Abstract: In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, many countries are hoping that massive increases in their money supplies will revive their economies. Evaluating the effectiveness of this strategy using traditional statistical methods would require the construction of an extremely complex economic model of the world that showed how each country’s situation affected all other countries. No matter how complex that model was, it would always be subject to the criticism that it had omitted important variables. Omitting important variables from traditional statistical methods ruins all estimates and statistics. This paper uses a relatively new statistical method that solves the omitted variables problem. This technique produces a separate slope estimate for each observation which makes it possible to see how the estimated relationship has changed over time due to omitted variables. I find that the effectiveness of monetary policy has fallen between the first quarter of 2003 and the fourth quarter of 2012 by 14%, 36%, 38%, 32%, 29% and 69% for Japan, the UK, the USA, the Euro area, Brazil, and the Russian Federation respectively. I hypothesize that monetary policy is suffering from diminishing returns because it cannot address the fundamental problem with the world’s economy today; that problem is a global glut of savings that is either sitting idle or funding speculative bubbles.
Abstract: Recent debate on the effectiveness of tax rebates has concentrated on the degree to which they can affect economic activity, which depends on the methodology, the state of the economy, and the underlying assumptions. A better approach to assess the effectiveness of these monetary transfers is by comparing this method to alternative policies—like the traditional monetary injections through the financial intermediaries. A limited participation model calibrated to the U.S. economy is used to show that the higher the proportion of the monetary injection channeled through the consumers—instead of banks—leads to a less vigorous recovery of output but softens the detrimental effect on the utility of the representative household from the inherent inflationary pressure. This result is robust to the relative importance of the injection (utilization of resources) and alternative utility functions.
Abstract: The focus of this paper is to examine potential impacts of fiscal and monetary policies on stock market performance in Poland. Applying the GARCH model and based on a sample during 1999.Q2 to 2012.Q4, this paper finds that Poland’s stock market index is not affected by the ratio of government deficits or debt to GDP and is negatively influenced by the money market rate. The stock index and the ratio of M3 to GDP show a quadratic relationship with a critical value of 46.03%, suggesting that they have a positive relationship if the M3/GDP ratio is less than 46.03% and a negative relationship if the M3/GDP ratio is greater than 46.03%. Furthermore, Poland’s stock index is positively associated with industrial production and stock market performance in Germany and the U.S. and negatively affected by the nominal effective exchange rate and the inflation rate.
Abstract: World economy is living a time of change, and the complexity of change has implied a new research agenda on the role of economic policy in society. The role, types and effects of economic policy have been major issues in economic science since its origins. Jean Tinbergen (1956)  established the basis for the traditional theory of economic policy in economics and he tried to show how economic knowledge could be organized to regulate and guide economic systems. Nevertheless, this traditional approach has been improved through several contributions, for example when Eggertsson (1997)  incorporated the existence of incomplete knowledge, endogenous politics and institutional change in the theory of economic policy.
Abstract: Game theory offers a rigorous set of concepts, relationships, and models that invite myriad applications to problems of political economy. Indeed, game theory can serve as a fundamental modeling technique that can bridge microfoundations of political and economic exchanges, with developmental processes and macro implications related to growth and distribution. Applications can range from localized interactions within workplaces, firms, political organizations, and community groups; to intermediate-level market, industry, community, or inter-organizational transactions; to encompassing national, regional, population, or global interactions. At any of these levels, game models can illustrate strategic responses of economic or political actors (individuals or organizations) to specifiable conditions concerning any or all of the following: prevailing social context—notably informal institutions (such as social norms) and formal institutions (such as mutually understood laws and regulations); available information (complete or not; accessible or strategically manipulated); agents’ motivations (material and/or social); and even levels of rationality—substantive (full cognition) or bounded (limited cognition). Applicable models may operate on the basis of given institutional context and preference orientations or may explore associated developmental processes, including adaptive social learning. Of particular interest are representations of one or more of the myriad social dilemmas (or collective-action problems) that inhabit political economy, associated exercises or distributions of power, and/or representations of potential resolutions to such dilemmas—perhaps with policy implications. Accordingly, this forthcoming issue of Economies seeks game-theoretic models based on classical, evolutionary, behavioral, or epistemic game theory that can be applied to one or more problems in political economy.
Abstract: We study whether forecasts of the rate of change of the price of oil are rational. To this end, we consider a model that allows the shape of forecasters’ loss function to be studied. The shape of forecasters’ loss function may be consistent with a symmetric or an asymmetric loss function. We find that an asymmetric loss function often (but not always) makes forecasts look rational, and we also report that forecast rationality may have changed over time.