How Does Land Tenure Security Affect Farm Succession? Evidence from Apple Growers in China

contributed equally to this work. Abstract: The security of farmland property rights is an important factor that affects farmland investment and succession, and farm succession is highly signiﬁcant for achieving sustainable agricultural development. In this study, based on survey data obtained from 1012 apple growers in Shandong and Shaanxi Provinces, we analyzed the impact of land tenure security on the farm succession willingness of farmers and related paths by constructing binary logistic regression and mediating effect models. The results showed that: (1) land tenure security plays a signiﬁcant role in promoting the farm succession willingness of farmers; and that (2) land tenure security promotes farm succession willingness by improving the farmland investment intentions of farmers. In the future, reforms of the farmland property rights system need to ensure the security of farmland property rights. In addition, with the inﬂuence of climate change, it is necessary to encourage farmers with advantageous agricultural resource endowments to invest in farmland and intergenerational transfers, as well as inducing farmers who lack advantageous agricultural resource endowments to conduct non-agricultural transfers, thereby providing more opportunities and a greater development area for agricultural land transfers and agricultural-scale operations.


Introduction
As the effects of global climate change expand, sustainable agriculture and revitalization of the countryside are two important factors that can support global sustainable development, and farmland is indispensable for achieving these two goals [1]. However, due to the transfer of rural laborers and the degradation of farmland, the pressure is increasing on the sustainable use of farmland to achieve these two vital goals. In particular, large numbers of young peasant workers have left their home villages to move to cities, and thus the communities left behind by rural job seekers have been weakened in China [2,3]. The fragmented families and children, women, and elderly people in their home villages struggle to sustain small farms, and about 2 million hectares of farmland are abandoned each year [4]. The "farmland inheritance dilemma" has become an increasingly important problem [5][6][7]. Therefore, farmland investment and succession are playing key roles in improving farmland use efficiency in order to ensure food security and promote the sustainable development of the rural economy in the future [8,9].
Thus, in this study, we considered the impact of LTS on farm succession to complement farm succession research. The overall aim of this study was to examine the effect of the security of farmland property rights on farm succession for households in China. Based on information obtained from 1012 apple growers in Shandong and Shaanxi Provinces, we employed logit and order logit regression models to estimate the effect of the security of farmland property rights on the possibility of farmland succession. The contributions of this study are to investigate the influence mechanism of LTS on farm succession and enrich the research on intergenerational transmission behavior of farmers' agricultural management.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain the changes to agricultural land tenure in China. In Section 3, we present the sampling and data collection methods, variables, and descriptive analysis. In Section 4, we explain the methodology, including the model specification and estimation strategy. In Section 5, we present the empirical results and discussion. We give our conclusions and suggest policy implications in Section 6.

Research Background
Explicit and stable farmland property rights are critical for agricultural production [42][43][44]. Due to the unique land system in China, farmland use management is greatly affected by changes in land use policies [45]. Following the reform and opening up of China in 1978, rural reforms were implemented in the agricultural management system [46][47][48]. In particular, the reform of the agricultural land system in China started with the affirmation of the household contract responsibility system in the government document of "Several Issues on Further Strengthening and Improving the Agricultural Production Responsibility System" during 1980s, which liberated and developed rural productive forces and led to historic changes in rural socioeconomic development and farmland use management [49,50].
Moreover, the agricultural land contract period was extended to 15 years and 30 years in 1984 and 1993, respectively. In 2008, "Several Major Issues Concerning the Promotion of Rural Reform and Development" emphasized that farmland contractual management rights will remain unchanged for a long time. A new round of pilot work for farmland confirmation was initiated until 2009, with the aim of further stabilizing farmland property rights. China's "No. 1 central document" for 2013 clearly stated that "it will take 5 years to basically complete the registration and issuance of the right to contractual management of rural land." [51,52]. Based on the effects of previous land empowerment reforms, the new round of farmland rights confirmation clearly defined the rights to each piece of land for each subject and the use of a property certificate to strengthen the stability of land rights for farmers. A systematic historical review of the land system reform process in China was provided by Zhou et al. [45].
However, greater industrialization and urbanization has led to the increased transfer of young laborers from rural households to urban households in search of non-agricultural jobs that pay relatively higher income [53]. The phenomenon of farmland abandonment has occurred in some rural areas of China to affect the allocation and utilization of farmland resources, thereby influencing the sustainable use of farmland [54]. The new round of farmland rights confirmation aims to strengthen the stability of land rights and reduce the random tax losses of farmers due to land rights issues [20]. Therefore, the stability of land rights will enhance the enthusiasm of farmers regarding agricultural production. In particular, agricultural production is dominated by small farmers, and family farmland management depends mainly on intergenerational transfer [34], so LTS can significantly increase the incentive for farming and enhance the willingness of farmers to invest in agriculture and intergenerational transfers [27].
According to a study by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), LTS is defined as the degree of certainty that a person's rights to land will be recognized by others and protected in cases of specific challenges [55]. Theoretically, the security of farmland property rights affects farmland investment and use in three ways (the assurance effect [56], collateral effect [57], and realizable effect) [26,27] and promotes the intergenerational transfer of farmland.

Sampling and Data Collection
In this study, we used survey data from the National Modern Apple Industry Technology System of the China Agriculture Research System, which comprises a cross-section dataset that we acquired between July and August of 2019. This survey employed multistage stratified cluster sampling to obtain a representative sample of 1057 apple households in eight counties across two provinces (Shandong and Shaanxi Provinces) in China. The sampling procedures were as follows. Each province was randomly selected from China's major apple-producing provinces. Shandong and Shaanxi Provinces were selected. Four sample counties were then selected from each province in a two-step procedure. First, we listed all of the counties in each province in descending order of apple acreage, which is a good predictor of the apple production capacity. Second, four counties in each province were selected from the list using the isometric random sampling method. From each selected county, we randomly selected sample townships and villages. Two townships were selected from each county. Five villages were selected per township according to the same procedure. Finally, we randomly selected 13-14 apple-producing households from each village, and a total of 1057 apple-producing households participated in the questionnaire survey. The reason why Shandong and Shaanxi are selected as sample provinces is that these two provinces are the top two provinces in China's apple production capacity. In 2021, the apple output in these two provinces was 19.07 million tons, accounting for 48.47% of the total output of the whole country [25]. The apple production in these two provinces can reflect the overall level of the whole country to a certain extent, and the conclusions also have universal reference value.
The majority of the survey respondents were the heads at the household level. We collected rich information by interviewing the village leaders at the village level. The questionnaire survey collected individual characteristics (such as age, education, and planting experience), household characteristics (such as the number of family members and apple laborers, and apple income share), agricultural management characteristics (such as whether the farmland property rights were confirmed and issued, and the farm's size, assets, and profitability), government support (such as the emphasis and subsidy degree of the government), and village characteristics (such as village terrain, the ratio of non-agricultural laborers, and the number of apple production disasters). Forty-five households were excluded because they were landless households due to land acquisition, or they did not have their own family and lived with their parents in 2018. Finally, we used the information acquired from 1012 apple-producing households in 51 villages in eight countries across two provinces ( Figure 1).

Measurement of the Dependent Variable
Previous studies paid more attention to the parents' willingness and behavior in agricultural operations [6,34,58,59], and less attention to those of the descendants. Given the cross-sectional characteristic of our survey, we used the intergenerational succession willingness of the farm holders regarding apple management to represent the intergenerational transfer of farmland [60,61]. Because the farm holder is the one who sets the succession plan for a family's apple business and identifies potential successors, their willingness can, to some extent, reflect the family's apple orchard succession plan. The apple operators were asked: "Do you want your descendants to inherit your orchards?" (hereinafter referred to as "parental willingness") and "Are your descendants willing to inherit your orchards?" (hereinafter referred to as "descendant willingness"). Since the expectations of the farm holder and/or children do not always change following farm succession, this statement can be used as a representative of the intergenerational transmission of apple management [58,62]. We assumed that the FSW took a value of 1 when both questions were answered "yes"; otherwise, the value was 0, because only when the willingness of parents and descendants are the same can intergenerational transmission be implemented smoothly.

Measurement of the Dependent Variable
Previous studies paid more attention to the parents' willingness and behavior in agricultural operations [6,34,58,59], and less attention to those of the descendants. Given the cross-sectional characteristic of our survey, we used the intergenerational succession willingness of the farm holders regarding apple management to represent the intergenerational transfer of farmland [60,61]. Because the farm holder is the one who sets the succession plan for a family's apple business and identifies potential successors, their willingness can, to some extent, reflect the family's apple orchard succession plan. The apple operators were asked: "Do you want your descendants to inherit your orchards?" (hereinafter referred to as "parental willingness") and "Are your descendants willing to inherit your orchards?" (hereinafter referred to as "descendant willingness"). Since the expectations of the farm holder and/or children do not always change following farm succession, this statement can be used as a representative of the intergenerational transmission of apple management [58,62]. We assumed that the FSW took a value of 1 when both questions were answered "yes"; otherwise, the value was 0, because only when the willingness of parents and descendants are the same can intergenerational transmission be implemented smoothly.

Measurement of Key Independent Variables
Previous studies have shown that the clearly defined farmland property rights measured by a farmland confirmation certificate are highly correlated with the security of farmland property rights, which significantly affects farmland investment and succession [51,63]. According to the official information released by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China, the land titling program (LTP) was mostly completed by the end of 2018 [64]. However, there are still some areas that have not yet issued land confirmation certificates (29.05% of apple growers have not obtained land confirmation certificates in our survey sample), and farmers may think that their land rights are secured only when they obtain land confirmation certificates. In this study, we used "the farmland confirmation certificate" to measure the LTS, where the LTS took a value of 1 when the farmland confirmation certificate was obtained; otherwise, the value was 0. Moreover, we used the farmland investment intention (FII) of farmers to measure

Measurement of Key Independent Variables
Previous studies have shown that the clearly defined farmland property rights measured by a farmland confirmation certificate are highly correlated with the security of farmland property rights, which significantly affects farmland investment and succession [51,63]. According to the official information released by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs of the People's Republic of China, the land titling program (LTP) was mostly completed by the end of 2018 [64]. However, there are still some areas that have not yet issued land confirmation certificates (29.05% of apple growers have not obtained land confirmation certificates in our survey sample), and farmers may think that their land rights are secured only when they obtain land confirmation certificates. In this study, we used "the farmland confirmation certificate" to measure the LTS, where the LTS took a value of 1 when the farmland confirmation certificate was obtained; otherwise, the value was 0. Moreover, we used the farmland investment intention (FII) of farmers to measure farmland investment, where the choices comprised: very low = 1, low = 2, medium = 3, high = 4, and very high = 5.
In addition, other control variables are drawn from the existing literature on land tenure security and farm succession. Specifically, characteristics of individual [37,65,66], households [34,40], apple-producing businesses [67], and government support, as well as village characteristics [68], are employed as control variables in this study, as shown in the bottom half of Table 1. Note: The total sample size is 1012, of which the sample size of the obtained group is 718, and the sample size of the not-obtained group is 294. The mean difference equals the mean of the obtained group minus the mean of the not-obtained group. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Yuan is a unit of money in China; 1 yuan = 0.1555 U.S. dollars in 2018. Mu is a unit of land size in China; 1 mu = 0.067 hectares. Source: Authors' own elaboration. Table 1 shows the definitions and summary statistics for the variables used in this study. It should be noted that the mean value of the FSW for the obtained group was 0.25, which was higher than that for the not-obtained group, i.e., 0.18. The mean value of FII for farmers in the obtained group was 3.29, which was higher than that for those in the notobtained group, i.e., 3.12. Moreover, Table 1 also shows that the control variables differed (such as age, planting experience, apple benefits, government support, village terrain, and apple disasters) between these two groups, where the difference in the FSW values for the obtained group and not-obtained group may have been caused by the differences in other control variables rather than the LTS measured, based on the confirmed land rights. Therefore, it was necessary to employ an econometric model for regression analysis to ensure that the research conclusions were valid.

Methodology
To estimate the impact of LTS on FSW, and to assess the mediating effect of FII on the impact of LTS on FSW, we constructed the following econometric model.

Binary Logistic Regression (BLR) Model
The dependent variable in our model was binary, so we used a BLR model to determine the impacts of LTS and FII on FSW. We estimated the following Equation: where y i is a dependent variable. We assigned the value of y i to be equal to 1 if the ith household was willing to transfer their apple-producing business between generations; otherwise, the value was 0. Z is LTS, M is FII, X is a vector of the control variables, i.e., individual, household, apple business, government support, and village characteristics, and α, β, and λ are the parameters that needed to be estimated. By applying the natural logarithm transformation to Formula (1), we obtained the following linear expression for the BLR model: where Log is the logarithm. ε is a random disturbance term.

Mediating Effects Examination Model
Based on the gradual test method of Wen et al. [69], we used the mediating effects examination model to assess the mediating effects of FII on the impact of LTS on FSW: where Y, Z, M, and X have the same meaning defined in Formulas (1) and (2), and a, b, c, and c' are the parameters that need to be estimated. e 1 , e 2 , and e 3 represent residual terms. The test procedure for the mediating effect was conducted as described by Wen et al. [69].

Empirical Results and Discussion
Prior to the logistic regression, we used the variance inflation factor (VIF) to detect multicollinearity. The VIF tests indicated that the maximum VIF was 2.18. Therefore, there was no multicollinearity between the variables.

Impact of LTS on FSW
A BLR model was constructed to confirm the relationship between LTS and FSW. Table 2 shows the results estimated with the BLR model based on maximum likelihood and robust variance estimation methods. Model 1 is the benchmark model (only including LTS).
After gradually introducing the control variables, Model 3 exhibited a higher predictive capacity and was more appropriate for interpretation, as indicated by the pseudo-R2 value of 0.195 and the smallest AIC (Akaike information criterion) and BIC (Bayesian information criterion). Admittedly, the pseudo-R2 in this paper is still low due to the limitations of the research data, probably because the heterogeneity of plots and the employment status of offspring are not considered, as the output efficiency of plot quality and the dependence of offspring on apple operations affect the willingness to transmit apple operations between generations. Future studies need to include more plot-level and offspring-level variables to improve the predictive capacity of the model. Notes: **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. "Logarithmic" denotes the natural logarithm of the original value of apple productive assets. "Std. Dev." denotes robust standard error. Shaanxi is the reference group in the provincial virtual variables. The sample size of each model is 1012. Source: Authors' own elaboration.
As shown in Table 2, the coefficients for LTS in Models 1, 2, and 3 had positive and statistically significant effects on FSW, thereby suggesting that a retiring apple operator with a confirmed land title was more likely to transfer farmland to their descendants, possibly because the LTS due to the new round of farmland rights confirmation could inspire farmers to be more enthusiastic about farming [20,70], thereby increasing their willingness to pass on farmland management between generations.
Among the control variables, the age of the household head had a positive and statistically significant effect on FSW in the form of an inverse U-shaped relationship. It is possible that the farm management experience and skills represented by age are an indication of farm succession [71], but if the household head delays the farm inheritance plan for too long, they may find it difficult to find a suitable successor to the farm because their offspring can make a living in other ways [19,72]. The coefficient of the education level of the household head was negative and statistically significant for FSW, which suggests that a household head with higher education has more opportunities to engage in non-agricultural work [6]. The apple income shares and benefits had positive and statistically significant effects on FSW, thereby demonstrating that the economic profits of apple farms are crucial for determining whether a successor is interested in taking over apple management. Thus, more profitable apple orchards are likely to attract potential successors [41,73]. Respondents with more physical assets were more willing to pass on their apple orchards to subsequent generations. This result is consistent with that reported by Pessotto et al. [40], who found that small-scale farmers with better infrastructure would be more likely to expect farm succession. The natural conditions reflected by the village terrain and the frequency of apple production disasters had significant impacts on the intergenerational transfer of apple management, which suggests that due to the natural attributes of apples, suitable climatic conditions are fundamental for the survival of apple production by families [18,74]. Table 3 shows that LTS had a positive and statistically significant effect on FII (coefficient = 0.364, p ≤ 0.10). The marginal effect of LTS suggests that the farmers with a farmland confirmation certificate in a Chinese rural household are more willing to invest in farmland. Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. "Yes" denotes that control variables have been controlled. "Std. Dev." denotes robust standard errors. The sample size of each model is 1012. Source: Authors' own elaboration.

Model 4 in
Based on the results in Tables 2 and 3, we examined the mediating effect of FII on the impact of LTS on FSW. It should be noted that FII could significantly improve FSW (coefficient = 0.269, p ≤ 0.05), and thus FSW increased as FII increased. However, the coefficient for LTS in Model 5 was not statistically significant, which suggests that FII had a full mediating role in the impact of LTS on FSW. These findings are consistent with the fact that LTS affected FSW by influencing FII, thereby validating the theoretical analysis model.

Conclusions and Implications
In this study, we used a BLR model and mediating effect model to estimate the impact of LTS on FSW and to examine the mediating effect of FII on the impact of LTS on FSW by using data from 1012 apple farming households in Shandong and Shaanxi Provinces, China.
We found that LTS promoted FSW by improving FII, and FII had a full role in mediating the impact of LTS on FSW.
The security of farmland property rights affects farmland succession by incentivizing investment. Farmers may consider farmland succession as a long-term investment in agricultural production. An increase in LTS can reduce the expected losses of farmers due to random agricultural taxes and ensure the stability of their incomes from farming, thereby increasing the willingness of farmers to pass their farmland to subsequent generations.
The empirical results obtained in this study have profound policy implications. The improved security of land rights caused by the agricultural land rights confirmation policy will encourage farmers to invest in farmland and intergenerational succession, which can help to alleviate the general concern in China about "who will farm the land in the future". The continued reform of the agricultural land system in China has effectively curbed the risk of rural households losing their land due to insecure land rights. Thus, intergenerational transmission has been encouraged by enhancing the security of land rights and increasing the willingness of farmers to invest in farmland. Therefore, it is necessary to continue the reform of the farmland property rights system to ensure security, to encourage farmers with advantageous agricultural resource endowments to invest in farmland and intergenerational transfer, and to induce farmers who lack advantageous agricultural resource endowments to conduct non-agricultural transfers, thereby providing more opportunities and a greater development capacity for agricultural land transfers and agricultural-scale operations.

Data Availability Statement:
The data presented in this study are available on request from the author.