Next Article in Journal
External Pressure on Alliances: What Does the Prisoners’ Dilemma Reveal?
Previous Article in Journal
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Baccara Chemin de Fer
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessArticle
Games 2013, 4(4), 738-753; doi:10.3390/g4040738

Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection

Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) and the MOE Key Laboratory in Econometrics, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, China
Department of Economics, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 23 September 2013 / Revised: 25 October 2013 / Accepted: 11 November 2013 / Published: 27 November 2013
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [731 KB, uploaded 27 November 2013]   |  


We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is.
Keywords: ultimatum bargaining; auction; forward induction; loss avoidance ultimatum bargaining; auction; forward induction; loss avoidance
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

Scifeed alert for new publications

Never miss any articles matching your research from any publisher
  • Get alerts for new papers matching your research
  • Find out the new papers from selected authors
  • Updated daily for 49'000+ journals and 6000+ publishers
  • Define your Scifeed now

SciFeed Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Shachat, J.; Swarthout, J.T. Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection. Games 2013, 4, 738-753.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics



[Return to top]
Games EISSN 2073-4336 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top