Abstract: Although the consensus in the field of human intelligence holds that a unitary factor (g) accounts for the majority of the variance among individuals, there are still some who argue that intelligence is composed of separate abilities and individual differences across abilities in combination are what constitutes intelligence. In keeping with the latter theoretical support, the Sternberg Triarchic Abilities Test (STAT) is an intelligence test that is designed to measure three distinct types of intelligence: analytical, practical, and creative. Several analyses were conducted to establish whether or not the triarchic model is empirically supported, or if a unitary construct is the best explanation of individual differences on this test. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses indicate that a g model is the best explanation for the data.
Abstract: The size and nature of sex differences in cognitive ability continues to be a source of controversy. Conflicting findings result from the selection of measures, samples, and methods used to estimate sex differences. Existing sex differences work on the Cognitive Abilities Test (CogAT) has analyzed manifest variables, leaving open questions about sex differences in latent narrow cognitive abilities and the underlying broad ability of fluid reasoning (Gf). This study attempted to address these questions. A confirmatory bifactor model was used to estimate Gf and three residual narrow ability factors (verbal, quantitative, and figural). We found that latent mean differences were larger than manifest estimates for all three narrow abilities. However, mean differences in Gf were trivial, consistent with previous research. In estimating group variances, the Gf factor showed substantially greater male variability (around 20% greater). The narrow abilities varied: verbal reasoning showed small variability differences while quantitative and figural showed substantial differences in variance (up to 60% greater). These results add precision and nuance to the study of the variability and masking hypothesis.
Abstract: A consensus definition of intelligence remains elusive but there are many reasons to believe that the field of intelligence is entering a new era of significant progress. The convergence of recent advances in psychometrics, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience has set the stage for the development of stronger theories and more sophisticated models. The establishment of a new open access journal as an outlet for new intelligence research is evidence that the new era has begun.
Abstract: This brief commentary suggests that the usefulness of the concept of intelligence might depend on how one defines intelligence and on whether one is using it for scientificor practical purposes. Furthermore, it is suggested that the concept of working memory must not be overlooked when considering individual differences in intelligence.
Abstract: Here, I suggest we must invest our scientific resources in brain research. Scientists interested in human (and non-human) intelligence should frame their key questions regarding where to look and where to go around technical advances related to the fascinating, general purpose, highly dynamic device we call the ‘brain’.