

Supplementary Materials: Online Appendix

Table S1: List of Countries with data on female managers

Country	Years	Country	Years	Country	Years
Afghanistan	2008, 2014	Gabon	2008	North Macedonia	2008, 2012
Albania	2013	Gambia	2018	Pakistan	2014
Angola	2010	Georgia	2008, 2013	Panama	2010
Antigua and Barbuda	2010	Ghana	2012	Papua New Guinea	2015
Argentina	2010, 2017	Greece	2018	Paraguay	2010, 2017
Armenia	2008, 2012	Grenada	2010	Peru	2010, 2017
Azerbaijan	2008, 2013	Guatemala	2010, 2017	Philippines	2009, 2014
Bahamas	2010	Guinea	2016	Poland	2008, 2013
Bangladesh	2013	Guyana	2010	Romania	2008, 2012
Barbados	2010	Honduras	2010, 2016	Russia	2008, 2012
Belarus	2008, 2013	Hungary	2008, 2013	Rwanda	2011
Belize	2010	India	2014	Senegal	2014
Benin	2009, 2016	Indonesia	2009, 2015	Serbia	2008, 2013
Bhutan	2015	Iraq 2011	2011	Sierra Leone	2008, 2017
Bolivia	2010, 2017	Israel 2013	2013	Slovak Republic	2008, 2013
Bosnia	2008, 2012	Jamaica	2010	Slovenia	2008, 2013
Botswana	2010	Jordan	2013	Solomon Islands	2015
Brazil	2008	Kazakhstan	2008, 2013	South Sudan	2014
Bulgaria	2008, 2012	Kenya	2013, 2018	Sri Lanka	2011
Burkina Faso	2009	Kosovo	2008, 2013	St Kitts and Nevis	2010
Burundi	2014	Kyrgyz Republic	2008, 2013	St Lucia	2010
Cambodia	2016	Lao PDR	2012, 2016, 2018	St Vincent and Grenadines	2010
Cameroon	2009, 2016	Latvia	2008, 2013	Sudan	2014
Cape Verde	2009	Lebanon	2013	Suriname	2010, 2018
Central African Rep.	2011	Lesotho	2008, 2016	Sweden	2014
Chad	2009, 2018	Liberia	2008, 2017	Tajikistan	2008, 2013
Chile	2010	Lithuania	2008, 2013	Tanzania	2013
China	2012	Madagascar	2008, 2013	Thailand	2015
Colombia	2010, 2017	Malawi	2009, 2014	Timor Leste	2015
Congo, Rep	2008	Malaysia	2015	Togo	2009, 2016
Costa Rica	2010	Mali	2010, 2016	Trinidad and Tobago	2010
Croatia	2013	Mauritania	2014	Tunisia	2013
Czech Republic	2008, 2013	Mauritius	2008	Turkey	2008, 2013
Côte d'Ivoire	2008, 2016	Mexico	2010	Uganda	2013
Congo, Dem. Rep	2010, 2013	Moldova	2008, 2012	Ukraine	2008, 2013
Djibouti	2013	Mongolia	2008, 2012	Uruguay	2010, 2017
Dominica	2010	Montenegro	2008, 2013	Uzbekistan	2008, 2013
Dominican Republic	2010, 2016	Morocco	2013	Venezuela	2010
Ecuador	2010, 2017	Mozambique	2018	Vietnam	2009, 2015
Egypt	2013, 2016	Myanmar	2014, 2016	West Bank and Gaza	2013
El Salvador	2010, 2016	Namibia	2014	Yemen	2010, 2013
Eritrea	2009	Nepal	2009, 2013	Zambia	2012
Estonia	2008, 2013	Nicaragua	2010, 2016	Zimbabwe	2011, 2016
Eswatini	2016	Niger	2009, 2017		
Ethiopia	2011, 2015	Nigeria	2014		

Table S2: Sample means of dependent and independent variables

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Transactions with government officials					
Firm got construction license (dummy)	110,134	0.137	0.343	0.000	1.000
Firm got import license (dummy)	109,227	0.123	0.328	0.000	1.000
Firm got operating license (dummy)	109,479	0.231	0.422	0.000	1.000
Firm faced tax inspection (dummy)	109,392	0.587	0.492	0.000	1.000
Firm attempted to get government contract (dummy)	107,599	0.179	0.383	0.000	1.000
Bribes requested					
Bribe requested when getting construction license (dummy)	13,975	0.203	0.402	0.000	1.000
Bribe requested when getting import license (dummy)	12,460	0.114	0.318	0.000	1.000
Bribe requested when getting operating license (dummy)	23,775	0.143	0.350	0.000	1.000
Bribe requested when getting tax inspection (dummy)	60,111	0.131	0.338	0.000	1.000
Bribes needed to get government contracts (dummy)	19,244	0.149	0.356	0.000	1.000
Control Variables					
Firm has female manager (dummy)	110,851	0.157	0.364	0.000	1.000
Firm has female owners (dummy)	105,522	0.338	0.473	0.000	1.000
Respondent was female (dummy)	97,507	0.238	0.426	0.000	1.000
Number of workers (nat. log)	104,425	3.351	1.396	-2.485	12.047
Firm exports (dummy)	109,284	0.225	0.417	0.000	1.000
Share of firm foreign owned (percent)	109,090	7.670	24.610	0.000	100.000
Share of firm state-owned (percent)	109,090	0.706	6.459	0.000	100.000
Per capita GDP (PPP 2010\$, nat.log)	110,851	8.888	0.879	6.457	10.681
Firm is in manufacturing sector (dummy)	110,851	0.538	0.499	0.000	1.000
Firm is in retail trade sector (dummy)	110,851	0.284	0.451	0.000	1.000
Firm is in service sector (dummy)	110,851	0.179	0.383	0.000	1.000

Table S3: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested, female owners.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	62,792		62,364		61,511		62,164		60,656	
Observations for 2nd stage	6572		6762		10354		12965		35066	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
All owners are female [dummy]	-0.020 (-0.30)	0.026 (0.93)	0.243*** (3.24)	-0.065** (-2.19)	0.101* (1.74)	-0.064*** (-2.58)	-0.096** (-2.01)	0.076*** (3.22)	-0.010 (-0.32)	-0.041** (-1.97)
Number of workers [nat. log]	-0.011 (-0.76)	0.192*** (34.49)	0.032** (2.14)	0.156*** (27.34)	-0.018 (-1.47)	0.106*** (21.20)	-0.004 (-0.34)	0.058*** (11.07)	-0.029*** (-4.32)	0.129*** (27.79)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.176*** (-4.07)	0.139*** (7.78)	0.081* (1.77)	0.428*** (24.07)	0.111*** (2.97)	0.038** (2.34)	0.043 (1.27)	0.111*** (6.55)	-0.014 (-0.62)	0.062*** (4.15)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.001** (-1.99)	-0.000 (-0.03)	0.001 (0.90)	0.003*** (9.52)	-0.002*** (-3.34)	-0.001*** (-4.55)	-0.001* (-1.92)	0.000 (0.84)	-0.001*** (-2.89)	0.000* (1.84)
% government owned [percent]	-0.008** (-2.32)	-0.000 (-0.27)	-0.001 (-0.36)	0.000 (0.30)	-0.000 (-0.05)	0.005*** (5.16)	-0.007** (-2.34)	0.002* (1.74)	-0.004** (-2.21)	-0.001 (-0.77)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.283*** (-14.70)	-0.022*** (-2.82)	-0.240*** (-10.85)	-0.061*** (-7.40)	-0.171*** (-10.71)	-0.012* (-1.72)	-0.219*** (-12.04)	0.014* (1.75)	-0.227*** (-21.53)	-0.008 (-1.11)
% of other firms with license [percent]		4.222*** (56.90)		4.015*** (68.99)		3.452*** (65.08)		3.365*** (117.90)		3.012*** (107.95)
Constant	1.894*** (9.72)	-2.417*** (-33.96)	0.458** (2.23)	-2.040*** (-27.16)	0.106 (0.71)	-1.913*** (-29.66)	0.923*** (6.14)	-2.103*** (-29.64)	1.253*** (14.76)	-1.950*** (-27.98)
Correlation between errors	-0.031 (-0.65)		0.193*** (4.27)		0.260*** (5.62)		0.032 (1.37)		-0.374*** (-17.14)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade.

Table S4: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested, female respondents.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	91,404		90,983		90,337		90,358		88,331	
Observations for 2nd stage	10930		9637		15862		19937		50989	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Respondent is female [dummy]	-0.135*** (-4.01)	-0.098*** (-7.19)	-0.019 (-0.47)	-0.097*** (-6.46)	-0.103*** (-3.38)	-0.112*** (-8.97)	-0.161*** (-6.02)	-0.053*** (-4.19)	-0.099*** (-5.60)	-0.079*** (-7.26)
Number of workers [nat. log]	0.016 (1.40)	0.203*** (46.52)	0.028** (2.25)	0.166*** (35.25)	-0.034*** (-3.44)	0.119*** (29.85)	0.005 (0.56)	0.070*** (17.02)	-0.021*** (-3.82)	0.138*** (37.00)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.104*** (-3.11)	0.107*** (7.41)	0.058 (1.51)	0.429*** (28.82)	0.060** (1.97)	0.007 (0.52)	0.043 (1.53)	0.063*** (4.55)	-0.014 (-0.76)	0.068*** (5.50)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.002*** (-3.79)	-0.000 (-1.44)	0.000 (0.99)	0.003*** (13.08)	-0.002*** (-3.59)	-0.001*** (-5.97)	-0.001** (-2.48)	-0.000 (-0.16)	-0.001*** (-3.41)	0.000 (1.59)
% government owned [percent]	-0.004* (-1.76)	-0.003*** (-3.24)	-0.001 (-0.41)	-0.001 (-0.63)	-0.001 (-0.63)	0.004*** (6.23)	-0.006*** (-2.99)	0.000 (0.17)	-0.000 (-0.25)	-0.003*** (-4.16)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.261*** (-17.41)	-0.019*** (-2.91)	-0.258*** (-13.63)	-0.070*** (-9.82)	-0.113*** (-9.14)	0.004 (0.71)	-0.190*** (-13.40)	0.030*** (4.81)	-0.225*** (-25.69)	-0.016*** (-2.94)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.972*** (69.30)		4.139*** (82.95)		3.401*** (76.48)		3.300*** (136.18)		2.913*** (123.15)
Constant	1.468*** (8.94)	-2.414*** (-41.69)	0.676*** (3.91)	-2.004*** (-30.76)	-0.112 (-0.90)	-2.070*** (-40.01)	0.639*** (5.52)	-2.249*** (-38.72)	1.246*** (17.84)	-1.846*** (-32.60)
Correlation between errors	0.075* (1.86)		0.223*** (5.92)		0.169*** (4.30)		0.042** (2.05)		-0.376*** (-19.78)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade.

Table S5: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested, all female variables.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	61,119		60,719		59,874		60,516		59,039	
Observations for 2nd stage	6400		6588		10099		12491		34121	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Manager is female [dummy]	0.001 (0.01)	-0.025 (-1.00)	0.208*** (3.27)	-0.018 (-0.72)	0.117** (2.28)	-0.030 (-1.34)	0.155*** (3.44)	0.081*** (3.60)	0.114*** (3.76)	0.025 (1.26)
All owners are female [dummy]	0.066 (0.88)	0.065** (2.11)	0.195** (2.42)	-0.033 (-0.99)	0.096 (1.49)	-0.039 (-1.40)	-0.072 (-1.33)	0.069** (2.53)	0.003 (0.08)	-0.024 (-0.99)
Respondent is Female [dummy]	-0.182*** (-3.42)	-0.062*** (-2.94)	-0.128** (-2.22)	-0.050** (-2.28)	-0.102** (-2.24)	-0.020 (-1.05)	-0.246*** (-5.83)	-0.074*** (-3.78)	-0.162*** (-5.87)	-0.066*** (-3.91)
Number of workers [nat. log]	-0.013 (-0.86)	0.191*** (34.02)	0.031** (2.07)	0.155*** (26.76)	-0.021 (-1.64)	0.103*** (20.36)	-0.005 (-0.50)	0.059*** (11.09)	-0.027*** (-4.03)	0.130*** (27.53)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.170*** (-3.89)	0.144*** (7.95)	0.081* (1.74)	0.430*** (23.93)	0.120*** (3.19)	0.046*** (2.82)	0.045 (1.30)	0.110*** (6.44)	-0.009 (-0.42)	0.066*** (4.40)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.001* (-1.74)	0.000 (0.36)	0.001 (1.14)	0.003*** (9.34)	-0.002*** (-3.55)	-0.001*** (-4.26)	-0.001 (-1.48)	0.000 (1.01)	-0.001*** (-2.95)	0.000 (1.31)
% government owned [percent]	-0.008** (-2.23)	-0.000 (-0.22)	-0.002 (-0.45)	0.001 (0.48)	-0.000 (-0.05)	0.005*** (5.19)	-0.007** (-2.23)	0.002* (1.73)	-0.004** (-2.08)	-0.001 (-0.71)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.270*** (-13.75)	-0.016** (-2.02)	-0.229*** (-10.15)	-0.060*** (-7.05)	-0.164*** (-10.02)	-0.011 (-1.50)	-0.180*** (-9.60)	0.014* (1.76)	-0.223*** (-20.71)	-0.004 (-0.62)
% of other firms with license [percent]		4.219*** (56.08)		4.042*** (68.33)		3.450*** (64.30)		3.359*** (114.83)		3.013*** (106.47)
Constant	1.812*** (9.05)	-2.463*** (-33.84)	0.381* (1.83)	-2.044*** (-26.65)	0.083 (0.54)	-1.912*** (-29.04)	0.647*** (4.17)	-2.107*** (-29.06)	1.215*** (13.98)	-1.976*** (-27.76)
Correlation between errors	-0.030 (-0.64)		0.184*** (4.04)		0.236*** (5.03)		0.009 (0.37)		-0.362*** (-16.14)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade.

Table S6: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested in countries with low corruption, managers.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	32,816		32,701		32,902		32,635		32,450	
Observations for 2nd stage	5450		4368		6474		6086		15929	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Manager is female [dummy]	0.090 (1.37)	-0.053** (-2.14)	0.352*** (3.90)	-0.101*** (-3.71)	0.073 (1.23)	-0.077*** (-3.39)	0.154** (2.40)	0.050** (2.14)	0.021 (0.45)	-0.025 (-1.26)
Number of workers [nat. log]	0.026 (1.01)	0.253*** (38.55)	0.028 (0.99)	0.184*** (26.12)	-0.047*** (-2.59)	0.120*** (19.26)	0.078*** (4.62)	0.134*** (20.62)	0.033** (2.46)	0.155*** (26.59)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.053 (-0.97)	0.086*** (4.22)	-0.092 (-1.14)	0.348*** (16.25)	0.010 (0.20)	0.001 (0.04)	0.030 (0.54)	0.006 (0.28)	-0.109*** (-2.65)	0.087*** (4.95)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.000 (-0.45)	-0.001* (-1.94)	0.000 (0.07)	0.002*** (5.06)	-0.002** (-2.46)	-0.002*** (-5.44)	0.000 (0.10)	-0.001** (-2.00)	-0.000 (-0.28)	0.000 (0.58)
% government owned [percent]	-0.002 (-0.45)	-0.003 (-1.54)	-0.006 (-0.75)	0.001 (0.62)	-0.002 (-0.55)	0.005*** (3.18)	-0.013* (-1.72)	0.004** (2.37)	-0.006 (-1.30)	0.001 (0.42)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.241*** (-6.90)	-0.034** (-2.51)	-0.158*** (-2.89)	-0.085*** (-5.71)	-0.053* (-1.78)	-0.024** (-1.98)	-0.120*** (-2.94)	0.012 (0.90)	-0.167*** (-6.63)	-0.049*** (-4.22)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.167*** (32.99)		3.954*** (40.90)		2.990*** (34.68)		3.462*** (57.72)		2.700*** (61.82)
Constant	0.741* (1.73)	-2.257*** (-17.83)	-0.127 (-0.25)	-1.753*** (-12.24)	-0.383 (-1.43)	-1.715*** (-14.39)	-0.531 (-1.50)	-2.308*** (-17.25)	-0.152 (-0.70)	-1.507*** (-12.78)
Correlation between errors	0.741* (1.73)		-0.127 (-0.25)		-0.383 (-1.43)		-0.531 (-1.50)		-0.152 (-0.70)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade. Countries are classified as low corruption if they are in the top third for control of corruption based on rankings from the World Governance Indicators (<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>). See Kaufmann and others (2009) for a description of the control of corruption indicator.

Table S7: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested in countries with low corruption, owners.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	17,872		17,789		17,916		17,745		17,614	
Observations for 2nd stage	2411		2149		3536		3034		8335	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
All owners are female [dummy]	0.168 (1.32)	-0.036 (-0.74)	0.209 (1.06)	-0.090 (-1.61)	-0.084 (-0.70)	-0.088** (-2.05)	0.148 (1.28)	0.123*** (2.73)	0.012 (0.14)	0.056 (1.49)
Number of workers [nat. log]	0.108*** (3.46)	0.226*** (23.18)	0.075** (2.20)	0.167*** (16.28)	-0.003 (-0.14)	0.122*** (13.54)	0.109*** (4.64)	0.104*** (10.52)	0.061*** (3.35)	0.135*** (15.99)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.128 (-1.57)	0.101*** (3.45)	-0.164 (-1.59)	0.366*** (12.08)	0.003 (0.04)	-0.001 (-0.03)	0.018 (0.23)	0.075** (2.53)	-0.116** (-2.00)	0.055** (2.22)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.000 (-0.13)	-0.001* (-1.91)	0.002 (1.26)	0.001** (2.38)	-0.002 (-1.48)	-0.002*** (-4.75)	0.000 (0.38)	-0.001 (-1.42)	0.000 (0.46)	-0.000 (-0.25)
% government owned [percent]	0.005 (0.99)	-0.000 (-0.01)	-0.001 (-0.12)	0.002 (0.67)	0.001 (0.16)	0.004 (1.55)	-0.006 (-0.81)	0.008*** (3.31)	-0.000 (-0.10)	0.002 (0.91)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.181*** (-4.58)	-0.034** (-2.30)	-0.126** (-2.20)	-0.077*** (-4.71)	-0.041 (-1.22)	-0.026* (-1.94)	-0.065 (-1.41)	0.015 (0.98)	-0.155*** (-5.32)	-0.034*** (-2.62)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.455*** (21.45)		3.927*** (30.68)		2.899*** (26.49)		3.513*** (48.81)		2.783*** (49.63)
Constant	-0.636 (-1.29)	-2.199*** (-15.72)	-0.349 (-0.63)	-1.769*** (-11.33)	-0.588** (-1.98)	-1.657*** (-12.37)	-1.241*** (-3.07)	-2.260*** (-14.91)	-0.358 (-1.47)	-1.618*** (-12.03)
Correlation between errors	0.486*** (3.31)		-0.238* (-1.89)		-0.134 (-1.16)		0.069 (0.98)		-0.061 (-0.78)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade. Countries are classified as low corruption if they are in the top third for control of corruption based on rankings from the World Governance Indicators (<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>). See Kaufmann and others (2009) for a description of the control of corruption indicator.

Table S8: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested in countries with low corruption, respondents.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	25,800		25,720		25,861		25,674		25,475	
Observations for 2nd stage	4258		3223		5075		4404		12401	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Respondent is female [dummy]	-0.008 (-0.13)	-0.091*** (-4.05)	0.034 (0.38)	-0.086*** (-3.39)	-0.051 (-0.91)	-0.061*** (-2.90)	-0.011 (-0.16)	-0.047** (-2.06)	-0.045 (-1.00)	-0.066*** (-3.51)
Number of workers [nat. log]	0.031 (1.10)	0.237*** (31.75)	0.047* (1.66)	0.181*** (22.00)	-0.032 (-1.54)	0.133*** (18.58)	0.063*** (3.12)	0.111*** (14.62)	0.048*** (3.18)	0.147*** (22.01)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.034 (-0.54)	0.087*** (3.77)	-0.089 (-1.00)	0.362*** (14.46)	0.059 (1.06)	-0.020 (-0.91)	-0.022 (-0.32)	0.019 (0.81)	-0.125*** (-2.67)	0.063*** (3.14)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.000 (-0.19)	-0.001*** (-3.26)	0.001 (0.99)	0.001*** (3.78)	-0.002* (-1.83)	-0.002*** (-5.19)	0.000 (0.18)	-0.000 (-1.25)	-0.000 (-0.14)	0.000 (0.56)
% government owned [percent]	-0.001 (-0.11)	-0.005*** (-2.58)	-0.007 (-0.79)	-0.000 (-0.14)	0.001 (0.26)	0.004** (2.36)	-0.009 (-1.29)	0.003* (1.90)	-0.007 (-1.46)	0.001 (0.68)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.186*** (-5.34)	-0.033** (-2.54)	-0.121** (-2.23)	-0.095*** (-6.39)	-0.057* (-1.92)	-0.023* (-1.95)	-0.054 (-1.24)	0.026* (1.86)	-0.149*** (-5.79)	-0.043*** (-3.75)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.086*** (28.56)		4.084*** (39.33)		2.873*** (31.77)		3.451*** (51.60)		2.705*** (55.80)
Constant	-0.004 (-0.01)	-2.139*** (-17.40)	-0.664 (-1.40)	-1.659*** (-11.63)	-0.464* (-1.71)	-1.724*** (-14.59)	-0.994*** (-2.75)	-2.336*** (-17.03)	-0.264 (-1.22)	-1.512*** (-12.66)
Correlation between errors	0.236* (1.92)		-0.041 (-0.39)		-0.075 (-0.74)		-0.106 (-1.57)		-0.108 (-1.59)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade. Countries are classified as low corruption if they are in the top third for control of corruption based on rankings from the World Governance Indicators (<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>). See Kaufmann and others (2009) for a description of the control of corruption indicator

Table S9: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested in countries with high corruption, managers.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	30,369		30,290		29,415		30,001		29,086	
Observations for 2nd stage	3335		3404		5290		8414		18959	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Manager is female [dummy]	-0.071 (-1.07)	-0.055* (-1.86)	-0.021 (-0.28)	-0.100*** (-3.03)	0.007 (0.12)	-0.156*** (-5.94)	-0.059 (-1.31)	0.012 (0.48)	-0.030 (-0.99)	-0.027 (-1.18)
Number of workers [nat. log]	0.035* (1.76)	0.197*** (24.79)	-0.016 (-0.83)	0.157*** (18.28)	-0.056*** (-3.21)	0.129*** (17.89)	-0.027** (-1.99)	0.057*** (7.92)	-0.028*** (-3.21)	0.126*** (18.42)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.000 (-0.00)	0.106*** (3.84)	0.190*** (3.26)	0.406*** (14.50)	0.133** (2.55)	0.046* (1.80)	0.221*** (5.08)	0.069*** (2.71)	0.056* (1.90)	0.088*** (3.70)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.001 (-1.53)	-0.000 (-0.45)	0.002** (2.10)	0.003*** (8.09)	-0.001 (-1.61)	-0.001*** (-2.75)	0.001 (1.07)	-0.000 (-0.63)	-0.001** (-2.21)	0.000 (0.75)
% government owned [percent]	-0.011*** (-3.10)	-0.003** (-2.09)	-0.000 (-0.01)	-0.001 (-0.42)	-0.005* (-1.93)	0.005*** (4.30)	-0.008** (-2.56)	-0.002 (-1.43)	-0.000 (-0.07)	-0.002** (-2.08)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.069*** (-3.06)	-0.025** (-2.46)	-0.128*** (-4.43)	-0.123*** (-10.27)	-0.098*** (-5.36)	0.001 (0.12)	-0.150*** (-8.00)	0.027*** (2.99)	-0.172*** (-12.98)	-0.034*** (-3.57)
% of other firms with license		3.707*** (33.32)		3.714*** (53.20)		3.388*** (36.99)		3.172*** (81.01)		2.865*** (54.69)
Constant	-0.503** (-1.98)	-2.287*** (-25.14)	-0.414* (-1.69)	-1.438*** (-13.68)	0.325 (1.35)	-2.044*** (-26.74)	0.150 (0.99)	-2.123*** (-25.39)	0.896*** (9.08)	-1.648*** (-15.85)
Correlation between errors	0.341*** (4.80)		0.434*** (9.17)		-0.022 (-0.27)		0.260*** (7.66)		-0.262*** (-6.39)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade. Countries are classified as high corruption if they are in the bottom third based on rankings from the World Governance Indicators (<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>). See Kaufmann and others (2009) for a description of the control of corruption indicator.

Table S10: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested in countries with high corruption, owners.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	18,720		18,593		17,605		18,509		17,876	
Observations for 2nd stage	1847		2384		2579		4976		12549	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
All owners are female [dummy]	-0.024 (-0.22)	0.034 (0.72)	0.102 (0.92)	-0.029 (-0.59)	0.026 (0.26)	-0.034 (-0.77)	-0.039 (-0.57)	0.064* (1.67)	-0.032 (-0.73)	-0.041 (-1.15)
Number of workers [nat. log]	0.027 (1.00)	0.183*** (17.24)	-0.000 (-0.02)	0.161*** (15.01)	-0.038 (-1.52)	0.137*** (13.76)	-0.033* (-1.86)	0.018* (1.82)	-0.019* (-1.81)	0.107*** (11.80)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.098 (-1.32)	0.174*** (5.06)	0.198*** (2.89)	0.398*** (11.84)	0.176*** (2.58)	0.056* (1.70)	0.226*** (4.22)	0.089*** (2.78)	0.050 (1.45)	0.049* (1.67)
% foreign owned [percent]	0.000 (0.30)	0.000 (0.83)	0.002** (2.32)	0.003*** (6.24)	-0.002** (-2.22)	-0.001* (-1.74)	0.002** (2.21)	-0.000 (-0.16)	-0.000 (-0.69)	0.001** (1.96)
% government owned [percent]	-0.026*** (-3.56)	-0.002 (-0.87)	-0.005 (-1.06)	-0.001 (-0.27)	-0.003 (-0.64)	0.003* (1.83)	-0.015*** (-2.74)	0.001 (0.57)	-0.006** (-2.54)	-0.003 (-1.59)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.043 (-1.10)	-0.009 (-0.53)	-0.035 (-0.82)	-0.119*** (-6.41)	-0.147*** (-4.20)	-0.038** (-2.44)	-0.102*** (-2.92)	0.005 (0.30)	-0.118*** (-6.36)	-0.002 (-0.12)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.944*** (25.40)		3.503*** (43.15)		3.658*** (28.67)		3.238*** (72.42)		3.078*** (43.13)
Constant	-0.593 (-1.53)	-2.433*** (-16.40)	-1.179*** (-3.38)	-1.491*** (-9.66)	0.459 (1.41)	-1.833*** (-13.87)	-0.076 (-0.27)	-1.848*** (-13.66)	0.392*** (2.76)	-1.972*** (-11.93)
Correlation between errors	0.309*** (3.12)		0.400*** (7.16)		0.090 (0.88)		0.157*** (4.13)		-0.136** (-2.47)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade. Countries are classified as high corruption if they are in the bottom third based on rankings from the World Governance Indicators (<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>). See Kaufmann and others (2009) for a description of the control of corruption indicator.

Table S11: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested in countries with high corruption, respondents.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	29,697		29,642		28,734		29,118		28,397	
Observations for 2nd stage	3099		3154		5014		8004		18789	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Respondent is female [dummy]	-0.262*** (-4.46)	-0.120*** (-4.62)	-0.064 (-0.91)	-0.139*** (-4.66)	-0.260*** (-4.89)	-0.162*** (-7.15)	-0.111*** (-2.72)	-0.038* (-1.74)	-0.172*** (-6.26)	-0.053*** (-2.68)
Number of workers [nat. log]	0.053*** (2.64)	0.193*** (23.67)	0.009 (0.43)	0.159*** (17.96)	-0.049*** (-2.75)	0.137*** (18.54)	-0.015 (-1.08)	0.055*** (7.51)	-0.023*** (-2.65)	0.121*** (17.43)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.000 (-0.01)	0.115*** (4.05)	0.169*** (2.84)	0.417*** (14.58)	0.130** (2.45)	0.040 (1.52)	0.237*** (5.37)	0.062** (2.36)	0.042 (1.43)	0.080*** (3.28)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.001 (-1.13)	0.000 (0.20)	0.002*** (2.84)	0.003*** (7.85)	-0.001 (-1.40)	-0.001** (-2.28)	0.002** (2.31)	-0.001 (-1.30)	-0.000 (-0.81)	0.001* (1.90)
% government owned [percent]	-0.012*** (-3.46)	-0.003* (-1.94)	-0.002 (-0.59)	-0.001 (-0.39)	-0.005** (-2.18)	0.005*** (4.32)	-0.009*** (-2.78)	-0.002 (-1.31)	-0.001 (-0.35)	-0.002** (-1.97)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.045** (-1.98)	-0.013 (-1.27)	-0.054* (-1.71)	-0.129*** (-10.05)	-0.078*** (-4.16)	0.010 (1.15)	-0.105*** (-5.31)	0.030*** (3.27)	-0.144*** (-10.85)	-0.029*** (-2.99)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.761*** (31.58)		3.643*** (50.05)		3.470*** (37.24)		3.175*** (81.26)		2.859*** (52.62)
Constant	-0.772*** (-3.02)	-2.368*** (-25.41)	-0.934*** (-3.60)	-1.404*** (-12.60)	0.173 (0.70)	-2.157*** (-27.70)	-0.091 (-0.58)	-2.144*** (-25.15)	0.692*** (7.01)	-1.661*** (-15.76)
Correlation between errors	0.378*** (5.22)		0.368*** (7.56)		-0.003 (-0.04)		0.139*** (4.15)		-0.276*** (-6.65)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade. Countries are classified as high corruption if they are in the bottom third based on rankings from the World Governance Indicators (<https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>). See Kaufmann and others (2009) for a description of the control of corruption indicator.

Table S12: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested with country and sector dummies included, managers.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	100,118		99,653		99,102		99,218		97,050	
Observations for 2nd stage	12737		11443		17731		22025		55374	
Sector dummies (ISIC)	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country-year dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Manager is female [dummy]	-0.051 (-1.25)	-0.001 (-0.09)	0.011 (0.22)	-0.087*** (-4.90)	0.029 (0.76)	-0.048*** (-3.30)	-0.043 (-1.33)	0.052*** (3.68)	-0.004 (-0.19)	-0.017 (-1.38)
Number of workers [nat. log]	-0.016 (-1.00)	0.238*** (54.15)	0.067*** (3.81)	0.193*** (41.21)	-0.045*** (-3.75)	0.124*** (30.92)	0.010 (1.03)	0.095*** (23.18)	-0.022*** (-3.23)	0.160*** (43.23)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.004 (-0.10)	0.127*** (8.93)	0.185*** (3.97)	0.417*** (28.53)	0.054 (1.62)	0.026** (1.97)	0.135*** (4.41)	0.046*** (3.38)	0.043** (2.16)	0.088*** (7.29)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.000 (-0.55)	-0.001*** (-3.66)	-0.000 (-0.24)	0.002*** (10.67)	-0.002*** (-3.04)	-0.002*** (-8.24)	-0.001 (-1.49)	-0.000 (-1.30)	-0.000 (-1.29)	0.000 (0.39)
% government owned [percent]	-0.004* (-1.91)	-0.002*** (-2.74)	-0.003 (-1.21)	-0.001 (-0.76)	-0.004** (-2.42)	0.005*** (6.87)	-0.007*** (-2.80)	-0.000 (-0.58)	-0.001 (-0.82)	-0.003*** (-4.32)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.157*** (37.89)		2.814*** (26.45)		2.928*** (46.13)		3.137*** (70.43)		2.673*** (71.79)
Constant	-1.318*** (-3.69)	-2.836*** (-24.81)	-7.189 (-0.00)	-2.816*** (-18.12)	-1.424*** (-4.34)	-2.149*** (-21.01)	-2.030*** (-7.31)	-2.116*** (-22.25)	-1.971*** (-5.41)	-2.141*** (-22.68)
Correlation between errors	0.018 (0.28)		0.554*** (6.20)		0.019 (0.26)		0.109*** (2.58)		-0.248*** (-6.87)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are 20 dummies indicating the sub-sector the firm operates in. Country-year dummies are separate dummies for each country by year.

Table S13: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested with country and sector dummies included, female owners.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	62,058		61,653		60,797		61,435		59,970	
Observations for 2 nd stage	6482		6664		10211		12738		34532	
Sector dummies (ISIC)	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country-year dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
All owners are female [dummy]	-0.037 (-0.49)	0.018 (0.63)	0.130 (1.43)	-0.085*** (-2.66)	0.013 (0.19)	-0.018 (-0.68)	-0.066 (-1.20)	0.056** (2.25)	-0.017 (-0.48)	-0.046** (-2.09)
Number of workers [nat. log]	-0.029 (-1.56)	0.219*** (36.08)	0.051** (2.06)	0.180*** (28.93)	-0.004 (-0.28)	0.121*** (22.47)	-0.000 (-0.04)	0.069*** (12.27)	-0.033*** (-4.17)	0.143*** (29.02)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.149*** (-2.95)	0.154*** (8.00)	0.133* (1.94)	0.436*** (22.82)	0.049 (1.13)	0.054*** (3.08)	0.142*** (3.61)	0.096*** (5.33)	0.037 (1.48)	0.072*** (4.59)
% foreign owned [percent]	0.001 (1.02)	-0.001** (-2.25)	-0.000 (-0.34)	0.002*** (6.56)	-0.003*** (-4.15)	-0.002*** (-5.82)	-0.001 (-1.18)	0.000 (0.08)	-0.000 (-0.14)	0.000 (1.23)
% government owned [percent]	-0.006* (-1.69)	-0.001 (-0.96)	-0.005 (-1.14)	-0.000 (-0.26)	-0.003 (-1.16)	0.005*** (4.78)	-0.007** (-1.98)	0.001 (0.75)	-0.005** (-2.19)	-0.001 (-1.15)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.544*** (35.72)		3.137*** (22.28)		3.077*** (41.02)		3.313*** (64.75)		2.809*** (65.50)
Constant	-0.949*** (-2.96)	-2.635*** (-27.43)	-3.038*** (-5.85)	-2.743*** (-24.75)	-1.392*** (-5.27)	-2.069*** (-24.44)	-1.618*** (-3.97)	-2.252*** (-19.85)	-1.018*** (-6.85)	-2.027*** (-26.99)
Correlation between errors	-0.059 (-0.84)		0.408*** (3.12)		0.160* (1.88)		0.095** (2.13)		-0.279*** (-7.26)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are 20 dummies indicating the sub-sector the firm operates in. Country-year dummies are separate dummies for each country by year.

Table S14: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested with country and sector dummies, female respondents.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	90,577		90,178		89,529		89,535		87,553	
Observations for 2nd stage	10823		9529		15699		19698		50410	
Sector dummies (ISIC)	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country-year dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Respondent is female [dummy]	-0.181*** (-4.73)	-0.113*** (-7.64)	-0.125*** (-2.85)	-0.092*** (-5.61)	-0.162*** (-4.62)	-0.105*** (-7.75)	-0.155*** (-4.87)	-0.053*** (-3.92)	-0.131*** (-6.32)	-0.069*** (-5.83)
Number of workers [nat. log]	-0.014 (-0.88)	0.225*** (47.53)	0.070*** (3.99)	0.190*** (37.15)	-0.035*** (-2.70)	0.130*** (30.27)	0.009 (0.89)	0.079*** (17.89)	-0.019*** (-2.82)	0.153*** (38.78)
Firm exports [dummy]	0.010 (0.25)	0.130*** (8.41)	0.199*** (4.16)	0.440*** (27.48)	0.092*** (2.61)	0.022 (1.54)	0.137*** (4.24)	0.056*** (3.81)	0.050** (2.44)	0.074*** (5.70)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.000 (-0.27)	-0.001*** (-3.89)	0.000 (0.32)	0.002*** (10.35)	-0.002*** (-3.08)	-0.002*** (-7.10)	-0.001 (-1.48)	-0.000 (-0.76)	-0.000 (-0.64)	0.000 (0.68)
% government owned [percent]	-0.005** (-2.03)	-0.003*** (-3.08)	-0.003 (-0.96)	-0.001 (-1.15)	-0.004** (-2.16)	0.004*** (6.19)	-0.007*** (-2.75)	-0.000 (-0.53)	-0.001 (-1.00)	-0.003*** (-3.92)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.220*** (38.41)		3.009*** (27.20)		2.927*** (45.41)		3.157*** (69.09)		2.694*** (71.99)
Constant	-1.608*** (-6.80)	-2.604*** (-35.11)	-6.409 (-0.04)	-2.459*** (-32.13)	-1.411*** (-6.04)	-2.072*** (-29.13)	-2.332*** (-7.53)	-1.925*** (-26.69)	-1.778*** (-7.74)	-2.045*** (-32.11)
Correlation between errors	0.042 (0.64)		0.592*** (7.22)		0.092 (1.24)		0.116*** (2.71)		-0.259*** (-7.22)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are 20 dummies indicating the sub-sector the firm operates in. Country-year dummies are separate dummies for each country by year.

Table S15: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested with sales included, female manager.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	91,953		91,524		90,956		91,184		89,199	
Observations for 2nd stage	11997		10640		16610		20267		50953	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Manager is female [dummy]	-0.008 (-0.20)	-0.014 (-0.86)	0.111** (2.38)	-0.081*** (-4.62)	0.028 (0.81)	-0.088*** (-6.01)	-0.034 (-1.14)	0.038*** (2.68)	0.000 (0.02)	-0.022* (-1.75)
Sales (US\$) [nat. log]	-0.025*** (-3.47)	0.121*** (45.78)	-0.060*** (-7.36)	0.108*** (38.45)	-0.052*** (-8.34)	0.074*** (30.84)	-0.034*** (-6.91)	0.038*** (15.66)	-0.036*** (-11.28)	0.078*** (36.11)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.087*** (-2.75)	0.153*** (11.27)	0.098*** (2.59)	0.429*** (30.74)	0.071** (2.42)	0.005 (0.41)	0.084*** (3.10)	0.078*** (5.95)	-0.000 (-0.01)	0.106*** (9.03)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.001** (-1.97)	-0.000 (-1.30)	0.001* (1.87)	0.002*** (11.51)	-0.002*** (-3.39)	-0.002*** (-7.60)	-0.001 (-1.50)	-0.000 (-0.83)	-0.001*** (-3.57)	0.000 (0.98)
% government owned [percent]	-0.002 (-0.93)	-0.000 (-0.48)	0.001 (0.22)	0.002* (1.84)	-0.000 (-0.23)	0.005*** (6.94)	-0.004** (-2.12)	0.001 (1.41)	0.000 (0.36)	-0.001 (-1.55)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.256*** (-16.22)	-0.086*** (-12.62)	-0.244*** (-12.50)	-0.122*** (-16.73)	-0.099*** (-7.53)	-0.036*** (-5.98)	-0.176*** (-11.94)	0.010 (1.57)	-0.223*** (-23.87)	-0.063*** (-10.70)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.774*** (68.89)		4.035*** (79.46)		3.374*** (74.93)		3.278*** (131.45)		2.907*** (121.48)
Constant	1.788*** (10.03)	-2.706*** (-44.71)	1.465*** (7.60)	-2.362*** (-35.63)	0.307** (2.25)	-2.286*** (-41.80)	0.878*** (7.35)	-2.324*** (-38.80)	1.554*** (21.08)	-1.994*** (-33.77)
Correlation between errors	0.067 (1.62)		0.187*** (4.44)		0.168*** (4.20)		0.090*** (4.21)		-0.314*** (-15.22)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade.

Table S16: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested with sales included, female owners.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	58,316		57,941		57,085		57,763		56,370	
Observations for 2nd stage	6254		6202		9789		12026		32498	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
All owners are female [dummy]	-0.030 (-0.43)	0.036 (1.27)	0.183** (2.36)	-0.028 (-0.90)	0.082 (1.38)	-0.041 (-1.61)	-0.113** (-2.30)	0.058** (2.34)	-0.027 (-0.83)	-0.029 (-1.33)
Number of workers [nat. log]	-0.036*** (-4.29)	0.096*** (28.64)	-0.067*** (-6.99)	0.095*** (27.50)	-0.042*** (-5.55)	0.067*** (22.09)	-0.039*** (-6.27)	0.021*** (6.98)	-0.035*** (-9.61)	0.071*** (26.17)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.176*** (-4.05)	0.195*** (10.83)	0.092* (1.93)	0.460*** (25.59)	0.149*** (3.98)	0.036** (2.18)	0.066* (1.93)	0.123*** (7.19)	0.002 (0.10)	0.083*** (5.48)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.000 (-0.46)	0.000 (0.30)	0.001* (1.84)	0.002*** (8.24)	-0.002*** (-2.98)	-0.001*** (-4.78)	-0.001 (-1.37)	0.000 (0.60)	-0.001** (-2.45)	0.001** (2.31)
% government owned [percent]	-0.008** (-2.24)	0.002* (1.66)	-0.002 (-0.49)	0.003** (2.24)	0.001 (0.22)	0.005*** (5.12)	-0.007** (-2.25)	0.003*** (2.66)	-0.003* (-1.76)	0.002 (1.44)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.249*** (-12.14)	-0.071*** (-8.44)	-0.194*** (-8.21)	-0.108*** (-12.18)	-0.149*** (-8.76)	-0.045*** (-6.01)	-0.175*** (-9.19)	0.009 (1.09)	-0.195*** (-17.48)	-0.040*** (-5.42)
% of other firms with license [percent]		4.095*** (54.58)		4.030*** (61.85)		3.413*** (63.04)		3.349*** (112.59)		3.050*** (104.57)
Constant	2.059*** (9.92)	-2.562*** (-34.07)	1.245*** (5.32)	-2.341*** (-29.09)	0.402** (2.44)	-2.115*** (-30.64)	1.045*** (6.64)	-2.131*** (-28.34)	1.337*** (14.72)	-2.160*** (-28.79)
Correlation between errors	-0.034 (-0.71)		0.115** (2.27)		0.277*** (5.93)		0.037 (1.56)		-0.343*** (-14.90)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade.

Table S17: Probability that firms engage with government and that bribe was requested with sales included, female respondents.

License/gov't interaction	Construction License		Import License		Sales to Government		Operating License		Tax Inspection	
Total observations	83,836		83,442		82,793		82,894		81,089	
Observations for 2 nd stage	10273		8908		14765		18265		46786	
Sector dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Stage of regression	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Sold to Government	Bribe sought	Got license	Bribe sought	Inspected
Respondent is female [dummy]	-0.122*** (-3.56)	-0.067*** (-4.74)	-0.005 (-0.12)	-0.083*** (-5.32)	-0.106*** (-3.37)	-0.095*** (-7.32)	-0.165*** (-6.00)	-0.048*** (-3.65)	-0.099*** (-5.43)	-0.061*** (-5.41)
Number of workers [nat. log]	-0.019*** (-2.66)	0.108*** (39.27)	-0.061*** (-7.51)	0.102*** (34.64)	-0.049*** (-7.76)	0.075*** (29.79)	-0.038*** (-7.43)	0.028*** (11.26)	-0.032*** (-10.14)	0.073*** (32.74)
Firm exports [dummy]	-0.084** (-2.50)	0.158*** (10.86)	0.091** (2.30)	0.455*** (30.12)	0.098*** (3.16)	0.004 (0.30)	0.084*** (2.95)	0.089*** (6.30)	0.010 (0.53)	0.087*** (6.93)
% foreign owned [percent]	-0.001** (-2.09)	-0.000 (-1.38)	0.001** (2.17)	0.003*** (11.44)	-0.002*** (-3.27)	-0.001*** (-6.09)	-0.001 (-1.28)	-0.000 (-0.58)	-0.001** (-2.49)	0.000* (1.75)
% government owned [percent]	-0.002 (-1.20)	-0.001 (-0.72)	0.001 (0.30)	0.002* (1.75)	-0.000 (-0.10)	0.005*** (6.65)	-0.004** (-2.13)	0.001 (1.57)	-0.000 (-0.16)	-0.001 (-1.14)
Per capita GDP [nat. log]	-0.240*** (-14.86)	-0.074*** (-10.59)	-0.213*** (-10.46)	-0.121*** (-15.78)	-0.082*** (-6.14)	-0.029*** (-4.74)	-0.144*** (-9.50)	0.021*** (3.05)	-0.198*** (-21.03)	-0.050*** (-8.22)
% of other firms with license [percent]		3.827*** (65.63)		4.131*** (75.72)		3.384*** (73.88)		3.281*** (130.07)		2.941*** (119.30)
Constant	1.614*** (9.06)	-2.622*** (-42.64)	1.315*** (6.77)	-2.315*** (-33.35)	0.137 (0.99)	-2.339*** (-41.77)	0.765*** (6.22)	-2.287*** (-36.96)	1.346*** (18.01)	-2.045*** (-33.64)
Correlation between errors	0.074* (1.76)		0.172*** (4.18)		0.186*** (4.65)		0.037* (1.77)		-0.343*** (-17.02)	

Source: Author's calculations based upon data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.

***, **, * Statistically significant at 1%,5% and 10% significance levels.

Note: t-statistics in parentheses. The selection variables are dummy variables indicating the firm got a license, sold goods to the government or was inspected by tax officials. For firms that completed that transaction, the dependent variables are dummy variables indicating the firm said bribes were requested or expected during the transaction. The model is a probit model allowing for selection effects. The sector dummies are dummies indicating the firm is in manufacturing, services, or retail trade.