Special Issue "Games and Industrial Organization"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 June 2018)

Special Issue Editor

Guest Editor
Prof. Dr. Luca Lambertini

Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy
Website | E-Mail
Interests: optimal control and differential games (theory and applications); industrial organization; international trade; environmental and resource economic

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

This Special Issue of Games is dedicated to the analysis of strategic behavior in the field of industrial organization. In addition to the traditional topics of interest in this discipline, which acted as a Trojan horse in the adoption of game theory by the modern social sciences as a whole, potential topics of interest include, but are by no means limited to, the relationship between aggregate innovation and industry structure, two-sided markets, platforms, and price algorithms. Submissions dealing with the impact of vertical or horizontal mergers on technical progress, the analysis of the intertemporal evolution of an industry using Markovian tools, potential games and experimental evidence—to mention just a few other possibilities—are also welcome. The same applies to well-motivated reviews of ongoing debates.

Prof. Dr. Luca Lambertini
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All papers will be peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access quarterly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 550 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • game theory
  • platforms
  • two-sided markets
  • industry evolution
  • innovation
  • mergers
  • vertical relations
  • potential games

Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

Open AccessArticle Ranking Supply Function and Cournot Equilibria in a Differentiated Product Duopoly with Demand Uncertainty
Games 2018, 9(3), 60; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030060
Received: 26 June 2018 / Revised: 7 August 2018 / Accepted: 18 August 2018 / Published: 21 August 2018
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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a welfare ranking for the equilibria of the supply function and quantity competitions in a differentiated product duopoly with demand uncertainty. We prove that the expected consumer surplus is always higher under the supply function competition, irrespective of
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In this paper, we provide a welfare ranking for the equilibria of the supply function and quantity competitions in a differentiated product duopoly with demand uncertainty. We prove that the expected consumer surplus is always higher under the supply function competition, irrespective of whether the (duopolistic) products are substitutes, complements, or independent. Numerical simulations suggest that if the products are either complements or independent, or if they have an extremely low degree of substitution, then the supply function competition can always be Pareto superior to the quantity competition in terms of the producers’ and consumers’ welfares. Moreover, if the degree of product substitution is not extremely low, then the supply function competition can be Pareto superior to the quantity competition if and only if the size of the demand uncertainty is sufficiently large to exceed a critical level. We find that this critical level of demand uncertainty becomes higher when the duopolistic products are less differentiated. Additionally, this critical level is nonincreasing both in the marginal cost of producing a unit output and in the own-price sensitivity of each inverse demand curve when all other parameters are fixed. Our results imply that in electricity markets with differentiated products, the regulators should not intervene to impose the quantity competition in favor of the supply function competition unless the degree of product substitution is sufficiently high and the predicted demand fluctuations are sufficiently small. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Games and Industrial Organization)
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