Next Article in Journal
Sustainability, Learning and Capability: Exploring Questions of Balance
Previous Article in Journal
Crop Sequence Influences on Sustainable Spring Wheat Production in the Northern Great Plains
Previous Article in Special Issue
Sustainable Development: Between Moral Injunctions and Natural Constraints
Article Menu

Export Article

Open AccessReview
Sustainability 2010, 2(12), 3710-3734; doi:10.3390/su2123710

Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

1
Energy Institute, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Altenberger Straße 69, 4040 Linz, Austria
2
Institute of Economics, Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Altenberger Straße 69, 4040 Linz, Austria
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Received: 4 October 2010 / Revised: 15 November 2010 / Accepted: 22 November 2010 / Published: 30 November 2010
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Economy and Sustainability)
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [185 KB, uploaded 24 February 2015]   |  

Abstract

There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them.
Keywords: public choice and environmental policies; sustainability; voters; government; interest groups; tradable permits; green taxes [D23, D62, D72, D73, H23, Q57, Q58] public choice and environmental policies; sustainability; voters; government; interest groups; tradable permits; green taxes [D23, D62, D72, D73, H23, Q57, Q58]
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY 3.0).

Scifeed alert for new publications

Never miss any articles matching your research from any publisher
  • Get alerts for new papers matching your research
  • Find out the new papers from selected authors
  • Updated daily for 49'000+ journals and 6000+ publishers
  • Define your Scifeed now

SciFeed Share & Cite This Article

MDPI and ACS Style

Kollmann, A.; Schneider, F. Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis. Sustainability 2010, 2, 3710-3734.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats

Related Articles

Article Metrics

Article Access Statistics

1

Comments

[Return to top]
Sustainability EISSN 2071-1050 Published by MDPI AG, Basel, Switzerland RSS E-Mail Table of Contents Alert
Back to Top