footnote 28 above), Wȏnhyo says that this sentence clarifies the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature of the original enlightenment inherent inālayavijñāna (See the Pyȏlgi T1845:44.230a07-10: 又四卷經云。阿梨耶識名如來藏 。而與無明七 識共俱。離無常過。自性清淨。餘七識者。念念不住。是生滅法。如是等文。同明梨耶本覺不生滅義). Although Wȏnhyo says that this passage is stated in the four-fascicle Sūtra, which is a mistake, it appears in the 10-fascicle recension. See the Ru lengqie jing T671:16.556b29-c04: 大慧！ 阿梨耶識者，名如來 藏，而與無明七識共俱，如大海波常不斷絕身俱生故， 離無常過離於我過自性清淨，餘七識者，心、意、意識等念念不住是生滅法. Moreover, Wȏnhyo also explains, in another place, the passages of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra from both approaches of a non-identical nature (K. purirȗimun 不一義門) and non-different nature (K. puriȗimun 不異義門). The distinction between the self-true character (K. chajinsang 自眞相) and the evolving character (K. chȏnsang 轉相) ofālayavijñāna is explained from the approach of a non-identical nature, while the identity of the nature of numinous realization (K. sinhae 神解) in the arising-and-ceasing and the self-true character is interpreted from the approach of a non-different nature. according to which the evolution of the phenomenal world typically occurs fromālayavijñāna, an arising-and-ceasing (viz., conditioned, C. youwei 有爲, sam . skāra) dharma, not from tathāgatagarbha or Thusness, neither-arising-nor-ceasing (viz., unconditioned, C. wuwei 無爲, asam . skāra) dharma. In East Asia, however, as Fazang's interpretation of the Awakening of Faith was established as the most influential commentary of the treatise, the theory of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha was also predominantly accepted as a doctrinal frame for understanding it. In the four-fold taxonomy (C. jiaopan 敎判) of Buddhist teaching, which Fazang explicates at the beginning of the Yiji, texts such as the Awakening of Faith and the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra are attributed to the fourth and highest level as the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. Rulaizang yuanqi zong 如來藏緣起 宗). 32 According to this doctrine, tathāgatagarbha, despite its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, directly participates in such an activity as the dependent origination. Fazang declares that the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha indicates the doctrine of interfusion and non-obstruction between the principle and phenomena (C. lishi rongtong wuai shuo 理事融通無說), implying that a direct interaction occurs between the principle (C. li 理; viz., tathāgatagarbha) and phenomena (C. shi 事; viz., the arising-and-ceasing). 33 Indeed, Fazang states that the tathāgatagarbha of this teaching, which conforms to (phenomenal) conditions to constitute theālayavijñāna, refers to the principle and it penetrates into phenomena (C. liche yushi 理徹於事). 34 In Fazang's view, the tathāgatagarbha's interaction with the arising-and-ceasing mind, which is described in the Awakening of Faith, is none other than a direct interaction between principle and phenomena.
The unification of truth and delusion refers to the unification of the tathāgatagarbha (viz., truth) and the arising-and-ceasing mind (viz., delusion) in a neither-identical nor-different condition. Fazang used this term to account for the unification of the two minds in theālayavijñāna, 35 and afterwards, it came to be adopted widely throughout East Asia, along with its connotation. As a result, theālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith is generally called the consciousness in which truth and delusion are unified (C. zhenwang hehe shi 眞妄和合識). Fazang's view on the twofold unification in theālayavijñāna might not appear different from Wȏnhyo's in its appearance; just as Wȏnhyo does, Fazang also explains the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra's equivocal statements regarding the relationship between tathāgatagarbha andālayavijñāna 36 in terms of the twofold unification inālayavijñāna. 37 However, the implications of the twofold unification in Fazang's view are different from those in Wȏnhyo's. Unlike Wȏnhyo, who explains each side of the twofold unification respectively based on the twofold nature of the tathāgatagarbha, Fazang interprets this twofold unification in theālayavijñāna as a single 32 The four levels of the teachings are as follows: the teaching of attachment to dharmas following their characteristics (C. Suixiang fazhi zong 隨相法執宗), the teaching of no-characteristics in true emptiness (C. Zhenkong wuxiang zong 眞空無相宗), the teaching of dharma characteristics in consciousness-only (C. Weishi faxiang zong 唯識法相宗), and the teaching of the dependent origination of tathāgatagarbha (C. Rulaizang yuanqi zong 如來藏緣起宗); see the only the truth and delusion, but also the origin and derivative (C. benmo 本末), as another pair with the same connotation. In fact, Yoshizu Yoshihide, in his insightful article (1983) on the Huayan notion of interfusion between the nature and the characteristics (C. xingxiang ronghui 性相融通), demonstrates that a series of paired notions, such as the mutual penetration of the truth and delusion (C. zhenwang jiaoche 眞妄交徹), the non-obstruction between the principle and phenomena (C. lishi wuai 理事無礙), the interfusion between the nature and characteristics, and the equality of the origin and derivatives (C. benmo pingdeng 本末平等), all have the same connotations in Fazang's works. For detailed information, see Yoshizu (1983). 36 See footnote 28 above. 37 As Wȏnhyo also does, Fazang relates the sutra's statement that tathāgatagarbha andālayavijñāna are separate from each other to the non-identical (C. buyi 不一) condition between the truth and delusion (see the Yiji T1846:44.255a14-18: 第二 不一義者。即以前攝末之本唯不生滅故。與彼攝本之末唯生滅法而不一也。依是義 故。經云。如來藏者。不在阿梨耶中。 是故七識有生有滅。如來藏者不生不滅); he associates the statement that they are identical to the non-different (C. buyi 不 異) condition between them (see the Yiji T1846:44.255a09-12: 三本末平等明不異者。經云。甚深如來藏。而與七識俱。又經 云。何梨耶識名如來藏。 而與無明七識共俱。如大海波常不斷絶).
state, in which the truth and delusion are interfused to each other. In other words, for Fazang, the neither-identical-nor-different condition of the unification is a new state in the unitary condition, which is distinguished from both the non-identical condition and the non-different condition. Although the neither-identical-nor-different condition ofālayavijñāna may be called 'twofold' merely based on its formal division into 'not-identical' and 'not-different', it does not mean that it has two distinct aspects, because the tathāgatagarbha has a unitary, not twofold, nature. This interfused state of the unification of the tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind inālayavijñāna is known by Fazang as "the unification of truth and delusion", and is explicated in his comments onālayavijñāna, as follows: As for the above statement, "This consciousness has two natures [of the enlightenment and the non-enlightenment]," the "natures" are somewhat difficult [to understand] and now I summarize the [entire] passage above and below to briefly describe the meaning. For the rest of the passages, one will then understand it when [later] reading it. As for what [it is like, it is] as follows: Thusness (C. zhenru 眞如) has two aspects. One is the aspect of unchangeability (C. bubian yi 不變義), and the other is the aspect of conforming to [changing] conditions (C. suiyuan yi 隨緣義). Nescience (C. wuming 無明, avidyā) also has two meanings.
One is the aspect of emptiness that lacks the essence (C. wuti jikong yi 無體即空義), and the other is the aspect of functioning that forms phenomena (C. youyong chengshi yi 有用成事義). Truth (C. zhen 眞), [i.e., Thusness] and delusion (C. wang 妄), [i.e., nescience] constitute the abode of Thusness (C. zhenrumen 眞如門) on the basis of the former aspects, and constitute the abode of arising-and-ceasing (C. shenmiemen 生滅門) on the basis of the latter aspects.
[The two latter aspects, that is,] Thusness that conforms to conditions (C. suiyuan zhenru 隨緣 眞如) and nescience that forms phenomena (C. chengshi wuming 成事無明) each also have two aspects. One is the aspect of opposing itself and according with the other (C. weizi shunta yi 違自順他義), and the other is the aspect of opposing the other and according with itself (C. weita shunzi yi 違他順自義 The unification of the truth and delusion, described in the above passage, may be represented in Figure 1. In this abode of arising-and-ceasing, [the nature of] the truth and delusion is briefly divided into four aspects, but in detailed level, there are eight aspects. When [paired aspects from Thusness and nescience] are unified to constitute the dependent origination, there are four divisions, namely, two for enlightenment and two for non-enlightenment. When the origin and its derivatives are not separated from each other, there are only two divisions, namely, enlightenment and non-enlightenment. When [they are all] interfused to encompass each other, there are only one, namely, the abode of arising-and-ceasing of the one mind (C. yixin shengmie men 一心生滅門). 38 The unification of the truth and delusion, described in the above passage, may be represented in Figure 1. As seen in Figure 1, the mutual interfusion between Thusness and nescience represents a state, in which truth and delusion, are intricately interconnected to constitute ālayavijñāna. For Fazang, the neither-identical-nor-different state of the unification in ālayavijñāna is not dividable into two aspects of the non-identical condition and the non-different condition; rather, it is a unitary state called 'synthetic' consciousness. It was due to this interpretation that the concept of ālayavijñāna of the

39
This figure was originally composed by Whalen Lai (1980, p. 252) in his article titled "the I-ching and the Formation of the Hua-yen Philosophy." Here, I have added the part of the abode of Thusness and made some modifications in English translations. I introduce this figure to facilitate the understanding of the reciprocal interfusion between truth and delusion, or Thusness and nescience, described in this passage. As seen in Figure 1, the mutual interfusion between Thusness and nescience represents a state, in which truth and delusion, are intricately interconnected to constituteālayavijñāna. For Fazang, the neither-identical-nor-different state of the unification inālayavijñāna is not dividable into two aspects of the non-identical condition and the non-different condition; rather, it is a unitary state called 'synthetic' consciousness. It was due to this interpretation that the concept ofālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith has been regarded as doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra Buddhism. The 'synthetic' structure of theālayavijñāna, in which the neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha is directly interacting with the arising-and-ceasing mind, is simply incongruous with the early Yogācāra's 38 See the Yiji T1846:44.255c18-256a13: 前中言此識有二義等者。此義稍難。今總括上下文略敘其意。 餘可至文 當知。何 者。謂眞如有二義。一不變義。二隨緣義。無明亦二義。一無體即空義。二有用成事義。此眞妄中。 各由初義故成上眞 如門也。各由後義故成此生滅門也。此隨緣眞如及成事無明亦各有二義。一違自順他義。二違他順自義。無明中初違自順 他亦有二義。一能反對詮示性功德。二能知名義成淨用。違他順自亦有二義。一覆眞理。二成妄心。眞如中違他順自亦有 二義。一翻對妄染顯自德。二內熏無明起淨用。違自順他亦有二義。一隱自眞體義。二顯現妄法義。此上眞妄各四義中由 無明中反對詮示義。及眞如中翻妄顯德義。從此二義得有本覺。又由無明中能知名義。及眞如中內熏義。從此二義得有始 覺。又由無明中覆眞義。眞如中隱體義。從此二義得有根本不覺。又由無明中成妄義。及眞如中現妄義。從此二義得有枝 末不覺。此生滅門中。眞妄略開四義。廣即有八門。若約兩兩相對和合成緣起。即有四門。謂二覺二不覺。若約本末不相 離。唯有二門。謂覺與不覺。若鎔融總攝。唯有一門。謂一心生滅門也. 39 This figure was originally composed by Whalen Lai (1980, p. 252) in his article titled "the I-ching and the Formation of the Hua-yen Philosophy." Here, I have added the part of the abode of Thusness and made some modifications in English translations. I introduce this figure to facilitate the understanding of the reciprocal interfusion between truth and delusion, or Thusness and nescience, described in this passage.
understanding of tathāgatagarbha or Thusness as the unconditioned dharmas, which never take part in any phenomenal activity. Moreover, theālayavijñāna in this 'synthetic' state has a metaphysical implication, which is generally not accepted in Buddhist tradition. 40 It might be said that Fazang succeeded in compromising the contemporary doctrinal tension by interpretingālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith as the 'synthetic' consciousness, in which the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind are interpenetrated to each other. However, as far as Fazang's claim that tathāgatagarbha and the phenomenal world, or Thusness and nescience, are unified in one state has a metaphysical connotation, his interpretation ofālayavijñāna also remains odd from the general standpoint of Buddhist tradition.

Concluding Reflections
The Awakening of Faith has been considered to doctrinally deviate from the early Yogācāra because of its innovative description ofālayavijñāna as the 'synthetic' consciousness, in which the tathāgatagarbha and the phenomenal mind are unified. This way of understanding has mostly been based on Huayan exegete Fazang's commentary, according to which Thusness and nescience, truth and delusion, or principle and phenomena, are interpenetrated in theālayavijñāna. The question of how the neither-arising-nor-ceasing tathāgatagarbha can participate in the arising-and-ceasing activities of the phenomenal world still remains a problem innate to Fazang's interpretation. In comparison, Wȏnhyo's commentaries of the Awakening of Faith suggest an alternative view on theālayavijñāna. By considering the twofold nature of tathāgatagarbha, which includes not only the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, but also the arising-and-ceasing nature, Wȏnhyo explains how tathāgatagarbha keeps its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature on the one hand, and also engages itself in the phenomenal world on the other hand. On the basis of this understanding the tathāgatagarbha, the unification of the tathāgatagarbha and the arising-and-ceasing mind inālayavijñāna is also explained in a twofold way-the unification in a not-identical condition on the one hand, and in a not-different condition on the other hand. In this way, Wȏnhyo explains doctrinal compatibility between theālayavijñāna of the Awakening of Faith and that of the early Yogācāra, and based on his perspective on the tathāgatagarbha and thē alayavijñāna, we may see a possible doctrinal connection between the Awakening of Faith and the early Yogācāra.