social sciences

MDPI

Article

The Effect of Generation Z's Understanding of Free Will and Fatalism on Their Political Choice: A Field Study

İbrahim Aksakal [1,*] and Müjdat Avcı [2]

[1] Department of Social Work, Faculty of Economics and Adaministrative Sciences, Erzincan Binali Yildirim University, 24002 Erzincan, Turkey
[2] Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Osmaniye Korkut Ata University, 80010 Osmaniye, Turkey; mujdatavci@osmaniye.edu.tr
* Correspondence: ibrahim.aksakal@erzincan.edu.tr

Abstract: The aim of this study is to determine whether the fatalistic tendencies of young adult university students predict their political preferences. For this purpose, the fatalism tendency scale consisting of four sub-dimensions was applied, and the predictive power of the obtained data on political preferences was examined. The study sample consisted of 630 young adult university students (male 294, female 336) between the ages of 18 and 26. Independent variables are fatalism sub-dimensions (predetermination, personal control, luck, and superstition), and dependent variables are political leaders and political party preferences. Multinomial logistic regression analysis was used to determine the effect of independent variables on dependent variables. The analysis results revealed that the sub-dimensions of fatalism, predetermination, luck, and superstition significantly predicted voters' preferences for political leaders. No significant relationship could be detected between the change in participants' personal control tendency and their preference for political leaders. In the second stage of the analysis, it was examined whether the tendency towards fatalism affected the choice of political party. It was observed that the sub-dimensions of predetermination, luck, and superstition were significant predictors of political party preferences. There was no significant relationship between change in personal control tendency and political party preference. The research results revealed that if the tendency towards fatalism changes, there are also significant changes in political preferences.

Keywords: tendency of fatalism; political choice; generation Z; university students

check for updates

Citation: Aksakal, İbrahim, and Müjdat Avcı. 2024. The Effect of Generation Z's Understanding of Free Will and Fatalism on Their Political Choice: A Field Study. *Social Sciences* 13: 86. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci13020086

Academic Editors: Nigel Parton and Patrick James

Received: 20 November 2023
Revised: 9 January 2024
Accepted: 26 January 2024
Published: 30 January 2024

Copyright: © 2024 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

1. Introduction

In Turkish politics, one of the various political discourses that some political parties use for their electorate and some other parties prefer not to use is fatalism. From time to time, politicians refer to fate to explain various events (epidemics, earthquakes, diseases, accidents, etc.), and this is criticized by some other politicians. For example, when a natural disaster or work accident occurs, politicians associate this situation with fate, while some other politicians reject fatalistic discourses. Considering the world we live in and the conditions of the period, we can say that societies have become relatively secular, and the habit of attributing things that happen around fate has been largely abandoned. However, when it is considered that the belief in fate is faith-based and the Turkish society is relatively dependent on its beliefs, the situation takes on a different meaning. While Turkish society appears to be a modern society, it is known that it has not completely abandoned the concept of destiny. Giddens argues that this situation is normal, and although modern people have relatively abandoned the understanding of fate, they have not completely given up on fatalistic approaches (Giddens 2019, p. 169).

There are various opinions in Turkey that the new generation voters (Generation Z) are especially distant from the traditional perspective and also the fatalistic approach.

Some claim that Generation Z young adult university student voters are more distant from traditional values and have a secular perspective compared to other generations. He also thinks that Generation Z will be in a decisive position in the elections in the near future and that politicians will, therefore, have to give up traditional discourses. This study was designed to learn Generation Z's perspective on the fatalistic approach, which is a traditional discourse. Within the scope of the study, first, the participants' perception of fatalism was determined, and then it was determined whether their perception of fatalism had an effect on their preferences for political parties and political leaders. Within the scope of the study, on the one hand, the level of fatalism of the participants was examined, and thus, their potential to move away from traditional values was tried to be evaluated. On the other hand, it was determined whether the fatalistic attitudes of the participants were related to their political preferences.

This study has a unique value in terms of examining for the first time a topic that is curious in Turkish politics and has never been researched by other researchers before. The findings reveal what kind of voters will be in Turkish politics in the near future and what kind of attitude the young generation has toward the traditional point of view.

2. A New Era in Turkish Politics: Generation Z

Generation is a term used to describe differences in age, experiences, cultural interactions, and social changes between people. In other words, it can be defined as a community of people who were born approximately in the same years, shared the conditions of the same age, therefore had similar troubles and destinies, and were obliged to similar duties (Akalın 2009). Analyzing the value judgments, beliefs, behavioral patterns of generations, socio-economic and political events, and expectations of their period plays an important role in understanding generations from a sociological perspective. Although the conditions in which each generation is born vary, these conditions can be decisive in that generation's view of life (Bayhan 2016; as cited in Çavuşoğlu and Yalçın 2021). On the other hand, there are different approaches as to whether the determining factor in defining a generation is biological or social. The basic approach on this subject was pioneered by Karl Mannheim, and later, It is a theory that has been developed and developed in a more theoretical manner in recent years and is called "Strauss-Howe Generation Theory". The theory suggests that individuals born and raised in certain periods and within the same age group show similar behavioral characteristics and that these behavioral characteristics may change with each new generation. According to the theory, many important historical events and social changes in every society (such as enormous changes in resource distribution as a result of wars and economic depressions) can affect the value judgments, attitudes, behaviors, and tendencies of individuals belonging to that society (Odabaşı and Aydın 2020, p. 43). The concept of generation, in terms of the transmission of social relations, has existed since the early days of human societies. The concept of generation, which we encounter especially as the notion of tradition, has a religious characteristic in that it is based on the sanctity of the ancient, that is, those who lived before. As Max Weber describes in Economy and Society, the tradition from which authority derives is a 'social time marker' whose beginning is unknown, emerged in ancient times, and was passed on through ancestors. Gerontocracy (government of the elderly), one of the forms of traditional authority, is a form of authority that sees it as natural for the elderly, who are the living evidence and witnesses of tradition, to have a say in the fate of the society (Weber 2012). In this sense, the concept of generation refers to both a historical time and the social knowledge acting in this historical time. On the other hand, the concept of generation directly addresses the transmitters of the social knowledge in question, which means that social knowledge comes into being in a group of people (Çakır 2021, p. 10).

If we look at its origins, we see that the concept of generation, traces of which can be found in Ancient Egyptian and Greek civilizations, was first brought to the dimension of research by Auguste Comte between 1830 and 1840. Comte argues that social progress can be achieved through the savings that one generation leaves to the next generation (Sarıoğlu

and Özgen 2018, p. 1067). In the 20th century, the first sociologist to systematically address the concept of generation was Karl Mannheim (Mannheim 1927; as cited in Sarıoğlu and Özgen 2018). On the other hand, Howe and Strauss predicted that a new generation would emerge after the millennium generation. It is seen that the generation that Howe and Strauss put forward in the generation theory they developed and said will emerge in the future is called 'Generation Z' (Howe and Strauss 1991; as cited in Taşlıbeyaz 2019). Although Generation Z generally refers to those born after 1995 in Western sources, the vast majority of studies conducted in Turkey include those born after 2000 in this generation. This difference in dating is due to the temporal difference between the critical change processes experienced by societies. While the widespread use of the internet, which is the first distinguishing feature of Generation Z, has been seen in Western societies since 1995, it has been possible to spread it to the general society in Turkey since 2000 (Demir 2022, p. 116). It is seen in the literature that the terms I Generation, Internet Generation, Next Generation, and Network Generation have been suggested for people belonging to this generation (Levickaite 2010, p. 173). Members of Generation Z called the crystal generation, are considered ambitious and materialistic individuals who were born and raised with technology and have access to information very quickly. It is also stated that this group is more careless, speed-loving, independent, self-confident, lonely, impatient, dissatisfied, seeking security, fond of pleasure, spending a lot of time on the internet, not adhering to traditions, and introverted (Beyaz 2020, p. 56). Therefore, it can be seen that this generation grew up sensitive to social and environmental issues and had significant impacts in many areas, such as the business world, education, communication, and consumer habits.

Although the research is insufficient to clearly determine the religious tendencies of Generation Z, it shows that the religious orientations of the members of this generation are not important, especially in countries such as Germany, Japan, and England, where per capita income is high (Yılmaz and Aktürk 2021, pp. 53–54). The behaviors, attitudes, religious and spiritual orientations, and social and political thoughts of Generation Z individuals seem to be quite different from those of previous generations (Twenge 2018; as cited in Gökçe and Tekin 2021). For example, studies conducted in the USA support this view, with findings that the generation in question rejects traditional social rules, has weak religious commitments, and has an obsessive attitude toward security (Bozkurt 2023). In a study conducted by a research company in Turkey on Generation Z in 2018, it was found that this generation does not attach much importance to factors such as race, language, religion, gender, and sect; 15.7% of them fulfilled the requirements of their religious beliefs such as praying and fasting, and 55.8% did not fulfill these requirements; The fact that 28.5% of them were non-believers is remarkable in terms of giving the generation in question's perspective on religious belief in society (Gül 2021). Another important data on the subject is that in a study conducted by C. Forward, almost half of Generation Z (47%) stated that they do not see themselves as religious (Sanchez 2021).

When the literature is examined, it is seen that there are no studies directly targeting Generation Z's understanding of destiny. It is seen that the studies on the belief characteristics of Generation Z are only on the axis of the "view of religion and perception of religion" of the generation in question. Therefore, an interpretation can be made regarding Generation Z's understanding of destiny based on the aforementioned studies. Generation Z generally has a more flexible, freer, and less traditional approach, and they have more information about events around the world due to their access to technology, which helps them think differently and see the bigger picture. Additionally, Generation Z can be defined as a generation that grew up sensitive to social problems. This can be interpreted as meaning that they can actively act and make changes on issues such as climate change, environmental sustainability, gender equality, and racism.

The social and economic difficulties that members of Generation Z face at a young age, the rapid advancement of technology, and major global problems such as climate change and social inequalities also affect their understanding of destiny. However, the fact that Generation Z embraces religious diversity more than previous generations and

tends to be respectful of different religions, beliefs, and worldviews causes this generation's understanding of fate to be individual and personal, just like their religious beliefs, and, therefore, each individual has a different perspective. In other words, since the generation in question is considered a generation that values free thought and individual choices more, they have an understanding of fate that is different from the traditional understanding of fate and focuses more on shaping their own future. Since Generation Z grew up in a world equipped with more autonomy and options, it can be said that they have a more positive attitude towards determining their own destiny.

3. Belief in Destiny and Fatalism

There are many definitions of fatalism. According to Macit (2014) fate, it can be defined as a belief that everything is known and determined in advance by a supernatural power. Fatalism, on the other hand, is the belief that one cannot get out of this determination by making an effort and that this situation is an inevitable fact of life. Giddens (2019) expresses the fatalistic perspective as an obedient acceptance that events should proceed in their own course. Rotter (1966; as cited in Ross et al. 1983) defines fatalism as a generalized expectation. According to him, belief in fate is the idea that what happens is determined by forces outside the person himself. Therefore, fatalism is a belief (Ross et al. 1983). Florov (1991) defines fate as "the religious, idealistic understanding of the existence of a supernatural power that predetermines all events in people's lives" and says that in Ancient Greek mythology, the fate of both people and Gods was believed to be based on Moerae. Fatalism, on the other hand, is a belief that all processes and everything that happens in the world are predetermined (Florov 1991, p. 252). In fatalism, or in other words, fatalism, the outcome of everything is predetermined, and it is not possible to avoid these consequences by making an effort (Marshall 1999, p. 373). Therefore, there is a difference between believing in fate and being a fatalist. According to Kasapoğlu (2008), a person who truly believes in fate should believe that whatever is good or bad happens by God's will but should not ignore human responsibility while doing so because believing in fate does not mean ignoring human will.

There is a close relationship between societies' habits of resorting to a fatalistic approach and scientific developments. Believing that one can dominate the environment and control what happens is the opposite of fatalism (Ross et al. 1983). Science and knowledge give the individual the chance to dominate the environment. Therefore, it seems that secular societies dominated by positivist thought have moved away from fatalistic perspectives. However, at this stage, the suspicion that the concept of religiosity and positivist thought may be contradictory will arise. Because belief systems clearly talk about fate and say that God's will is in the things that happen around us. For example, did someone who died in a traffic accident meet their fate, or was this caused by the person's negligence? Or should the situation of the earthquake victims trapped under the rubble be explained by fate or by the engineer's error? Should the situation of Western societies with high levels of prosperity on one side of the world and third-world countries that are enslaved by deep poverty on the other side be explained by fate? Finally, do engineers who can build earthquake-resistant buildings in Japan change the fate of the Japanese, or is it the destiny of the Japanese to train engineers who can build earthquake-resistant buildings? All these questions cause confusion about belief in fate and fatalism.

4. Sociocultural Background of Fatalism

One of the many basic tendencies and needs of human beings is knowing, understanding, and explaining. Dominating nature, giving meaning to what is happening around them, and explaining them are among the common and general characteristics of human beings in every period, from primitive societies to modern humans. Maslow (1970) States that humans have the tendency to know and understand and argues that these are natural positive impulses. Human history has also revealed that human beings have always sought the facts and tried to provide satisfactory explanations. He was interested in the mysterious,

the unknown, chaotic situations, and unexplainable things and always made an effort to explain (Maslow 1970, pp. 48–49). Fromm (1994) is one of those who think that there is a need to find direction in the nature of human existence and that this need has a very powerful energy source.

Since archaic times, societies have experienced various problems of knowing and understanding, and the inadequacy of science and knowledge has led to the need for them to take refuge in a superior power. Accordingly, a fatalist understanding emerged (Kasapoğlu 2008). In this respect, the understanding of fate has become an epistemology for human beings trying to find their way in the dark. Fatalism, on the other hand, is defined as a conservative extension that has become socialized and transformed into a paradigm under the determination of historical, cultural, and socio-economic factors of this epistemology (Macit 2014, p. 12). For societies that need to illuminate the darkness and do not have scientific instruments, belief in fate actually appears as an inevitable means of refuge. However, this situation changed relatively after the Enlightenment and reform movements. Thanks to the enlightenment and predictability provided by science, societies began to feel safer in the face of nature, and over time, the fatalistic paradigm was replaced by a positivist perspective. In other words, scientific developments. As a result, efforts to understand and explain have enabled societies to move away from a relatively fatalistic understanding and evolve into a secular lifestyle. However, the same situation did not occur at the same time and at the same pace in all societies. Because the rate at which societies' ancient habits change may vary. The reasons for this difference can be attributed to the fact that traditional societies are sometimes cautious in keeping up with the secularist lifestyle and insist on maintaining their habits. In summary, the relative abandonment of the fatalistic approach, which is a very common paradigm in traditional societies, can be associated with scientific developments in contemporary societies. However, despite all the scientific developments, one of the reasons why the belief in fate has not completely disappeared is that the belief in fate is faith-based. Macit (2014) clarified this issue and stated that believing in fate is essential in Islam. Giddens (2019) approached the issue from a different perspective and said that the understanding of fate has a function of making the individual feel safe. Societies that have difficulty understanding what is happening in the environment or in dominating nature explain what is happening by connecting it to the understanding of fate and thus experience psychological well-being (Macit 2014, p. 61).

5. How Does the Perception of Destiny Reflect on Social Life?

As Heider states, when individuals encounter problems that exceed themselves from time to time, they attribute it to environmental factors and thus avoid taking responsibility for what happens (Heider 1964, p. 90). Throughout history, societies have encountered many natural events that they could not overcome or explain, and they tried to explain this situation with supernatural powers. According to many thinkers, this trend has affected both the spread of belief systems and the use of the concept of fate in daily life. Although societies have become more dominant over nature with scientific developments compared to the past, old habits have not been completely abandoned, and the understanding of fate continues to exist in daily life, especially in traditional societies. Giddens (2019) clarified this issue and stated that even in modern social conditions, it is possible for the understanding of fate not to disappear completely and for the secular perspective and the fatalistic understanding to exist side by side. For this reason, it is natural that individuals who try to explain things that happen in daily life experience confusion from time to time. Because, in things that happen or will happen, is personal will or fate dominant? If science can explain everything, is the notion of predetermination completely meaningless? All these questions indicate that the understanding of fate is ambiguous.

Belief systems are the basis of the perception of destiny. However, the environmental factors in which individuals live are also very effective. Ross et al. (1983) examined the relationship between ethnic identity, gender, age, and social class variables and fatalistic attitude and found that there is a relationship between fatalistic approach and socio-cultural

structure. While some societies build identities with independent, self-confident, and distinct personalities while raising children, others strive to raise obedient and harmonious types. In this case, in the first type of culture, internally controlled individuals predominate, and in the second type of culture, externally controlled individuals predominate (Macit 2014, p. 102). In societies where externally controlled individuals are in the majority, it is normal for individuals to be more closely bound to traditions, values, and beliefs because obedience is expected not only from society but also from values, traditions, and belief systems. Macit (2014) states that the traditional Turkish family structure raises externally controlled and obedient individuals and that this is due to the authoritarian family structure. Kağıtçıbaşı (2019) study on the relationship between culture, family, and individual also reveals findings that support this claim. There are various studies that show that people with an internal locus of control make more efforts to improve themselves and change the things that happen. For example, Seeman found that tuberculosis patients with a focus on internal control were more knowledgeable about their disease and more active in coping with their condition. Again, prisoners with an internal locus of control made more attempts at parole than those with an external locus of control. Finally, Swedish workers with an external locus of control were more active in becoming union members and being informed about workers' rights (Ross et al. 1983, p. 384).

The meaning people give to fate affects the way they understand and explain the world. The perception of destiny is effective in a person's choices, habits of taking responsibility, perspectives on life, and problem-solving methods (Doğan 2021, p. 647). A person or society with a fatalistic perspective sees God as the only will in all areas of life while ignoring the human factor in the flow of events and phenomena. This perspective pushes the individual and society into passivity. For example, poverty, death, diseases, or natural disasters are believed to come from God, and human beings are thought to have no influence on what happens.

6. Purpose of the Research

The aim of this study is to determine the fatalistic tendencies of young adult university students between the ages of 18 and 26 and to investigate whether fatalistic tendencies have an effect on political preferences. This issue is a frequently discussed and important issue in Turkish politics. Many studies show that the general electorate in Turkey has a partisan attitude. In this context, he states that there are two different dichotomous relationships: traditionalists and innovators. For example, in his study on Turkish voters, Akgün (2000) stated that the voter base is differentiated in social and cultural contexts and pointed out that voter behavior should be re-examined. Similarly, Hafizaoglu (2021) revealed that there are differences in terms of voter behavior between Generation Z individuals living in modern families and individuals living in traditional families. We examined the studies on the subject and could not find a study investigating whether belief in fate affects political choices. For this reason, this study will fill an important gap in related issues and provide a new perspective to other researchers.

For this purpose, the fatalism levels of young adult university students between the ages of 18–26 were determined, and their effect on their political preferences was examined. While determining fatalism education, the "Fatalism Tendency Scale" developed by Kaya and Bozkur (2015) was applied. The Fatalism Tendency Scale has four subscales: Predetermination, Personal Control, Superstition, and Luck. It was examined whether the scores the participants received from the sub-dimensions of the scale had a significant impact on their preferred political party and Presidential candidate in the 2023 general elections. With the help of the findings, "What effect does the discourse of fate/fate have on young adults of Generation Z as a political propaganda tool?" The answer to the question has been sought.

7. Research Problem

The research questions sought to be answered in this study are as follows:

1. As participants' "fatalism tendency" changes, do their tendencies to choose political parties also change?
2. As participants' "fatalism tendency" changes, do their tendencies to choose political leaders also change?

8. Sample

The number of voters between the ages of 15 and 29 registered with the Supreme Electoral Council in the 2023 political elections was determined to be 14,847,017 people (YSK 2023). The preferred basic analysis that will suit the purpose of the research is Regression analysis. In line with this analysis, when the power of the test was determined as 0.95 at the 0.15 (low) effect level, the number of samples to be reached with a 5% error rate was calculated with the G*Power 3.1.9.4 program, and it was concluded that the number of samples should be minimum 567. Considering the 10% margin of error, it is recommended to reach a minimum of 624 data. The sample determination process consisted of two stages. In the first stage, the scale was applied to a total of 2000 participants aged 18–26 in seven regions of Turkey. Assistance was received during the application of the scales, and face-to-face contact was established with the participants. The scales sent online to our colleagues were applied in educational environments while in face-to-face contact with the participants. Our supporters who applied the scales sent the scale to the participants via WhatsApp. A commitment text was also added to the WhatsApp group where the scales were sent, stating that the data would remain confidential. However, since participation in the scale was voluntary, most of the participants did not agree to participate in scales with political content. Therefore, after eliminating incorrect data and invalid scales, the final version of the sample was created with 630 participants. All participants are university students. The prerequisite for participating in the study is to be between the ages of 18 and 26 and to have voted in the 2023 political elections. While creating the sample, data was collected from various provinces to ensure maximum diversity. The scale used in the research was applied to all participants online (see Table 1).

Table 1. Distribution of demographic characteristics of participants (n = 630).

	n	%	Overall Average
Sex			
Female	336	53.3	49.9
Male	294	46.	50.1
Total	630	100	
Age (Mean ± SD)		22.24 ± 4.8	
Income rate			
Lower income	171	27.1	
Lower middle income	194	31.3	
Upper midde income	165	26.2	
High income	97	15.4	
Total	630	100	
Geographical Area			
Aegean R.	78	12.4	12.83
Black Sea R.	59	9.4	9.43
Central Anatolia R.	110	17.5	15.80
Eastern Anatolia R.	60	9.5	7.98
Marmara R.	173	27.5	30.50
Mediterrenian R.	90	14.3	12.96
Southeastern Anatolia R.	60	9.5	10.50
Total	630	100	

Participants were given a personal information form prepared by the researchers conducting this study, as well as the Fatalism Tendency Scale (FTS). In the personal information form, participants were asked which party and which presidential candidate they voted

for in the 2023 parliamentary and presidential elections. According to the information obtained from the personal information form, the political party preferences and presidential candidate preferences of the participants in the 2023 elections were determined (see Tables 2 and 3).

Table 2. Distribution of participants' political party preferences (n = 630).

	N	%	Overall Average
Adalet ve Kalkınma Party (AKP)	222	35.2	35.32
Cumhuriyet Halk Party (CHP)	160	25.4	25.42
Milliyetci Hareket Party (MHP)	49	7.8	10.04
Zafer Party (ZP)	11	1.7	2.28
IYI Party (IP)	70	11.1	9.90
Yesil Sol Party (YSP)	18	2.9	8.79
Other	64	9.5	8.25
Blank	43	6.3	
Total	630	100	

The data is available on the official website of YSK.

Table 3. Distribution of participants' Presidential preferences (n = 630).

Presidential Candidate	N	%	Overall Average [a]
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	294	46.70	49.24
Kemal Kilictaroglu	179	28.40	45.07
Sinan Ogan	111	17.60	5.28
Muharrem Ince	4	0.60	0.41
Blank	42	6.70	
Total	630	100	

[a] These are the 2023 general election results and were received from the Supreme Electoral Council. There is no data showing vote distribution rates by age group. For this reason, there is no definitive criterion to show how compatible the voting distributions of the participants included in the research are with reality. In line with these results, it is understood that the vote rate that Kılıçtaroğlu received from young voters between the ages of 18–26 was lower than the general population. It is seen that Ogan receives more support from young voters. The vote rate that Erdogan and İnce received from young voters and the general vote rate are compatible with each other.

A stratified sampling method was used to create a heterogeneous structure in terms of population distribution. TUIK data was used to categorize the participants in terms of their income levels.

9. Study Design

In this research, the fatalistic tendencies of the participants were categorized through FTS. FTS has four subscales. The first sub-dimension is "predetermination". It was concluded that the participants who scored high on this subscale had a high level of belief that everything was predetermined. The second sub-dimension is Personal Control. The items of this subscale are reverse-scored. For this reason, it was concluded that participants who scored high in this subscale had low fatalism tendencies. The third sub-dimension is "Luck". It was based on the conclusion that those who scored high on this subscale believed in luck. The fourth sub-dimension is "Superstition". It is based on the conclusion that those who score high in this subscale believe in fate in a superstitious way and think that the individual has no role in the flow of events. These four variables were used as independent variables in our research. The dependent variables are the political parties and political leaders participating in the 2023 elections. After the fatalism categories (independent variables) were determined, the effect the changes in these categories had on political party and political leader preferences. For example, which political party is more likely to be chosen by a voter with an increase in superstition level, or which political party is less likely to be chosen?

Field (2009) says that logistic regression is used to predict which category a person will gravitate towards. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 437) say that logistic regression is used to estimate the probabilities that will arise for each situation. It is also an effective analysis method used to predict discontinuous variables with the help of continuous variables. In cases where there are more than two dependent variables, the multinomial logistic regression model is used (Field 2009; Pallant 2010). Based on this, Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis (LRA) was performed in our research to determine the effect of independent variables on dependent variables.

10. Instruments

10.1. Self-Report Measures

Before the data collection process, a personal information form was created by the researchers conducting the study, and in this context, demographic characteristics such as age, gender, family income level, and city of residence were determined in the form. In addition, participants were also asked questions about which political party and which presidential candidate they voted for in the 2023 elections.

10.2. Measurements of Fatalism Tendency

In the study, the "Fatalism Tendency Scale" developed by (Kaya and Bozkur 2015) was used as a data collection tool to determine the participants' fatalistic tendencies. To use the Fatalism Tendency Scale, the authors were contacted, and the necessary permissions were obtained. The Fatalism Tendency Scale has four subscales: Predetermination, Personal Control, Superstition, and Luck. The scale is 5-point type and consists of 24 items. There are a total of 8 items in the Predetermination sub-dimension, and the maximum score that can be obtained from this sub-dimension is 40, and the minimum score is 8. The participant's high score on this dimension indicates that he/she has a high belief that what happens is predetermined. There are 6 items in the "Personal Control" sub-dimension of FTS, and the maximum score that can be obtained from this dimension is 30, and the minimum score is 6. In this dimension of the scale, items are scored reversely. The participant's high score on this dimension indicates that the perception of personal control is weak. There are six items in the Superstition dimension, which is the third sub-dimension of the scale. The maximum score that can be obtained from the superstition dimension is 30, and the minimum score is 6. The participant's high score in this dimension indicates that they have a high tendency to believe in superstitions. The "Luck" dimension, which is the fourth sub-dimension of the scale, consists of 4 items. The maximum score that can be obtained from the items is 20, and the minimum score is 4. The participant's high score on this dimension indicates that he or she has a high tendency to believe in the luck factor. The maximum score that can be obtained from the overall scale is 120, and the minimum score is 24. The sum of the scores obtained from all subscales shows the participant's fatalism tendency level. As the score obtained from the scale increases, the tendency towards fatalism increases (Kaya and Bozkur 2015, pp. 941–42).

11. Results

Before analyzing the data, Skewness and Kurtosis values were examined to test the assumption of normal distribution. The fact that the values obtained by dividing the Skewness and Kurtosis values by the standard error are between −3 and +3 shows that the normality assumption is met (Mayers 2013, p. 53). A threshold of ±1.96 can be used for samples less than 50, a threshold of ±2.58 for samples from 51 to 100, and a threshold of ±3.29 for samples larger than 100. Skewness and kurtosis values of 650 people in the data set were examined, and values outside the range of +3 and −3 were obtained. By detecting extreme data with the help of the box plot chart, 20 people were excluded from the study, and Skewness and Kurtosis values were recalculated. It was determined that the data for 630 people came from normal distribution. Skewness Kurtosis values of the 63 personality data set are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Normality Test Results.

Sub Dimensions	Skewness	Std. Error	Kurtosis	Std. Error	Skewness/Std. Error	Kurtosis/Std. Error
Predetermination	−0.210	0.097	0.060	0.194	−2.16	0.31
Superstition	0.173	0.097	−0.463	0.194	1.78	−2.39
Luck	−0.011	0.097	0.176	0.194	−0.11	0.91
Personal control	−0.092	0.097	−0.315	0.194	−0.95	−1.62

The Fatalism tendency scale, consisting of 24 items and 4 sub-dimensions, was applied to 630 participants, and a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted with the Amos 20.0 program to confirm the four-factor structure on the data obtained. In the confirmatory factor analysis conducted for the fatalism tendency scale, CMIN/DF, GFI, AGFI, CFI, and RMSEA values were examined in the evaluation of the model. When the confirmatory factor analysis results for the fatalism tendency scale were evaluated, it was seen that the fit level of the scale was good, and the 4-factor structure was confirmed.

In order for the results of the study to be reliable, the participants were told about the purpose of the research and were given sufficient time to answer. Additionally, the applications were conducted face-to-face to prevent participants from giving random answers. Additionally, a statement was made by the responsible investigator that ethical rules would be followed. The Cronbach Alpha Reliability coefficient obtained from the analysis of the scales applied after these measures was determined to be 0.841. In line with this result, it was determined that the reliability level of the data obtained was sufficient.

11.1. Analyzes on the Fatalism Tendency Scale

Table 5 shows the subscale averages of the fatalism tendency scale.

Table 5. Subscale averages of the fatalism tendency scale.

Sub Dimensions	N	Mean ± SS	Minimum	Maximum
Predetermination	630	24.63 ± 5.97	8.00	40.00
Superstition	630	13.61 ± 4.56	6.00	30.00
Luck	630	11.19 ± 3.02	4.00	20.00
Personal control	630	12.74 ± 3.42	6.00	29.00

As shown in Table 5, the participants' average of the predetermination subscale is 24.63. The maximum score from this subscale is 40. The average of the superstition sub-dimension is 13.61. The maximum score from this subscale is 30. The mean of the luck sub-dimension is 11.19. The maximum score from this sub-dimension is 20. The mean of the personal control subscale is 12.74. The maximum score from this subscale is 29.

11.2. KEÖ Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results

As shown in Table 6, when the confirmatory factor analysis results for the fatalism tendency scale are evaluated, it is seen that the fit level of the scale is good and the 4-factor structure is confirmed.

Table 6. CFA results for the fatalism tendency scale.

Fit Indices	Model Value	Limit Values	
		Good Fit	Acceptable Fit
CMIN/DF	3.470	≤3	≤5
GFI	0.890	≥0.85	≥0.80
AGFI	0.870	≥0.85	≥0.80
CFI	0.860	≥0.85	≥0.80
RMSEA	0.062	≤0.05	≤0.08

Reference: (Akkuş 2020; Byrne and Campbell 1999; Kline 2011).

11.3. Control Variables Analysis Results

Before starting the analysis, the effect of control variables on dependent variables was examined. In line with the results obtained, it was seen that the gender variable was significant. Geographical region, place of residence and income levels did not yield significant results.

Geographical region; The scores obtained from the Predetermination, Superstition, Luck, and Personal control sub-dimensions do not show a statistically significant difference depending on the region of residence ($p > 0.05$). In other words, the region you live in does not cause a difference in the scores obtained from the Predetermination, Superstition, Luck, and Personal control sub-dimensions.

Place of residence; Scores from the Predetermination subscale do not show significant differences according to place of residence (t = 3.37; $p = 0.55$, $p > 0.05$). The Predetermination mean and standard deviation value for individuals living in the city center was 24.59 ± 5.79, the Predetermination mean and standard deviation value for individuals living in the district was 25.51 ± 5.39, and the Predetermination mean and standard deviation value for individuals living in the village was 23.75 ± 5.52. Since the differences were not significant, it was decided that they had no effect on the result, and the analysis continued.

Income levels; The scores obtained from the Predetermination, Superstition, Luck and Personal control subscales do not show a statistically significant difference according to income level ($p > 0.05$). In other words, income level does not cause a difference between the scores obtained from the Predetermination, Superstition, Luck, and Personal control sub-dimensions.

Sex; Scores from the Predetermination subscale show significant differences according to gender (t = −2.45; $p = 0.014$, $p < 0.05$). The Predetermination mean and standard deviation value for women was 24.24 ± 4.87, and the Predetermination mean and standard deviation value for men was 25.34 ± 6.38. The predetermination average of men was found to be higher (see Table 7).

Table 7. Significance levels of participants according to sex.

	Sex					
	Female		**Male**			
Sub Dimensions	**N**	**Mean ± SS**	**N**	**Mean ± SS**	**t**	***p***
Predetermination	336	24.24 ±4.87	294	25.34 ± 6.38	−2.454	0.014
Superstition	336	13.95 ± 4.26	294	13.24 ± 4.45	2.035	0.042
Luck	336	11.21 ± 2.78	294	11.16 ± 3.02	0.224	0.823
Personal control	336	12.61 ± 3.04	294	12.79 ± 3.32	−0.695	0.487

Independent Sample T Testi, $p < 0.05$.

As shown in Table 7, scores from the Superstition subscale show significant differences according to gender (t = −2.035; $p = 0.042$, $p < 0.05$). The Superstition mean and standard deviation value for women was 13.95 ± 4.26, and the Superstition mean and standard deviation value for men was 13.24 ± 4.45. Women's Superstition average was found to be higher.

The scores obtained from the Luck and Personal control subscales do not differ significantly according to gender ($p > 0.05$).

11.4. Logistic Regression Analysis

In logistic regression analyses, two models were created to examine the effects of independent variables (predetermination, superstition, personal control, and luck) on political party and political leader preferences. These models are interpreted sequentially.

11.5. The Effect of Fatalıst Tendency on Presıdentıal Preferences (Model 1)

A multi-category logistic regression analysis was conducted to examine the effect of the four sub-dimensions of the fatalism tendency scale on presidential preference. Table 8 shows the likelihood ratio test result for the suitability of the model.

Table 8. Result of the likelihood ratio test for the suitability of model 1.

Model	Model Suitability Criterion	Likelihood Ratio Test		
	−2 Log Likelihood	Chi Square	df	*p*
Fixed	1538.720			
Finale	1425.209	113.511	16	0.000

Significant ($p < 0.05$).

As a result of the likelihood ratio test in Table 8, it was decided that the model was appropriate ($p < 0.05$).

As shown in Table 9, the "predetermination" and "superstition" sub-dimensions were found to be significant for Erdogan ($p < 0.05$). For Kilictaroglu, the "predetermination" and "luck" subscales were found to be significant ($p < 0.05$). For Ogan, the "superstition" and "luck" subscales were found to be significant ($p < 0.05$). For Ince, no significant results were found ($p < 0.05$).

Table 9. Table of logistic regression parameter estimates (Model 1) (Reference category: Blank).

CB. Preference		B	St.eror	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
								Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Erdogan	Intercept	0.761	1.152	0.437	1	0.509			
	Predetermination	0.103	0.036	8.095	1	0.004	1.108	1.032	1.189
	Superstition	−0.111	0.046	5.682	1	0.017	0.895	0.817	0.981
	Luck	0.054	0.073	0.550	1	0.458	1.056	0.915	1.218
	Personal Control	−0.035	0.054	0.414	1	0.520	0.966	0.869	1.074
Kilictaroglu	Intercept	3.561	1.154	9.520	1	0.002			
	Predetermination	−0.089	0.038	5.524	1	0.019	0.915	0.849	0.985
	Superstition	−0.077	0.049	2.532	1	0.112	0.926	0.841	1.018
	Luck	0.155	0.076	4.177	1	0.041	1.168	1.006	1.355
	Personal Control	−0.052	0.056	0.858	1	0.354	0.950	0.852	1.059
Ogan	Intercept	1.672	1.223	1.868	1	0.172			
	Predetermination	0.015	0.039	0.139	1	0.709	1.015	0.940	1.095
	Superstition	−0.106	0.051	4.363	1	0.037	0.899	0.814	0.993
	Luck	0.163	0.079	4.277	1	0.039	1.177	1.009	1.373
	Personal Control	−0.108	0.059	3.371	1	0.066	0.898	0.800	1.007
Ince	Intercept	2.575	2.524	1.040	1	0.308			
	Predetermination	−0.134	0.116	1.329	1	0.249	0.875	0.697	1.098
	Superstition	−0.261	0.173	2.261	1	0.133	0.771	0.549	1.082
	Luck	0.314	0.201	2.432	1	0.119	1.368	0.923	2.030
	Personal Control	−0.187	0.175	1.140	1	0.286	0.830	0.589	1.169

Reference category: Blank; Significant ($p < 0.05$).

As shown in Table 9, a 1-unit increase in "superstition" score increases the probability of voting for Erdogan instead of casting a blank vote by 1.108 times. Additionally, a 1-unit decrease in the "predetermination" score increases the probability of voting for Erdogan instead of casting a blank vote by 0.915 times.

A 1-unit decrease in the "predetermination" score increases the probability of voting for Kilictaroglu instead of casting a blank vote by 0.915 times. Additionally, a 1-unit increase in "luck" score increases the probability of voting for Kilictaroglu instead of casting a blank vote by 1.168 times.

A 1-unit decrease in the "superstition" score increases the probability of voting for Ogan instead of casting a blank vote by 0.899 times. Additionally, a 1-unit increase in

luck score increases the probability of voting for Ogan instead of casting a blank vote by 1.177 times.

The common finding in the comparisons is this: It can be said that young voters, who think that events are predetermined and people do not have the power to change these situations, have a higher tendency to prefer Erdogan as a political leader. In addition, it was concluded that the fatalism of Erdogan voters is not at the level of superstition. On the other hand, it has been observed that the fatalistic tendencies of Kilictaroglu voters differ from those of Erdogan voters. Kilictaroglu voters' belief that everything is predetermined and that people have no power to change what happens is not at a high level. Additionally, it has been observed that Kılıçtaroğlu voters think that the luck factor is also effective in life. It has been determined that the voters of Sinan Ogan and Kılıçtaroğlu are similar to the voters of Erdogan in terms of the luck factor and in terms of superstition tendencies.

12. The Effect of Fatalism Tendency on Political Party Preferences (2nd Model)

A multi-category logistic regression analysis was conducted to examine the effect of the four sub-dimensions of the fatalism tendency scale on political party preference. Table 10 shows the likelihood ratio test result for the suitability of the model.

Table 10. Result of the likelihood ratio test for the suitability of model 2.

Model	Model Suitability Criterion	Likelihood Ratio Test		
	−2 Log Likelihood	Chi Square	df	*p*
Fixed	2163.276			
Finale	2034.966	128.310	28	0.000

Significant ($p < 0.05$).

As a result of the likelihood ratio test in Table 10, it was decided that the model was appropriate ($p < 0.05$). Table 11 shows the logistic regression analysis results.

As shown in Table 11, significant results were obtained for AKP, CHP, IP, MHP, and others. No significant results were obtained for YSP and ZP. The results obtained from the analysis are as follows:

A 1-unit increase in "predetermination" score increases the probability of voting for AKP instead of casting a blank vote by 1.117 times. Additionally, a 1-unit decrease in the "superstition" score increases the probability of voting for AKP instead of casting a blank vote by 0.906 times.

A 1-unit decrease in the "predetermination" score increases the probability of voting for CHP instead of casting a blank vote by 0.913 times.

A 1-unit decrease in the "superstition" score increases the probability of voting for IP instead of casting a blank vote by 0.879 times.

A 1-unit decrease in the "superstition" score increases the probability of voting for MHP instead of casting a blank vote by 0.788 times. Additionally, a 1-unit increase in "luck" score increases the probability of voting for MHP instead of casting a blank vote by 1.246 times.

The common finding in the comparisons is this: When Tables 9 and 11 are compared, it is seen that Erdogan voters and AKP voters are similar in terms of fatalism tendencies. This situation is actually expected. Because Erdogan was supported by the AKP in the elections. However, it is a meaningful situation for politicians that the fatalistic tendency of the party's voter base is compatible with the fatalistic tendency of Erdogan's voter base. A similar situation is also seen among CHP voters and Kılıtaroğlu supporters. However, unlike CHP voters, Kılıçtaoğlu voters believe in luck. Kılıçtaroğlu was also supported by voters of other parties in the elections. Therefore, it is not surprising that CHP voters and Kılıçtaroğlu supporters differ in terms of their tendency to believe in luck. As seen in Table 11, it has been determined that CHP voters and AKP voters differ significantly in terms of their tendency to believe in fate. CHP voters have a lower tendency to believe in fate than

AKP voters. This contrast is compatible with the diversity of party policies. MHP voters have a low tendency towards superstition. In other words, voters with high superstition tendencies are less likely to vote for MHP. MHP voters also have a high tendency to believe in luck. Mhp voters were similar to CHP voters in this aspect. Finally, IP voters do not have a high tendency towards superstition, just like MHP voters. This similarity can be explained by the fact that these two political parties have the same voter base because IP was founded by politicians who recently left MHP. Therefore, it is not unusual to observe similar characteristics in voter bases.

Table 11. Table of logistic regression parameter estimates (Model 2) (Reference category: Blank).

CB. Preference		B	St.error	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp (B)	95% Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
								Lower Bound	Upper Bound
AKP	Intercept	−0.021	1.213	0.000	1	0.986			
	Predetermination	0.110	0.037	8.742	1	0.003	1.117	1.038	1.201
	Superstition	−0.098	0.048	4.190	1	0.041	0.906	0.825	0.996
	Luck	−0.012	0.075	0.025	1	0.875	0.988	0.853	1.145
	Personal Control	0.033	0.056	0.354	1	0.552	1.034	0.926	1.155
CHP	Intercept	3.250	1.189	7.480	1	0.006			
	Predetermination	−0.091	0.039	5.500	1	0.019	0.913	0.846	0.985
	Superstition	−0.070	0.050	1.964	1	0.161	0.933	0.846	1.028
	Luck	0.106	0.077	1.897	1	0.168	1.112	0.956	1.293
	Personal Control	0.008	0.057	0.017	1	0.895	1.008	0.901	1.127
IP	Intercept	1.780	1.319	1.823	1	0.177			
	Predetermination	0.026	0.041	0.381	1	0.537	1.026	0.946	1.113
	Superstition	−0.129	0.056	5.355	1	0.021	0.879	0.788	0.980
	Luck	0.042	0.085	0.250	1	0.617	1.043	0.884	1.231
	Personal Control	−0.040	0.064	0.390	1	0.532	0.961	0.847	1.090
MHP	Intercept	1.310	1.391	0.886	1	0.346			
	Predetermination	−0.056	0.046	1.487	1	0.223	0.945	0.864	1.035
	Superstition	−0.238	0.063	14.526	1	0.000	0.788	0.697	0.891
	Luck	0.220	0.089	6.129	1	0.013	1.246	1.047	1.484
	Personal Control	0.071	0.070	1.023	1	0.312	1.073	0.936	1.231
YSP	Intercept	1.177	1.746	0.455	1	0.500			
	Predetermination	−0.083	0.062	1.815	1	0.178	0.920	0.816	1.039
	Superstition	−0.080	0.082	0.966	1	0.326	0.923	0.786	1.083
	Luck	0.046	0.122	0.140	1	0.708	1.047	0.825	1.328
	Personal Control	0.049	0.091	0.293	1	0.589	1.050	0.879	1.254
ZP	Intercept	0.496	2.084	0.057	1	0.812			
	Predetermination	0.018	0.067	0.069	1	0.793	1.018	0.893	1.160
	Superstition	−0.152	0.096	2.511	1	0.113	0.859	0.711	1.037
	Luck	0.093	0.138	0.456	1	0.499	1.098	0.838	1.438
	Personal Control	−0.092	0.110	0.696	1	0.404	0.912	0.735	1.132
Other	Intercept	1.290	1.356	0.905	1	0.342			
	Predetermination	0.002	0.043	0.002	1	0.969	1.002	0.921	1.090
	Superstition	−0.121	0.057	4.536	1	0.033	0.886	0.792	0.990
	Luck	0.113	0.086	1.716	1	0.190	1.120	0.945	1.327
	Personal Control	−0.038	0.066	0.324	1	0.569	0.963	0.846	1.096

Reference category: Blank; Significant ($p < 0.05$).

13. Discussion

While designing our study, we first applied the fatalism tendency scale, which has four sub-dimensions, to determine the participants' fatalism tendency. The subscales of the scale are as follows: Predetermination, Personal control, Superstition, and Luck. Each sub-dimension of the scale determines the tendency toward fatalism in the individual from different perspectives. Participants who score high on the personal control dimension of the scale think that the functioning of life is predetermined and the individual does not have a significant effect on changing it. Participants who score high on the personal control dimension are individuals who do not accept that the functioning of life is predetermined and think that individual preferences and efforts are active in this process. Individuals with high scores on the superstition dimension believe in various non-rational things and

use them in their daily lives (for example, those who believe that some objects bring bad luck or those who believe that some rituals are protective). Those who score high on the luck dimension are those who think that some things in life are closely related to luck (for example, those who think that people's happiness or success in life is related to luck).

While determining the participants' fatalism tendency, we also used a personal information form and asked questions in this form to find out which political party and which Presidential candidate they voted for in the 2023 elections. In our study, we considered the sub-dimensions of predetermination, personal control, superstition, and luck as independent variables and political party preference and political leader preference as dependent variables. In the final stage, we conducted the analyses and used the multinomial logistic regression technique to determine the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variables.

There are two models in the study. In the first model, the effect of fatalism sub-dimensions on political leader preference was examined, and in the second model, the effect of fatalism sub-dimensions on political party preference was examined.

13.1. First Model

In the first model, we examined the effect of the fatalism tendency scale on political leader preferences. The analysis results showed us that fatalism tendencies have an impact on political leader preferences. Based on the research findings, we can discuss the following about the fatalistic tendencies of political leaders and their electorates.

Erdogan; The increase in the likelihood of voters preferring Erdogan, whose tendency towards predetermination increases, is a significant finding for Generation Z. Erdogan sometimes prefers fatalistic discourse as a political communication tool. According to the research findings, there is a voter group with a fatalistic tendency among the young voters of Generation Z. This situation shows that there is an electorate for which Erdogan's fatalistic rhetoric resonates. In addition, it is a significant finding that as the superstition level of voters decreases, their tendency to prefer Erdogan increases. Because it can be thought that preferring fatalistic discourses at the level of superstition will have a negative effect on the voters. It seems that young voters in Generation Z accept the tendency towards fatalism as a traditional value. This situation can also be explained by the fact that Turkish Erdogan voters have a traditional and conservative character.

Kilictaroglu; The decrease in the fatalistic tendency of Generation Z voters increases the possibility of choosing Kilictaroglu. Kilictaroglu's policies prefer secular discourses as a means of political communication and criticize fatalistic discourses. This tendency is compatible with the party policy of CHP, of which Kilictaroglu is the leader. Based on this finding, two possibilities can be considered. First, Kilictaroglu may be ignoring the voters' tendency to believe in fate. Secondly, Kilictaroglu may want to convince the voters with secular discourses instead of fatalistic discourses, no matter what. But the obvious truth cannot be ignored. There is a young electorate in Turkey with fatalistic tendencies. Another important finding from the research is about the vote rate Kilictaroglu received from young voters. Kilictaroglu received 47.82% of the votes in the 2023 elections. However, the research results show that the vote rate that Kilictaroglu received from young voters is lower than the general vote rate. This situation will be discussed in more detail in the next Ogan topic.

Ogan: In the analysis, we found that Ogan's voters have a low tendency to believe in superstition and a high tendency to believe in luck. Ogan participated in the election as an independent candidate and quickly won the admiration of the masses. Ogan was different from the other two candidates. He did not have a large voter base. For this reason, national broadcasting organizations could not provide sufficient support for propaganda. This situation encouraged Ogan to make propaganda on social media. Ogan managed to gain the support of mostly young people by using social media effectively. Ogan received 5 percent of the votes in the elections. However, 17.6% of young voters who participated in our research reported that they voted for Ogan. Our research results also revealed

that Ogan voters do not have high fatalistic tendencies and believe in luck. Ogan's and Kilictaroglu's voter bases showed similar characteristics in terms of a tendency toward fatalism. For this reason, Ogan may have received the votes of Kilictaroglu's young voters.

In summary, in the analyses made in different reference categories, we saw that the level of Predetermination in Erdogan's voter base was high in a positive direction, and the tendency to superstition was high in a negative direction. We found that the predetermination tendency was high in the negative direction in Kilictaroglu and Ogan voters. This shows that these political leaders share some similarities with the structural characteristics of their voter bases.

13.2. Second Model

In the second model, the reference category was selected as blank votes, and the effect of the tendency of fatalism on choosing a political party was examined. In the second model, good results were obtained for AKP, CHP, IP, and MHP. According to these results, the following evaluations have been made about the effect of fatalism tendency on political party choice.

AKP; A 1-unit increase in the participants' predetermination level increased the probability of voting for the AKP by 1.117 times. In this respect, it has been observed that AKP voters' tendency to believe in fate and think that events are predetermined is significantly high. In addition, it was determined that voters with reduced superstition tendencies had a higher tendency to voting the AKP. AKP supported Erdogan in the elections. Additionally, Erdogan is the founding leader of the AKP. Therefore, it is not surprising that the tendencies of AKP's voter base are similar to those of Erdogan's voter base. Our research findings show that AKP does not have difficulty getting votes from young voters. This situation can be explained by the dichotomous relations in Turkish politics, as well as the effect of the preferred political communication tools.

CHP; We detected a negative correlation between the predetermination sub-dimension and CHP. A 1-unit decrease in the perception that everything is predetermined increases the probability of voting for CHP instead of casting a blank by 0.913 times. Based on this, it has been concluded that individuals whose fatalism tendency is high at the level of predetermination have a lower tendency to prefer CHP. No relationship was found between the Luck, Superstition, and Personal Control subscales and the tendency to prefer CHP. It is not surprising that the fatalistic tendencies of CHP voters are compatible with the fatalistic tendencies of Kilictaroglu voters. Because Kilictaroglu was supported by CHP. In addition, CHP is a political party that has long adopted and implemented secularism as its party policy. However, our research has reached a remarkable conclusion on this issue. CHP received 25.41% of the votes in the 2023 parliamentary elections. As shown in Table 2, 25.2% of the individuals who participated in our research reported that they voted for CHP. These rates show us that the research results are compatible with the election results. But what is interesting is this: Although Kilictaroglu received 44.90% of the votes in the 2023 elections, 28.9% of the voters who participated in our research reported that they voted for Kilictaroglu. Based on this, it has been understood that there is a difference between the political leader preference tendencies and political party preference tendencies of young Generation Z voters.

IP; It has been observed that voters whose superstition tendency decreases are more likely to vote for IP. IP is a new party, but it was founded by MHP politicians. For this reason, on the one hand, it has similar characteristics to MHP, and on the other hand, it has emerged as an alternative among right-wing parties. Our research results have shown that both political party voters (MHP and IP) have similar characteristics in terms of fatalism tendencies.

MHP; The findings showed that individuals' probability of voting for MHP increased as their tendency to believe in superstition decreased. An alliance is being made between MHP and AKP in the general elections. However, although there is cooperation between parties, there are various characteristic differences among voters. Research results support

this difference. However, it should not be forgotten that despite the differences between the voter bases of these two parties, there are also many common aspects. Our research results have shown us that there are similarities between MHP's rate of winning the votes of young voters and the rate of young voters. However, it is clear that more efforts must be made to increase the young voter base.

The research was created with two separate models and it was seen that both models gave consistent results. The participants exhibited the usual voter behavior of the Turkish right and the Turkish left. In other words, voters who voted for right-wing parties/leaders showed fatalistic tendencies, while voters who voted for left-wing parties/leaders showed low-level fatalistic tendencies. Varying results were obtained in central parties. These findings also coincide with the characteristic structure of Turkish politics.

It is known that in Turkish politics, there is a dichotomous relationship between political parties and the voter base of these parties. Although it is not valid for all voters, it is possible to say that Turkish voters are grouped into two main blocks: left and right. In fact, this type of relationship is also present in the electorate of many countries. For example, there are two different political tendencies in the USA, and this has given rise to the two-party system. Voters supporting the Democratic Party and voters supporting the Republican Party reveal two different political tendencies: federalists and anti-federalists (Açıkgöz 2022, p. 695). Similar divisions are also seen in Western European voters. It is known that progressive voters with secular attitudes tend to prefer left-wing parties, while voters with conservative attitudes tend to prefer right-wing parties (Gidron 2022, p. 22). There is a similar distinction between left and right parties in Turkey. Voters who position themselves in the left fraction adopt more secular values, while right fraction voters support the traditional approach. Since the first years of the Republic, CHP has insisted on the new human model and tried to build a human type that adopted positivism against tradition. In the past period, the Turkish left has built its existence on an elitist basis (Göksu 1996; as cited in Göksu 2014). On the other hand, CHP's insistence on new people was opposed by right-wing parties that tend to protect traditional values, and Turkish political life witnessed the mutual competition between these two political factions. As a result of this form of separation, leaders and political parties in Turkish politics have developed their own forms of political propaganda and preferred to communicate with their voters from their own perspective. In this sense, the Turkish right and the Turkish left differ in terms of preferring traditional or secular discourses. The discourse of destiny is one of these traditional forms of discourse. In our research, we tried to determine what kind of response the destiny discourse, better known as the right-wing party discourse, has in left and right-party voters. At the same time, we tried to solve the uncertainty about whether Generation Z young adult university student voters continue the tradition. There are widespread opinions that Generation Z young people are moving away from traditional values, and a new voter base is forming in Turkish politics. Our research results showed that Generation Z young adults do not have an attitude contrary to the dichotomous relationship type in Turkish politics. Young people make choices similar to the political preferences of their social circles and families and display an attitude similar to previous generations in maintaining traditional tendencies.

14. Conclusions

As a result, Generation Z, which has a unique set of values and attributes compared to previous generations, differs in terms of its interest in technology, socialization features, learning, and life habits. So much so that with this generation, many things in society that have not been dared to be questioned until now have begun to be questioned. Despite all these differences between Generation Z and previous generations, their attitude towards fatalism, their approaches to concepts/beliefs based on this attitude (the answers they give), and their preferred political parties and political leaders are similar to previous generations, with the "ideological tradition" that the political view they belong to creates on individuals can be explained. The fact that this generation, which questions many acceptances in society

and develops new/different attitudes, thoughts, and behaviors related to these acceptances, has a similar attitude to previous generations in the intellectual/belief background of the political choices it makes is also important in terms of showing how strong a response these political traditions have in society. The fact that this generation, on the one hand, has a strict attitude towards individualism and, on the other hand, is distant towards religious beliefs in society and has a similar attitude to previous generations regarding political choice necessitates that this seemingly contradictory situation of this generation be clarified with future studies and a healthier understanding of this generation is made.

15. Limitations

This research has several limitations. As it is known, participants may hesitate to express their preferences clearly in political data collection forms. For this reason, there may be participants who refrained from giving truthful answers to questions about which political party and political leader they voted for. Secondly, what they gave on the fatalism scale may not fully reflect the truth. Because from time to time in their daily lives, people may do things that do not make sense to them and may feel the need to hide this situation. Thirdly, since there is no similar study on this subject in the domestic and foreign literature, it was not possible to compare the findings with other research data.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, İ.A. and M.A.; Methodology, İ.A. and M.A.; Formal analysis, İ.A. and M.A.; Investigation, İ.A. and M.A.; Resources, İ.A. and M.A.; Writing—original draft, İ.A. and M.A.; Writing—review & editing, İ.A. and M.A. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Ethics committee approval for the research was obtained from Erzincan Binali Yıldırım University Ethics Committee on 26 July 2023 and numbered E-88012460-050.01.04-280524.

Informed Consent Statement: Informed Consent Form was used during the data collection process and the participants were promised that the data would not be shared with other parties. Since there were no participants under guardianship within the scope of the research, a separate guardian consent form was not required.

Data Availability Statement: The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author due to privacy issues.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References

Açıkgöz, Merve. 2022. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde başkanlık seçimi ve federal yüksek mahkemenin seçime ilişkin emsal kararları. *Hacettepe Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi* 12: 677–717. [CrossRef]

Akalın, Şükrü Haluk. 2009. *Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları*. Ankara: Saray Matbaacılık.

Akgün, Birol. 2000. Türkiye'de seçmen davranışları: Partizan tutumlar, ideoloji ve ekonomik faktörlerin oy verme etkisi. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Meslek Yüksekokulu Dergisi* 1: 75–92.

Akkuş, Adem. 2020. Developing a scale to measure students' attitudes toward science [Developing a Scale to Measure Students' Attitudes toward Science]. *International Journal of Assessment Tools in Education* 6: 706–20. [CrossRef]

Beyaz, Rafet. 2020. Z kuşağı tüketicilerin kişilik özellikleri ve bilinçli tüketim eğilimleri arasındaki ilişkinin incelenmesi. *Gençlik Araştırmaları Dergisi* 8: 51–75. Available online: https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/genclikarastirmalari/issue/59338/776553 (accessed on 25 October 2023).

Bozkurt, Veysel. 2023. Kuşaklar sosyolojisi ve Z kuşağı: Data ne söylüyor? In *Bursa'da Z Kuşağını Anlamak*, 1st ed. Edited by Mukaddes Yılmaz. Görükle: Mümin Ceyhan Araştırma Kütüphanesi, pp. 44–68.

Byrne, Barbara M., and T. Leanne Campbell. 1999. Cross-Cultural comparisons and the presumption of equivalent measurement and theoretical structure: A look beneath the surface. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 30: 555–74. [CrossRef]

Çakır, Halil. 2021. Mavi Yakalı ve Beyaz Yakalı Emekliliğin Kuşaklar Sosyolojisi Bağlamında Karşılatırılması. Ph.D. thesis, Mersin University, Mersin, Türkiye.

Çavuşoğlu, Selin, and Melis Yalçın. 2021. Üniversitelerde kuşaklararası farklılık ve erişilebilirlik: Kavramsal bir değerlendirme. *Üçüncü Sektör Sosyal Ekonomi* 56: 1021–45. [CrossRef]

Demir, Talip. 2022. Kutsal olan her şey buharlaşıyor mu? Z kuşağının değer yöneliminde transhümanist izler [Is Everything Sacred Evaporating? Transhumanist Traces on Value Orientation of Generation Z]. *Marifetname* 9: 111–39. [CrossRef]
Doğan, Mebrure. 2021. Üniversite öğrencilerinin kader algıları: Metaforik bir araştırma [The Perception of Fate (Qadar) among the University Students: A Metaphorical Analysis]. *Kader* 19: 645–77. [CrossRef]
Field, Andy. 2009. *Discovering StatIstics Using SPSS T*, 3rd ed. Newcastle upon Tyne: SAGE.
Florov, Ivan. 1991. *Felsefe Sözlüğü*. İzmir: Cem Yayınevi.
Fromm, Erich. 1994. *Kendini Savunan Insan*. Istanbul: Say Yayınevi.
Giddens, Anthony. 2019. *Modernite ve Bireysel Kimlik*. Istanbul: Say Yayınları.
Gidron, Noam. 2022. Many ways to be right: Cross-pressured voters in western europe. *British Journal of Political Science* 52: 146–61. [CrossRef]
Gökçe, Sena, and İshak Tekin. 2021. Z kuşağının dindarlık eğilimleri [A Study on The Religiosity Trends of Generation Z]. *Talim* 5: 182–205. Available online: https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/talim/issue/68006/1029590 (accessed on 21 October 2023).
Göksu, Vahap. 2014. Siyasal kimlikler ve merkez-çevre dikotomisi bağlamında türkiye'de merkez sağ ve merkez sol [In The Context of Political Identities and Central-Periphery Dichotomy, Center Right and Center Left in Turkey]. *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi* 8: 69–93. Available online: https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/akademikincelemeler/issue/1544/18957 (accessed on 21 October 2023).
Gül, Dilek. 2021. Dijital çağın çocukları olarak kabul edilen ve Türkiye'de 2023 seçimlerinde seçmen sayısı 7 milyonu bulan Z kuşağı, uzunca bir süredir şirketlerin yanısıra siyasilerin de çekim alanında. Peki Türkiye nüfusunun yüzde 39'unu oluşturan Z kuşağının kaygıları ve gelecek beklentileri neler? *Euro News*. Available online: https://tr.euronews.com/2021/02/04/z-kusag-turkiye-de-genc-jenerasyonun-kayg-lar-ve-beklentileri-neler (accessed on 21 October 2023).
Hafizaoglu, Yeşim. 2021. Z Kusagi Secmen Davranislari. *Eğitim Ve Yeni Yaklaşımlar Dergisi* 4: 141–64. [CrossRef]
Heider, Fritz. 1964. *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
Kağıtçıbaşı, Çiğdem. 2019. *Benlik, Aile ve Insan Gelişimi—Kültürel Psikoloji*, 6th ed. Istanbul: Koç Üniversitesi Yayınları.
Kasapoğlu, Abdurrahman. 2008. Kur'an açısından fatalizm. *Hikmet Yurdu Düşünce-Yorum sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Dergisi* 1: 87–107.
Kaya, Alim, and Binaz Bozkur. 2015. Kadercilik eğilimi ölçeğinin geliştirilmesi: Geçerlik ve güvenirlik çalışması. *Mersin Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi* 11: 935–46. [CrossRef]
Kline, Rex B. 2011. *Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling*, 3rd ed. New York: The Guilford Press.
Levickaite, Rasa. 2010. Generations x, y, z: How social networks form the concept of the world without borders (the case of Lithuania). *LIMES: Cultural Regionalistics* 3: 170–83. [CrossRef]
Macit, Mustafa. 2014. *Boyun Eğme-Başa Çıkma Sarkacında Kadercilik Sosyal Psikolojik bir Yaklaşım*, 1st ed. Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi.
Marshall, Gordon. 1999. *Sosyoloji Sözlüğü*. Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Yayınları.
Maslow, Abraham. 1970. *Motivation and Personality*. Manhattan: Harper and Row.
Mayers, Andrew. 2013. *Introduction to Statistics and SPSS in Psychology*, 1st ed. London: Pearson.
Odabaşı, Fatma, and Nida Aydın. 2020. Muhafazakâr ailelerin 'dijital yerli' çocukları/Z kuşağı üzerine nitel bir araştırma. *Toplum Bilimleri Dergisi* 14: 65–100. [CrossRef]
Pallant, Julie. 2010. *SPSS Survival Manual: A Step by Ssep Guide to Data Analysis Using SPSS*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Ross, Catherine E., John Mirowsky, and William C. Cockerham. 1983. Social class, Mexican culture, and fatalism: Their effects on psychological distress. *American Journal of Community Psychology* 11: 383–99. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Sanchez, Sabrina. 2021. Z kuşağının dini, dijital içerikler. *Compaign*. Available online: https://www.campaigntr.com/z-kusaginin-dini-dijital-icerikler/ (accessed on 21 October 2023).
Sarıoğlu, E. Başak, and Ebru Özgen. 2018. Z Kuşağının sosyal sedya kullanım alışkanlıkları üzerine bir çalışma. *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi* 11: 1067–81. [CrossRef]
Tabachnick, Barbara G., and Linda S. Fidell. 2007. *Using Multivariate Statistics*. London: Pearson.
Taşlıbeyaz, Elif. 2019. Analysis of Research Trends about Generation Z and Their Contributions to Education. *The Journal of Graduate School of Social Sciences* 21: 715–29. [CrossRef]
Weber, Max. 2012. *Ekonomi ve Toplum*. Istanbul: Yarın Yayınevi.
Yılmaz, Ercan, and Abdullah Aktürk. 2021. *Z kuşağı-Bir Nesli Anlamak*. Konya: Palet Yayınları.
YSK. 2023. Cumhurbaşkanı Seçimi ve 28. Dönem Milletvekili Genel Seçimi Sonuçları. Available online: https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/14-mayis-2023-secimleri/82491 (accessed on 16 October 2023).

Disclaimer/Publisher's Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.