Next Article in Journal
From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach
Previous Article in Journal
Acknowledgement to Reviewers of Games in 2014
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Games 2015, 6(1), 2-31; doi:10.3390/g6010002

Selection-Mutation Dynamics of Signaling Games

1
Department of Mathematics, University of Vienna, Oskar-Morgenstern-Platz 1, A-1090 Vienna, Austria
2
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California at Irvine, 3151 Social Science Plaza A, Irvine, CA 92697, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Ulrich Berger
Received: 26 September 2014 / Accepted: 10 December 2014 / Published: 9 January 2015
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [289 KB, uploaded 9 January 2015]   |  

Abstract

We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling games are not isolated and, therefore, not robust under perturbations. However, some of them attract open sets of initial conditions. We prove the existence of certain rest points of the selection-mutation dynamics close to Nash equilibria of the signaling game and show that all but the perturbed rest points close to strict Nash equilibria are dynamically unstable. This is an important result for the evolution of signaling behavior, since it shows that the second-order forces that are governed by mutation can increase the chances of successful signaling. View Full-Text
Keywords: selection-mutation dynamics; replicator dynamics; signaling games; structural stability selection-mutation dynamics; replicator dynamics; signaling games; structural stability
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

Scifeed alert for new publications

Never miss any articles matching your research from any publisher
  • Get alerts for new papers matching your research
  • Find out the new papers from selected authors
  • Updated daily for 49'000+ journals and 6000+ publishers
  • Define your Scifeed now

SciFeed Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Hofbauer, J.; Huttegger, S.M. Selection-Mutation Dynamics of Signaling Games. Games 2015, 6, 2-31.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top