The United Kingdom’s Ukraine Schemes and the Case for a Safe Passage Visa: At-Risk People, So-Called ‘Safe and Legal Routes’, and the Refugee Convention

Abstract

This paper analyses the existing international refugee framework in light of the emergence of alternative so-called ‘safe and legal routes’ devised by the UK government—in particular, the bespoke Ukraine visa schemes—and considers the practical implementation of a Safe Passage Visa programme in the UK. It will consider how safe routes may benefit at-risk people when provided alongside the protection afforded under the Refugee Convention. It will also evaluate the persistent failure of UK government policy that focuses on deterrent-only aims but has been unsuccessful in reducing irregular journeys to the UK. The paper will then explore the case for a ‘Safe Passage Visa’, focusing on the practical challenge of implementation and the potential impact of its development on the workings of the asylum system in the UK, including the potential reduction in irregular entry and other benefits. The paper argues that there is an imperative need to take action to safeguard and protect human lives in transit whilst asserting that this must be conducted in a way that complements and enhances the principles enshrined in the Refugee Convention.

1. Introduction

The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) (‘The Refugee Convention’) has been the cornerstone of refugee protection for over 70 years. However, much has changed globally in that time period. The concept of the “asylum-seeker” has become increasingly politicised. This is true of many countries, but is particularly true of the UK context. Recent legislative developments in the UK (for example, the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and the Illegal Migration Act 2023) as well as the abandoned Rwanda migration partnership plan have highlighted the growing hostility to providing sanctuary to asylum seekers in the UK. However, during the same time period, the UK government (and indeed the people of the UK) welcomed approximately 250,000 at-risk people from Ukraine to the UK, many directly invited into UK homes under the Homes4Ukraine scheme.

Hostility within the UK asylum system predates either of the above-mentioned Acts of Parliament (and indeed predates the ‘Hostile Environment’ laws and policies of the 2010s) (Travis 2007). However, years of increasing hostility within the system have not discouraged desperate people from continuing to travel irregularly to the UK in the hope of reaching safety, with the highest number of asylum claims in the UK recorded in June 2025 (Home Office 2025a). However, restrictions on access to regular visas for tourism or study, the imposition of visa national rules on countries that generate asylum seekers and increasing measures to prevent irregular entry to the UK by lorry (Home Office 2025b; PA News Agency 2023; Bish 2024) have caused people smuggler gangs to switch their business model to launching small, overcrowded inflatable dinghies across the English channel as the only remaining unchecked mode of entry to the UK—a model previously developed and used in the Mediterranean. Faced with no alternative travel options, desperate people are pushed to accept travel by this extremely dangerous method. The result is a situation that benefits no one. Criticism of the “small boats crisis” is heard on all sides of the asylum debate and across all areas of the political spectrum—whether the focus is the protection of life or protection of the border (Refugee Council 2024; Merrifield 2026). The current state of affairs is unsustainable and change is needed urgently.

This article proposes that, contrary to much of the current discourse in the media (Merrifield 2026), a properly implemented Safe Passage Visa scheme would eliminate these dangerous journeys. The type of Safe Passage Visa programme that I propose in Section 5 of this paper would allow for a controlled, external immigration application process that prioritises fairness and international refugee law principles alongside an understandable desire to protect the UK border and have knowledge of the identity of those entering the UK. My proposal builds on the work already undertaken in this area by the Public and Commercial Services Union, the charity Care4Calais, and the Refugee Council. It also draws heavily on existing concepts within UK immigration law, including the implementation of the Ukraine schemes and the Human Trafficking regime.

In writing this article, I draw on more than 18 years of experience in the sector and in the representation of asylum seekers, refugees, and other immigrants in the UK in their cases to the Home Office and in immigration courts. As a response to the Ukraine war, I devised and set up Ukraine Project Cymru and ran this university pro bono project for two years. The project provided free immigration advice to Ukrainians in Wales and was funded by the Welsh Government. The combination of these experiences has provided me with a unique insight into the wider asylum system and what can be achieved when there is a concerted policy effort to provide safe passage to people fleeing war and persecution. This article will therefore include reflections, with examples from the Ukraine Project Cymru casework alongside more traditional academic commentary. With all of this in mind, I argue that the time has come for the UK to implement a broadly defined Safe Passage Visa programme.

This paper will initially outline the context within which a Safe Passage Visa would operate by considering some of the key concepts of the Refugee Convention as well as recent UK asylum policy development, arguing that these changes have been ineffective at tackling the issue of irregular entry to the UK. It will then go on to consider what lessons can be learned from the implementation of the Ukraine visa schemes, which enabled 250,000 people to safely enter and/or remain in the UK by regular means. It will then consider how these aspects can inform and assist the implementation of a Safe Passage Visa scheme in the UK, arguing that this would be the most effective way of ending irregular small boat crossings in the English channel.

2. The Refugee Convention—Some Key Concepts

In including this section, I do not aim to add substance to the extensive academic commentary on the role of the Refugee Convention in international or UK domestic law. However, in summarising some of these key concepts, I hope to identify parts of the common experience of asylum seekers (who are so often dehumanised within the asylum system), demonstrating the types of experiences and fears they must evidence to be successful in their claims for protection, and highlighting that a “keep them out at all costs” policy aim is at odds with the UK’s obligations under international law.

The definition of a refugee in Article 1A has been the subject of much commentary (see, for example, Yeo 2022) and is that a person:

“… owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is out-side the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”.

This definition can be broken down to include several aspects requiring consideration. A person must have left their country of origin to make a claim for asylum, meaning that they must necessarily have crossed a border to be considered a refugee. They must be in fear of persecution. The fear must be “well-founded”, that is, based on objective information available about the circumstances in a specific country. The fear is limited to persecution, and does not include other situations such as famine or natural disasters (UNHCR 1979, para. 39). However, there is no definition of persecution within the Refugee Convention. In the case of Shah and Islam (1999)1, Lord Hoffman postulated a view that “Persecution = serious harm for a convention reason + a failure of state protection”, and the UK’s highest courts have determined that the word must be given its “ordinary meaning” (Horvath v SSHD 2000).2 Some explanatory wording is included in the UNHCR handbook, although the UNHCR also concedes “(t)here is no universally accepted definition of ‘persecution’, and various attempts to formulate such a definition have met with little success”. It is suggested that “as threat to life or freedom” for a convention reason (see below) or “other serious human rights violations—for the same reasons—would also constitute persecution” (UNHCR 1979, para. 51). The Refugee Qualification Directive suggests a definition of persecution under the convention as acts that are “sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights” (Article 9(1)(a)) and result from a convention reason (Article 9(3)) (Directive 2004). The fear of persecution must be grounded in one of the five characteristics outlined in the definition at 1A of the Refugee Convention (“convention grounds”). These characteristics can be held by the person or attributed by others (imputed)—for example, a person may be at risk of persecution because they are perceived to hold a particular political opinion when in fact they do not (see RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD 2012).3

A person must be either unable or unwilling to seek protection from their home government because of a fear of persecution, either from the state or others (Yeo 2022, p. 146). This aspect is known as “sufficiency of protection”. If there are sufficient agents of protection (a functioning government, law and order, rule of law and enforcement of legal rulings), that person is unlikely to be recognised as a refugee. In addition, if there is a part of the country to which a person could relocate to avoid persecution, they will be expected to utilise that alternative. The leading case of Januzi v SSHD (2006)4 posed the question “Can the claimant, in the context of the country concerned, lead a relatively normal life without facing undue hardship” in the internal location identified. If they would be able to, then they do not require international protection. As Yeo states: “it is certainly consistent with the notion that a refugee may only turn to the international community if domestic protection is not available” (Yeo 2022, p. 155).

The burden of proof in asylum cases falls upon the person claiming that they require protection. This can wholly consist of a person’s own witness testimony if necessary, and there is no requirement for corroboration, although corroborating evidence can help to prove a person’s case to the required standard (see HKK (Afghanistan) 2018).5 The relevant standard of proof in international law (as determined by caselaw) is that a person must demonstrate that there is a ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ that the factual basis of their claim is true, and that this creates a risk on return to them in line with the definition of a refugee outlined above. The standard of proof is low, given that the evidential burden rests almost solely on the applicant. This standard of proof is accepted to apply in most democratic countries (Morgan et al. 2021). It was also the accepted standard of proof in the UK for over 30 years, but recent changes in the law have resulted in a two-tier standard of proof being implemented. Section 29 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA 2022) amends the standard of proof in asylum claims. Concerns regarding this change were previously highlighted by the author in written evidence to the UK Parliament when at the Bill stage in 2021 (Morgan et al. 2021). Despite detailed judicial discussion on this topic in the UK cases of Sivakumaran (1988)6 and Rajendrakumar (1996),7 which determined that the correct standard of proof in asylum cases was ‘a reasonable degree of likelihood’, Section 29 states that the assessment of facts in asylum claims must be decided on the balance of probabilities and not the lower standard outlined in this caselaw and set out in the previous section. However, the assessment of risk on return remains at the lower standard, creating a complex system for the assessment of evidence (Morgan et al. 2021).

It is clear, therefore, that for a person to be recognised as a refugee, they must have suffered or be at risk of suffering the most extreme forms of violence and harm if returned to a home country. There must be no safety available to them at all within the territory from which they are fleeing and, crucially, it is down to the person asking for asylum to prove to an increasingly high standard that this is the case. It is from these circumstances and in this context that asylum seekers leave their home countries and seek to travel to safe places, including the UK. This is important context for understanding what motivates human beings to undertake such dangerous journeys. As a result, the Refugee Convention expressly addresses the unauthorised crossing of a border for the purpose of claiming asylum. Article 31 provides a defence against civil or criminal penalties for crossing a border as an illegal entrant for this reason. Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (IAA 1999) mirrored this provision in UK domestic law, providing a statutory defence within the UK against criminal charges of being an illegal entrant for asylum seekers who entered here. However, increasing global instability has led to greater numbers of people being unable to remain safely in a home territory. Although the vast majority of refugees remain in neighbouring countries, it is inevitable that at-risk people will undertake onward travel to access better means of survival and family members. This is part of a global trend. The history of UK asylum policy over the last 30 years has been to consistently make it more difficult for asylum seekers to reach the UK, or to access the asylum system once they arrive (see the discussion of NABA 2022, IMA 2023, and the Rwanda plan in the next section). However, there is clear evidence that such deterrent-based policies have not worked because the number of asylum seekers travelling to the UK has not decreased, despite the journey becoming ever more dangerous. With such a focus on deterrence and dangerous journeys, there is a risk of losing sight of the humanitarian need for at-risk people to be enabled to access safe countries, which is the underpinning principle of the Refugee Convention and at the heart of the argument for the implementation of a Safe Passage Visa programme.

3. The UK Government’s Attitude to the Refugee Convention Since 2021

3.1. Context

The concept of immigration sparks constant attention in the UK media, where rhetoric focuses on party political implications rather than the human or legal impact of policy (Morani and Willmington 2024). Net migration figures have been the source of consternation and obsessive review by government after government for at least the last 15 years, despite Yeo highlighting their unreliable nature as a measure of overall immigration (Yeo 2022). The racist undertones (and sometimes explicit overtones) of the ongoing immigration debate that too often focuses on numbers and stereotypes rather than people has arguably been worsened by Brexit. Goodfellow (2020, p. 1) states:

“The word ’immigrant’ carries all kinds of ideas in its three syllables. It’s weighed down by all the meanings. You know the kind of things I’m talking about: ‘low-skilled’, ‘high skilled’, ‘contributor’, ‘drain’, ‘cockroach’, or just, plainly put, ‘a concern’. Not all these terms are necessarily negative, but each of them is impersonal, clinical and cold”.

In an effort to address the number of small boats crossing the English Channel, UK government policy from 2021 onwards took a two-pronged approach (House of Lords 2020). Firstly, by implementing bespoke and very narrow routes for specific groups of at-risk people to come to the UK safely. Secondly, to restrict access to protection where at-risk people use irregular routes, regardless of whether one of the aforementioned safe routes mentioned is available to them. The presence of around 250,000 Ukrainians in the UK since 2022 under bespoke government schemes demonstrates the effective implementation of a safe mode of travel to the UK for at-risk people and highlights a continuing willingness in the UK population to help refugees, particularly when humanising and positive language is used about them in the media (Sambaraju and Shrikant 2023). Whilst this research highlighted the relevance of the “Whiteness” of Ukrainian refugees in their overall acceptance, it also attributed to the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees to the language that positioned them as “contingent refugees” directly linked to the Russian invasion. Sambaraju and Shrikant argue that treatment in the media afforded to Ukrainian refugees could assist similar inclusive policies for other refugees. It is clear that the experience of the successes of the Ukraine schemes could be used to inform the development and implementation of a wider Safe Passage Visa programme, if there was the political will to do so. A more detailed exploration of the impact and success of the Ukraine schemes is included in Section 4 of this paper.

3.2. Inadmissibility and Rwanda

The treatment of Ukrainian refugees in policy and in the media can be juxtaposed with policy changes affecting those who entered the UK without being able to access a safe route in the same time period. Under the Ukraine schemes (discussed in greater detail in Section 4), an easily accessible legal pathway to the UK was created for almost any Ukrainian national to travel to the UK. A year before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in March 2021, then Home Secretary Priti Patel published her “New Plan for Immigration”. This White Paper was presented as “the Government’s landmark programme to deliver the first comprehensive overhaul of the asylum system in decades” (UK Parliament 2021). The New Plan for Immigration White Paper laid the foundation for the Rwanda asylum plan, NABA (2022), and several subsequent Acts of Parliament, in particular the Illegal Migration Act 2023 (IMA 2023) and the Safety of Rwanda (Immigration and Asylum) Act 2024 (SR 2024). All of these legislative developments aimed to restrict access to the UK asylum system for those who had travelled to the UK without permission to do so (Morgan and Querton 2026). This is despite the fact that irregular entry is specifically permitted under the Refugee Convention (see discussion of Article 31 above), where the purpose of entry is to seek asylum.

This claimed overhaul began with the creation of a two-tier system of asylum seekers based on their method of travel to the UK (NABA 2022). When this proved ineffective at reducing the numbers of small boat arrivals, the Home Office abandoned the two-tier approach in favour of more direct measures in the IMA (2023). One of those measures was a duty placed on the Home Secretary to remove all asylum seekers that had arrived in the UK by irregular means, particularly by small boats crossing the English Channel. It was envisaged by the government that a small group of so-called “inadmissible” asylum seekers could be sent to Rwanda following the Migration and Economic Development Partnership signed between the UK and Rwandan Governments in April 2022. Asylum seekers who had travelled to the UK by irregular means were to be transferred to Rwanda to have their asylum claims considered there. If their claims were granted, they would remain in Rwanda. However, this also proved to be an ineffective solution to the issue of asylum seekers crossing the English Channel in small boats (Morgan and Willmington 2023). Litigation on the lawfulness of the plan to remove asylum seekers to Rwanda involved multiple refugee support charities and civil society organisations in a case that became known as AAA and others v SSHD (2023).8 Those challenging the Home Office’s Rwanda plan included the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS Union), who represent over 80% of Home Office staff (Brazell 2022) and have been a key player in putting forward the case for a Safe Passage Visa scheme (PCS Union and Care4Calais 2022). The involvement of their trade union in challenging the policy suggests that Home Office staff had reservations about implementing the Rwanda asylum partnership. This view is supported by Kelly’s account of the atmosphere in the Home Office at the time (Kelly 2025, p. 46). She states “(n)ascent rebellion movements started from the inside …. One team printed posters of Paddington Bear being flown off to Rwanda, pinning them up around the tea rooms and coffee points … and visa application centres …. Stickers were stuck to cabinets and printers … ‘Refugees Welcome!’ they exclaimed”.

The Rwanda asylum plan was found to be unlawful by the Supreme Court in December 2023 (AAA and others v SSHD 2023), and although the government tried to overcome that ruling by enacting the SR (2024), the plan had faced significant opposition in the courts, in civil society and within the Home Office itself (Kelly 2025). The government called a General Election, which it subsequently lost. The incoming Labour government announced the abandoning of the Rwanda asylum plan on its first day in power (Francis n.d.).

Since the new Labour Government has come into power in July 2024, there has been a somewhat shift away from the most demonising rhetoric employed by the previous government and a marginally greater regard for international refugee law principles (Tettenborn 2025). However, in Section 5 of this paper, my proposal for a Safe Passage Visa will be set out, which has not formed part of the UK government’s strategy to tackle small boat crossings in the English Channel. The current UK government’s plans have included more of the same deterrent-focused policies (which, as previously stated, has not been effective) such as significant rhetoric (“smash the gangs”) underpinned by international agreements (Home Office 2025c) and measures to disrupt the operations of people smugglers (Home Office 2025d). These measures may tackle the international crime aspects of the situation, but they do not address the humanitarian ones. For example, the reported irregular English Channel crossings of Ukrainian nationals from the outbreak of the conflict in March 2022 to the time of writing are virtually zero. This demonstrates that the continuing focus on limiting access to the asylum system and entry to the UK for asylum seekers through deterrent-focused measures is a policy-failure that contributes to the continued use of irregular routes. For asylum seekers from countries with high asylum grant rates such as Eritrea and Iran, there are no safe routes to travel to the UK at all, and the only way to access protection in the UK is via irregular means. A crucial aspect of the Safe Passage Visa case, therefore, is to remove the queue of desperately vulnerable customers from people smuggler gangs (of which many would be granted refugee status) and allow for the regular and controlled route of access to the UK. In this respect, the UK government could review the operation of the Ukraine schemes to inform their implementation of a Safe Passage Visa programme, as set out in Section 4 and Section 5 of this paper.

The discussion in this section outlined how the UK government approached the second prong of their approach to at-risk people by sidelining the Refugee Convention to prevent asylum seekers accessing its provisions. These examples demonstrate that restricting access to the Refugee Convention without offering a viable alternative is ineffective. This is demonstrated by the fact that increasingly restrictive policies have not seen any reduction in the numbers of asylum seekers travelling to the UK. In fact, as previously stated, in 2025, the highest number of asylum claims were recorded in the UK. The following section will set out the first prong of the UK government’s approach through the devising of routes to safety in the UK for at-risk people, which this paper contends offers aspects of a more viable approach to the future of international protection, although further development and consideration will be necessary.

4. So-Called Safe and “Legal” Routes—The Ukraine Schemes

The UK government justified (and in some instances continue to justify) the restrictions on the application of the Refugee Convention because they have created bespoke so-called “safe and legal routes” for at-risk people around the world (Home Office 2024b). These routes have consisted of creating specific visa categories for some nationals of Hong Kong, some Syrian nationals, some Afghan nationals, some refugees identified in UN-run refugee camps, and most Ukrainian nationals (Home Office 2023c). Some of these routes existed prior to 2021 in various forms, but these routes have become the focus to differentiate being those arriving “legally” and those arriving “illegally” (Chakelian 2025). Numbers successfully travelling to or remaining in the UK under each scheme vary widely—from only 441 arrivals under the UN Mandate scheme (Home Office 2023c) to over 250,000 people under the Ukraine schemes (Home Office 2024c). Given the large-scale impact and operation of the Ukraine schemes, these will be examined in greater depth.

4.1. Framework of Protection Under the Ukraine Schemes

Between March and May 2022, the UK government (no doubt influenced by the Temporary Protection Directive and EU provisions for Ukrainian nationals) set up several bespoke schemes for Ukrainians to travel to the UK following the Russian invasion. Crucially, the Ukraine schemes operated outside the scope of the Refugee Convention and were, in essence, immigration routes in the same vein as work or study visas. Although colloquially regarded as “refugees”, those arriving or extending their stay in the UK did not do so through the asylum system and were not protected under the Refugee Convention.

4.1.1. Travel

The overwhelming experience of the work of Ukraine Project Cymru was that their clients were women. This is borne out by data, which indicate that 82% of entrants under the Ukraine Scheme were women (ONS 2022). This contrasts with general patterns of migration amongst asylum seekers, where the majority of those who travel to the UK are men. Elements within the media and political figures comment extensively on this “influx” of often young men from other countries (for example, see Elmer 2025). However, others have identified that the journey to the UK is fraught with danger and risk including sexual violence being commonplace on irregular routes (Amnesty International 2016). The fact that over 90% of refugee family reunion applicants to the UK are women and children suggests that these more vulnerable family members stay behind whilst men go ahead to make the more difficult, irregular journey (Families Together Coalition 2021). It is acknowledged that the conscription of men in Ukraine will have influenced the numbers of men making the journey to the UK (see for example, MacKenzie 2024). However, the safety of an organised and regular route to the UK and a standard method of travel must also be considered as a factor in the number of women and children who have felt able to access both the refugee family reunion route and the Ukraine schemes. This demonstrates that more vulnerable refugees would be able to make the primary journey to safety if regular routes were available.

Most people who travelled to the UK from Ukraine did so under the “Homes4Ukraine” scheme (Home Office 2024c). The requirements of this scheme were light touch, and a person needed to demonstrate that they had been present in Ukraine on or around 1 January 2022 and were a Ukrainian national or a family member of one. Recent changes to the schemes have created a more stringent process for application and travel, but the content of this section refers to the scheme as first enacted. Those provisions are no longer readily accessible on the Home Office web pages but can be recounted from the author’s experience of the operation of the initial design of the schemes.

The visa schemes allowed for the orderly movement of approximately 250,000 people to seek safety across international borders and enter the UK with permission. The UK authorities created a streamlined process whereby Ukrainian applicants could apply online and upload documents, with only a limited number needing to attend appointments at visa application centres. This was generally required where more complex issues relating to identity or nationality arose. As part of this process, the UK was able to undertake security checks and verify the identity of applicants in advance of providing permission to travel. A letter was provided that gave permission to travel, and on arrival, applicants would have their passport stamped with 6 months leave to remain. Within the first 6 months in the UK, Ukrainians were required to make a further online application to the Home Office in-country and would then be issued with a Biometric Residence Permit. The initial period of leave to remain that was granted under all the Ukraine schemes was a period of 3 years (later reduced in February 2024 to 18 months leave to remain) (Home Office 2024a).

In February 2024, the Ukraine family scheme was closed with no notice, leaving some Ukrainians stranded on the brink of applying. In May 2024, applications to the Ukraine extension scheme were restricted to registering Ukrainian national babies born in the UK. Ukrainians in the UK already nearing the end of their period of 3 years leave to remain were able to apply for a further 18 months leave under a new permission extension scheme (Home Office 2024a). These developments have heightened the sense of precarity felt by Ukrainians in the UK (see below). Recent reports suggest that the UK government may introduce further visa extension options for Ukrainian nationals, as this course of action is taking place in the European Union (Appleblat 2025). However, Ukrainians continue to remain in the UK on short visas with no definite possibility that they will be able to settle here permanently (Taylor 2025).

4.1.2. Arrival and Initial Treatment

Ukrainian nationals under the Ukraine schemes were given significantly greater rights and entitlements in the UK than would have been the case if those people had claimed asylum. Their situation was most similar to the rights and entitlements provided to those recognised as refugees in the UK under the Refugee Convention through the asylum process using the definition discussed above in Article 1A. This included the right to work, study, and claim benefits (Home Office 2023b). However, as stated above, Ukrainians were granted a three-year period of leave with no initial possibility of extension, with more recently very limited short-term extensions available. Their position is therefore much more precarious than those who are granted asylum under the Refugee Convention. This is because recognised refugees receive 5 years limited leave to remain, and this must lead to permanent residence after the initial period has been completed (UNHCR 1979). They have the right to work, study, and access social security as soon as they are recognised as refugees, under Articles 17–23 of the Refugee Convention.

Following their arrival, there was a lack of support and significant uncertainty for Ukrainians in the UK (Dunstan 2024). Ukrainians, therefore, sometimes struggled to gain or keep employment or rent homes as they could not evidence a long-term right to remain in the UK (Morton 2025). Ukrainians could also not always access home fees for university, as they were not always classed as refugees. Different institutions approached the issue differently, creating confusion (Morton 2025). Clients of Ukraine Project Cymru who had teenage family members expressed concern about the education of their children and whether they might be forced to leave the UK part way through taking their GCSEs or A-Levels. Young adult clients worried about committing to university courses that they may not be eligible to remain in the UK to complete. As a result, one of the main queries that was raised by clients seeking advice from Ukraine Project Cymru was the merits of applying to other immigration categories—such as skilled worker or student—in the hope of establishing greater certainty or a route to settlement in their situation.

Further issues emerged regarding the use of travel documents. Recognised refugees are not permitted to use their national passports or return to their home country. Should they do so, they will be considered to have “re-availed themselves” of the protection of their country of origin under the cessation clauses of the Refugee Convention. As a result, refugees under the Convention are entitled to apply for Convention Travel Documents for international travel under Article 28. However, Ukrainians in the UK under the Ukraine schemes were required to use their national passports and permitted to move between Ukraine, the UK and elsewhere. A regular problem encountered by clients of Ukraine Project Cymru was that, when passports neared expiry, Ukrainians were not always able to renew them at the Ukrainian Embassy in London because of the high demand and limited staff capacity (see measures to address this reported by the Ukrainian National Bar Association 2024). This left Ukrainian nationals without valid passports, which could have had implications for proving their identity and nationality. Given that successive UK governments have actively pursued hostile environment policies that force everyone in the UK to prove their right to be here and access services at every turn, a lack of valid identity documents could be problematic (Goodfellow 2020; Yeo 2020).

There were reports of issues involving family members and family unity. Through the work of Ukraine Project Cymru, it was known that Ukrainian women with permission under the Ukraine schemes had travelled to Ukraine when pregnant and unexpectedly given birth in Ukraine. An unanticipated consequence of the Ukraine schemes was that there was no provision for an application for the baby to return with the mother in these circumstances. This left these women in limbo, stranded in a conflict zone with newborn babies. Had Ukrainian nationals been recognised as refugees under the Refugee Convention, these women might have been able to access an alternative immigration application for their babies, because recognised refugees are able to sponsor family visa applications. This demonstrates a weakness in bespoke immigration schemes as their specific nature may fail to consider all possible actions and adequately provide responses.

4.1.3. Conclusions

Although the Ukraine schemes had many benefits in terms of safer and more organised journeys to the UK, their conception did not always take into account the needs of those who travelled to settle and feel safe in a new country, particular given the high numbers of women and children involved who required secure housing, flexible employment, support network, and a sense of certainty. However, the Ukraine schemes were highly successful in that they all but eliminated unsafe and irregular journeys to the UK for this group, utilised digital technology to create a smooth application process, and prevented people smuggling gangs and criminals from gaining a foothold in the movement of people fleeing to safety. Without the creation of these schemes, many of the 250,000 people who came to the UK from Ukraine would probably have still travelled but made at least part of the journey in an irregular way. This could have included possible small boat crossings in the English Channel. However, once they arrived in the UK, Ukrainians received worse conditions than is the case for recognised refugees protected under the Refugee Convention. This was due to the short lengths of their visas, the lack of access to travel documents, and less flexible family reunion arrangements. The short length of visas led to uncertainty in housing, employment, and the provision of education, which has made it difficult for this population to truly set down roots in their new communities.

5. The Case for a Safe Passage Visa

‘Safe passage’ can be defined as a permitted route of travel to claim asylum elsewhere. A Safe Passage Visa as a concept involves the issuance of permission to travel to an at-risk person who wishes to seek safety in a third country (PCS Union and Care4Calais 2022). It is conceptually different to the ‘off shoring’ of asylum decision-making by countries of the Global North to other, generally less financially wealthy countries. Therefore, a safe passage approach differs to that taken by the previous government in pursuing a migration partnership with Rwanda.

This section builds on the research and arguments put forward by the joint efforts of the charity Care4Calais and the Public and Commercial Services Union (PCS Union). The PCS Union, as stated previously, represents 80% of Home Office staff. In particular, this section refers to the policy paper published by these organisations in November 2022 and the follow-up policy paper dated March 2023, which proposed an amendment to Clause/Section 10 of the IMA (2023). The input of the PCS Union on this issue is particularly valued, as their close contact with Home Office staff indicates that their proposals would be viewed favourably by those tasked with implementing them. This is in stark contrast to the widespread negative reaction of Home Office staff to the Rwanda asylum partnership, referenced earlier in this paper (Kelly 2025). Further calls for a Safe Passage Visa, learning the lessons of the Ukraine schemes, were put forward by these organisations again in 2025 (PCS Union and C4C 2025). This section also builds on the arguments put forward by the Refugee Council in a policy briefing in January 2024 that called for the creation of a Safe Passage Visa (Refugee Council 2024).

The Refugee Council made their proposal for a Safe Passage Visa alongside other policy suggestions, which provided a valuable contribution to the discussion, but which were outside of the scope of this article. The case for a Safe Passage Visa, as proposed by the Refugee Council, differs somewhat in format and proposed targeting but aims to essentially serve the same purpose as the visa scheme proposed by the PCS Union and Care4Calais (C4C). The PCS/C4C proposal is aimed at preventing a build-up of at-risk people in France and therefore proposes an application process available from any country within the European Union. The Refugee Council proposes targeting a Safe Passage Visa at those from countries with high asylum grant rates, such as Eritrea and Iran. This paper does not directly pursue either of those suggestions but acknowledges that they have merit and could form part of a workable Safe Passage Visa scheme if desired. This paper will consider wider UK immigration and asylum law, drawing on established concepts and ideas, to investigate how a Safe Passage Visa could operate practically in the current context. It will consider the role of the Refugee Convention, the lessons that can be learned from the implementation of the Ukraine Schemes, as well as how a Safe Passage Visa could work within the existing asylum system.

5.1. Practical Implementation

As noted in an earlier section, over 250,000 Ukrainians have travelled or remained in the UK on the Ukraine schemes since March 2022. The example of the Ukraine schemes demonstrates that technology can work to bring the concept of safe passage to fruition. The UK already operates an almost exclusively online and electronic visa system for immigration, with electronic methods increasingly being incorporated into its international protection system (Home Office Undated). Therefore, a Safe Passage Visa scheme could be designed to be almost entirely electronic, mirroring the earlier stages of the Ukraine scheme design. Applicants could make an online application and upload documents using a smart phone. To avoid digital exclusion, paper applications could also be submitted to visa application centres in exceptional circumstances. However, it has been estimated that over 60% of the world’s population has a smartphone, with this number projected to increase (Gil n.d.). Therefore, although digital poverty and exclusion require consideration (particularly access to the Internet/data and charging facilities), these factors do not preclude the creation of a predominantly online application system.

The Ukraine schemes also provide a sketch of how an initial decision can be made out-of-country, allowing for safe travel before a further decision is made in country, which is a concept that already exists in an assessment of safety context within the UK under the trafficking regime. In the assessment of whether a person has been subjected to human trafficking under Section 49 of the Modern Slavery Act, the Home Office, as the UK’s Competent Authority under the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), assesses whether someone is a “Potential Victim of Trafficking” (PVOT) or a “Victim of Trafficking” (VOT), operating a two-stage assessment process under the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005 (ECAT 2005). Once a referral is made to the NRM, the Competent Authority must assess whether there are “reasonable grounds” to determine that the person is a PVOT using provisions in the Modern Slavery Act (2015) and NABA (2022). The test that the Competent Authority applies can be simplified as “I suspect but cannot prove”. This standard of proof is intentionally low, as it is meant to identify and exclude cases that are clearly without merit. Reasonable grounds decisions should be made quickly, usually within 5 days. This then facilitates a more detailed consideration of cases that prima facie have merit. What follows is a Conclusive Grounds Decision made by the Competent Authority, which states conclusively on the balance of probabilities whether a person is a VOT (see R (MN) v SSHD (2018) for discussion of that test in this context).9

A similar two-stage test could be applied to the issuance of a Safe Passage Visa. An at-risk person could complete an online application stating their reason for needing to travel to the UK. Corroborating evidence is not required under the Refugee Convention (see MAH (Egypt) v SSHD 2023),10 nor is it required to confirm that a person is a PVOT (Modern Slavery Guidance 2025). However, the person could be encouraged to provide information about their personal circumstances and the situation in their home country. For example, a gay Somali asylum seeker could provide some brief information about their sexuality and explain that this is illegal and heavily punished in their country. A simple review of the available country information would inform a Home Office caseworker that gay men are at risk in Somalia. This could be regarded as meeting the test of there being reasonable grounds that a person is a “Potential Refugee”. It is a requirement of all existing visa categories that applicants satisfy the UK government of their identity and nationality. This is usually carried out by providing copies of passports or identify documents, which can be verified by the authorities and security checks carried out. However, as highlighted by the Refugee Council, the UK government takes a flexible approach to verifying identity and nationality in Refugee Family Reunion applications (for example, considering the cumulative value of marriage certificates, birth certificates, and other evidence suggestive of identity), and therefore a similar approach could be taken here (Refugee Council 2024).

To contribute to a fair application process, clear and impartial guidance could be developed in consultation with refugee organisations to enable at-risk people to understand the information required by the Home Office. In addition, within the current asylum process in the UK, the initial Home Office interview records only personal information and brief details of the claim to be put forward. The content of the initial interview record is generally given lower evidential weight as the claim moves forward, because it is not intended that an at-risk person will give a full account of their situation (see YL (China) 2004).11 A similar approach could be taken with regard to the information provided by the at-risk person in their online application. This would also mitigate the lack of legal advice prior to applying, as most asylum seekers in the UK do not receive legal advice until after they have had their initial interview. If successful, the PCS Union/C4C proposal suggests that travel to the UK could be funded by the UK government. This may be necessary in some cases, but could be means tested to control the costs of the scheme. It is noted that both Ukrainian nationals and successful Refugee Family Reunion applicants are expected to fund their own travel to the UK. For safety reasons, generic language could be used on documents to protect the at-risk person from being identified as a “Potential Refugee” or the recipient of a Safe Passage Visa.

Once in the UK, a recipient of a Safe Passage Visa could enter the normal asylum system for full consideration of their asylum case. There would be no need to detain asylum seekers on arrival or have a fast-track system for the consideration of cases with prima facie less merit, because everyone arriving on a Safe Passage Visa would have been provisionally assessed as a “Potential Refugee”. Entrants on a Safe Passage Visa could be given permission to work to enable them to contribute to the UK economy and support their own living costs. The option of receiving asylum support could be retained for those unable to work whilst their asylum claims were considered (for example, because of disability or caring responsibilities). This would continue to protect vulnerable refugees from destitution without providing access to the standard welfare benefits system. Further discussion on these points continues in the section below.

5.2. Wider Considerations

An applicant for a Safe Passage Visa would need to provide evidence of their nationality and identity, including documents, when they apply. Access to this information increases the chances of eventual removal from the UK if a claim is ultimately rejected. It is much easier for a person to be redocumented and removed from the UK in these circumstances. So-called “returns agreements” are not required for countries to take back their own documented nationals. In addition, those issued with Safe Passage Visas would already have been provisionally assessed as “Potential Refugees”, which would increase the chance that those who enter the UK on those visas would be ultimately successful in their asylum claims. The Safe Passage Visa proposal by the Refugee Council recommends that a programme be implemented for the top five nationalities that apply for asylum and have a high grant rate. This paper does not specifically advocate for this, due to the changing nature of international protection needs. However, it is recognised that nationals of high grant rate countries would be likely to make up the majority of those issued with Safe Passage Visas. This indicates that the vast majority of those issued with a Safe Passage Visa would go on to receive a positive asylum determination in their case.

The earlier part of this work set out a series of immigration policy failings by the UK government, and this has also been well-documented elsewhere (Goodfellow 2020; Yeo 2022; Kelly 2025). This may call into question whether it is realistic to expect that such a Safe Passage Visa programme could be operated fairly and in the interests of at-risk people. However, as we have seen with the policy to create bespoke schemes for Ukraine and other groups, when the political will is there, the government can enact a fair and just immigration policy that prioritises the human rights and safety of vulnerable people. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the Labour government currently in power may be more sympathetic to upholding international refugee obligations than has been the case with previous recent governments. For example, there is no current government discussion about leaving the ECHR (Tettenborn 2025). In addition, there is evidence that the very people who would be tasked with the implementation of this scheme—Home Office staff—could be in favour of it. Against the backdrop of chaos and loss of life in the English Channel, prioritising an exploration of a generalist and controlled safe route to the UK for at-risk people seems essential.

A more controlled approach would also benefit the UK government. Safe Passage Visas would not only provide a genuine alternative to irregular entry for at-risk people who cannot access current safe routes, but crucially, it would also allow the UK government to control the movement of people to the UK for the purposes of safety. It would enable the UK government to restrict or increase the number of visas made available for this purpose and allow for the prioritisation of certain groups. Although the imposition of “quotas” is not endorsed by this article, both the PCS/C4C and the Refugee Council proposals on this topic include a discussion of the number of visas that could be issued under such a scheme. The PCS/C4C proposal suggests that 80,000 Safe Passage Visas could be issued. The Refugee Council proposal suggests a Safe Passage Visa pilot where 10,000 visas are issued per year. Discussion of the specific number of visas that could be issued is an area for further research. However, if the UK government recognised the value of a generalist and controlled Safe Passage Visa scheme, it is anticipated that they would offer enough visas to create a realistic alternative to unsafe journeys for ordinary at-risk people around the world. Control would also be able to extend to border security, as the standard security checks under the “Suitability” criteria of the Immigration Rules could be actioned against every visa application. This would enable the UK government to reject applications and prevent travel to the UK of, for example, foreign criminals.

Introducing a Safe Passage Visa programme would also provide justification for government action to penalise those who travel through arguably safe countries or who make irregular journeys to the UK. Since 2004, the UK government has made adverse credibility findings against asylum seekers who cross through perceived safe countries without making a claim for asylum through Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act (2004). Both NABA (2022) and IMA (2023), through different means (some now abandoned), prevented asylum seekers from being granted asylum in the UK if it was considered that they should have claimed asylum elsewhere. However, as already identified, there has been no credible alternative available for most at-risk people around the world to access protection in the UK. If a generalist, controlled safe passage policy was in place offering a sufficient number of visas, the UK government would be able to legitimately question why this route was not accessed for anyone who travelled to the UK irregularly. If a Safe Passage Visa was available, adverse credibility findings for failing to use it would be more likely to be justified. Credibility is a crucial part of the asylum assessment process, and if a person is found to have damaged their credibility through their actions, they will be unlikely to be granted asylum (Home Office 2023a). It is not suggested that such claims should be inadmissible, as this would likely breach Article 31 of the Refugee Convention. However, it would place these adverse credibility findings on much firmer ground. As a consequence, most at-risk people would be likely to apply for a Safe Passage Visa to have a better prospect of succeeding in an eventual asylum claim.

If this policy was implemented, asylum seekers who arrived with Safe Passage Visas could be permitted to work in the UK. The Lift the Ban coalition has identified numerous research sources, including research by the Institute for Government in 2024, that indicates that any perceived pull factor created by allowing asylum seekers to work is a myth (Lift the Ban Coalition 2025). In fact, this research found that allowing asylum seekers to work would increase the tax revenue by £1.3 billion (Lift the Ban Coalition 2025). In addition, in this scenario, permission to work would only be given to asylum seekers who entered the UK with a Safe Passage Visa. Therefore, even if such a pull factor existed (which research indicates it does not), the pull factor would be restricted to applications for a Safe Passage Visa. As the government would be able to refuse applications, any economic migrants misusing the Safe Passage Visa scheme could be identified and have their applications refused, preventing entry of those people to the UK.

This approach would meet the minimum standards required under the Refugee Convention and likely meet other comparative regional minimum standards for the treatment of asylum claimants under, for example, EU law, thus allowing the UK to maintain its global standing as a country that respects human rights. This is because the current asylum system would still operate, and those who made irregular journeys would not be excluded from applying for asylum. Article 34 of the Refugee Convention provides that if a person is found to be a refugee, they should be allowed to remain permanently in the country that has given them refuge. A Safe Passage Visa scheme would have no impact on this and would only relate to the method of travel. Once in the UK, the normal asylum system would take over, and the claims of at-risk people would be processed as normal. Also, unlike other proposed solutions, this approach could be undertaken unilaterally by the UK. It does not rely on the actions of the French or other governments. This approach cuts off the business of people smugglers and irregular small boat use at the source. Put simply, if at-risk people can access a safe and regular route to the UK, this will be preferred to an unsafe, irregular one. We can extrapolate this from the fact that virtually no Ukrainians attempted to travel to the UK by small boat across the English Channel. They did not need to, because the government provided a safe and accessible route for them to travel to the UK.

6. Conclusions

The Refugee Convention has been the cornerstone of international protection for over 70 years, and it should continue to provide the international protection framework. Millions of people around the globe are displaced or at-risk due to conflict and individual characteristics. No amount of “stop the boats” or “smash the gangs” rhetoric is going to change that or prevent people from making hazardous journeys in the desperate hope of being able to live in safety. The disastrous example of the Rwanda asylum partnership illustrates the wide-ranging difficulties in policies that “offshore” responsibility for the asylum system. However, a Safe Passage Visa approach could add great value to the existing refugee framework. The use of technology to provide convenient application methods can assist. Although digital poverty is an issue, access to a smart phone in the post-COVID world is no longer seen as the luxury that it was even 5 years ago.

For this approach to work, there would need to be genuine buy-in from the UK government, the media, and the public. However, the research referenced in this paper has demonstrated that when the media use humanising language to describe refugees (as was the case with Ukrainians), public opinion can be positively influenced. Should the UK government choose to pursue a Safe Passage Visa policy, they must implement it in a way that offers enough visas to provide a genuine alternative for at-risk people. A safe passage policy also provides the opportunity to reduce the costs of the asylum system, as permitting those assessed as Potential Refugees to work would reduce the number of asylum seekers in government accommodation and in receipt of support payments. In addition, research suggests that the UK would also benefit from an increase in tax revenue.

Such complex global problems require radical solutions. This paper does not claim to have all the answers, but it is intended to open a conversation about how we might be able to do things differently. With the acceptance that any government would want to control who enters their territory, the safe passage policy proposed by this paper would allow the UK government to regulate who can and cannot enter the UK as an asylum seeker in almost all instances. In this way, the UK can honour the underpinning principle of the Refugee Convention, which is that every country in the world needs to play a part in protecting and providing refuge to at-risk people. To prevent the growth of regressive, populist policymaking in this field, those committed to protecting the rights of asylum seekers and refugees need to put forward alternative ideas and explain how they could be implemented and administered. At this crucial moment, if we take a wrong turn, the loss of life in the English Channel and elsewhere will continue to increase. The UK government has a clear opportunity to lead from the front by providing a bespoke Safe Passage Visa category within the spirit of the Refugee Convention and which learns the lessons of the Ukraine schemes and past policy mistakes.