Next Article in Journal
Spousal Dictator Game: Household Decisions and Other-Regarding Preferences
Next Article in Special Issue
When Is Green Too Rosy? Evidence from a Laboratory Market Experiment on Green Goods and Externalities
Previous Article in Journal
Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network
Previous Article in Special Issue
The Effects of Social Exclusion and Group Heterogeneity on the Provision of Public Goods
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Games 2018, 9(3), 68; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030068

Cooperation of Pairs

Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg, Universitätsplatz 2, 39106 Magdeburg, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 25 May 2018 / Revised: 23 August 2018 / Accepted: 30 August 2018 / Published: 11 September 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Public Good Games)
Full-Text   |   PDF [7631 KB, uploaded 17 September 2018]   |  

Abstract

To examine the stability of prosocial behavior in groups and pairs, we use an indirect approach. We conducted linear public good experiments with two and four subjects repeatedly three times at intervals of one week. All experiments were carried out without providing feedback and used a payment mechanism promoting stable behavior. We study the dynamics of behavior in repeated sessions and find that pairs are much better at establishing and stabilizing cooperation than groups of four. Furthermore, we conducted all experiments in a partner and a stranger design. As is known from the literature, cooperation in a stranger design should be lower than in a partner design. Once again, we are interested in the differences of the strength of this cooperation reducing effect between pairs and groups. Unlike pairs, groups show very low contributions to the public good in the stranger treatment and display a strong tendency to decrease cooperation in the partner treatment. The results in all treatments demonstrate that decreasing cooperation is a stable pattern of behavior in dynamic social dilemma contexts. Finally, we conducted a norm elicitation experiment using a method introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013) and find that in pairs symmetric behavior plays a very important role. View Full-Text
Keywords: repeated public good experiments; group size effects; moral self-licensing repeated public good experiments; group size effects; moral self-licensing
Figures

Figure 1

This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).
SciFeed

Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Sass, M.; Timme, F.; Weimann, J. Cooperation of Pairs. Games 2018, 9, 68.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top