Special Issue "Credit Risk under Moral Hazard"
A special issue of International Journal of Financial Studies (ISSN 2227-7072).
Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (1 October 2013)
Dr. Panayiotis G. Artikis (Website)
Department of Business Administration, University of Piraeus, 80 Karaoli & Dimitriou Street., Piraeus 18534, Greece
Interests: asset pricing; financial modeling; corporate finance; portfolio management; risk management
Over the years it has become evident that the issue of moral hazard in financial intermediation plays a fundamental role in all modern economies. The analysis of moral hazard influences to a large extent the formation of bank regulation and, more generally, financial regulation. The problems of moral hazard in banks, financial institutions and sovereigns have become even more evident at many stages of the recent financial crisis. The question of whether governments or banks, in the brink of bankruptcy due to reckless borrowing or lending, should be bail-out has regained serious attention in the financial economics literature. Policy makers and scholars in favor of bailouts base their arguments mainly on the risk contagion hypothesis and were those against put forward issues of market discipline. Furthermore, a number of other issues have emerged, such as whether moral hazard in financial intermediation can cause aggregate economic fluctuations, or how policy makers can shape bank and financial regulation to contain the risks of moral hazard, or what is the role of moral hazard in the securitization process of financial intermediaries and how this has affected their credit risk profiles. From this perspective, the purpose of this volume is to further explore and analyze issues related to credit risk taking and moral hazard and what lessons can be learnt from the recent financial crisis.
Dr. Panayiotis G. Artikis
- moral hazard
- credit risk
- financial crisis
- financial intermediaries
- risk management