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Open AccessArticle

Supporting Sustainable Development of Water Resources: A Social Welfare Maximization Game Model

1,2, 1, 1,3,* and 1,2
1
School of Economics and Management, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan 430074, China
2
Research Center of Resource and Environmental Economics, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan 430074, China
3
School of Economics and Management, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16(16), 2896; https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph16162896
Received: 25 June 2019 / Revised: 8 August 2019 / Accepted: 8 August 2019 / Published: 13 August 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Water Resources Systems Quality and Quantity Management)
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Abstract

Water can carry a boat but can also overturn it (human societal sustainable development). Governments faced aquatic ecosystem restoration and preservation challenges following the establishment of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. This paper proposes a social welfare maximization game model to analyze the dominant strategy equilibrium of enterprise-1 and enterprise-2 based on welfare maximization under the total sewage emission control policy. Under the aforementioned control policy, a stricter total sewage emission control of an enterprise corresponds to a lower enterprise output and a higher output of a competing enterprise; that is, the profit transfer effect occurs. When the government implements a relatively strict total sewage emission control policy for an enterprise, it is beneficial to reduce the amount of sewage emission from an enterprise but has no impact on the amount of sewage emission from a competing enterprise; however, the amount of sewage reduction of both enterprises will increase. If the government does not provide capital and technical support to enterprise-2, then enterprise-1 and enterprise-2 should implement total quantity control policies with different rigor degrees to avoid the one-size-fits-all phenomenon. To maximize social welfare, the government should adjust the total sewage emission control policy in time according to sewage stock changes and focus more on enterprises with insufficient capital and poor technical skills and provide financial and technical support. View Full-Text
Keywords: water pollution; maximization of social welfare; game; total sewage control water pollution; maximization of social welfare; game; total sewage control
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Guo, M.; Jiang, Z.; Bu, Y.; Cheng, J. Supporting Sustainable Development of Water Resources: A Social Welfare Maximization Game Model. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2019, 16, 2896.

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