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Economies, Volume 2, Issue 2 (June 2014) – 3 articles , Pages 95-146

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513 KiB  
Article
Access to Media and HIV Knowledge in India
by Smriti Agarwal and Pedro De Araujo
Economies 2014, 2(2), 124-146; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2020124 - 18 Jun 2014
Cited by 20 | Viewed by 6923
Abstract
This paper aims to better understand the relationship between HIV knowledge and media exposure in India. We use a two-stage hurdle model to estimate the effect of media sources such as newspapers, radios and television on AIDS-related knowledge among Indian men and women [...] Read more.
This paper aims to better understand the relationship between HIV knowledge and media exposure in India. We use a two-stage hurdle model to estimate the effect of media sources such as newspapers, radios and television on AIDS-related knowledge among Indian men and women using demographic health survey data. Overall, access to newspapers, radio, or television increases the likelihood of better HIV knowledge in both males and females by an order between 2% and 12%. These findings, albeit quantitatively small, suggest, even if indirectly, possible problems faced by AIDS campaigns and government programs in combating the HIV epidemic in India. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Role of Education and Health in Economic Development)
294 KiB  
Article
The Formation of New Monetary Policies: Decisions of Central Banks on the Great Recession
by Ana Esther Castro and José Francisco Teixeira
Economies 2014, 2(2), 109-123; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2020109 - 21 May 2014
Cited by 27 | Viewed by 6862
Abstract
The effect that the Great Recession had on monetary policies has led to the profound reorientation of central banks’ actions from 2007 to 2013. The purpose of this work is to analyze the monetary policies applied by the main central banks, mainly the [...] Read more.
The effect that the Great Recession had on monetary policies has led to the profound reorientation of central banks’ actions from 2007 to 2013. The purpose of this work is to analyze the monetary policies applied by the main central banks, mainly the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve System of USA and the Bank of Japan, in order to raise thoughts on the guidelines that central banks should follow in the future. In the first section the bases of monetary policy before the crisis are described; in the second we explain the change in the orientation of the role of central banks during the crisis; and finally, we synthesize the bases on which the economic debate is taking place on the orientation of future monetary policies. We conclude that, in so far as the inoperativeness of transmission mechanisms still persists, monetary policies will remain in a process of change. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the Great Recession)
439 KiB  
Article
Union Bargaining in an Oligopoly Market with Cournot-Bertrand Competition: Welfare and Policy Implications
by Elizabeth Schroeder and Victor J. Tremblay
Economies 2014, 2(2), 95-108; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2020095 - 25 Mar 2014
Cited by 10 | Viewed by 8455
Abstract
We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, [...] Read more.
We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this model, with the competitive advantage going to the Cournot-type competitor. A comparison of the results from the Cournot-Bertrand model with those found in the traditional Cournot and Bertrand models reveals that firms and the union have a different preference ordering over labor market bargaining. These differences help explain why the empirical evidence does not support any one model of union bargaining. We also examine the welfare and policy implications of union activity in a Cournot-Bertrand setting. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Political Economy)
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