Sustainability 2010, 2(12), 3710-3734; doi:10.3390/su2123710
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Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

Received: 4 October 2010; in revised form: 15 November 2010 / Accepted: 22 November 2010 / Published: 30 November 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy and Sustainability)
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Abstract: There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them.
Keywords: public choice and environmental policies; sustainability; voters; government; interest groups; tradable permits; green taxes [D23, D62, D72, D73, H23, Q57, Q58]
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MDPI and ACS Style

Kollmann, A.; Schneider, F. Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis. Sustainability 2010, 2, 3710-3734.

AMA Style

Kollmann A, Schneider F. Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis. Sustainability. 2010; 2(12):3710-3734.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Kollmann, Andrea; Schneider, Friedrich. 2010. "Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis." Sustainability 2, no. 12: 3710-3734.

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