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Adm. Sci., Volume 5, Issue 3 (September 2015) – 3 articles , Pages 125-176

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Open AccessArticle
Leasehold: An Institutional Framework for Understanding Nonprofit Governance in a Civil Society Context
Adm. Sci. 2015, 5(3), 165-176; https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci5030165 - 23 Sep 2015
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2328
Abstract
Nonprofit organizations play a role in the creation of a society that is civil, and it is an important one that neither the state nor for-profit organizations undertake. This raises the question of governance and accountability, which is often addressed by looking to [...] Read more.
Nonprofit organizations play a role in the creation of a society that is civil, and it is an important one that neither the state nor for-profit organizations undertake. This raises the question of governance and accountability, which is often addressed by looking to agency-based models from the private sector. The acknowledged problem is that the agency’s notion of owners does not translate well to nonprofits. Adapting the concept of leasehold (wherein the managers and organization operate with broad autonomy, using resources supplied by supporters in exchange for the promise that specific societal value will be created, and are accountable for doing so) allows for a more flexible and responsive arrangement. It also suggests a mechanism whereby many independent nonprofits taking multiple approaches help civil society evolve. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Nonprofit Governance: Concepts, Visions, and Perspectives)
Open AccessArticle
Learning from the Co-operative Institutional Model: How to Enhance Organizational Robustness of Third Sector Organizations with More Pluralistic Forms of Governance
Adm. Sci. 2015, 5(3), 148-164; https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci5030148 - 14 Aug 2015
Cited by 7 | Viewed by 3520
Abstract
Third sector organizations are oftentimes seen as contributing to a robust civil society. Yet the dominant modes of third sector organizational governance often adhere to a unitary orientation. The over-reliance on unitary modes of governance introduces two challenges: first, organizational stakeholders are kept [...] Read more.
Third sector organizations are oftentimes seen as contributing to a robust civil society. Yet the dominant modes of third sector organizational governance often adhere to a unitary orientation. The over-reliance on unitary modes of governance introduces two challenges: first, organizational stakeholders are kept from utilizing participatory mechanisms that would enable them to act as societal intermediaries, and; second, these organizations may underperform due to the artificial separation of stakeholders from participating in governance. This paper addresses calls to widen our knowledge by translating theory into practice through a discussion about the efficacy of pluralistic governance. The co-operative enterprise in introduced to focus analyses on pluralist modes of stakeholder governance. A specific co-operative’s governance structure and practice is introduced—Choctaw Electric Co-operative—through an archival analyses of secondary media accounts of a stakeholder-led reform initiative in rural Oklahoma. The Ostrom Design Principles—a diagnostic used to assess institutional robustness—are applied to demonstrate the shortsightedness of unitary governance, and highlight the potential benefits of pluralistic stakeholder engagement. Knowledge is widened in two ways: first, empirical analyses of co-operative enterprise may provide for significant insights and innovations in third sector governance, and; second proper systems of pluralistic governance exhibit enormous capacity to better orient the firm toward better serving the stakeholder base, improving performance and institutional robustness, while empowering stakeholders as societal intermediaries. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Nonprofit Governance: Concepts, Visions, and Perspectives)
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Open AccessArticle
Conflicting Incentives Risk Analysis: A Case Study of the Normative Peer Review Process
Adm. Sci. 2015, 5(3), 125-147; https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci5030125 - 09 Jul 2015
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3462
Abstract
This paper presents an approach to conduct risk assessments of complex incentive systems, using a case study of the normative Peer Review Process (PRP). This research centers on appliances and adaptations of the Conflicting Incentives Risk Analysis (CIRA). First as an approach to [...] Read more.
This paper presents an approach to conduct risk assessments of complex incentive systems, using a case study of the normative Peer Review Process (PRP). This research centers on appliances and adaptations of the Conflicting Incentives Risk Analysis (CIRA). First as an approach to Root Cause Analysis of a known incident, and then for a full assessment of the incentives in the PRP together with possible risk treatments. CIRA uses an alternative notion of risk, where risk modeling is in terms of conflicting incentives between the risk owner and the stakeholders concerning the execution of actions. Compared to traditional risk assessment approaches, CIRA provides an insight into the underlying incentives behind a risk, and not just the technical vulnerability, likelihood and consequence. The main contributions of this work are an approach to obtain insight into incentives as root causes, and an approach to detecting and analyzing risks from incentives in the normative PRP. This paper also discusses risk treatments in terms of incentives to make the PRP more robust, together with a discussion of how to approach risk analysis of incentives. Full article
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