In the present paper, we address the following general question in the framework of classical first-order logic. Assume that a certain mathematical principle can be formalized in a first-order language by a set
E of conditional formulas of the form
. Given a base theory
T, we can use the set of conditional formulas
E to extend the base theory in two natural ways. Either we add to
T each formula in
E as a new
axiom (thus obtaining a theory denoted by
) or we extend
T by using the formulas in
E as instances of an
inference rule (thus obtaining a theory denoted by
). The theory
will be stronger than
, but how much stronger can
be? More specifically, is
conservative over
for theorems of some fixed syntactical complexity
? Under very general assumptions on the set of conditional formulas
E, we obtain two main conservation results in this regard. Firstly, if the formulas in
E have low syntactical complexity with respect to some prescribed class of formulas
and in the applications of
side formulas from the class
and can be eliminated (in a certain precise sense), then
is
-conservative over
. Secondly, if, in addition,
E is a
finite set with
m conditional
sentences, then nested applications of
of a depth at most of
m suffice to obtain
conservativity. These conservation results between axioms and inference rules extend well-known conservation theorems for fragments of first-order arithmetics to a general, purely logical framework.
Full article