In 1991 collaboration between the Tellus Institute and the Stockholm Environment Institute explored the following high-level research questions as part of the PoleStar Project (www.polestarproject.org, [6]):

This research resulted in the development of the polestar system, a flexible tool for quantification of integrated alternative long-range scenarios at regional, national and global scales. As such, it was used to produce detailed data sets (parameters relevant to economy, society, resource use, and environment) which, combined with the richness of scenario narratives, provided a robust methodological framework for considering fundamental shifts in global development—including discontinuities and restructuring of socio-ecological systems [7]. To carry on this legacy the Global Scenario Group (GSG—www.gsg.org), an interdisciplinary and international group with a pedigree of conducting integrated scenario assessments, was assembled in 1995 by the Tellus Institute and Stockholm Environment Institute. In 1997 Gallopin and colleagues first proposed a set of three plausible, divergent world end-states [8]—referred to as Conventional, Great Transitions and Barbarization—to which a fourth was later added [9]: ‘Muddling through’—a passive majority (i.e., not pro-active) on the grand question of the global future. Over a five-year period, six scenario variants (Table 1) were subsequently defined, refined and checked repeatedly for internal consistency [10,11]. In addition, quantification of analyzed data (using the Polestar system) was made available in a Technical document for four scenarios; MF, PR, NSP and FW, Table 1 [7], updated in 2009 using an additional 10 years of data and an expanding literature on environmental, resource, and social developments [6]. Two others (EC and B) were not quantified, presumably because of their extreme nature.

In 2005 Raskin (president of Tellus) compared GSGs’ visions of the future with five other well-reported scenario studies, WBCSD [12], OECD, [13,14,15], IPCC [16], UNEP [17,18] and WWV [19,20], and suggested that a common set of four archetypes could be found [21] (Table 1). Further mapping exercises have since been conducted, resulting from the development of yet more scenarios [22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32]. By combining this prior knowledge from the literature and adding in further scenario variants (based on qualitative details given within scenario narratives), a substantially increased evidence-base is provided herein to support the hypothesis that the world-end states (and scenario variants) first proposed by GSG continue to form a distinct set of archetypes (Section 2). The legacy of these GSG scenario variants are subsequently discussed in the context of providing a distinct set of archetypes relevant to anyone considering scenario-based studies (Section 3). Conclusions are subsequently drawn regarding the credibility of archetypes drawn from the GSG work (Section 4).

The first GSG scenario variant within the conventional world archetype is ‘Market forces—MF’.

‘Market Forces’ was originally referred to as a ‘Reference’ or ‘Business-As-Usual’ scenario [8,10]. The name ‘Market forces’ came later [6,9,11] and illustrates the need for a generic worldwide application for each world end-state. Whilst MF may be based upon historical patterns and business-as-usual for the future in the U.S. [6], it may not be a fair representation for a reference scenario everywhere.

Within the literature there are numerous scenarios aligning with the MF variant. Raskin [21] first suggested that the MF scenario was broadly similar to:

The compatibility between ‘A1’ and ‘FROG’ has been recognized previously by Morita et al. [36], and the strong links between ‘A1’ and ‘Markets first’ have been reinforced by numerous authors [23,24,26,32,37,38], based upon both having a strong global-economic-self-interest/reactive focus, a commonality shared by many of the scenarios described herein (Figure 1a,b and Figure 2). As such, ‘Great escape’ and ‘Global economy’ can also be added to the list. Table 3 shows qualitative patterns for some of the previously mentioned scenarios according to a range of key drivers from where direct alignment with MF can be seen.

Pridmore [22] has previously suggested a close alignment between ‘A1’ and ‘World Markets’, e.g., they are similar to the present day USA [39], with consumerist values, global governance and declining manufacturing and agriculture [23,40,41]. The close relationship with MF is illustrated in Figure 3 [30] and is confirmed by Pinnegar et al. [23], with the addition of ‘Market world’ [42], ‘Beta’ (An early version of EA’s ‘Jeopardy’ scenario), and ‘Global Orchestration’ (although the last of these has not been added to the list as it resonates more evidently with NSP (Section 2.1)). Around the same time EA [27] reported close links between ‘World Markets’ (previously linked to many other MF type scenarios) and their ‘Jeopardy’ scenario (an intensive materialistic consumerist culture, coupled with high economic growth, growing social fragmentation and a continuing reliance on fossil-based fuels [27], a scenario upon which ‘Blinkered Evolution’ (a world where mainstream behaviour is committed to an individualized consumption paradigm [43]) was based. Taylor et al. [28] confirms many of these relationships and further suggests close resemblance between ‘Market Forces’, a scenario based directly on the work of GSG that assumes economic growth paradigms, based on the experience of developed countries, are appropriate for the rest of the world [25], and their ‘New Frontiers’ scenario. This is not surprising given the references therein to market competition, individual meritocracy and unfettered consumption, as well as education and health for those that can afford it.

Several additions have been made to this list based on the adoption of similar descriptors and core values to MF:

The second scenario within the conventional archetype is ‘Policy reform—PR’.

Raskin [21] first suggested that PR was broadly similar to:

The compatibility between ‘B1’ and ‘GEOpolity’ has been recognized previously by Morita et al. [35] whilst correspondence between PR, ‘B1’ and ‘Policy first’ is reinforced by numerous authors [18,23,26,37,38]. In terms of high global-environmental-solidarity/pro-active considerations (Figure 1a,b, and Figure 2) very close compatibility is reported between ‘B1’ and ‘Global sustainability’ [22,24]. This view is upheld by Busch [26] and Kok et al. [32] with the addition of the following: ‘Technogarden,Knowledge is King, Big Crisis, Strong Europe and Global Co-operation’. As ‘Global Sustainability’ and ‘B1’ align with both PR and NSP, albeit more strongly in NSP, they appear in both lists (Table 2). Table 4 shows close alignment of previously-mentioned scenarios to PR when considering qualitative patterns of change according to a range of key drivers [26].

Whilst Makropoulos et al. [30] suggest that PR is on the way to NSP, Raskin [53] argues that the transition very much depends upon where branch points [8] might form. Pinnegar et al. [23] have aligned ‘B1’ with ‘Global commons’ (where people aspire to high levels of welfare and a sound environment, and international co-operation towards global sustainability [23]); ‘Gamma’ (An early version of EA’s ‘Alchemy’ scenario); ‘Green World’ [42] and ‘Technogarden’ (where Global markets in ecological property combine green technology, eco-efficiency, openness and competition [54]), which the Environment Agency suggests has similarities to their ‘Alchemy’ scenario (where a new regulatory environment spurs innovation in new technologies and new standards of producer responsibility [51]). Defra also noted similarities between ‘Alchemy’ and their own ‘Strong government’ scenario [43] (the latter built upon the former). Both ‘Alchemy’ and ‘Technogarden’ have been linked to Natural England’s ‘SUCCEED through SCIENCE’ scenario [31] (where the global economy continues to be driven by innovation and everyone relies on business to keep the country growing), as shown in Figure 4. The ‘Green Policy’ (where ecologists influence central policy) and ‘Technocratic’ scenarios (where public engineers and technocrats influence policy) as proposed by Makropoulos et al. [30] are very much policy-related and therefore not dissimilar to PR. In ‘Policy reform’ (a scenario in which negative impacts of market mechanisms are tempered by the inclusion of mitigation programs) it is argued that the socio-economic and political considerations may make it expedient for governments to take actions that favor citizens, rather than wait for the operation of the market to correct these ills [25]. As this is drawn directly on the work of GSG the direct comparison with PR is unavoidable.

Several additions have been made to this list based on the adoption of similar descriptors and core values to PR:

The first variant within the great transitions archetype is ‘New Sustainability Paradigm—NSP’.

Raskin [21] first suggested that this scenario is broadly similar to:

According to the Environment Agency this scenario is also very similar to their ‘Restoration’ scenario (a world where societal values and behavior are oriented more towards sustainable development goals as a result of greater awareness and perception of environmental risk [51]—subsequently renamed to ‘Sustainable Behavior’ [52]). They also suggest similarity with Foresights ‘Global Sustainability’ scenario, (e.g., that it is similar to the Netherlands [39]) also known as ‘Global responsibility’ [41,58], a world with: a strong index of sustainable economic welfare and climate management, conservationist values (biodiversity is stable), global governance, renewable energy, less resource-intensive manufacturing, equity, and improved air and water quality [59,60]. Previously, Pridmore [22] suggested a closer alignment between ‘Global sustainability’ and ‘B1’ [16], based upon a strong global-environmental focus, this relationship being confirmed by de Vries [24] in Figure 2. Hence, the subtle similarities with ‘Green World’ (aligned previously with PR) cannot be ignored. Table 5 shows the close alignment of a number of the scenarios aligned under NSP, according to key drivers [26].

Taylor et al. [28] suggest that some elements (i.e., restorative stages) of their ‘Living on the No.8 Wire’ scenario (where New Zealand reacted too late to sustainability challenges and got left behind globally, but social cohesion has permitted an indigenous and inventive subsistence in the economy, as seen in other Pacific Islands) resonate well with ‘Restoration’ (mentioned earlier). This in turn is assumed by Defra [43] to closely resemble their ‘Civic renewal’ scenario (a world where British citizens and consumers, rather than British politicians, begin to change their behavior—this being a strong characteristic that resonates well within NSP).

As can be seen in Figure 4, Natural England align their ‘CONNECT for LIFE’ scenario (where people now connect through vast global networks [31]) with ‘Global Orchestration’ (a world of sustainable development, economic growth, fair trade, global public health, global education, global NGO and multilateral organizations [54]).

In addition it is closely related to ‘Global Sustainability’ (mentioned previously), ‘Sustainability First’ (mentioned previously) and ‘Global commons’ (a world where people aspire to high levels of welfare and a sound environment—driven through International co-operation towards global sustainability [23]). It is interesting to note that ‘Sustainability First’, whilst being environmentally-focused, provides a balance between global and regional (i.e., spanning somewhere between NSP and EC), although its position is best described by Figure 1b rather than 2. ‘Great Transitions’ is a world in which the three pillars of sustainable development are strengthened and behavioral patterns that characterize modern societies, such as consumerism, give way. As such a new level of satisfaction that is not materialistic is defined [25]. It is worth noting that de Vries [24] locates ‘Great transitions’, a combination of EC and NSP as defined by Hammond (1997), in the lower right-hand quadrant in Figure 2; however, when NSP is disassociated from EC within this archetype, the former would move vertically upwards (into the upper quadrant) whereas the latter would move marginally downwards. Macropoulos et al. [30] align their ‘Sustainable world’ (a world where integrated solutions are the aim) directly with NSP, as it draws narratives from this research.

Several additions have been made to this list, based on the adoption of similar descriptors and core values to NSP, these are:

The second scenario within the great transition world is ‘Eco-communalism—EC’.

Raskin [21] first suggested that this scenario is broadly similar to:

The Environment Agency suggested similarities between their ‘Survivor’ scenario (a scenario in which the consumers become more frugal and self-reliant with resurgence in traditional regional and local cultures and values [51] — subsequently renamed to ‘Local Resilience’ [52]) and Foresight’s ‘Tribal Trading’ scenario (a world shrunk to their own community, a global economic system that is severely damaged with infrastructure falling into disrepair, local food production and services and local transport - typically by bike and horse. There are local conflicts over resources: lawlessness and mistrust are high. The state does what it can—but its power has been eroded [47]). Landcare Associates suggest that some elements of their ‘Independent Aotearoa’ scenario (also known as the ‘Shire’) were broadly similar to ‘Tribal Trading’: the link to EC is easily recognized given the references to a world that has international geopolitical instability, strong social cohesion and a voluntary disconnect from globalization. In other words, as Taylor describes it: equitable, educated, environmental—friendly and dull. Macropoulos et al. [30] align their ‘Eco-communalism’ (green visions of bioregionalism, localism, face to face democracy, small technology and economic autarky) directly with EC. From Figure 1a, b other scenarios include: Blueprints, Lettuce surprise U, Evolved Society, Regional Communities and Sustainability eventually (a world where water demand has structurally decreased, derived from ‘Sustainability First’ [34,35]).

During this research the following additions have been made to this list, based on the adoption of similar descriptors and core values to EC:

The first scenario within the barbarization archetype is ‘Fortress World—FW’.

Raskin [21] suggested that this scenario was broadly similar to:

The last of these scenarios has been linked directly to ‘A2’ (A high regional-economic focus [16] by de Vries [24], in addition to ‘Barbarization’ which includes FW and B [11] (see Figure 2). It can be seen that ‘Security First’ is the least localized of the scenarios considered under FW, thus far—economics being broadly similar in each case. The reference to ‘clash of civilizations’ [64] in Figure 2, is understandable given the context of a world in which global affairs and interactions are between “civilizations” rather than nation-states. Table 6 [26] shows the close alignment of a number of scenarios under NSP according to key drivers, these relationships being confirmed by Zurek [37] and Westhoek et al. [38].

‘Fortress World’, as derived by Makropoulos et al. [30], is based upon narratives drawn from FW and therefore shows considerable similarities: e.g., environmental conditions that deteriorate rapidly; pollution; climate change; and ecosystems degradation that interact and amplify the crisis. The links between FW and ‘National Enterprise’ as identified by Makropoulos et al. [30] can be seen in Figure 3; a world committed to building capabilities and resources to secure a high degree of national self-reliance and security. In ‘National Enterprise’, Political and cultural institutions are strengthened to buttress national autonomy in a more fragmented world [47]—in a similar way to present day Switzerland [39], although increasingly like present day North Korea, Fortress India (so named due to its fortified borders) and others.

More recently NESC [31] have aligned ‘National Enterprise’ with ‘Regional Stewardship’ [65] and ‘Order from Strength’ [54]. This was presumably related to the fact that all these scenarios include the requirements for ‘high regulation’ (i.e., national level policies), security and protectionism within a climate of fear—all of which are consistent with the descriptors of FW. Pinnegar et al. [23] recognized that ‘Order from Strength’ correlated well with their ‘Fortress Britain’ scenario (This scenario assumes that people aspire to personal independence and material wealth within a nationally-rooted cultural identity that gets in the way of global sustainability) in addition to UKCIP’s ‘Fortress Britain’ [66], ‘Provincial Enterprise’ (a precursor to ‘National Enterprise’ [67]); ‘Fortress Europe’ [42] ‘A2’ and the Environment Agencies ‘Alpha’ scenario [27]—subsequently changed to ‘Survivor’ (EA, 2006) and the ‘Medium-High emissions’ scenario [68]. Whilst Landcare Associate’s ‘Fruits for a few’ (benefits of global market access, communications, health protection and use of natural resources are aspects reserved to an elite, which also values sustainability, [28]) has been linked closely to ‘Technogarden’ (aligned previously with PR) reference to a dissenting and landless majority of population resonates also with FW (Section 2.3). Busch [26] and Kok et al. [32] confirm a number of these relationships (Figure 1a,b) with the addition of: ‘Scramble, Transatlantic Market and Continental Markets’

Several additions have been made to this list based on the adoption of similar descriptors and core values to FW:

The second scenario within the barbarization worlds is ‘Breakdown—B’. This archetype is the least well-adopted within the literature, perhaps because it is the world we would least like to consider possible. In addition it is likely to be a difficult scenario in which to test things (e.g., sustainability solutions) because it might be considered ‘too-far-gone’.

Raskin [21] first suggested that this scenario was broadly similar to:

‘Diamonds’ [61] and ‘Decline to disaster’ [72] have been added to the list due to their reference to devastation of ecosystems and a triple bottom line in tatters, which includes: global economic depression, crippling energy shortages, local and regional wars, rampant terrorism, crime, corruption and more.

In 1998 Hammond based the title of his book ‘Which World? Scenarios for the 21st Century’ [11] on the results of the 2050 project (a joint venture between the Brookings Institution, the Sante Fe Institute and the World Resources Institute—of which Hammond was director) and in line with GSG investigated three possible world end-states (Market, Transformed and Fortress) within seven continents. The three worlds suggested by Hammond map directly onto the four GSG archetypes derived by Gallopin et al. [8] and adopted by Raskin [21] (not surprising given that Hammond was part of the GSG team).

Van Asselt et al. [4] subsequently suggested four scenario archetypes based on their key combining elements: ‘Think Green’—Environmental protection; ‘Money maker—high economic growth; ‘Wait and See’—limited policy action, and ‘Doom Monger’—a pessimistic outlook. The link with GSG archetypes is self-evident and is not dissimilar to the four archetypal classifications (based upon 10 scenario sets—40 scenarios) presented by Wilson [75]; ‘Market dominance’; ‘GlobalInstitutional Governance’; ‘Fortress against the storms’, and ‘People power’.

Figure 5 shows a family tree of scenario archetypes as presented by Tibbs [76] in which it is particularly easy to identify the GSG archetypes. Moreover, it illustrates how archetypes are related and identifies phases likely required to pass through before reaching the different worlds—something previously well recognized by GSG [8].

Morita et al. [36] grouped 124 scenarios from 48 sources (derived from 1980–1999) 43 of which pre-dated the work of GSG, according to demographic, socio-economic, technological and environmental dimensions (Table 7). It was recognized by Morita and colleagues that three archetypes matched closely those first proposed by GSG.

In 2009, Natural England considered 35 different scenarios from the literature where land-use had been considered, and suggested the emergence of five archetypes (Figure 4 and Table 8, [32]). The similarity between these archetypes and those suggested by Hammond [11] and GSG are self-evident (Table 1). Except, for ‘business as usual’, which has confusing connotations and this is something that the GSG have previously adopted and subsequently replaced with ‘Conventional worlds’.

Whilst Tibbs [76], Morita [36] and NESC [32] present an archetypal set related to ‘Technology’ alone, it could be argued, that it is perhaps not required, as the technology driver cannot be divorced from the other archetypes, for example, GSG assigns PR and NSP the best technologies (Figure 5 and 7) and technologies are already heavily embedded within ‘Paradigm shifts’.

We already live in a technological age—what is distinctively important is what pulls or pushes the technological adoption to occur, and how this might be intertwined with user-behavior (Section 3.3). This is remiss in other scenario sets and something on which the GSG scenario variants provide significant clarity. Notwithstanding this observation, similar adoption has occurred within the water engineering field (e.g., Macropoulos et al. [30]) which is not surprising given that technology is considered to be a key driver.

Kok et al. [32] highlighted the practical implications for being able to link scenarios and use additional information from other studies provided that scenarios could be categorized in a similar structure. The difficulty here is ensuring that internal consistency is assured whilst characteristics are being cherry picked. Table 9 was created for the CLIMSAVE scenarios project, based on the similarities found between scenarios (Figure 1a). Once again the match to GSG archetypes is very strong.

Therefore it appears that the three world end-states proposed by GSG are sufficiently diverse, distinct, clearly defined, well-grounded, defendable, and wholly appropriate including key world drivers (social, technological, economic, environmental, political, organizational, and security) that are as relevant today as they were some 16 years ago. Moreover, if data from Morita [36] are included it might be suggested that there is >30 years worth of evidence to back up GSGs scenario archetypes. As such user buy-in is achieved easily, as evidenced by the critical acclaim of Hammonds’ book [127] and the significant global citations of GSG’s work within the scenarios literature.

In general, practitioners recommend that two scenarios be considered the minimum (one is too easily mistaken for a forecast) and four scenarios appear to be the maximum number for easy audience engagement while still allowing for depth and rigor of analysis [128]. In many cases when tasked with getting an audience to imagine a different scenario to their place of reference, it is not inappropriate to assume that the audience are likely to draw from images of places that may not conform to their sense of normality and yet, albeit subconsciously, are related to something they have seen, or heard of, in other parts of the world. This may be the underlying reason why MF, PR, NSP and FW scenarios work so well and have been so well-adopted within the literature even when derived in seemingly different ways—credibility is gained because people can imagine living there. In this context this is not necessarily an end-state, i.e., it is some manageable time period, not some vague and static point. That said, the use of a national tagging (e.g., assuming the UK is a PR world and the USA is a MF world) could be misleading as it very much depends upon the scale being considered. For example, at the national scale, the UK might be assumed to align with the characteristics used to define PR and yet glimpses of each of the different world-end states may be evident nationally (the next county) or locally (i.e., the next street or the next house).

It is interesting to see that ‘Breakdown—B’ scenario is less-well adopted within the literature (only three of the scenarios assessed here align with Breakdown), and whilst a narrative was developed by GSG, detailed numerical analysis was not considered. This perhaps reinforces the notion that this marginalized world end-state variation is less useful analytically than FW, where the premise is to avoid the immediate threat of Breakdown. Therefore, it is not surprising that authors align it closely with FW using two ‘axes of uncertainty’ (Figure 1). However, it could be argued that breakdown can occur at any point in time from any scenario, exampled in the 1990’s by the LA riots (MF breakdown?) or in 2011 by the UK riots (PR Breakdown?) and the overriding goal in these cases is to restore democracy. Whilst ‘Eco-communalism—EC’ is well-adopted within the literature, it once again was not explored by GSG with detailed numerical analysis. According to Raskin [129], this is because GSG didn't want to emphasize a scenario it felt to be implausible in light of soaring cross-border interdependence (except as an offshoot, perhaps, of other scenarios). Raskin suggests that the EC/NSP distinction is "clear-cut"; in NSP, the extension of human identity to embrace global citizenship becomes the foundation for the construction of supra-national institutions for effectively addressing supra-national challenges and pursuing opportunities (i.e., some degree of nation-state sovereignty is ceded to global governance). In EC, state sovereignty is challenged, but in a localizing direction. Therefore quantification would have been (and still is) straightforward [129].

Many of the UK scenarios reported here (including OST) adopt an ‘axes of uncertainty’ approach (Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3) as distinct from the ‘key drivers’ approach used by GSG (Section 2). It is a testament to the flexibility and applicability of the GSG scenarios that they can be mapped accordingly and yet still keep the necessary divergence that allows for meaningful research-based (sensitivity-type) analysis within a controlled system boundary (Figure 3). The placement of the scenarios (or the size of the containing bubble) within any of these grid like structures is not exact, and will be, to some extent, subject to judgment. Moreover it is important to appreciate certain caveats; scenarios may be located within the same quadrant and share an archetypal vision, but not be identical; that is, they will more than likely have subtle variations within characteristic sub-sets. Notwithstanding this shortfall, for research purposes the process of plotting GSG against any existing (or new) set of axes facilitates identifying similarities between scenario variants and can be used to identify potential research areas for further interrogation.

For example, in Figure 6 the four GSG scenarios (MF, FW, NSP and PR) are mapped against two key drivers (SOCIAL—user behavior and TECHNOLOGICAL—technological efficiency). The mapping process reveals a level of detail within the GSG scenarios that makes them rather unique amongst others found within the scenarios literature. First, technological efficiency and behavior adoption in each scenario is diverse and yet can be traced back to a single driving force within the scenario (i.e., that which pushes or pulls a change to occur). For example, in PR and NSP it is evident that both adopt high levels of sustainable technological efficiency; however, in PR, changes are pushed through policy impacting very little on changing user behavior (which, it could be argued, is not altered for the better or constrained from getting worse). In many respects this matches directly the approach being taken within the Code for Sustainable Homes in the UK, which might be considered as weak, medium and strong forms of PR, where B represents the baseline of where we are now, and 1 (least sustainable) to 6 (most sustainable) represents the various levels of the Code. This compatibility is extremely important when making scenarios directly relevant to current National policy makers and stakeholders. Conversely, in NSP individuals’ willingness to change their behavior (to be more sustainable) is the pulling force which requires adoption of more higher efficiency technologies; whilst policy facilitates this action, it is not required as a stimulus to effect change. Sustainability performance is based on voluntary reduced demand performance (e.g., 80 liters per person per day of water or zero heating requirements in homes). What is most interesting is that the performance of NSP could match exactly that achieved in FW_HN (i.e., for those that have-not) but for completely different reasons. The push in FW_HN is lack of available resources (perhaps rationing) that demands a significant step-change in behavior; likewise, the push in FW_H is security of supply. In MF, the pull is peoples’ growing demand, which in this world must be met and the push is an expanding economy where more goods are made widely available.