Games2015, 6(2), 79-123; doi:10.3390/g6020079 - published 18 May 2015 Show/Hide Abstract
Abstract: We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of three pools of subjects: Undergraduate students, temporary workers and permanent workers. We find that students are more selfish and contribute less than workers. Temporary and permanent contract workers have similar other-regarding preferences and display analogous contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game.
Games2015, 6(2), 57-78; doi:10.3390/g6020057 - published 8 May 2015 Show/Hide Abstract
Abstract: Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by \(\theta\in(0,1)\). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. However, this solution exists only for certain \(\theta\). A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium, always exists. Under a ''with replacement'' assumption as well as a simplifying assumption concerning the information available to one of the players, we derive each of the three solutions for all \(\theta\).
Games2015, 6(2), 39-56; doi:10.3390/g6020039 - published 22 April 2015 Show/Hide Abstract
Abstract: This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form. We show that agreement is immediate in equilibrium, and the proposer advantage disappears as the breakdown probability goes to zero. We then turn to the special case of apex games and explore the consequences of varying the probabilities that govern the selection of formateurs and proposers. Letting the breakdown probability go to zero, most of the probabilities considered lead to the same ex post pay-off division. Ex ante expected pay-offs may follow a counterintuitive pattern: as the bargaining power of weak players within a protocoalition increases, the weak players may expect a lower pay-off ex ante.
Games2015, 6(1), 32-38; doi:10.3390/g6010032 - published 5 March 2015 Show/Hide Abstract
Abstract: Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.
Games2015, 6(1), 2-31; doi:10.3390/g6010002 - published 9 January 2015 Show/Hide Abstract
Abstract: We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling games are not isolated and, therefore, not robust under perturbations. However, some of them attract open sets of initial conditions. We prove the existence of certain rest points of the selection-mutation dynamics close to Nash equilibria of the signaling game and show that all but the perturbed rest points close to strict Nash equilibria are dynamically unstable. This is an important result for the evolution of signaling behavior, since it shows that the second-order forces that are governed by mutation can increase the chances of successful signaling.