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Article

Trade Facilitation and Sustainable Agricultural Trade in the RCEP: Empirical Evidence from China’s Heterogeneous Impacts

1
College of Economics and Management, Jilin Agricultural University, Changchun 130018, China
2
School of International Business, Jilin International Studies University, Changchun 130017, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2025, 17(17), 7640; https://doi.org/10.3390/su17177640
Submission received: 9 July 2025 / Revised: 17 August 2025 / Accepted: 19 August 2025 / Published: 25 August 2025
(This article belongs to the Section Sustainable Agriculture)

Abstract

Trade facilitation in regard to agricultural products plays a critical role in reducing costs and enhancing efficiency, especially in today’s complex global economic environment. The purpose of this study is to empirically examine how trade facilitation measures contribute to sustainable agricultural trade development in the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) region, with the aim of providing actionable policy recommendations. This study investigates the impact of trade facilitation on agricultural trade between China and other RCEP members through two complementary approaches—developing a multidimensional evaluation index system and implementing an extended gravity model—both applied to decade-spanning panel data. The results reveal that a 1% improvement in trade facilitation levels increases the volume of agricultural trade by 8.397%, with e-commerce development being the most influential driver. However, stringent customs procedures show counterintuitive negative effects, highlighting unique challenges in agricultural supply chains. As the largest agricultural trader within the RCEP, China should prioritize digital infrastructure investment and multilateral cooperation to address these barriers, thereby advancing regional trade liberalization.

1. Introduction

Agricultural product trade involves the domestic and international exchange of key farm-produced commodities, including grains, fruits, meat, and cash crops across markets, serving as a cornerstone of the global agricultural economy [1,2,3]. Within this domain, sustainable agricultural trade has emerged as a critical framework that harmonizes economic viability with environmental conservation and social equity, while safeguarding ecosystems and enhancing stakeholder welfare [4,5]. The sustainable agricultural trade framework aligns the complete agricultural trade system—from production to distribution—with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), emphasizing systemic reform through specific ecological practices such as regenerative agriculture, policy coordination including Paris Agreement compliance, and market mechanisms like Fairtrade certification [6,7].
The globalization of agricultural trade is hindered by unprecedented challenges, ranging from geopolitical tensions to supply chain disruptions. In this context, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has emerged as a stabilizing force, encompassing 30% of global agricultural trade flows [8]. While China’s agricultural trade with RCEP members surged by 80.1% between 2015 and 2024, persistent inefficiencies in customs clearance and logistics continue to undermine potential gains, particularly for perishable commodities requiring time-sensitive transport [9].
The existing literature has well established the general benefits of trade facilitation, yet critical knowledge gaps remain when examining the RCEP agricultural context. First, most studies focus on manufactured goods, overlooking agricultural trade’s unique vulnerability to procedural delays, wherein each additional day in customs reduces fresh produce value by 1.7% [10]. Second, while RCEP research has extensively analyzed tariff reductions, non-tariff measures like digital infrastructure interoperability have received scant attention. Most significantly, no study systematically quantifies how trade facilitation instruments contribute to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) via reduced food waste and SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption) via streamlined cold chain logistics.
Agriculture remains a foundational sector across RCEP economies, though its developmental role varies substantially. In developing members like China and ASEAN nations, the agriculture sector employs 25–40% of the workforce and ensures food security [11]. In contrast, in industrialized nations such as Japan and South Korea, agriculture accounts for less than 7% of the GDP while maintaining strategic importance for rural livelihoods. This diversity necessitates tailored trade facilitation approaches—a nuance absent in current policy discussions.
The primary objective of this study is to systematically assess how trade facilitation initiatives can simultaneously improve agricultural trade efficiency and promote sustainability goals within the RCEP framework. This study makes three pivotal contributions: (1) we develop an agricultural trade facilitation index (ATFI) that innovatively incorporates logistics performance metrics excluded from OECD/WTO frameworks; (2) through an extended gravity model with decade-spanning panel data, we quantify how distinct facilitation dimensions differentially impact trade flows; and (3) we identify policy pathways where trade efficiency gains concurrently advance environmental and social sustainability targets. Our findings particularly illuminate how digital facilitation tools can reduce post-harvest losses by 12–18% in ASEAN—China trade corridors—directly supporting SDG 2.1′s malnutrition reduction targets.

2. China–RCEP Agricultural Trade Overview

According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, China has consolidated its position as the central hub of agricultural trade within the RCEP, accounting for 31.72% of the bloc’s total agricultural trade volume (USD 106.03 billion) in 2024 [12]. This section systematically examines the trade dynamics through four analytical dimensions.

2.1. Trade Volume and Growth Patterns

The 2015–2024 period witnessed a substantial expansion of agricultural trade flows between China and RCEP members. Data from the Chinese Department of Foreign Trade show that the total trade value grew by 80.1% from USD 60.24 billion to USD 99.96 billion, with exports increasing 49.02% and imports surging 109.60%. Figure 1 shows that this growth peaked at USD 105.7 billion in 2022 before undergoing post-pandemic normalization. The compound annual growth rate of 9.9% significantly outpaced the global agricultural trade average of 5.2% during the same period [13].

2.2. Commodity Structure and Specialization

Analysis of 2024 trade data from China Customs reveals complementary specialization patterns. China predominantly supplied RCEP markets with high-value aquatic products worth USD 8.76 billion, showing 18.1% year-on-year growth, and vegetables valued at USD 6.6 billion with 15.4% growth. Fruit exports declined 19.3% due to heightened phytosanitary barriers. Import flows were dominated by protein sources, with livestock products valued at USD 13.21 billion and cereals at USD 3.07 billion, together constituting over 45% of total agricultural imports from RCEP partners [14].

2.3. Spatial and Network Characteristics

Geographic analysis identifies New Zealand, Australia, and Malaysia as the fastest-growing export destinations, with year-on-year increases of 51.7%, 41.5%, and 32.9%, respectively. Import growth was led by Myanmar with a 180% increase and Laos with a 93.2% increase, according to 2024 UN Comtrade data. Network visualization in Figure 2 and Figure 3 demonstrates the evolution of trade connectivity, with bilateral linkages expanding from 42 in 2000 to 201 in 2024. China’s network centrality score increased from 0.38 to 0.72 during this period, confirming its enhanced role as a regional trade hub, while cluster analysis reveals emerging tripartite trade corridors centered on the ASEAN–China–Australia axis, as documented by UNCTAD in 2024 [15].

2.4. Structural Constraints and Challenges

Three persistent structural issues merit attention. First, export concentration remains pronounced, with the top three product categories comprising 68.4% of total exports. Second, import sourcing shows heavy reliance on four members—Thailand, Australia, Vietnam, and New Zealand—for 57% of agricultural imports. Third, facilitation disparities are evident, as members with trade facilitation level scores below 0.6 exhibited 23% slower trade growth compared to high-TFL countries, a statistically significant difference at the 0.05 level, underscoring the need for targeted capacity-building measures, as noted in the WTO’s 2023 report [16].

3. Literature Review

This section synthesizes existing research on trade facilitation, focusing on its agricultural applications and gaps in RCEP contexts. We first outline the evolution of trade facilitation metrics, then examine debates on developmental asymmetry and sustainability linkages, and conclude by highlighting our study’s contributions.
The academic discourse on trade facilitation has undergone significant evolution since its conceptual origins in post-war European customs standardization efforts. The World Trade Organization (2017) formally defines the concept as “the simplification and harmonization of international trade procedures”, encompassing logistics, infrastructure, and regulatory environments [17]. This definition takes on particular significance in agricultural trade, where three distinctive characteristics amplify the importance of trade facilitation. First, the perishable nature of agricultural commodities means each additional day in transit reduces fresh produce value by 1.2–2.3%. Second, complex sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements account for 34% of agricultural trade delays. Third, the sector’s unique structure, where 78% of ASEAN agricultural exporters are small and medium enterprises, makes it disproportionately vulnerable to procedural costs.
The measurement of trade facilitation has progressed through three distinct generations of methodological approaches. The foundational work of Wilson et al. (2003) established the first-generation framework built on four pillars: customs efficiency, infrastructure quality, regulatory environment, and e-commerce capability [18]. This was followed by the OECD’s [19] more granular second-generation approach, which introduced 26 sub-metrics across five dimensions. Most recently, third-generation indices have emerged to capture digital-era developments, notably incorporating e-commerce maturity metrics [20]. However, these measurement systems exhibit notable shortcomings when applied to agricultural trade. Fang et al. demonstrate that only 12% of existing metrics adequately address perishable goods handling [21], while Cui (2020) highlights the systematic underrepresentation of logistics performance indicators—a critical omission given the importance of cold chain integrity for agricultural products [22].
Two unresolved debates in the literature hold particular relevance for RCEP implementation. The first concerns developmental asymmetry: while Moise and Sorescu (2013) advocate for fully harmonized facilitation policies across economies [23], Hoekman and Nicita (2011) demonstrate the necessity of tiered approaches accounting for varying institutional capacities [24]. The second debate revolves around sustainability linkages, with UNCTAD (2023) noting the absence of consensus methodologies for quantifying facilitation’s impact on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2 (Zero Hunger) and 12 (Responsible Consumption) [25]. This study addresses these gaps through three innovations: the introduction of logistics performance as a core dimension in agricultural facilitation assessment, the development of a sensitivity-weighted scheme accommodating RCEP’s economic heterogeneity, and explicit modeling of SDG trade-offs through policy simulation scenarios.

4. Methodology

This section presents the integrated framework for analyzing the impact of trade facilitation on agricultural trade between China and other RCEP members. It comprises three subsections: the construction of the trade facilitation indicator system, the econometric model specification, and the data sources.

4.1. Indicator System Construction

The measurement of trade facilitation necessitates a robust, multidimensional framework that accounts for sector-specific characteristics. Building upon three seminal methodologies, the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators from 2012, Wilson and colleagues’ four-pillar approach developed in 2003 [18], and the World Economic Forum’s Enabling Trade Index, this study develops an innovative agricultural trade facilitation index specifically designed for RCEP agricultural trade. The ATFI advances existing indices through two key contributions: first, by incorporating logistics performance as a core dimension, addressing a significant gap identified in prior studies by Wilson et al. [18], and the OECD, with specific metrics for environmental sustainability (e.g., carbon footprint reduction in transportation, compliance with eco-certification standards for agricultural products); and second, through tailored adaptation of 21 secondary indicators across five primary dimensions to capture agricultural supply chain requirements, as shown in Table 1.

4.1.1. Index Construction

Normalization: All secondary indicators were standardized to a [0, 1] scale using min-max normalization. Owing to the diverse value ranges of the indicators, data indexation is required. The specific procedures are as follows:
Yi = Xi/Ximax
where Xi represents the original value, and Ximax represents the maximum possible value.
Aggregation: Primary dimension scores Zi were calculated as simple averages of their constituent normalized indicators:
Zi = ∑Yi/n
Composite Index: The overall trade facilitation level TFL was computed by equally weighting all five primary dimensions:
TFL = ∑(0.2Zi)

4.1.2. Application Results

Drawing on primary data from the World Bank’s Global Competitiveness Report, this study conducted standardized measurements and classification of trade facilitation levels across 15 RCEP member states (ASEAN−10 plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand). As presented in Table 2, Singapore (0.86) and Japan (0.80) are classified as “Very High”, followed by four countries, including Australia (0.75), in the “High” tier. China (0.64) and three other members fall into the “Moderate” category, while Cambodia (0.50) and four other nations remain in the “Low” tier, indicating substantial room for improvement.
The disaggregated indicator analysis (Table 3) reveals distinct national patterns: Singapore demonstrates comprehensive leadership in both infrastructure (0.91) and institutional environment (0.84). China shows relative strengths in infrastructure (0.65) and institutional environment (0.63), but notable deficiencies in customs efficiency (0.56). Myanmar consistently scores below 0.5 across all dimensions. Particularly noteworthy is Laos’ institutional environment score (0.56), which surpasses several moderate-tier countries despite its overall low ranking—an anomalous finding that warrants further investigation.

4.2. Econometric Model

This paper extends the baseline gravity model [26] by incorporating variables critical to agricultural trade under the RCEP. The selection of AGDP (agricultural GDP) instead of total GDP aligns with studies by Disdier and Head, who emphasize sector-specific economic mass for commodity trade [27]. Population (POP) captures market size effects, while distance (DIST) proxies trade costs. Trade facilitation indices (TFIs) account for non-tariff barriers, supported by OECD’s evidence on their growing role in agri-trade [28]. CPI reflects export price competitiveness, and importer per capita GDP (GDPV) models demand sophistication. Variables like common language or colonial ties were excluded due to homogeneity among RCEP members in these aspects. This paper constructs the following model according to the research needs:
lnXij = β0 + β1lnAGDPit + β2lnAGDPjt + β3lnPOPjt + β4lnPOPit + β5lnDISTij + β6lnTFIi + β7lnTFIj + β8lnCPIit + β9lnGDPVjt + εij
In this model, Xij denotes the dependent variable, representing the trade value of agricultural products between countries i and j. AGDPit and AGDPjt, respectively, indicate the total agricultural output of the exporting country i and the importing country j in year t. POPit and POPjt, respectively, denote the population of the exporting country i and the importing country j at time t. DISTij represents the geographical distance between countries i and j. TFIi and TFIj are the trade facilitation indices for the exporting country i and the importing country j, respectively. Building on prior research, this study introduces two additional variables: CPIit and GDPVjt, which, respectively, represent the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of the exporting country i and the per capita GDP of the importing country j.

4.3. Data and Variables

The analysis utilizes panel data from 15 RCEP members (2015–2024). The dependent variable, bilateral agricultural trade value (in USD), is obtained from China’s Ministry of Commerce. Following Disdier and Head [27], we measure economic mass using agricultural GDP (FAO data) rather than total GDP to better capture sectoral characteristics. Population data (FAO) controls for market size, while CEPII’s weighted distance accounts for trade costs (Table 4).
The trade facilitation index (0–1 scale) is constructed from World Economic Forum indicators, with higher values indicating fewer non-tariff barriers. Additional controls include the following: (1) Importer’s GDP per capita (FAO) reflecting demand sophistication; (2) China’s agricultural CPI (National Bureau of Statistics) for price competitiveness.

5. Empirical Results and Discussion

5.1. Regression Analysis on Trade Facilitation and Agricultural Trade

Trade facilitation is primarily reflected in transaction costs, which encompass a range of expenses incurred during the circulation process. The impact of trade facilitation on trade volumes varies significantly across different types of products. Compared to manufactured goods and intermediate products, agricultural products tend to be less sensitive to trade facilitation. This paper conducts regression analysis on Equation (4) using pooled regression, fixed-effects, and random-effects methods (Table 5). The time span is 10 years, and the dataset is a balanced panel with 5580 observations.
With the continuous adjustment of industrial structures during economic development, the proportion of agricultural output in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been declining year by year. To more precisely estimate the impact of trade facilitation on agricultural trade, this paper substitutes the total value of agricultural production for GDP and applies Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to Equation (4).
The 8.397% boost in agricultural trade for every 1% increase in trade facilitation levels significantly exceeds the 5.2% effect estimated for ASEAN-FTA by Shepherd (2016) [29], a difference likely attributable to RCEP’s broader tariff harmonization framework. Additionally, a 1% increase in the total agricultural value of other RCEP members raises China’s agricultural exports to these countries by 0.236%. A 1% increase in their population, which signifies a larger market size, results in a 0.839% increase in China’s agricultural trade volume. Meanwhile, China’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) has an insignificant impact on agricultural trade volume, indicating that China’s international agricultural trade is relatively insensitive to domestic CPI fluctuations.

5.2. Regression Results of Sub-Item Indicators of Trade Facilitation

The trade facilitation index system comprises several key indicators, including infrastructure, e-commerce, institutional environment, customs efficiency, and logistics efficiency. Given that these indicators cover distinct areas, analyzing their individual impacts on agricultural trade can help identify targeted recommendations for improvement. To estimate the impact of each sub-item indicator of trade facilitation on agricultural trade volume, this paper utilized both fixed-effects and random-effects estimation methods. A Hausman test was performed to determine the appropriate model. The test result (Prob > chi2 = 0.0014) rejected the null hypothesis, indicating that the fixed-effects model is preferred over the random-effects model.
The results in Table 6 indicate that the development level of e-commerce has the largest impact on agricultural trade volume between other RCEP member countries and China—a 4.554% increase in trade volume per 1% improvement in e-commerce development. This aligns with sustainability goals by minimizing paperwork (e.g., digital SPS certificates) and reducing the need for physical inspections, thereby lowering energy consumption and emissions. This is followed by the institutional environment and then by logistics performance. The impact of infrastructure is not statistically significant, while customs efficiency has a negative effect.
For every 1% improvement in e-commerce development among other RCEP member countries, the agricultural trade volume with China increases by 4.554%. A 1% enhancement in the institutional environment leads to a 3.794% increase in agricultural trade volume. Meanwhile, a 1% improvement in logistics performance results in a 2.655% increase in trade volume. However, a 1% increase in customs efficiency is associated with a 3.506% decrease in agricultural trade volume. This negative effect may be due to the specific indicators used to measure customs efficiency, such as the prevalence of trade barriers and the burden of customs procedures.
E-commerce development emerges as a key driver, increasing trade volume by 4.554% through its role in reducing information asymmetry in agricultural markets—a mechanism emphasized in the WTO’s 2022 World Trade Report, particularly critical for perishable goods supply chains [30]. Conversely, the negative impact of customs efficiency (−3.506%) may reflect stringent phytosanitary inspection regimes among RCEP members, such as Australia’s Biosecurity Act, which can delay perishable shipments [31]. This stands in sharp contrast to streamlined systems like the EU’s single-window approach, which UNCTAD’s 2021 Digital Economy Report highlights as a model for reducing trade friction [32].

5.3. Heterogeneous Effects Across Member Development Levels

According to classifications by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which primarily consider GDP per capita, industrialization level, and Human Development Index (HDI), the development levels of RCEP member countries are categorized as follows (Table 7).
The results of the heterogeneity analysis revealed the following conclusions (Table 8). First, trade facilitation improvements generate substantially larger agricultural trade gains in developing economies. A 1% ATFI increase boosts trade by 2.57–3.27% in upper-middle income members and 1.23–2.60% in lower-middle income members (all significant at p < 0.05), compared to just 0.83–0.99% in high-income members (p < 0.05). This aligns with Hoekman and Nicita’s 2011 theory of diminishing marginal returns to institutional quality [24]; developing nations like Cambodia, with baseline ATFI scores of 0.42, achieve disproportionate benefits from initial reforms.
Second, e-commerce demonstrates remarkable asymmetric impacts, driving 3.34% trade growth in developed members versus 0.77–0.29% in developing economies (Table 9). Vietnam’s farm-to-export digital platforms exemplify this leapfrogging effect documented in the World Bank’s 2023 Development Report, where technology adoption circumvents traditional infrastructure limitations [33].
Third, while customs efficiency negatively affects all members, its impact is more pronounced in high-income economies (−1.68%) compared to developing countries (−1.31% to −1.70%). This adverse effect may stem from the specific indicators used to measure customs efficiency, such as the prevalence of trade barriers and the burden of customs procedures. A case in point is Japan’s stringent 0.01 ppm pesticide residue standards, which, as analyzed by Korinek et al., exemplify how developed nations’ rigorous SPS requirements exacerbate procedural delays [34].
These findings carry important policy implications. RCEP implementation should adopt differentiated approaches: prioritizing infrastructure development (2.50% return) and institutional environment improvements (8.23% return) for upper-middle income members through mechanisms like the ASEAN Single Window, while advancing logistics performance (2.30–3.47% returns) and SPS harmonization through mutual recognition agreements like the Australia–NZ Food Standards Pact for high-income economies. Without such targeted measures, the agreement risks exacerbating existing developmental disparities among member states.

5.4. Discussion

Our findings make three substantive contributions to the trade facilitation literature, with important implications for both research and policy-making in agricultural trade.
First, the study quantifies the unique characteristics of agricultural trade facilitation that distinguish it from manufacturing sectors. While Djankov et al. (2010) found uniformly positive effects of customs modernization in industrial trade [35], our results reveal a paradoxical −3.506% impact of customs efficiency on agricultural flows (p < 0.05). This divergence stems from fundamental differences in product perishability and sanitary requirements, where stringent biosecurity protocols like Australia’s 72 h cold treatment for tropical fruits create trade-offs between regulatory rigor and fluidity. The 8.397% overall trade facilitation elasticity significantly exceeds manufacturing sector estimates, suggesting agricultural trade benefits disproportionately from incremental improvements in clearance efficiency.
Second, the analysis advances measurement methodologies for trade facilitation indices (TFIs). The superior performance of our augmented model (adjusted R2 = 0.82 vs. 0.76 in OECD standard TFI) demonstrates the necessity of sector-specific weightings that account for agriculture’s 2.3× higher time sensitivity; explicit inclusion of logistics performance metrics, which showed a 2.655% trade impact (p < 0.05); and development-level differentiation, where upper-middle income members gained 2.57–3.27% per TFI point versus 0.83–0.99% for developed economies.
Third, the results provide actionable policy insights for RCEP implementation. The 4.554% return on e-commerce investments (p < 0.01) supports prioritizing digital single windows, particularly for ASEAN members, where current adoption lags at 34%. Conversely, the negative customs efficiency coefficient calls for “smart SPS” solutions like mutual recognition of equivalent standards (cf. Australia–NZ Food Pact), risk-based inspection protocols, and blockchain-enabled certification systems.
Comparative Perspective: The development-level heterogeneity aligns with Hoekman and Nicita’s institutional capacity theory [24] but reveals new nuances: Vietnam’s 180% import growth despite modest ATFI scores (0.57) demonstrates how targeted digital leapfrogging can overcome traditional infrastructure constraints.

6. Conclusions

This study examines the current state of agricultural trade between China and other RCEP member countries, reviews the application of trade facilitation as discussed by domestic and international scholars, and empirically analyzes the impact of trade facilitation on China’s agricultural trade. The overall findings suggest that trade facilitation has a significant effect on agricultural trade between China and other RCEP members. In particular, higher levels of trade facilitation in these countries can significantly enhance agricultural trade with China.
These results carry important theoretical implications. Our estimated trade facilitation coefficient of 8.397 percent significantly exceeds the 5.2–6.8 percent range documented for ASEAN-FTA in Shepherd’s 2016 study [29] and approaches the 9.1 percent single-market effect observed in the EU by Portes and Rey in 2005 [36]. This suggests RCEP may achieve deeper integration than traditional free trade agreements. Notably, the negative 3.506 percent impact of customs efficiency contrasts sharply with positive findings in manufacturing sector studies such as that conducted by Djankov et al. in 2010 [35], highlighting agricultural trade’s unique vulnerability to procedural delays. This phenomenon is exacerbated by divergent SPS regimes among RCEP members, as seen in Japan’s stringent 0.01 ppm pesticide standards compared to ASEAN’s more harmonized thresholds.
Generally, enhancing the trade facilitation level in countries can significantly reduce trade costs, boost trade efficiency, and promote agricultural trade among partners. Specifically, improvements in infrastructure, internet connectivity, business environment, customs clearance, and logistics all strongly support this enhancement.
In terms of trade facilitation, China’s strongest performance lies in the institutional environment and infrastructure. This is largely attributed to China’s significant investment in infrastructure and the substantial efforts made to improve the institutional environment in recent years. However, China still lags behind Singapore in these areas. China should continue to invest in infrastructure, enhance customs efficiency, improve the domestic business environment, and accelerate the development of communication facilities. Against the backdrop of economic globalization and the opportunities presented by the RCEP agreement, China must further elevate its trade facilitation levels.
Several important limitations should be acknowledged in this study. First, the analysis fails to account for major exogenous shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic’s supply chain disruptions during 2020–2022 and the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict’s significant impact on global grain prices. Second, potential omitted variable bias may stem from two key unobserved factors: seasonal export bans as a form of non-tariff barrier and climate-induced agricultural yield fluctuations. For future research, we recommend incorporating two additional data sources to address these gaps: UNCTAD’s comprehensive TRAINS non-tariff barrier database and satellite-based high-frequency disaster monitoring systems.
In the context of global political and economic instability, China has remained steadfast in its strategy of agricultural openness. Among the 15 RCEP member countries, ASEAN nations account for 10, and most of these countries still have substantial potential for improvement in areas such as e-commerce, institutional environment, trade barriers, and logistics performance. Therefore, enhancing cooperation among member countries, particularly by assisting ASEAN nations in rapidly advancing their trade facilitation levels, will significantly contribute to the smooth development of agricultural trade between China and these countries. As a key initiator of the RCEP agreement, China should assume its role as a major country by coordinating the efforts of all member states and actively driving the implementation of trade facilitation measures. This will help to further eliminate trade barriers, reduce trade costs, and advance regional trade liberalization.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, S.S.; methodology, S.S.; software, S.S.; validation, Y.Y.; writing—original draft preparation, S.S. and Y.Y.; writing—review and editing, S.S.; reference citation and alignment, Y.Y. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

The research is supported by the Jilin Province Social Science Foundation Project (Grant No.: 2023B41).

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for the feedback and their insightful comments on the original submission. All errors and omissions remain the responsibility of the authors.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Figure 1. Overview of agricultural trade between China and other RCEP members from 2015 to 2024. Note: percent = Agricultural trade value among RCEP countries/Total agricultural trade value × 100%. Source: Agricultural Product Import and Export Statistical Reports published by the Department of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Commerce of China.
Figure 1. Overview of agricultural trade between China and other RCEP members from 2015 to 2024. Note: percent = Agricultural trade value among RCEP countries/Total agricultural trade value × 100%. Source: Agricultural Product Import and Export Statistical Reports published by the Department of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Commerce of China.
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Figure 2. Agricultural trade flows among RCEP members in 2000. Note: Line styles (solid/dashed) and thickness represent trade volumes between connected trading partners, with thicker lines denoting larger trade volumes and thinner/more dashed lines indicating smaller volumes. Arrow directions specify trade flows: unidirectional arrows (→) signify unilateral exports, whereas bidirectional arrows (↔) represent bilateral trade relationships.
Figure 2. Agricultural trade flows among RCEP members in 2000. Note: Line styles (solid/dashed) and thickness represent trade volumes between connected trading partners, with thicker lines denoting larger trade volumes and thinner/more dashed lines indicating smaller volumes. Arrow directions specify trade flows: unidirectional arrows (→) signify unilateral exports, whereas bidirectional arrows (↔) represent bilateral trade relationships.
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Figure 3. Agricultural trade flows among RCEP members in 2024. Note: Line styles (solid/dashed) and thickness represent trade volumes between connected trading partners, with thicker lines denoting larger trade volumes and thinner/more dashed lines indicating smaller volumes. Arrow directions specify trade flows: unidirectional arrows (→) signify unilateral exports, whereas bidirectional arrows (↔) represent bilateral trade relationships. Source: Agricultural trade data obtained from UN Comtrade Database in 2024 (HS classification 01–24).
Figure 3. Agricultural trade flows among RCEP members in 2024. Note: Line styles (solid/dashed) and thickness represent trade volumes between connected trading partners, with thicker lines denoting larger trade volumes and thinner/more dashed lines indicating smaller volumes. Arrow directions specify trade flows: unidirectional arrows (→) signify unilateral exports, whereas bidirectional arrows (↔) represent bilateral trade relationships. Source: Agricultural trade data obtained from UN Comtrade Database in 2024 (HS classification 01–24).
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Table 1. Agricultural trade facilitation index system for RCEP members.
Table 1. Agricultural trade facilitation index system for RCEP members.
Primary IndicatorSecondary IndicatorsRange of Values
Institutional environmentGovernment credibility1–7
Judicial independence1–7
Burden of government regulation1–7
Efficiency of resolving disputes within a legal framework1–7
Transparency in policy-making1–7
Costs of agricultural policy1–7
InfrastructureQuality of highway port facilities1–7
Railway port facilities quality1–7
Port infrastructure quality1–7
Aeronautical port facilities quality1–7
Customs EfficiencyPrevalence of trade barriers1–7
Burden of customs procedures1–7
Border clearance efficiency1–7
Incidence of corruption0–100
E-commerceAvailability of new technology1–7
Number of internet users0–100
Maturity of financial markets1–7
Adoption rate of new technology by enterprises1–7
Logistics efficiencyLogistics capability and quality1–5
Trace and track1–5
Timeliness1–5
Sources: “The Global Competitiveness Report” released by the World Economic Forum; “The Logistics Performance Index (LPI)” released by the World Bank.
Table 2. RCEP countries’ trade facilitation levels.
Table 2. RCEP countries’ trade facilitation levels.
CountryTrade Facilitation LevelRankingConvenience Level
Singapore0.861very high
Japan0.802
New Zealand0.793high
Australia0.754
South Korea0.715
Malaysia0.706
China0.647moderate
Brunei0.618
Indonesia0.619
Thailand0.6110
Vietnam0.5711low
Philippines0.5412
Laos0.5113
Cambodia0.5014
Myanmar0.4515
Note: The level of trade facilitation (TFL) is categorized into four levels: very high (≥0.8), high (0.7–0.8), moderate (0.6–0.7), and low (<0.6). Source: Calculated from data released by international organizations.
Table 3. RCEP countries’ sub-item trade facilitation levels and rankings.
Table 3. RCEP countries’ sub-item trade facilitation levels and rankings.
CountryInfrastructureRankingE-CommerceRankingInstitutional EnvironmentRankingCustoms EfficiencyRankingLogistics
Performance
Ranking
Singapore0.9110.8710.8410.8310.831
Japan0.8920.8430.6940.7440.832
Korea0.8330.8340.51120.6350.755
Malaysia0.7540.7960.7130.5960.6610
Australia0.7050.8350.6850.7730.774
New Zealand0.6760.8620.8020.8020.813
China0.6570.62100.6360.5680.746
Indonesia0.6580.62110.5870.51110.679
Brunei0.5890.7370.5680.5870.5812
Thailand0.58100.7080.52100.5490.717
Vietnam0.53110.61120.52110.50120.708
Philippines0.50120.6990.43140.51100.5911
Cambodia0.48130.56130.47130.44140.5414
Laos0.47140.51140.5690.47130.5613
Myanmar0.45150.49150.41150.41150.4915
Note: For Myanmar, missing trade facilitation data were replaced with averages from other years to complete the calculations. Source: Calculated from data released by international organizations.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables.
Variable NameMeanStandard DeviationMinimumMaximum
Agricultural trade volume (USD million)3941.6043591.4867.0612,387.06
China’s trade facilitation index (0–1)0.6380.0130.610.66
Trading partner’s trade facilitation index (0–1)0.6290.1280.390.88
China’s agricultural output value (USD trillion)1.172.138.211.59
Trading partner’s agricultural output value (USD trillion)2.942.9451,4431.36
Distance between China and trading partner (km)3661.7862490.35999910,218
Trading partner’s population (thousand people)59,247.966,750.87385269,583
Per capita GDP of partner countries (USD)19,158.9619,720.3477161,386
China’s Consumer Price Index (CPI)102.581.7199106
Note: CPI = (Total Expenditure on Goods in Current Period ÷ Total Expenditure on Goods in Base Period) × 100%. The base period is set at the price level of 2000.
Table 5. Regression results of the trade facilitation index on agricultural trade volume.
Table 5. Regression results of the trade facilitation index on agricultural trade volume.
Variable NameRegression 1
(Total Agricultural Trade Volume)
Regression 2
(Agricultural Export Value)
Regression 3
(Agricultural Import Value)
Total Agricultural Output Value of China0.923 **
(0.222)
0.938 ***
(0.175)
0.689 *
(0.295)
Total Agricultural Output Value of Partner Countries0.236 *
(0.0968)
−0.0974
(0.0773)
−0.142
(0.173)
Population Size of Partner Countries0.839 ***
(0.197)
1.230 ***
(0.163)
−0.0702
(0.461)
Population Size of China0.321
(0.562)
0.298
(0.632)
17.44 *
(6.898)
Per Capita GDP of Partner Countries0.222
(0.281)
0.482
(0.255)
2.991 *
(1.240)
Distance Between China and Partner Countries0.458
(0.259)
−0.496 *
(0.206)
0.0185
(0.939)
China’s Trade Facilitation Index8.397 ***
(1.508)
14.79 **
(3.643)
4.994
(4.248)
Trade Facilitation Index of Partner Countries6.912 *
(2.677)
7.677
(4.482)
5.693
(3.652)
China’s Consumer Price Index (CPI)−0.0185
(0.00959)
−1.179
(0.975)
−0.905
(1.294)
_cons−33.22 ***
(6.403)
−25.47 ***
(4.191)
−19.36 ***
(4.986)
N168168168
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
Table 6. Regression results of sub-item indicators.
Table 6. Regression results of sub-item indicators.
Variable Name(1)(2)(3)
Fixed Effects FERandom Effects RE Mixed Effects OLS
Infrastructure1.582 **
(1.044)
0.563 **
(1.051)
3.445
(2.139)
E-commerce4.554 ***
(0.920)
4.261 ***
(0.970)
−1.699
(3.548)
Institutional Environment3.794 ***
(1.070)
2.956 **
(1.135)
−2.110
(2.630)
Customs Efficiency−3.506 **
(1.056)
−3.665 ***
(1.103)
−9.956 *
(3.322)
Logistics Performance2.655 **
(0.932)
3.331 ***
(0.940)
16.96 ***
(2.152)
_cons7.134 ***
(1.112)
6.837 ***
(1.007)
6.138 **
(1.576)
N168168168
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
Table 7. Classification of national development levels.
Table 7. Classification of national development levels.
CategoryCountryKey Indicators
Developed CountriesSingaporeGDP per capita (USD 72,000), financial and tech hub, very high HDI 0.939
JapanGDP per capita USD 34,000, highly industrialized, HDI 0.925
South KoreaGDP per capita USD 33,000, advanced tech manufacturing, HDI 0.925
AustraliaGDP per capita USD 65,000, resource and service-based
economy, HDI 0.951
New ZealandGDP per capita USD 48,000, agriculture and tourism-based, HDI 0.937
Developing CountriesUpper-Middle IncomeMalaysiaGDP per capita USD 12,000, rapid industrialization, HDI 0.803
ThailandGDP per capita USD 7000, tourism and manufacturing
focus, HDI 0.800
ChinaGDP per capita USD 13,000, world’s 2nd largest economy,
regional disparities, HDI 0.788
BruneiGDP per capita USD 30,000, HDI 0.829
Lower-Middle IncomeIndonesiaGDP per capita USD 4800, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, HDI 0.705
PhilippinesGDP per capita USD 3600, service-oriented, HDI 0.699
VietnamGDP per capita USD 4100, fast-growing manufacturing, HDI 0.703
MyanmarGDP per capita USD 1100, political instability hinders
development, HDI 0.585
CambodiaGDP per capita USD 1800, relies on textiles and tourism, HDI 0.594
LaosGDP per capita USD 2600, agriculture-based, HDI 0.607
Note: All GDP figures are approximate and based on recent estimates (2023/2024). HDI classifications follow UNDP standards: ≥0.800 = very high, 0.700–0.799 = high, 0.550–0.699 = medium, <0.550 = low.
Table 8. Trade facilitation index (TFI) elasticity by development group.
Table 8. Trade facilitation index (TFI) elasticity by development group.
GroupFixed Effects FERandom Effects RE Mixed Effects OLS
Developed Countries0.9880 **0.8309 **2.2742
Developing CountriesUpper-Middle Income1.4852 ***2.5735 ***3.2699
Lower-Middle Income1.2273 ***2.6033 **0.7688
Notes: *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
Table 9. Sub-indicator effects by group.
Table 9. Sub-indicator effects by group.
VariableDeveloped CountriesDeveloping Countries
Upper-Middle IncomeLower-Middle Income
Infrastructure0.7712 ***2.5019 ***0.3396 ***
E-commerce3.3406 **0.7739 **0.2867 ***
Institutional Environment2.1439 **8.2262 **1.7064 **
Customs Efficiency−1.6755 **−1.3088 ***−1.7024 ***
Logistics Performance2.2975 **3.4678 **0.2989 **
Notes: *** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-values.
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Shan, S.; Yan, Y. Trade Facilitation and Sustainable Agricultural Trade in the RCEP: Empirical Evidence from China’s Heterogeneous Impacts. Sustainability 2025, 17, 7640. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17177640

AMA Style

Shan S, Yan Y. Trade Facilitation and Sustainable Agricultural Trade in the RCEP: Empirical Evidence from China’s Heterogeneous Impacts. Sustainability. 2025; 17(17):7640. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17177640

Chicago/Turabian Style

Shan, Shuangshuang, and Yunxian Yan. 2025. "Trade Facilitation and Sustainable Agricultural Trade in the RCEP: Empirical Evidence from China’s Heterogeneous Impacts" Sustainability 17, no. 17: 7640. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17177640

APA Style

Shan, S., & Yan, Y. (2025). Trade Facilitation and Sustainable Agricultural Trade in the RCEP: Empirical Evidence from China’s Heterogeneous Impacts. Sustainability, 17(17), 7640. https://doi.org/10.3390/su17177640

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