Special Issue "Moral Hazard in Banking"
A special issue of International Journal of Financial Studies (ISSN 2227-7072).
Deadline for manuscript submissions: 31 May 2014
Dr. Enrico Onali
Bangor Business School, Hen Goleg, College Road, Bangor, LL57 2DG, UK
Phone: 01248 38 3650
Interests: asset pricing; applied econometrics; corporate finance; banking
The recent global financial crisis has reignited interest in the topic of moral hazard in banking. Theoretically, safety nets should prevent bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and therefore preserve financial stability. However, deposit insurance and other types of government guarantees (both implicit and explicit) may increase bank risk-taking because of the isomorphic relation between insurance and a put option (Ronn and Verma, 1986). Recent contributions have provided evidence of moral hazard in banking deriving from bailouts expectations (Dam and Koetter, 2012), as well as risk-shifting in the form of dividend payments (Acharya et al., 2011; Onali, 2012).
Capital adequacy regulation is supposed to reduce the perverse incentives generated by government guarantees by forcing bank owners to have some ‘skin in the game’. However, capital requirements in a liberalized banking system may result in lower franchise values, and the overall impact of capital requirements on bank risk-taking is hard to assess a priori (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000).
The new Basel III framework aims at reducing moral hazard. To achieve this objective, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has proposed a number of amendments to the current regulation encompassing all three pillars of the framework (minimum capital requirements based on risk-weighted assets, supervisory review process, and market discipline). However, further theoretical and empirical research is warranted to assess the effectiveness of different types of banking regulation in reducing moral hazard and to understand the extent to which the Basel III framework addresses the pitfalls of the current rules.
Dr. Enrico Onali
Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. Papers will be published continuously (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.
Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are refereed through a peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. International Journal of Financial Studies is an international peer-reviewed Open Access quarterly journal published by MDPI.
Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. For the first couple of issues the Article Processing Charge (APC) will be waived for well-prepared manuscripts. English correction and/or formatting fees of 250 CHF (Swiss Francs) will be charged in certain cases for those articles accepted for publication that require extensive additional formatting and/or English corrections.
- moral hazard
- bank risk-taking
- prudential regulation
- deposit insurance
- bank bailouts
- systemically important financial institutions
- Basel III
- managerial incentives
- market discipline
Last update: 11 November 2013