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Sensors 2016, 16(7), 1138; doi:10.3390/s16071138

Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing

1,* , 2
and
3
1
School of Automation, Beijing Institute of Technology, 5 South Zhongguancun Street, Haidian District, Beijing 100081, China
2
School of Computer Science and Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, 5 South Zhongguancun Street, Haidian District, Beijing 100081, China
3
College of Computing and Informatics, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University City Blvd., Charlotte, NC 28223-0001, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Athanasios V. Vasilakos
Received: 19 April 2016 / Revised: 26 June 2016 / Accepted: 12 July 2016 / Published: 21 July 2016
View Full-Text   |   Download PDF [419 KB, uploaded 21 July 2016]   |  

Abstract

In this paper, we propose effective data collection schemes that stimulate cooperation between selfish users in mobile opportunistic crowdsensing. A query issuer generates a query and requests replies within a given delay budget. When a data provider receives the query for the first time from an intermediate user, the former replies to it and authorizes the latter as the owner of the reply. Different data providers can reply to the same query. When a user that owns a reply meets the query issuer that generates the query, it requests the query issuer to pay credits. The query issuer pays credits and provides feedback to the data provider, which gives the reply. When a user that carries a feedback meets the data provider, the data provider pays credits to the user in order to adjust its claimed expertise. Queries, replies and feedbacks can be traded between mobile users. We propose an effective mechanism to define rewards for queries, replies and feedbacks. We formulate the bargain process as a two-person cooperative game, whose solution is found by using the Nash theorem. To improve the credit circulation, we design an online auction process, in which the wealthy user can buy replies and feedbacks from the starving one using credits. We have carried out extensive simulations based on real-world traces to evaluate the proposed schemes. View Full-Text
Keywords: mobile opportunistic crowdsensing; incentive mechanism; data query; two-person cooperative game; optimal stopping theory mobile opportunistic crowdsensing; incentive mechanism; data query; two-person cooperative game; optimal stopping theory
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).

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Liu, Y.; Li, F.; Wang, Y. Incentives for Delay-Constrained Data Query and Feedback in Mobile Opportunistic Crowdsensing. Sensors 2016, 16, 1138.

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