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Information 2011, 2(2), 277-301; doi:10.3390/info2020277

Article

Spencer-Brown vs. Probability and Statistics: Entropy’s Testimony on Subjective and Objective Randomness

Julio Michael Stern

Department of Applied Mathematics, Institute of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Sao Paulo, Rua do Matao 1010, Cidade Universitaria, 05508-090, Sao Paulo, Brazil

Received: 8 February 2011; in revised form: 22 March 2011 / Accepted: 23 March 2011 / Published: 4 April 2011

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Selected Papers from "FIS 2010 Beijing")

Download PDF Full-Text [346 KB, Updated Version, uploaded 6 April 2011 08:35 CEST]

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Abstract: This article analyzes the role of entropy in Bayesian statistics, focusing on its use as a tool for detection, recognition and validation of eigen-solutions. “Objects as eigen-solutions” is a key metaphor of the cognitive constructivism epistemological framework developed by the philosopher Heinz von Foerster. Special attention is given to some objections to the concepts of probability, statistics and randomization posed by George Spencer-Brown, a figure of great influence in the field of radical constructivism.

Keywords: Bayesian statistics; cognitive constructivism; eigen-solutions; maximum entropy; objective-subjective complementarity; randomization; subjective randomness

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