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The Labour Market for Immigrants: Evidence from Data

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Abstract: This article verifies how regular migrants are inserted into the labour markets of receiving countries. The analysis will be made with reference to the position of neo-classical economists relating to the insertion of immigrants in the labour markets of host countries. Reference will also be made to existing data on the dynamics of the integration of authorized migrants in the labour force of OECD and EU countries.

Keywords: labour market; immigrants; complementarity; competition

1. Introduction

This article verifies how regular migrants are inserted into the labour markets of receiving countries. The analysis will be made with reference to the position of neo-classical economists relating to the insertion of immigrants in the labour markets of host countries. Reference will also be made to existing data on the dynamics of the integration of authorized migrants in the labour force of OECD countries.

2. The Economists' Case in Favour of More Migrants

Neo-classical economists are generally consensual in underlining the benefits of international immigrants.[1] Giovanni Peri, for example, studies the consequences for receiving countries in terms of employment, productivity, and skill bias. In his conceptualisation, immigrants do not lead to a crowding-out effect on the employment opportunities of the local labour force (See Peri 2012a, 2012b, 2013). This conclusion has important consequences on the question of the integration of authorized migrants in the labour markets of host societies. As claimed by Peri indeed:

> "For economists, (. . .) international migration has the formidable ability to increase total world income and productivity, generating huge global economic opportunities". (Peri 2012a, p. 37)

The World Bank (2005) and others do forecast huge surges in the global GDP with more international migration, to the extent that the liberalization of migration is considered even more effective in terms of increasing output than the liberalization of trade Pritchett (2006). In the opinion of some leading economists, the complete liberalization of migration in OECD countries would increase the GDP of the world by 150% in fifty years Klein and Ventura (2009).

The reason why this happens is because international migration produces a positive impact on productivity. In fact, by employing migrants in economies where their productivity is 4 or 5 times higher than in their original countries increases the total efficiency of labour worldwide (Clemens 2015). But will this mean that everyone in host societies is better off by increasing the number of immigrants? For sure migrants are advantaged by migration, but will they lower wages and/or job opportunities for the locals? Or will the increase in productivity translate into a positive sum game for everyone?

In the opinion of Peri, immigrants do not take the jobs of the natives, which means that foreigners do not compete with the locals for the same jobs (Peri 2012a, p. 41). This

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happens not only in the medium to long term but also in the short term because workers are not homogeneous and the assumption that other variables are fixed is not correct.

Also according to Portes the distributional impact of immigration, which is its impact on the reduction of wages and employment opportunities for domestic low-skilled workers, is virtually nonexistent (Portes 2019, pp. 3–4). In fact, while it is evident that more migrants increase the labour supply of a country and that they might also take the jobs of the natives, they also increase the overall number of jobs available.

A very debated issue is whether there is an impact on the wages of the local labour force. This question has been studied by many economists with reference to the data. The most famous analysis of the impact of immigration on the wages of the natives has been proposed by David Card in his 1990 work on the Mariel boat lift. With the landing of a substantial number of Cuban refugees in Miami in 1980 the local economy experienced a massive "supply shock" of low-skilled immigrants. However, this did not have a huge effect on the wages of domestic labour. The outcome of this study produced a heated controversy to the extent that another economist, Borjas felt the need to dispute it in his 2016 monograph. However, according to Portes Card's results are still widely considered valid (Portes 2019, pp. 3–4).[2] Indeed, looking at the effects on the labour market of the recent immigration from central and eastern European countries to the UK, these were relatively limited. In fact, the increase in the number of immigrants in the labour market of the UK has actually increased the number of jobs available to British workers (Portes 2019). On the contrary, when the US decided to withdraw the "bracero" program, the consequence was not more jobs for the locals, but a contraction of employment in agriculture.[3]

To be more specific and following Peri, it is possible to identify four ways in which the economy and labour market of receiving countries react to an inflow of foreign workers (Peri 2012a, p. 41).

First, there is an increase in investments because firms react to an increase in labour supply by investing to keep the ratio between capital and labour constant. This not only adds to the total GDP of the country but also to its innovation content (Peri 2012a, p. 42). Moreover, according to Portes (2019), there are innovation advantages also from the transfer of knowledge due to the free circulation of international workers. This happens through, for example, new patents, technology transfer, the development of multinational supply chains, and other similar effects.

Second, foreign workers are not homogeneous. They can be distinguished according to their level of education into highly educated, with tertiary education, or with lower levels of education, without tertiary education (Katz and Murphy 1992; Goldin and Katz 2008). Because of this, they are not integrated into the same sections of the labour market, and therefore they do not affect the same groups of local workers. Thus, when the economy experiences a labour supply of immigrants with lower levels of education which is larger than that of natives, in theory, this will have a negative impact only on the wages of lower educated native workers which will decrease relative to highly educated workers. However, Peri demonstrates that this does not happen if the proportion is the same between foreigners and natives (Peri 2012a, p. 43).

Moreover, even within groups with the same level of education, the skills of foreigners differ from those of the locals, which makes competition between them far less likely. Peri and Sparber (2009), for example, show that foreigners, given their relatively less established knowledge of the host country's language and culture, tend to specialize in manual work. Because of this, native workers can move to better jobs and, as this happens for sections of the labour market, the overall outcome is a boost in total productivity and the wages of domestic workers (Peri 2012b, 2013). Thus, we can conclude that the skills and competencies of immigrants are often complementary to those of natives, and this improves the overall efficiency of the economy (Portes 2019). For example, looking at the US and Italy, the inflow of low-skilled female migrants taking up jobs in the household enhanced the opportunities of native women who could participate in the labour market instead of being confined at home (Portes 2019).[4]

Finally, as we will ascertain in the next section, data show that migrants are usually underemployed and underpaid with respect to natives with the same skills and jobs. This helps decrease the costs of production, while also creating more jobs and increasing productivity (Peri 2012b, p. 44). Portes (2018a, 2018b) demonstrates how the inflow of immigrants increased the productivity of the UK while the IMF in 2016 showed that a 1% increase in the migrant share of the adult population resulted in around a 2% increase in GDP per capita and productivity gain (Portes 2019).

Summing up, increasing immigration leads to more investment; complementarities between immigrants and the local labour force; an upgrade of local workers and the enhancement in technology and innovation. All this guarantees more employment, productivity and a higher GDP for everyone, locals and foreigners.

Moreover, as Peri suggests, immigration helps reduce the shortage of labour supply in OECD countries experiencing an ageing population with fewer younger workers (Peri 2012a, p. 48). Therefore, we can say that economists, such as Peri, advocate for a total liberalisation of immigration. In his words:

> "Clearly the demand for immigrants in these kinds of jobs is one of the driving forces that have contributed to the problem of undocumented immigration. Without finding a legal way to satisfy that demand and the continued employment of those undocumented, there will not be a solution to the issue". (Peri 2012a, p. 49)

Thus, for neo-classical economists, the case in favour of opening the borders to migrants is very strong. In the next section, we will address the question of how migrants are integrated into the labour markets of host economies. This will help verify whether they are complementing the local labour force or competing with it.

3. The Integration of Migrants in the Labour Force of Receiving Country: A Look at the Data

This section reports on the scarce data available relating to the integration of international migrants in the labour markets of receiving countries[5].

Data from EUROSTAT allows us to compare how the situation evolved between 2014 and 2008.[6] Using the ISCO's classification of ten occupational categories, we can distinguish between the first three categories which require a high level of qualifications, the following four as medium-skilled and including white-collar/office and service jobs and blue-collar/manual occupations, and the last two categories which represent unskilled workers.

From this data, in 2014, a tendency emerged for 'first-generation immigrants' to work in less qualified jobs, especially elementary occupations and service workers.

Overall, still, in 2014, more than 25% of 'first-generation immigrants' residing legally in the EU had an 'unskilled blue-collar occupation' ('plant and machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations') (see Figure 1). These are the kinds of jobs that require a very low level of education, such as primary education. However, a substantial number of 'first-generation immigrants', almost 1 in 3, were employed in highly skilled office occupations, such as 'senior officials', 'managers', 'professionals', and 'technicians' which normally require a first or second stage of tertiary education. This is in contrast with more than 40% of 'natives with native background' working in these highly qualified occupations.

The crisis of 2008 seems to have had a greater impact on immigrants than on the native working force. While highly skilled migrants have been positively impacted by structural changes in the period between 2008–2014, with an increase of 3.7% in the number of 'first-generation immigrants' working in highly skilled non-manual jobs, the percentage of 'first-generation immigrants' working in 'unskilled blue-collar occupations' was lower in 2014 than in 2008 (−1.5%). Similarly, the percentage of 'first-generation immigrants' working in skilled manual jobs, decreased by 4.3% between 2008 and 2014.




Figure 1. Occupation of employees by migration status and year, EU, 2008 and 2014 (%). *Source:* Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 21 April 2024).

Looking at the differences between 'first-generation immigrants' from the EU and from outside the EU, in 2014, foreign-born workers of 'EU origins' were more likely to be employed in 'skilled occupations' than those of 'non-EU origins'. Authorised non-EU migrants were instead mostly employed either as unskilled manual workers (29.4%) or as 'highly-skilled professionals' (30.6%) (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Occupation of first-generation immigrant employees, by origin, EU, 2008 and 2014 (%). *Source:* Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 21 April 2024).

Looking at the three main job occupations of 'first-generation immigrants' in EU member states in 2014, in countries like Italy and Spain, as well as four other EU member states, regular immigrants were mostly employed in 'elementary occupations'. Also, overall, in the EU, 'elementary occupations' ranked first amongst the occupations of 'first-generation immigrants' (Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008).

In 2014, EU countries able to attract the most highly skilled 'first-generation immigrants' were Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In 2017, across the OECD, the percentage of immigrants holding low-skilled jobs, or elementary occupations was 18% as opposed to 11% of the native workers. In the EU this difference was more accentuated, with figures of 20% and 8%, respectively.

Overall, immigrant workers are more concentrated in lower-skilled employment in most countries. This is especially true in southern Europe, where the percentage of immigrants holding low-skilled jobs or elementary occupations is at least 30%, with the exception of Portugal. This figure was three times higher than the number of native workers employed in those sectors (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf). In Greece, immigrants are employed in elementary occupations six times more than the local labour force (33.1% vs. 5.2%) and four times more than in Nordic countries. In the EU and in the US, more than 20% of low-skilled jobs are held by immigrants. However, this level exceeds 40% in Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Norway, and 60% in Switzerland and Luxembourg. Moreover, migrants from outside the EU were far more likely to have unskilled jobs in 2017, except in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Hungary (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf).

Usually, the percentage of immigrants working in highly skilled occupations is lower than that of the native-born in all OECD and EU countries except in Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, Malta, Turkey, and some Central European countries (such as Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic, and Poland) (see Figure 3). In the EU in 2017, 11% fewer migrants were employed in highly skilled positions than native ones. This gap has actually increased between 2007 and 2017 (OECD 2018) especially in Nordic countries (with the exception of Sweden) (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf).




Figure 3. Self-employment by migration status and origin, EU, 2008 and 2014 (%). *Source:* Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 7 May 2024).

Looking at the precise sector of employment of migrants, Eurostat uses the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE) (Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008).

In 2014, most 'first-generation immigrants' were employed in 'manufacturing' together with 'wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles'. These sectors were also those employing most workers generally, and almost a third (30.2%) of the 'native-born with native background' (16.0% and 14.2%, respectively). However, pointing at some form of complementarity between the existing and incoming labour force, it should be noted that there were many activities where the percentages of 'native-born with native background' and 'second-generation immigrants' were similar while those of 'first-generation immigrants' were higher. As may be expected, these were: 'construction', 'accommodation and food service activities', 'administrative and support services', and 'activities of households as employers'.

Especially in the case of the latter, 'first-generation immigrants' were 7.4% as compared to less than 1% for the other two groups. Similarly, in the hospitality sector, they were almost double that of the other two categories. On the other hand, they were less represented in the categories of 'education' and 'public administration and defense' (5.6% compared to 8.6% and 8%) and 'compulsory social security' (2.9% compared with 7.7% and 7.8%).

One of the consequences of the global financial crisis was the decline, between 2008 and 2014, in the number of migrants in general working in 'manufacturing' and 'construction'. While, during the same period, 'first-generation immigrants' activities increased substantially (+2.3%) in the category of 'activities of households as employers'.

Looking at the differences between EU-born and non-EU-born 'first-generation immigrants' the biggest differences were in the categories of 'construction' and 'manufacturing'. In those activities, 'EU immigrants' were more represented by 3% (see Table A3). These two sectors were decreasing from 2008 to 2014 while remaining two of the largest. Also, in 2014, more 'first-generation immigrants' of 'EU origins' were employed in the 'professionals' sector (5.9% as opposed to 4.5%). Whereas, in 2014, the number of non-EU migrants was around 2% higher in the sectors of 'human health and social work', 'accommodation and food service', 'wholesale and retail', and 'activities of households as employers'.

In 2014, the most common sector of employment for first-generation immigrants in the EU 28, and in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Slovakia was 'manufacturing' (Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008[7]).

The second sector employing the most 'first-generation immigrants' in the EU was wholesale and retail, which however ranked first only in Hungary, while for Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg it did not feature in their top three activity sectors.

Human health and social work activities ranked third as a sector of activity for 'first-generation immigrants' in the EU, with France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom having it ranked first.

Very important for Spain, Cyprus, and Italy are immigrants working in the 'activities of household as employers', while Greece and Malta had the highest percentage of immigrants employed in the tourist sector.

Unique was the situation of Luxembourg where the three top activities for migrants were: 'financial and insurance activities', 'activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies', and 'professional' activities.

In the EU, self-employment seems to be mostly confined to the native population.[8] In 2014, 18.9% of natives were self-employed. In relation to 'second-generation immigrants' only 14.6% with an 'EU origin' were self-employed, with the rate being 11.5% for 'non-EU origin' migrants. Moreover, the self-employment percentage of 'first-generation immigrants' was 16.7% for EU migrants and 15.5% for non-EU ones. These figures have increased for non-EU 'first-generation immigrants' since 2008.

In countries like Greece, Italy, and Cyprus, the percentage of immigrants in self-employment was lower than that of natives.

In 2017, across the OECD and the EU, the percentage of immigrants in self-employment was around 12% of the total immigrant population, the same rate as for natives. However great variation exists among countries. For example, there were more immigrants in self-employment than native workers in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, with a percentage twice that of locals. On the other hand, in southern Europe, Japan, Korea, and the Latin American OECD countries, immigrants were underrepresented amongst the self-employed. For example, in Greece, Italy, and Iceland, the number of self-employed among the natives was twice that of the migrants, and in Korea four times (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf).[9] Immigrant businesses in OECD countries are however smaller than the business of native-born individuals, apart from in Australia, New Zealand, Central Europe, and the Baltic countries (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf). This is especially true in the EU, where up to 75% of immigrant businesses have no employees,

in comparison to seven out of ten natives. Moreover, in 2017 in the EU, for central and eastern Europe, more native-owned businesses than immigrant-owned businesses had over 10 employees, especially in Luxembourg, Denmark, and Switzerland.

All immigrants from outside the EU were more likely than those from the EU to hold temporary employment contracts.[10] In 2014, while only 11.9% of natives had a temporary contract, the rate was 17.0% for 'first-generation immigrants' from outside the EU (see Figure 4).




Figure 4. Temporary contract by migration status and origin, 2008 and 2014 (%). *Source:* Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 18 May 2024).

This trend was true for all countries within the EU, where 'first-generation immigrants' have always had higher rates of temporary contracts than natives, pointing to a higher degree of precariousness of immigrants, and of non-EU immigrants in particular, as opposed to natives.

In the majority of EU member states, those with the highest number of temporary contracts were immigrants from outside the EU. In France, the difference between non-EU and EU immigrants was 8.9%, in Belgium 6.8%, in Sweden 6.7% and in Luxembourg 6.2%. In other EU countries, the variation was less than 5%, and in Italy, the Czech Republic, Austria, Spain, and Portugal, EU migrants had more temporary contracts than non-EU ones. It must be noted however that in southern European countries, given the relevance of irregular jobs, it is fairly likely that many non-EU migrants have no contracts at all (See Figure 5).

Table A5 in the Appendix A shows that overall, in the EU and in most member states, apart from France and Hungary, 'first-generation immigrant' employees of 'EU origins' recorded a higher percentage of temporary contracts in 2014 than 'native-born with native background'. In Spain, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Cyprus the variation between EU 'first-generation immigrants' and natives was significant (e.g., 12% in the case of Spain).

Another indicator of the higher precariousness for immigrant workers in comparison to the local labour force, which may also hint at a lack of competition between the two, is the fact that in 2014 'first-generation immigrants' of both 'EU origins' and 'non-EU origins' had the highest percentages of part-time employment.[11]

Figure 6 below indicates the prevalence of part-time work among both first and second-generation female immigrants, with a gap of up to 18% with the male population. Again, the rate of part-time jobs was higher for 'first-generation immigrants', both from the EU and from outside the EU. This rate represented more than one-third of female 'first-generation immigrants' and 6.7% ('EU origins') and 12.7% ('non-EU origins') of male ones in 2014. For the male employees, those with the highest rate of part-time positions, more than three

times that of native men, were 'first-generation immigrants' from outside the EU, testifying to their higher degree of vulnerability. As may be expected overall, part-time positions were higher amongst both male and female 'first-generation immigrants' with 'non-EU origins'.




Figure 5. Workers on temporary contracts, Percentage of all wage-earners, 15- to 64-year-olds, 2015–2016. *Source*: (OECD 2018): https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf (accessed on 25 May 2024).




Figure 6. Part-time employment by migration status, sex and origin, EU, 2008 and 2014 (%). *Source*: Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 25 May 2024).

In relation to 2008, in 2014 part-time work for 'first-generation immigrants' of both genders and from the EU and outside the EU increased. Although the data does not include whether such part-time contracts were voluntary or involuntary, this could well point to a worsening of the 'first-generation immigrants' position in the labour markets of receiving countries after the global economic crisis.

At the member state level, the situation was quite variegated. However, in all member states, apart from Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Austria, 'first-generation immigrants' from outside the EU had a higher rate of part-time jobs than any other category, with the highest gaps being in the United Kingdom (7.4%) and Italy (4.3%).

The difference between part-time positions in the native labour force and in the 'non-EU first-generation immigrant' category was significant in Greece (13.6%), Spain (10.7%), and Italy (12%). In general, 20.4% of 'first-generation immigrants' from the EU and 23.3% from outside the EU had a part-time job in the EU 28 in 2014. This percentage was around 25% or higher in Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Austria for both EU and non-EU 'first-generation immigrants' (see Table A6). Only in Cyprus, Slovenia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic did the percentage of non-EU 'first-generation immigrants' with part-time jobs fall below 10% (Table A2).

In general, in the majority of OECD countries more immigrants, especially women, are employed in part-time jobs (Figure 7).




Figure 7. Change in the share of women working part-time between 2007 and 2016. *Sources*: OECD/EU (2018), Settling In 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration, OECD Publishing, Paris/EU, Brussels, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307216-en OECD/EU 2019 (accessed on 3 June 2024).

Finally, another indicator of the lack of competition with the native labour force is the share of atypical jobs, defined as jobs with atypical working hours, such as working evenings, nights or weekends. Here again, the rate for immigrant statuses was higher than native populations. Men were also more likely than women to have atypical working hours. As could be expected, given their higher degree of vulnerability, the highest rate of atypical jobs was 54.4% for 'first-generation immigrants' of 'non-EU origins'. Even 'first-generation immigrant' women from outside the EU recorded a rate of 49.5% in 2014 (see Figure 7). As in the case of part-time jobs, atypical work also generally increased between 2008 and 2014 (see Figure 8).

Looking at the differences between member states, the highest shares (over 70%) among EU 'first-generation immigrants' of 'EU origins' were recorded in Croatia (87.2%). For 'second-generation immigrants' of 'non-EU origin' Greece had the highest shares (76.0%) (see Table A3).

Overall, in the EU 28, the highest rates of atypical work were registered again among 'first-generation immigrants' of 'non-EU origin' (52.1%). Although, this was not the case for the United Kingdom, Croatia and Poland, where immigrants from the EU had higher shares.




Figure 8. Atypical working time by migration status, sex and origin, EU, 2008 and 2014 (%). *Source*: Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 3 June 2024).

In 2015–16, across the OECD and the EU, 15% of foreign workers were on temporary contracts, as opposed to 16% and 12% among native workers, respectively. In the EU, non-EU migrants have the highest share of temporary contracts, with 18%. That was not the case, however, in most central and eastern European countries, the United Kingdom, Austria and Italy where EU-born migrants had slightly more temporary contracts (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf).

As shown in Figure 5 below, in around half of the EU countries the share of temporary contract workers is at least 5% higher among migrants than among native workers. This gap is especially wide in Spain, Greece and Poland. However, temporary work of migrants is uncommon in most central and eastern European countries, where it accounts for less than 10% of immigrant employment. Over the period 2005–06 and 2015–16 there does not seem to have been a significant change in temporary contracts as a share of employment arrangements (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf).

In 2015–2016, the percentage of foreign-born workers likely to be employed in jobs generating physical health risks (46% on average) was higher than for native workers (35% on average) in all European countries. The gap was at least 20% in Germany, Slovenia, Estonia and Sweden (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf). Only in Norway and Denmark did immigrants have an occupational risk similar to that of native-born workers. Such employment is typically low-skilled, and in fact, around three in five low-educated immigrants had physically risky jobs in 2015, as opposed to only half of their native-born peers. However, also for highly skilled jobs, the percentage of migrants in occupational-risk jobs is higher than that of native workers (See Figure 9).

In terms of the channels through which migrants find jobs, in 2014 'first-generation immigrants' were much more likely to use informal channels such as 'relatives, friends or acquaintances' (39.7% compared with 29.8% of 'native-born with native background' and 25.4% of 'second-generation immigrants'). Also 'private employment agencies' were cited more by 'first-generation immigrants' than by the other two groups (7.7%, as opposed to 4.1% for the 'native-born with native background').




Figure 9. Shares of the foreign- and native-born in occupations that put their physical health at risk. Sources: OECD/EU (2018), Settling In 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration, OECD Publishing, Paris/EU, Brussels, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264307216-en OECD/EU 2019 (accessed on 3 June 2024).

The prevalence of the modality of 'contacting the employer directly' was instead less (19.0% compared with 25.5% of 'second-generation' and 28.4% of 'native-born with native background').

Overall, both 'native-born with native background' and 'second-generation immigrants' would use more formal channels, such as 'contacting the employer directly', using 'public employment offices' and applying via the web. On the other hand, 'first-generation immigrants' use more private agencies and informal channels, such as relatives and friends (see Figure 10).

Moreover, migrant workers are overrepresented among the unemployed in all OECD countries except in the Slovak Republic, Mexico, Poland, Hungary, and Greece.[12] In the Nordic countries, and in Switzerland and Belgium, the unemployment rate for those who are foreign-born is more than twice that of the native-born. In France it is 7.6% points higher and in Germany 9.4%.

The economic recession of 2008–2009 seems to have heavily impacted the unemployment rate of immigrants who, in the period between 2009 and 2014, had an average unemployment rate that was 5% higher than native workers, at 15% in OECD countries (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf). Particularly difficult is the situation in southern European countries (except Portugal), as well as in Sweden, Finland, and France where more than 13% of migrants were unemployed in 2018. Smaller gaps were recorded in the US, Australia and Canada (see Figure 11 below).

Moreover, according to an analysis by the OECD (2018),[13] immigrants are more at risk of labour market exclusion.[14] Indeed, in the OECD, 2.2 million unemployed immigrants, roughly more than 30% of the total, could not find a job for at least one year. In 2015–16 in the EU, 50% of unemployed non-EU workers, and 44% of EU ones, were long-term ones (almost 2 million). This is in stark contrast with 2005–2006 when immigrants were less

likely than native-born workers, to experience long-term unemployment across the OECD and the EU (Table A4).




Figure 10. Method to find a job by migration status, 2014 (%). *Source*: Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 3 June 2024).

This is particularly true in countries hardly hit by the economic crisis, such as Ireland, Latvia, Greece and Spain. In Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Lithuania, the rates of foreign-born workers in long-term unemployment is more than 10 percentage points higher than those for natives. Moreover, inactivity is involuntary in one-quarter of those who are immigrants in the EU against one-sixth of the inactive native-born. This is less the case in the US, where involuntary inactivity is less than 10% among both native and foreign workers (See Figure 12 below).

Apart from unemployment and employment rates, the OECD records the number of younger immigrants who are neither in employment, education or training (NEET). In the EU in the period between 2013 and 2018, more than 18% of immigrants aged 15–24 were neither in employment, education or training. This is compared to 11% for their native counterparts in 2018. This share was lower in non-European OECD countries where this gap was smaller, except in New Zealand and Mexico (see Figure 13).




Figure 11. Unemployment rates by place of birth, 2007–18. *Note:* The data for the EU28 refer to the first three quarters of the year 2018. The series on non-EU born and EU born excludes Germany. *Source:* European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.




Figure 12. Involuntary inactivity due to discouragement or other reasons. *Source*: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf (accessed on 3 June 2024).




Figure 13. NEET rates by place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2013 and 2018. *Note*: The data for European countries refers to the first three quarters only. Compulsory military service is excluded from the calculation. *Source*: EU28: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); New Zealand, Canada, Israel: Labour Force surveys; Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE); United States: Current Population Surveys.

Another more general example of discrimination in the integration of foreign-born workers in Western labour markets is the fact that the majority of foreign-born workers are employed in jobs below their qualifications; or, in other words, they are overqualified for their job placements. Indeed, still in 2018, the share of immigrant workers with tertiary education in low and medium-skilled jobs remained disproportionally high across OECD countries (OECD 2018: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf). This is detailed in the figure below, which shows how, apart from the case of Switzerland, the rate of over-qualification is systematically higher among highly educated immigrant workers than their native peers. Looking at OECD countries, in 2018 the average gap between foreign and native-born workers increased by 1.5 percentage points to 12% from 2007. This gap is higher in the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria and Denmark while it decreased substantially only in Greece and Spain (Figure 14 below).

Huge differences also exist in the labour market outcomes of immigrants by regions of origin. Most notably in the EU in the period between 2013 and 2018, migrants from the Middle East appear to be less integrated than migrants from other countries of origin. In 2018, the unemployment level of migrants from the Middle East was still as high as in 2013 at around 22%.

Similarly, migrants from the Northern African region in the EU registered unemployment levels above 21% in 2018, much higher than that of sub-Saharan migrants. Also, in Australia in 2018, the migrants presenting the highest rates of unemployment were those from North Africa and the Middle East. They recorded an unemployment rate twice the average of foreign-born migrants at nearly 11%. While in Canada, migrants from the MENA area and sub-Saharan Africa topped the list.

In the US in 2018, the level of unemployment for Mexican and South American migrants increased by 5 percentage points from 2013 (see Table A1 in the Appendix A).

Another indicator of the poor performance of migrants in labour markets in the wake of the 2008–2009 economic crisis is the increase in the share of immigrant workers living below the poverty threshold. This occurred in all EU countries and at a higher rate than for native workers.




Figure 14. Differences in over-qualification rates between foreign- and native-born workers, 2007 and 2018. *Note:* The reference population are persons with a high education level aged 15–64 who are not in education, except in Israel where the calculation includes persons in education. The data for European countries and Turkey refer to the first three quarters only in 2018. The data for Australia refer to the years 2014 and 2017. *Source*: European countries: Labour Force Survey (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Survey; Israel: Labour Force Survey. OECD (2019).

In 2017, the European Union recorded a percentage of around 18% of immigrant workers aged 18 to 64 years old living below the poverty line as opposed to only 8% of the local workforce (Figure 15 below). The gap between the two populations actually increased from 6% to 10% in the last ten years. This rise has been especially marked in Spain and Italy, where about 30% of foreign-born workers were poor in 2017–18. Similarly, in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands, poverty rates increased at a fast pace in the last ten years, although not as much as in southern Europe (Figure 15 below).




Figure 15. Poverty rates of workers by place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2007, 2013 and 2017–18. *Note:* The poverty rate used here is the share of workers living below the poverty threshold as defined by Eurostat (60% of the median equivalised disposable household income in each country). *Sources:* European countries: Eurostat dataset (population aged 18–64) [ilc_iw16] extracted on 10 July 2019; United States: Current Population Survey (population aged 15–64).

Behind the poverty levels of immigrant workers are precisely the phenomena described above. In particular, such a percentage of immigrant workers are subjected to poverty due to their large concentration in low-skilled jobs, their working conditions being

below standard in terms of hours worked, their contract type and in general their more vulnerable and precarious position in the labour markets of receiving countries.

4. Conclusions

Summing up, the data above clearly demonstrates that foreign born populations endure labour market conditions far below those of their native counterparts. On average they experience higher unemployment than the native-born population for each level of education. Furthermore, those with North African origins are the most overrepresented in terms of unemployment rates. Moreover, more than locally born workers, foreign-born labourers are on average employed in the low skilled agricultural, care, and industrial sectors and they are often overqualified for their job placements.

Neo-classical economists' prediction on the insertion of immigrants in the labour force of receiving countries seem to have been vindicated.

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Appendix A

Table A1. Employees with temporary contracts, by origin, 2014 (%).

	Native-Born with Native Background	Second-Generation Immigrants		First-Generation Immigrants	
		EU	Non-EU	EU	Non-EU
EU-28	11.9	10.8	13.0	14.9	17.0
Belgium	5.4	7.9	12.6	13.5	20.3
Bulgaria	4.8				
Czech Republic	7.0	8.7		11.7	9.2
Denmark					
Germany					
Estonia	2.2			0.0	
Ireland					
Greece	10.3	11.6	26.6	18.6	18.8
Spain	21.8	30.6	26.4	33.5	31.8
France	12.1	12.4	21.1	11.8	20.6
Croatia	14.6	18.7	20.1		19.3
Italy	12.3	17.7		19.2	14.6
Cyprus	10.1	16.9		16.0	
Latvia	3.3				
Lithuania	2.4				
Luxembourg	5.4			7.6	13.7
Hungary	10.0			5.5	
Malta	6.0	0.0			

Table A1. *Cont.*

	Native-Born with Native Background	Second-Generation Immigrants		First-Generation Immigrants	
		EU	Non-EU	EU	Non-EU
Netherlands					
Austria	4.3	6.1		7.8	5.9
Poland	26.1	18.3			
Portugal	18.9	34.9		25.1	23.5
Romania	1.2				
Slovenia	12.3	15.9	28.6		22.4
Slovakia	7.1				
Finland	12.5	12.4		18.0	20.3
Sweden	8.9	10.9		11.8	18.5
United Kingdom	3.2	3.4	4.0	7.0	7.3

Note: population aged 25–54. *Source:* Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 29 March 2024).

Table A2. Part-time employment, by origin, 2014 (%).

	Native-Born with Native Background	Second-Generation Immigrants		First-Generation Immigrants	
		EU	Non-EU	EU	Non-EU
EU-28	13.2	16.7	18.0	20.4	23.3
Belgium	24.0	24.8	20.4	24.7	27.5
Bulgaria	1.4				0.0
Czech Republic	4.1	5.4		6.7	5.2
Denmark					
Germany					
Estonia	6.5	6.0			
Ireland					
Greece	7.8	13.7		22.8	21.4
Spain	14.9	19.6	25.6	26.0	25.6
France	16.6	16.1	21.9	21.4	20.8
Croatia	2.0				7.8
Italy	18.0	19.6		25.7	30.0
Cyprus	9.2	13.3		10.5	5.2
Latvia	4.1				
Lithuania	5.6				
Luxembourg	21.8	18.5		14.2	17.4
Hungary	5.2	10.7			22.3
Malta	13.4				
Netherlands					
Austria	28.2	27.3	31.7	31.0	25.5
Poland	4.7	6.6			
Portugal	5.6				11.1

Table A2. *Cont.*

	Native-Born with Native Background	Second-Generation Immigrants		First-Generation Immigrants	
		EU	Non-EU	EU	Non-EU
Romania	0.7				
Slovenia	5.7	5.4	8.2		8.2
Slovakia	4.6				
Finland	8.4			11.0	14.9
Sweden	19.5	21.0		21.5	20.9
United Kingdom	21.5	20.5	18.6	16.1	23.5

Note: population aged 25–54. *Source:* Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 3 April 2024).

Table A3. Atypical working time by migration status and origin, 2014 (%).

	Native-Born with Native Background	Second-Generation Immigrants		First-Generation Immigrants	
		EU	Non-EU	EU	Non-EU
EU-28	48.4	47.0	45.5	50.6	52.1
Belgium	42.5	43.7	50.8	39.1	43.1
Bulgaria	39.1				
Czech Republic	43.9	53.8		45.3	53.3
Denmark	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Germany	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Estonia	42.3	48.0	55.5		55.4
Ireland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Greece	56.0	73.7	76.0	64.5	69.8
Spain	47.0	45.8	43.4	45.0	53.8
France	44.4	45.0	45.7	40.3	43.4
Croatia	69.2	62.4	59.8	87.2	75.7
Italy	42.7	41.3	75.8	48.8	52.3
Cyprus	36.1	38.3		57.6	76.5
Latvia	37.4	44.9	34.2		40.2
Lithuania	41.0	35.8	54.3		37.1
Luxembourg	46.8	45.9		45.1	48.8
Hungary	47.1	44.0		48.6	44.9
Malta	47.9			55.0	56.2
Netherlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Austria	48.0	50.0	50.6	55.9	56.1
Poland	61.2	62.8	49.1	74.9	57.5
Portugal	47.8	48.7	64.9	50.6	52.1
Romania	48.2				
Slovenia	61.8	57.9	66.0	69.1	79.8

Table A3. *Cont.*

	Native-Born with Native Background	Second-Generation Immigrants		First-Generation Immigrants	
		EU	Non-EU	EU	Non-EU
Slovakia	56.2	57.0		58.8	
Finland	54.0	65.8		52.3	55.2
Sweden	34.1	34.3		33.8	41.4
United Kingdom	51.8	51.4	42.6	60.4	56.6

Note: population aged 25–54. *Source:* Eurostat, EU LFS AHM2014/2008, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 12 April 2024).

Table A4. Immigrants' labour market outcomes in OECD countries in 2018[15].

	2018		Annual Change		Gap with the Native-Born in 2018	
	Percentages		Percentage Points			
	Unemployment Rate	Employment Rate	Unemployment Rate	Employment Rate	Unemployment Rate	Employment Rate
Australia	5.5	72	−0.4	1.2	0.1	−3
Austria	9.4	68	−1.3	2.5	5.7	−6.4
Belgium	11.5	58.3	−1.8	1.8	6.8	−7.7
Canada	6.4	72.3	−0.4	−0.4	0.6	−2
Chile	7.5	76.9	1.7	3.1	−0.8	16.7
Czech Republic	2.5	79.4	−0.5	1.9	0.2	4.8
Denmark	9.8	66.4	−0.8	1.4	5.5	−10.6
Estonia	7.9	70.1	1.4	−1.6	2.7	−5.2
Finland	14.1	62.2	−1.7	1.9	7	−10.6
France	14.6	58.5	−0.8	1.9	6.3	−7.9
Germany	6	69.5	−0.4	1.4	3.1	−8.1
Greece	28.6	52.8	−1.3	0.1	10	−2.3
Hungary	4.6	71.7	1.2	−2	0.9	2.5
Iceland	5.1	82.5	2.4	−5.6	2.6	−2.8
Ireland	7.2	70.7	−1	1.7	1.8	2.7
Israel	3.5	78.8	−0.2	−0.1	−0.8	12.1
Italy	13.7	60.9	−0.5	1	3.4	2.8
Korea	4.6	70.9	–	–	–	–
Latvia	7.7	69	−0.3	2.4	0.1	−3
Lithuania	7.4	71.1	0.9	1	1.2	−1.4
Luxembourg	6.4	71.4	−1.5	0.6	2	9.6
Mexico	4.1	51.8	−0.1	−0.4	0.7	−9.7
Netherlands	7	64.9	−1.9	1.9	3.6	−14.3
New Zealand	4.1	77.2	−0.5	0.8	−0.5	−0.5
Norway	7.9	69.7	−1.2	0.3	5	−6.8

Table A4. *Cont.*

	2018		Annual Change		Gap with the Native-Born in 2018	
	Percentages		Percentage Points			
	Unemployment Rate	Employment Rate	Unemployment Rate	Employment Rate	Unemployment Rate	Employment Rate
Poland	4.7	73	−3.6	3.1	0.8	5.7
Portugal	8.5	75.1	−1.5	0.8	1.4	6
Slovak Republic	n.r.	73.3	n.r.	3.5	n.r.	5.7
Slovenia	6.5	67	−2	0.7	1.4	−4.6
Spain	20.7	61.6	−2.7	1.9	6.5	−1
Sweden	15.7	66.7	0.2	0.4	11.8	−14.1
Switzerland	7.9	76.6	−0.1	0.7	4.5	−5.3
Turkey	12.1	47.4	−3.3	1.2	1	−4.7
United Kingdom	4.7	73.7	−0.5	1.2	0.7	−1.2
United States	3.5	71.6	−0.5	0.7	−0.6	2.4
OECD average	8.7	68.3	−0.7	0.8	2.9	−2.4
OECD Total	7.1	69	−0.7	1	1.4	1.9
EU28	10.6	66	−1	1.6	4.1	−2.9

Source: OECD 2019. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/c3e35eec-en/1/2/2/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/c3e35eec-en&_csp_=5484c834d3b947b42e43a8aee995b48b&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book (accessed on 21 April 2024). n.r.: not relevant.

Table A5. Long-term unemployment rate.

Percentages of Total Unemployed, 2006–07 and 2015–16				
	Long-Term Unemployment of the Foreign-Born Population (% of Total Unemployment)		Differences with the Native-Born (% Points) +: Higher than Natives −: Lower than Natives	
	2006–07	2015–16	2006–07	2015–16
Australia	17.9	24.3	+1.4	−0.3
Austria	30.4	32.5	+4.1	+2.7
Belgium	57.2	57.1	+8.5	+8.3
Canada	10.4	13.5	+3.2	+2.8
Croatia	60.4	58.4	+0.3	+0.9
Cyprus	19.6	39.2	+0.9	−7.7
Czech Republic	69.9	48.8	+17.0	+7.8
Denmark	20.1	33.8	+1.8	+12.2
Estonia	58.8	38.3	+12.1	+3.9
Finland	32.0	28.1	+10.1	+1.8
France	45.7	49.6	+7.1	+7.7
Germany	56.7	57.7	−0.1	−0.3
Greece	44.5	71.1	−8.2	−1.6
Hungary	41.9	53.8	−4.2	+8.1
Iceland		13.1	−0.1	+3.5
Ireland	24.5	52.3	−9.6	−5.5
Israel		12.5		−0.7
Italy	41.2	55.2	−8.3	−4.1

Table A5. *Cont.*

Percentages of Total Unemployed, 2006–07 and 2015–16				
	Long-Term Unemployment of the Foreign-Born Population (% of Total Unemployment)		Differences with the Native-Born (% Points) +: Higher than Natives −: Lower than Natives	
	2006–07	2015–16	2006–07	2015–16
Korea		2.1		+0.8
Latvia	28.2	50.5	−2.8	+7.8
Lithuania		54.3	+2.8	+14.3
Luxembourg	29.8	30.6	+1.7	+2.1
Malta		48.1	−7.7	+6.4
Netherlands	50.2	50.3	+10.8	+9.9
New Zealand	10.4	9.5	−0.8	−2.4
Norway	31.1	34.4	+13.1	+7.9
Portugal	42.2	51.9	−7.2	−5.0
Slovenia	54.8	57.7	+7.9	+5.7
Spain	11.9	48.2	−11.1	−0.3
Sweden	18.7	27.6	+6.6	+13.0
Switzerland	46.3	43.6	+16.2	+14.3
Turkey		21.9	+0.0	−2.6
United Kingdom	24.0	24.1	+1.0	−5.0
United States	6.6	11.8	+0.2	+0.4
OECD total (29)	29.2	37.3	−2.1	+4.6
EU total (28)	41.3	48.4	−3.7	+0.1

Note: 2012–13 data for Turkey. Turkey is not included in the OECD total. Information on data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602. *Source*: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf (accessed on 25 April 2024).

Table A6. Employment and unemployment rates by region of origin in selected OECD countries in 2013 and 2018.

	Percentages				
	Region of Birth	2013	2018	2013	2018
Australia	Other Oceania	75.7	77.2	6.2	5.7
	Europe	73.9	77.9	4.5	4
	North Africa and the Middle East	47.7	50.9	12.1	10.7
	Sub-Saharan Africa	74.1	75.6	6.1	6.9
	Asia	66.7	69.4	6.4	5.7
	Americas	73.7	79.1	5.3	5
	Foreign-born (total)	69.7	72	5.9	5.2
	Native-born	73.3	74.9	5.8	5.4
Canada	Sub-Saharan Africa	65.3	69.9	12.3	9.5
	North Africa	60.8	69.5	14.8	8
	Middle East	59.1	61.4	12	9.7
	Asia	69.4	72.6	8.1	5.7
	Europe	74.3	77.3	5.8	5.4
	Oceania	79.2	76.4	5.8	3.4
	Central and South America and Caribbean	71.8	73.2	8.7	7
	Other North America	70.8	69.5	6.4	5.1
	Foreign-born (total)	69.9	73.8	8.2	5.9
	Native-born	73.2	74.4	6.9	5.7

Table A6. *Cont.*

	Percentages				
	Region of Birth	**2013**	**2018**	**2013**	**2018**
EU28 countries	EU28 and EFTA	66.2	72	13.5	8.3
	Other European countries	54.9	62.2	19.7	13
	North Africa	45.6	50.3	28.9	21.1
	Sub-Saharan Africa	58.7	64.9	21.1	14
	Middle East	50.6	50.2	22	22
	North America	69.1	70.8	6.4	6.9
	Central and South America and Caribbean	56.8	64.7	27.2	16.1
	Asia	64.3	66.1	10.4	6.9
	Other regions	62.6	66.2	11.4	11.2
	Foreign-born (total)	60.9	65	17.1	12
	Native-born	64.3	67.4	10.3	7.2
United States	Mexico	66.2	70.9	7.7	3.7
	Other Central American countries	73.6	74.9	6.5	3.5
	South America and Caribbean	69	73.6	8.7	4.1
	Canada	73.2	71.3	6.2	2.7
	Europe	70.6	75.4	6.2	3
	Africa	66.9	71.4	9.4	4.5
	Asia and the Middle East	68.1	69.2	5.3	3
	Other regions	63.6	68.8	7.8	4.6
	Foreign-born (total)	68.4	71.6	7	3.5
	Native-born	65.7	69.2	7.7	4.1

Source: OECD (2019).

Notes

1 Clemens (2015); Recent IMF research on whether immigration is good for growth and incomes. Portes (2018a, 2018b). News summaries of the research evidence on the economic impacts of migration to the UK on jobs, wages, productivity, and more.

2 Michael A. Clemens for Vox in 2017; 2011 NBER working paper by economists Sari Pekkala Kerr and William R. Kerr.

3 2018 American Economic Review paper, Clemens, Ethan G. Lewis, and Hannah M. Postel.

4 2011 articles by Patricia Cortés and José Tessada's in the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics and Guglielmo Baron and Sauro Mocetti in Labour Economics.

5 The data have been taken from the on-line dataset referred to in the paper. Data have not been collected by the author. All information about how all data have been collected by EUROSTAT can be found the following web-site: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_introduced#Key_concepts (accessed on 2 April 2024). For the data taken from the OECD the information about how they have been collected can be found at the following web-site: https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf (accessed on 3 May 2024).

6 See EUROSTAT https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions#Occupation (accessed on 23 April 2020).

7 See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:First_and_second-generation_immigrants_-_statistics_on_employment_conditions&oldid=387944#Source_data_for_tables.2C_figures_and_maps_.28MS_Excel.29 (accessed on 25 July 2024).

8 Self-employment Definition The self-employed are people who work in their own firms or create their own businesses, sometimes hiring employees. Self-employment includes entrepreneurs, liberal professions, artisans, traders, and many other freelance activities (OECD 2018).

9 https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf (accessed on 3 May 2024).

10 Definition In most countries, temporary work denotes any kind of wage-earning employment governed by a fixed-term contract, including apprenticeships, temporary employment agency work, and remunerated training courses. In Australia, temporary work is defined as work without paid leave. No such definition of temporary work exists in the United States (OECD 2018).

11 Part-time employees are persons whose usual working hours are less than the normal working hours. It can be either voluntary (e.g., for family reasons) or involuntary (when the person would like to work more hours but cannot find a suitable contract). This analysis does not distinguish between the two because of sample size limitations.

[12] Ibid., p. 114.

[13] https://www.intlnursemigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/OECD-2018-Immigrant-Integration.pdf (accessed on 3 May 2024).

[14] Definition The long term unemployment rate is the share of job seekers who have been without a job for at least 12 months among all the unemployed. Involuntarily inactive people are those who are not seeking work but are willing to take up work. They include, among others, discouraged workers, who are not seeking work because they believe no suitable jobs are available (OECD 2018).

[15] (OECD 2019). https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/c3e35eec-en/1/2/2/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/c3e35eec-en&_csp_=5484c834d3b947b42e43a8aee995b48b&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book (accessed on 21 April 2024).

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