

Article

Good Practices to Counteract Epidemic Emergency in Mining Companies in Poland

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Abstract: The date assumed as the beginning of the pandemic in Poland is 4 March 2020, the date of the first confirmed case of the virus. This article presents the actions undertaken by the management of underground hard coal mining plants concerning the risk of epidemic related to SARS-CoV-2. This work shows a set of implemented recommendations, guidelines and decisions, which were established after the appearance of the first wave of cases in Poland. What is more, it discusses measures aiming at reducing the risk of spreading the coronavirus among the mineworkers. The suggestions for different variants of the decision-making process concerning the pandemic and which have an enormous impact on the operating expenses of the company are also made. The paper presents the results of the study on actions taken in individual mining companies and good work practices recommended to be applied.

Keywords: COVID-19; pandemic; mining company; epidemic emergency; prevention; good practices



Citation: Bąk, P. Good Practices to Counteract Epidemic Emergency in Mining Companies in Poland. *Energies* **2022**, *15*, 5500. <https://doi.org/10.3390/en15155500>

Academic Editor: Donato Morea

Received: 16 May 2022

Accepted: 19 July 2022

Published: 29 July 2022

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1. Introduction

In March 2020, an epidemic emergency appeared in Poland due to the spread of the coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, causing acute respiratory disease COVID-19, which in some cases, may even lead to the death of the infected person. It was acknowledged that the virus is very easily transmitted from one person to another. The virus is mainly transmitted by the droplets created, when a person infected coughs, sneezes or speaks. These droplets are too heavy to float in the air, so they fall quickly on surfaces. Then, a person may become infected after touching the contaminated surface, followed by touching their eyes, nose or mouth. The risk of a severe course of the coronavirus disease appeared to be serious and led to making high-level decisions concerning the announcement of the state of epidemic emergency in the Republic of Poland, commencing 14 March 2020, and the state of epidemic commencing 20 March 2020 [1–3]. On that basis, a number of radical actions were implemented in the field of isolation and distancing of people. The isolation involved mainly the large scale, temporary suspension of their activities, especially closures of many businesses, offices, schools and retail outlets. Whenever possible, the so-called remote working system was implemented. This created a dilemma—what decisions should be made and what will be the consequences for mines? These decisions were left to be made by the mining companies and mine managements. These had to be made having insufficient information concerning a threat of this kind, which actually “only just” emerged. Therefore, what decisions need to be made (as soon as possible) with regard to the functioning of mines, without having any reliable knowledge about the sources of the spread of the threat itself and methods of preventing it? Further, knowledge of the risks involved is essential at each mining company management level. Although it would be more favourable to implement decisions that would involve “no risk”, the basis of the security concept involves “acceptable risk”. If it is adopted in relation to a mining company, it is necessary to anticipate and predict the possibility of occurrence for a risk. This term should be understood as a risk included between the desired upper and lower levels of safety, taking into account a set of

necessary criteria. In the analysed case, the criteria should concern epidemic emergency in relation to the employees. It should be clearly emphasised that a lack of knowledge on the virus concerns not only the mining industry. The COVID-19 pandemic spread worldwide and has had economic, environmental and social impacts [4–8]. All countries where the virus causing the previously unknown disease appeared have undertaken basic actions, primarily aimed at limiting the possibility of its spread by forcing social distancing. This has often involved the introduction of a lockdown of all social activities (“stay at home”—closure of educational, commercial and cultural facilities) and economic activities (forced production stops of many industrial plants). However, due to the specific nature of mining production, such recommendations could not completely be implemented in mining companies—neither the vast majority of mine workers can “stay at home”, nor, due to the deformation of underground excavations, can the mine’s operation be stopped for a long time. In such a situation, their managers had to make quick decisions concerning both reducing the spread of infections and preventing adverse effects on the operation of individual mines and plants. This study consists of an overview of the various solutions used in various mining companies to counteract the emerging epidemic emergency.

2. Research Material

The SARS-CoV-2 virus (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2) is a coronavirus of animal origin, causing acute respiratory infectious disease in humans that can even lead to death, called COVID-19 (Coronavirus Disease 19) [9]. According to the World Health Organization, SARS-CoV-2 is mainly spread via respiratory droplets [10]. Infection can occur through direct or close contact with the virus carrier or indirectly through contact with an object or surface contaminated with the pathogen. When speaking, coughing or sneezing, the carrier of the virus (a person with COVID-19 disease or asymptomatic infection) produces respiratory secretions or saliva that carry the pathogen. Such molecules contain the virus and, through another person’s mouth, nose or eyes, leads to a viral infection [11–13]. According to the literature, coronaviruses can survive from 2 h to 9 days on the surfaces of various materials, such as plastic, metal or glass. A synthesis of the results of the studies included in the papers [14,15], containing detailed data on the survival of different types of coronaviruses depending on the type of surface, in relation to human coronaviruses being an equivalent to SARS-CoV-2 virus in the study, is presented in the publication [16] (Table 1). Based, among other things, on the analyses carried out by Carraturo and co-workers, the following coronavirus life span is assumed for each type of surface: aluminum 2–8 h, metal 5 days, wood 4 days, paper and glass 5 days, and plastic 2–5 days. Another team of researchers assessed the amount of virus retaining its infectious properties for different surface types. The experiment to determine the duration of virus persistence in the air spray was carried out for three hours from the moment of spraying. During the whole time it was conducted, the following environmental conditions were maintained: temperature 21–23 °C and air humidity $\geq 40\%$.

Table 1. Survival of the two main SARS-CoV-2 virus surrogates (HCoV 229E and SARS-CoV) on different types of inanimate surfaces.

Surface Type	Strain	Temperature	Life Span
Aluminium	hCoV 229E and OC43	21 °C	2–8 h
Metal	SARS-CoV P9	room	5 d
Wood	SARS-CoV P9	room	4 d

Table 1. Cont.

Surface Type	Strain	Temperature	Life Span
Paper	SARS-CoV GVU6109 and P9	room	3 h–5 d
Glass	SARS-CoV P9	room	2–5 d
Plastic	SARS-CoV FFM1, HKU39849 and P9	20–25 °C	2–5 d
PVC	hCoV 229E	21 °C	5 d
Silicone	hCoV 229E	21 °C	5 d
Latex	hCoV 229E and OC43	21 °C	≤8 h
Disposable apron	SARS-CoV GVU6109	room	1 h–2 d
Ceramics	hCoV 229E	21 °C	5 d
Teflon	hCoV 229E	21 °C	5 d

Source: [16].

The amount of the virus in the sample was expressed as TCID₅₀. On the basis of the conducted tests, it was found that the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus had the shortest life span on the copper (4 h) and cardboard (24 h) surfaces, while the longest was on plastic and stainless-steel surfaces (up to 72 h). As mentioned, the concentration of viruses in the aerosol was measured within three hours. A decrease in the concentration of infectious virus particles in the air was found—the virus half-life span of the analysed strains reached a similar value and was approximately 1.1–1.2 h. It was noted, however, that at the end of the experiment, the value of TCID₅₀ remained above the set detection threshold. The half-life span of SARS-CoV-2 on particular types of surfaces was: 6.8 h for plastic, 5.6 h for stainless steel, 3.8 h for cardboard and about 1 h for copper [17]. The results of the study on the influence of temperature on coronavirus activity were presented, among others, in the paper [18]. Its authors evaluated, in laboratory tests, the stability of SARS-CoV-2 on steel plates incubated at: room temperature and 4 °C and 30 °C, at constant ambient humidity of 30–40%. The research proved that while there was a significant decrease in the viral load within 1 h after spraying at room temperature, its value remained stable within the next 4–8 h of incubation. A minimum decrease in values was recorded for 30 °C and for samples incubated at 4 °C, a large discrepancy in results was observed in individual series of measurements. After eight hours of incubation, a stable, slow decrease of the viral load was observed in all analysed temperatures during the following days of the experiment. However, the authors pointed out that it was possible to recover (reactivate) the amount of infectious SARS-CoV-2 even after 180 h incubation on a metal surface. The humidity of the environment in relation to coronavirus molecules was considered in the study in two ways—in terms of the influence of environmental humidity on its life span and the influence on the size of respiratory droplets being the direct carrier of the pathogen. The paper [19,20] presents the results of the research, which show that:

- Very high humidity (99.5%) induces a hygroscopic increase in liquid droplets, while humidity of 40% causes water to evaporate, reducing droplet size,
- Ambient humidity has a significant impact on the size of medium-sized respiratory droplets (50–100 µm)—high humidity is conducive to slowing down the evaporation of the droplets, so that the droplets will settle on the substrate more quickly and evaporate more quickly in dry air, which will cause them to stay longer in the air spray.

The mining production process consists primarily of a selection of the applicable technology for mining the deposit while maintaining occupational safety. Concerning the management of a mining company and its individual mines, particularly vital are decisions involving [21]:

- Ensuring high standards of occupational safety,

- Implementation of modern technical and technological solutions for deposit mining,
- Ensuring the required quality of commercial coal produced,
- Protection of the mining area where the effects of the carried-out mining and the natural environment may be visible.

Additionally, from an economic point of view, the mining production process should be efficient, or at least not generate financial losses. Such requirements for mining production are shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1. Features of standard for carrying out mining production process. Source: own study based on [21].

In underground mining, the basis for decisions, especially those related to industrial safety and natural hazards, are the laws, regulations, guidelines and various rules and procedures developed. In many cases, those are established based on past experience and are often supported by scientific research. These regulations are, or at least should be, well known to individual decision-makers. This allows for proper management of a mine and a mining company—proper, i.e., in a way that ensures the highest possible level of safety and avoids unjustified risks concerning mining production.

Hazards present in underground mining have been either technological or natural. The method of conducting works in the conditions of their occurrence and the scope of necessary anti-hazard measures have been developed over many years, based on operational experience and scientific research conducted on a large scale. On the other hand, in the case of an epidemic emergency caused by the virus, we are dealing with a wide range of ignorance concerning the decision-making process in relation to the operation of a mining plant.

As opposed to other hazards, in the case of an epidemic emergency caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus, there are no specific procedures that could be strictly followed in the operation of a mining company. For example, the Website of the Republic of Poland provides only five general guidelines [22]:

1. Regularly wash your hands with soap and water.
2. Cover your mouth and nose with your bent elbow or tissue when you cough.
3. Avoid touching your eyes, nose and mouth.
4. Stay at least 2 m from other people.

5. Stay home.

This means that the primary means of protection against becoming infected is to keep a distance from other people or even to avoid any contact at all. Implementation of such rules is absolutely not feasible in mines where the limited space of shaft hoist cages, underground means of transport and excavations and where a large number of people work, make it impossible to maintain two-meter space between people.

Various measures have been taken by various mining companies to counteract the epidemic emergency related to SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. Today we can say that they brought good results—after the initial perturbations resulting from a large number of infections among employees, the situation has been managed and stabilised. With the continuous enforcement of the newly developed and implemented procedures, mining companies now operate without the major turmoil that might have been brought by the spreading pandemic. As they have fulfilled their role, they can be described as “good practices used to counteract the epidemic emergency”. The research problem undertaken is an attempt to develop a set of such practices, which could be recommended for use in conditions of epidemic emergency.

3. Research Methodology

In order to conduct research on the activities undertaken in mining companies and their effects, it was decided to use a qualitative research method, a case study. As the name itself indicates, the primary purpose of this method is to illustrate and analyse the “selected case” in detail. The reasons for its use are most often atypical character of the case and a desire to learn about the analysed phenomenon in detail. As American scientist Wilbur Schramm, the pioneer of social communication research, stated: *“The essence of a case study (. . .) is to explain the decisions: why it was made, how it was made and what was the effect”* [23]. It indicates that in the case study, the main focus is on the decisions made. This is the preferred method in situations where [24]:

- The main questions are “how?” or “why?”,
- The researcher has little influence on behavioural factors,
- The study concerns a contemporary phenomenon.

With regard to the issues related to actions to combat the epidemic emergency caused by the previously unknown coronavirus, all the above conditions are undoubtedly met.

In order to obtain information on how to counteract the epidemic emergency, nine mining companies (seven from the hard coal mining industry and two from the metal ore mining industry) were sent a question about all undertakings—organisational, operational, informational—related to the preventive actions (ad. 1).

As mentioned, in mining companies, actions concerning combating the threats occurring so far are undertaken based on the applicable legal regulations. On the other hand, the study assumed (re. 2) that due to the lack of regulations imposing a specific course of action, independent solutions were introduced in each company.

The assumed unit of enquiry (re. 3), i.e., a specific case, was each separate company and solutions implemented in it.

Surveyed companies sent back various answers consisting of descriptions, drawings, diagrams and tables concerning the scope of undertaken actions. Some solutions were used in all of the companies, others in individual cases. For the sake of comparability, all of the solutions were summed up together, regardless of frequency of their implementation. The only condition for inclusion in the list was usefulness in combating the threat (re. 4).

The list of solutions used in various mining companies was analysed in terms of the frequency of their implementation and the results (effects) obtained. Next, on this basis, a set of so-called good practices, recommended to use in the area concerned, was developed (re. 5).

At the first stage of the case study, an assumption (theory) was made, which should be proved by the result of the study (a negative result was also considered). The assumption was as follows:

So far, no methods of combating the epidemic threat in underground mines caused by an unknown virus have been formulated clearly. However, if various actions were taken in different mining plans and were successful in all such plants, it is possible to prepare a list of standardised recommendations to be used in practice in the future.

Figure 2 shows the procedure and assumptions adopted in the conducted study.




Figure 2. Object and expected result of the case study. Source: author’s own elaboration based on the research carried out in mining companies.

4. Result

The first step consisted of asking managers of the nine mining companies to draw up a brief description of all action taken to combat the epidemic threat that had been spreading since March and to assess the effects of their implementation. From descriptions received, 33 various, specific projects were isolated and tabulated. Assuming that in some cases, the descriptions focused only on the vital counteractions concerning a given company, the compiled summary table was sent to all companies, asking them to analyse the list and mark all the actions that were taken in individual companies. In addition, acknowledging that some of them may not have been included in the submitted descriptions, companies were asked to add others, not included in the table in order to include all the implemented projects. As a result, the total number of actions amounted to 40; they are presented in Table 2. Before analysing the list, one should note that the descriptions showed that in all companies, the first actions were taken even before the official announcement of epidemic threat (14 March). Most frequently, those actions included the obligation to use any available protective masks, introducing an option to (or obligation to) measure the temperature of all people entering the premises and making urgent purchases of disinfectants and protective masks and gloves (in order to speed up their acquisition, purchase procedures were significantly simplified in all companies). This clearly shows that there is an awareness of the need to counteract a widespread and unknown threat as soon as possible. Seventeen of all forty actions were introduced in all mining companies. The majority of the actions concerned the possibility of maintaining social distance by:

- Table 2.** List of actions taken in mining companies to combat the epidemic threat.

[illegible]

Table 2. Cont.

No.	Actions Taken	LW Bogdanka SA	PGG SA	Węglokoks Kraj Sp. z o.o.	TAURON Wydobycie SA	JSW SA	SRK SA	ZG Bolesław SA	KGHM Polska Miedź SA	PG Silesia
14.	Modifying the terms and conditions of cooperation with external companies.	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
15.	Implementing simplified procedures for purchasing dust masks, surgical masks, protective gloves, and disinfectants.	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
16.	Measuring the temperature of all people entering the workplace and in means of public transport for workers with the use of remote thermometers and thermal cameras.	♦	♦	♦		♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
17.	Implementing changes to the working hours of underground workers in order to divide them into smaller groups.	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
18.	Thinning groups of workers in lamp rooms, pitbottoms, and pitheads, in work division areas etc. by implementing one-way traffic, changing work schedules, specifying areas to wait in queues—keeping a safe distance.	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
19.	Thinning groups of workers in cages of mining lifts by reducing the number of transported workers.	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	
20.	Installing additional protections in the form of a system of special partitions and provisional tunnels as well as making it mandatory to wear a mask while being transported.	♦		♦		♦	♦		♦	♦
21.	Making it mandatory to wear and use (cotton, surgical, dust) masks in the workplace and recommending that they are worn when commuting to and from the workplace as specified in general regulations.	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
22.	Disinfecting equipment, devices, and workstations on a regular basis—unlimited access to disinfectants for every worker; disinfecting shaft cages and underground cars after every use by people; disinfecting handrails, handles etc. on a regular basis.	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
23.	Installing additional underground hand washing stations.	♦	♦							
24.	Implementing a ban on taking snuff, eating seeds etc., which generate an additional risk of spreading the virus by droplet transmission.	♦	♦	♦		♦	♦			♦
25.	Shutting down touch-controlled equipment/devices if not necessary for mine operation (kiosks, vending machines).	♦		♦	♦	♦			♦	
26.	Reorganising the canteen—only takeaway meals.	♦	—	♦	♦		—		♦	
27.	Introducing remote work for workstations that can be operated remotely.	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
28.	Providing special rooms for people who have shown symptoms during work and waiting for the decision of the State Sanitary Inspection on a further course of action.	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦	♦
29.	Conducting screening tests among workers.		♦	♦		♦			♦	♦
30.	Launching a 24/7 psychological support service for employees.		♦	♦	♦	♦			♦	

Table 2. Cont.

No.	Actions Taken	LW Bogdanka SA	PGG SA	Węglkokos Kraj Sp. z o.o.	TAURON Wydobycie SA	JSW SA	SRK SA	ZG Bolesław SA	KGHM Polska Miedź SA	PG Silesia
31.	Suspending or limiting heading works.		♦	♦	♦		—			♦
32.	Suspending or limiting excavation.		♦	♦	♦		—			♦
33.	Installing decontamination chambers.			♦		♦				
34.	Revising the occupational hazard evaluation at workstations					♦	♦			
35.	Suspending the bonus for no absences due to sickness.	♦	—	—	—	—	—	—	♦	—
36.	Preparing and implementing Business Continuity Plans (BCPs).					♦				
37.	Implementing periodic OHS training in the form of e-learning.	♦								
38.	Suspending the obligation to conduct periodic check-ups of workers as specified in Article 12a of the Act of 31 March 2020.	♦								
39.	Introducing quarantine for incoming mail. Reorganising its reception so that direct contact between a mail department employee and external persons is limited.						♦			
40.	Implementing the possibility of conducting fast tests (at the cost of the company) for workers who may have had contact with people who contracted the virus.						♦			

Source: author's own elaboration based on the research carried out in mining companies.

Other actions were related to:

- Taking continuous action related to providing information about the threat with the use of all available means,
- Measuring the temperature of all people entering the workplace and in means of public transport for workers,
- Making it mandatory to wear and use protective masks in the workplace,
- Disinfecting rooms, equipment, devices and workstations on a regular basis, including the provision of wide access to disinfectants for workers.

In addition, special rooms for people suspected of contracting the virus and showing symptoms at work were established in all mining companies. Another common action was establishing crisis management teams (for the entire company and individual mines) that coordinated the implementation of anti-threat procedures and monitored the effects of their implementation. Other actions, listed in Table 2, were taken depending on the epidemic situation in a company. This particularly concerns conducting screening tests among workers and temporarily suspending or limiting work.

Figure 3 shows a diagram of classifying actions into groups concerning particular action areas based on the research carried out in mining companies.




Figure 3. Actions taken to combat the epidemic threat in mines. Source: author's own elaboration based on the research carried out in mining companies.

5. Discussion

In all descriptions of actions prepared before, it was emphasised that the implemented anti-threat procedures had a positive effect and, despite initial considerable disruptions in the operation of individual mines, they helped to control crisis situations. In many cases, actions were taken “by intuition” in a manner that would, to the largest extent possible, satisfy the recommendations of epidemiological services for the society as a whole and manufacturing companies operating in sectors other than the mining industry. Their effectiveness makes it possible to formulate a thesis that in the absence of means that would combat the ongoing pandemic effectively, the six groups of various actions shown in Figure 3 may be considered a list of good practices used to fight the epidemic threat affecting the operation of companies. However, it is also important for the new procedures to be reflected in documents prepared in mines and plants belonging to the mining company. In particular, this applies to the “Safety Document” prepared according to the template included in the appendix to the Regulation of the Minister of Energy of 23 November 2016 [25]. This document should mainly include descriptions of:

- Threats in a mining plant, how to identify and monitor them, and how to protect against them,
- How to evaluate and document risks in workplaces and workstations,
- How to inform workers of risks and prevent threats,
- Provision of workplaces with collective protection measures and of employees with personal protective equipment as well as safety signs in use.

All of these points should include appropriate provisions on the epidemic threat and the established countermeasures. In addition, if the implemented procedures are in any way related to the applicable regulations or workstation instructions, these documents should also be modified accordingly.

There is one more observation based on the analysis of actions taken to combat the threat. Compared to other companies, the situation at LW Bogdanka SA is particularly interesting because it did not have a single case of COVID-19 for a long time. It seems that this is due to two main reasons. The first reason is the location of the mine—the Lubelskie Voivodeship—which has a considerably smaller population (approx. 2.1 million) compared to the Śląskie Voivodeship (approx. 4.5 million). In addition, the number of infections

in this voivodeship was considerably lower, less than 4200, while, at the end of the first decade of October, this number was almost 25,200 in the Śląskie Voivodeship. This is an advantage of some sort, fully utilised by the management of the mining company because the other reason is that actions were taken the earliest in this mine, while their scope was the most extensive and detailed.

6. Conclusions

According to numerous studies conducted all over the world on the fight against the threats posed by SARS-CoV-2, there is no chance of its natural extinction. Until an effective vaccine is developed, there will be no other way to slow down the spread of the pandemic than to limit contact between individuals. Therefore, the management of mining companies must adopt such an assumption when making decisions related to their operation.

First of all, it is necessary to take all measures to reduce the number of people in underground excavations. One of them includes a change to the organisation of work, which is commonly introduced and mainly involves an increase in the number of shifts combined with varying work starting hours. Still, in-depth technical and economical analyses may also be conducted in every mine concerning the possibility of:

1. Limiting the number of people working at the face of a mine,
2. Limiting the number of faces in terms of works related to driving both headings and excavations,
3. Shutting down certain excavations and basic facilities (e.g., shafts and foreshafts).

The principles and technologies for carrying out certain works often, among others, provide for employing the minimum number of people necessary for their safe operation. Therefore, the procedure aiming at a reduction in the number of people working at faces of a mine cannot involve reducing this number below the required minimum. However, in many cases, it is possible to apply modern technical solutions that allow for the number of workers to be reduced significantly. They include, for example:

- The use of electro-hydraulic controllers for sections of powered roof supports carried out by only one operator located at the main gate,
- The use of full visualisation and automation for controlling conveyors that transport the output,
- The use of a container system for transporting materials—containers loaded on the surface can be transported directly to the face of a mine without the need of reloading them on main transport roads.

It is also very important to wear personal protective equipment, such as gloves and masks, and to disinfect rooms with such equipment, workstations and tools on a regular basis.

If there are other ways to prevent the epidemic threat in a given mining company and/or its mines, it is, of course, always necessary to use them. However, it is important for all activities to be taken in a coordinated manner, which should ensure their increased effectiveness.

Funding: The paper presents results of research conducted in AGH University of Science and Technology no. 16.16.100.215 and Research University Excellence Initiative.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement: The data presented in this study are new and have not been previously published.

Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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